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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the role of lament and praise in the respective theological 
approaches of Walter Brueggemann and David Ford for the purpose of examining how 
Christian faith transforms human response to suffering. 
 
The first three chapters trace Brueggemann’s engagement with Israel’s lament psalms, 
beginning with his observation that their typical dual form mirrors the collective shape 
of Israel’s psalter as well as all biblical faith. Influential interactions with sociology 
eventually lead Brueggemann to propose faith not simply as response to God’s 
faithfulness, but rather through rhetorical tension maintained between conflicts 
perceived in aspects of scripture such as praise and lament. We critique this view of 
irresolvable textual tension for leaving Brueggemann with an unresolved understanding 
of divine fidelity which obscures biblical expectation that God will respond faithfully to 
human lament.  
 
The fourth and fifth chapters concern David Ford’s consistent engagement with praise 
and subsequently, Christian joy. His early collaborative scholarship proposes praise as 
the result of faith in who God is through the suffering person and work of Jesus Christ. 
Nevertheless, continued ethical concerns lead Ford to identify Christian faith as an 
inextricable relationship between joy and responsibility resulting from “facing” Christ’s 
life and suffering death. We critique Ford for failing to clarify !"# such “facing” is 
made possible through #!"$God is in Christ, rendering faith merely the result of human 
expression of Christ’s example, and thus obscuring any real reason for praise amidst 
suffering. 
 
Beyond a synthesis of Brueggemann and Ford’s respective approaches to lament and 
praise, the final chapter argues that a trinitarian approach to Christ’s atonement is 
necessary to propose how God confronts both suffering and sin thereby producing 
faithful human response amidst persistent evil. We conclude by arguing that a trinitarian 
understanding of praise cannot be proposed apart from either who God is in Christ’s 
atonement or how the atoning Christ is humanly faithful in lament. 
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Introduction 
 
 This thesis examines how Christian faith transforms the human response to 
suffering. Suffering arises whenever and however humanity must endure that which 
fractures its very existence. No aspect of human life can escape suffering, whether 
physical, mental or spiritual. Pain afflicts all, regardless of age, gender, race, nationality, 
cultural orientation or social standing. Such is the reach of suffering that it can be 
difficult to separate from the being of life itself. As the American playwright Tennessee 
Williams reputedly said, “Don’t look forward to the day you stop suffering because 
when it comes you’ll know you’re dead.”  
 People of faith, however, believe something more. By its very definition, faith 
arises as transcendence of humanity and commonly means a reliance on the divine, a 
trust in someone or something B&7"5;$human experience. Of course, this reality is made 
all the more complicated by pain and affliction. “Suffering,” writes Paul Ricoeur, “is a 
scandal only for those who see God as the source of all that is good in creation.”
1
 For 
Christian faith, which proclaims God’s healing of creation through redemption in Jesus 
Christ, this scandal is particularly acute.
2
 How can Christianity proclaim redemption 
5"#, when the end to all suffering is so clearly 5",$7&,? 
 An analytical framework for answering this question is precisely what this 
project does 5",$ seek to pursue. Despite two millennia of Christian reflection, the 
problem of producing an adequate theodicy, arguably, remains yet to be resolved. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg states, “Even from the standpoint of reconciliation and 
eschatological consummation, of course, it is an open question why the Creator did not 
create a world in which there could be no pain or guilt.”
3
 Herein, I assume the existence 
of faith does not depend upon knowledge of why God allows creation to suffer but 
                                                 
1 Paul Ricoeur, E@2.0$1$4!)..&5*&$,"$-!2."(">!7$)5;$%!&"."*7 (trans. J. Bowden; New York: Continuum, 
2004), 70.  
2 Stanley Hauerwas, F)/25*$,!&$D2.&53&(0$G";<$'&;2325&$)5;$,!&$-6"B.&/$"+$D?++&625* (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1990), 78-9, “The problem of evil is not about rectifying our suffering with some general 
notion of God’s nature as all-powerful and good; rather, it is about what we mean by God’s goodness 
itself, which for Christians must be construed in terms of God as the Creator who has called into existence 
a people called Israel so that the world might know that God has not abandoned us. There is no problem 
of suffering in general; rather, the question of suffering can be raised only in the context of a God who 
creates to redeem.” 
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, D7(,&/),23$%!&"."*70$H".?/&$C$(trans. G. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1994), 165. 
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instead upon how humanity responds to God even when comprehensive answers to the 
most painful questions of life are not forthcoming.
4
  
 This thesis is thus particularly concerned with !"# faith arises from #!" God is 
revealed to be amidst human suffering. Of the relevant theological directions which 
could have been pursued here, I have chosen to focus on faith as praise and lament. The 
adoration and adulation of God in praise is central to biblical faith, and not least of all to 
the joyful New Testament proclamation of God revealed in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ. Yet the Apostle Paul’s exhortation, “Rejoice in the Lord always,” 
can seem difficult to accept at face value in a world where poverty, terrorism, war, child 
enslavement, catastrophic natural disasters, and global economic crises remain live 
issues, and all this just in the earliest years of a new millennium. Unsurprisingly, 
renewed interest in biblical lament and its meaning for Christian faith has surfaced in 
much recent theology.
5
 With it has come an accompanying concern over triumphalism 
and problematic manifestations of Christian praise which have contributed far more 
harm than healing to the world. Therefore, my choice to study these two aspects of faith 
stems not only from the relationship of both in the text of the Bible and their importance 
for liturgical tradition, but more pointedly because examining one alongside the other 
brings into relief the challenge suffering presents for the Church as it daily lives out its 
confession of God. 
 I have furthermore chosen to develop these issues with respect to the work of 
one biblical scholar, Walter Brueggemann of the United States, and one theologian, 
David Ford of Great Britain. Both have made substantial contributions to contemporary 
discussion of lament and praise, and both have done so out of an explicit concern over 
the nature of Christian faith amidst suffering. My research concentrates on how these 
                                                 
4 So John Webster, 4"5+&((25*$G";0$E(()7($25$4!62(,2)5$="*/),23($88 (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 205, 
“A theology of hope does not hang upon a satisfactory answer to the question of theodicy (satisfactory to 
whom, and to what ends?), but vice versa: only on the basis of faith’s confession of the God of hope, of 
his ways with the world in the history of fellowship in which we now live and for whose consummation 
we wait, is it possible to develop anything like a responsible Christian theodicy.” 
5 Examples include John Swinton, I)*25*$#2,!$4"/>)((2"50$-)(,"6).$I&(>"5(&($,"$,!&$-6"B.&/$"+$E@2. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007); Sally A. Brown and Patrick D. Miller, eds., J)/&5,0$ I&3.)2/25*$
-6)3,23&($ 25$ -?.>2,<$ -&#<$ )5;$-?B.23$ DK?)6& (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005); and Carleen 
Mandolfo, G";$25$,!&$="3L0$=2)."*23$%&5(2"5$25$,!&$-()./($"+$J)/&5, (JSOTSup 357; London: Sheffield 
Academic, 2002). Two influential works from the decade previous which deal significantly with lament 
are Kathleen Billman and Daniel Migliore, I)3!&.9($ 4670$ -6)7&6$ "+$ J)/&5,$ )5;$ ,!&$ I&B26,!$ "+$M">&$
(Cleveland: United Church, 1999); and Patrick D. Miller, %!&7$ 462&;$ ,"$ ,!&$ J"6;0$ %!&$ N"6/$ )5;$
%!&"."*7$"+$O2B.23).$-6)7&6$(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994). 
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theologians understand faith in response to human pain and also how they understand 
such faith to depend upon God’s own response to suffering in Christ.  
 Brueggemann is one of the most widely read biblical scholars in North America 
and has published substantially in most areas of Old Testament studies. For the purposes 
of this thesis, I examine an aspect of his work which I find to be particularly crucial 
throughout his career: the lament psalm form and its role in the development of his 
biblical theology. I approach this task through a genetic reading of his early Psalms 
scholarship which builds towards culmination in his masterwork %!&"."*7$"+$ ,!&$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,. That publication is now over a decade old, and while I have not here treated 
any subsequent writings of Brueggemann, I do not believe his overall views to have 
changed in any significant way from those articulated in %:%$concerning lament, faith, 
and suffering.
6
 
 Likewise, thesis constraints require choices in dealing with Ford’s body of work, 
especially regarding my omission of his most recent material concerning wisdom and 
scriptural reasoning. While complimentary to his earlier writings, this work does not 
significantly develop or alter his position on Christian praise or joy. An argument could 
be made that the very recent 4!62(,2)5$ P2(;"/, which was published late in my 
research for this thesis, develops his theology of faith amidst suffering through its 
sapiential application of Job from the Old Testament as well as the cry of Christ from 
the cross in the Gospel narratives.
7
 Still, lament or praise per se are not the focus, and, 
more importantly, I do not believe this work changes how Ford understands faith amidst 
suffering to result from who God is in Christ. His theological approach to that issue 
comes to maturity through the soteriological concerns of the earlier D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5 
and is the subject of my fifth chapter. 
Now, concerning the work at hand, this thesis can be divided roughly into three 
parts, beginning with the role of the lament psalm in the development of 
Brueggemann’s biblical theology. The first chapter traces his background as an Old 
Testament scholar concerned with the Psalms and his early observation that Israel 
faithfully addresses God in all life experiences, whether sorrowful or joyful, through the 
                                                 
6 Recent Brueggemann articles which continue to draw from his previous Psalms scholarship and 
theological conclusions in %:% include Brueggemann, “The Psalms in Theological Use: On 
Incommensurability and Mutuality,” in H&,?($ %&(,)/&5,?/ Sup. 99 (2004): 581-602; “Necessary 
Conditions of a Good Loud Lament,” in M"62Q"5($25$O2B.23).$%!&"."*7 25 no. 1 (2003): 19-49; and “The 
Friday Voice of Faith,” in 4).@25$%!&"."*23).$A"?65). 36 (2001):12-21. 
7 David F. Ford, 4!62(,2)5$ P2(;"/0$ =&(2625*$ G";$ )5;$ J&)6525*$ 25$ J"@& (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), see particularly chapters 1 and 3-5. 
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typical form of the lament psalm. He proposes that this form's two main 
parts, petition followed by praise, mirror the common shape not only of Israel’s 
psalter but also all biblical faith, including the New Testament proclamation of Christ’s 
cross and resurrection. His subsequent Psalms typology develops how this form 
practically functions to shape faithful human response to God amidst suffering.  
The second chapter studies the evolution of Brueggemann’s understanding of 
lament and praise through the influence of the social sciences upon his theology. As he 
increasingly finds theological methodology difficult to discern apart from sociological 
issues, Brueggemann’s concept of God evolves, and he begins to understand faith as 
constituted by human responses such as those inherent to the form of lament. He 
concludes that faith arises not simply in response to a faithful God, but from how human 
expressions of suffering and joy constitute our understanding of divine faithfulness. 
The third chapter concerns the culmination of Brueggemann’s consistent interest 
in the lament psalm form through his mature biblical theology. His magnum opus, 
%!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, proposes that all biblical faith must be discerned from 
the standpoint of rhetorical tension maintained between conflicts Brueggemann finds in 
aspects of scripture. The lament psalm offers a pivotal example through its typical dual 
form of complaint and/or petition understood as countertestimony against God and 
praise understood as testimony in affirmation of God. However, I will demonstrate how 
this view of unresolvable tension in the text leaves Brueggemann with an unresolved 
doctrine of God which obscures any Old or New Testament expectation of divine 
faithfulness. While I appreciate Brueggemann’s work to recover a role for lament in 
Christian faith, I will argue that such faith makes little difference to the suffering of 
humanity if neither the Bible nor theology can be understood to express the expectation 
that God will respond faithfully to our lament.  
 In the second part of this thesis, my focus shifts to David Ford and the 
development of his theology through a central concern over Christian praise and joy. 
The fourth chapter starts with Ford’s early collaboration alongside Daniel Hardy on 
A?B2.),&0$%!&"."*7$25$-6)2(&. While the authors argue that praise is the essential reality 
of biblical faith, they also emphasize that praise need not ignore or perpetuate suffering 
but overflows creation through participation in Christ as God’s own faithful response to 
the sufferings of the world. This overflowing nature of Christian faith is further 
developed in Ford’s subsequent 2 Corinthians commentary authored with Frances 
 5
Young. Here, like A?B2.),&, human participation in Christ’s person and work is 
emphasized as Paul’s basis for commitment to God’s glory even amidst suffering.  
 As Ford’s theology matures he remains concerned that Christian praise should 
not obscure ethical response. The fifth chapter consequently traces how Ford’s approach 
to faith evolves through his concept of joy in the face of Christ, first introduced in his 
collaboration with Young. This theological development allows him to address concerns 
over the traditional view of substitutionary atonement and to identify Christian faith as 
an inextricable relationship between joy and ethical responsibility resulting from 
“facing” how Christ lived and died in suffering. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate that by 
failing to clarify !"# such “facing” is made possible through #!"$God is in Christ, Ford 
risks rendering faith as merely the result of living by Christ’s example. 4!62(,2)5 faith, I 
argue, has little cause for joyful praise apart from God’s atoning human response to 
suffering on our behalf. 
In the concluding sixth chapter, which comprises the third and final section of 
this thesis, I clarify my concerns over the theology of Brueggemann and Ford in relation 
to their mutual failure to treat suffering in conjunction with the universality of sin and 
consequent human involvement in the persistence of evil in creation. I argue that a 
properly trinitarian understanding of Christ’s atonement is necessary to propose how 
God confronts B",! suffering )5; sin thereby producing faithful human response. I then 
consider this alternative through Colin Gunton’s account of atonement as 
pneumatological participation in Christ’s own human response to suffering. Though I 
affirm Gunton’s ultimate conclusion that the triune God’s faithfulness in Christ, 
mediated by the Holy Spirit, transforms humanity in joyful expectation of praise, I also 
assert that his identification of Christ’s cry from the cross (".&.7 with human sin 
problematically obscures the identification of Christ’s humanity with the suffering 
expressed in lament. I conclude by arguing that a trinitarian theology of praise cannot be 
understood apart from either who God is in Christ’s atonement or how the atoning 
Christ is humanly faithful in lament. 
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~1~  
 
Faithful Response to Suffering: The Lament Psalm in Brueggemann’s 
Biblical Scholarship  
 
 
The nature of faith amidst suffering is a consistent concern throughout the 
development of Walter Brueggemann’s biblical theology. This focus develops 
significantly through his study of the Psalms and particularly through his emphasis on 
the psalms of lament. His initial article, “From Hurt to Joy, from Death to Life,” begins 
as follows:  
The faith of Israel, like all human experience, moved back and forth between 
the polar moods of, on the one hand, deep anguish and misery and, on the other hand, 
profound joy and celebration. In this back and forth movement the people of Israel 
worked out the power and limits of their faith. In the process they also worked out a 
pattern of rhetoric that shaped their anguish and brought it to expression so that it could 
be dealt with. 
It is the lament that preserves for us Israel's most powerful and eloquent 
statements of the effort both to survive and to be transformed as a people of faith. The 
study of lament can provide important resources for our contemporary work of theology 
and ministry.
1
 
 
Here relatively early in his career as an Old Testament scholar, Brueggemann succinctly 
introduces aspects of both his overall approach to the Psalms and his distinct interest in 
lament. Not only is he concerned with the response of Israel’s faith but also with “all 
human experience.” Not only does he analyze the historical content of Israel’s “pattern 
of rhetoric,” but also the “important resources” this pattern offers to contemporary faith. 
Not only does he examine the transformation of Israel’s faith preserved in the form of 
lament psalms, but also how the form and function of lament may relate to any 
transformation through faith today.  
Still, it is precisely the form of the Psalms and their historical content with 
which Brueggemann begins. Form criticism and its innovators precede Brueggemann 
and lay the groundwork for his examination of what Gunkel calls “authentic” faith—
                                                 
1 Walter Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy, From Death to Life” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,!, 
Patrick D. Miller, ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 67. Originally published in 85,&6>6&,),2"5, 28 
(1974), 3-19.  
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faith which Brueggemann decisively discerns through the suffering and joy expressed in 
the psalms of lament.
2
 
 
I. Brueggemann’s Formative Influences 
  
      A. Form Criticism and the Psalms 
 
As a 1961 graduate of Union Theological Seminary, Brueggemann was 
fundamentally trained in the proficiencies predominant to the times. Form criticism 
plays a substantial role in his Th.D dissertation
3
 and influences his earliest work such as 
%6);2,2"5$ +"6$ 462(2(0$ 1$ D,?;7$ 25$ M"(&).
4
 Unsurprisingly, his first article on lament 
asserts, “The study of lament is best pursued by the method of form criticism.”
5
 The 
force behind this assertion rests primarily in the influence of Gunkel and subsequent 
responses and reactions to his seminal work.  
 
i. Hermann Gunkel 
 
Since Gunkel, modern biblical scholarship has focused not only on author and 
date but also on the relation of text structure to its original circumstance. Gunkel’s 
“method of classifying types of literature based on form, function, and social context,” 
writes James L. Crenshaw, “moves away from the specific to the typical, thus 
undercutting all efforts to isolate the unique features of individual psalms.”
6
 Emphasis 
on genre and its connection to social settings leads Gunkel to observe that “the Psalms 
                                                 
2 “Pure and authentic religion is to be found only where tremendous struggles have been experienced.” 
See Hermann Gunkel, %!&$-()./(0$1$N"6/R462,23).$85,6";?3,2"5 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 33, 
as quoted by Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 70.  
3 Walter Brueggemann, “A Form-Critical Study of the Cultic Material in Deuteronomy: An Analysis of 
the Nature of Cultic Encounter in the Mosaic Tradition,” (ThD diss., Union Theological Seminary, New 
York, 1961). An early and undoubtedly significant influence on Brueggemann’s particular use of form 
criticism is that of his doctoral supervisor James Muilenburg, author of the programmatic article, “Form 
Criticism and Beyond,” A"?65).$"+$O2B.23).$J2,&6),?6&$88 (1969): 1-18. See the discussion of Muilenburg 
in Walter Brueggemann, William C. Placher, and Brian K. Blount, D,6?**.25*$#2,!$D362>,?6& (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2002), 9. 
4 Walter Brueggemann, %6);2,2"5$+"6$462(2(0$1$D,?;7$25$M"(&) ( Atlanta: John Knox, 1968). See 
specifically Ch. 3, “The Prophets and the Covenant Forms.” 
5 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 69.  
6 James L. Crenshaw, foreword to %!&$-()./($25$8(6)&.9($P"6(!2>, by Sigmund Mowinckel, (trans. D. R. 
Ap-Thomas; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), xxv. For additional discussion of Gunkel in relation to his 
predecessors see Gene M. Tucker, N"6/$462,232(/$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1971), 5ff. 
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tend not to be free and innovative speech, but highly stylized and predictable in form, 
presumably in traditional societies that counted on the regularity of rhetorical pattern to 
shape and sustain life in certain ways.”
7
  Gunkel’s subsequent typology of the Psalms 
produces five major and five minor categories: Hymns, communal laments, royal 
psalms, individual laments, and individual songs of thanksgiving which comprise the 
major group while the minor group consists of songs of pilgrimage, communal songs of 
thanksgiving, wisdom poetry, liturgy and mixed psalms.
8
 Because it would be difficult 
to conceive of Brueggemann’s work apart from a basic conceptual starting point in form 
criticism, Patrick D. Miller concludes, “Brueggemann’s work is greatly indebted to 
and—like all contemporary Psalms scholarship—builds upon Gunkel.”
9
 
 
ii. Sigmund Mowinckel 
 
Brueggemann also engages with the work of Gunkel’s most notable student, 
Sigmund Mowinckel. Departing from the proposal of his mentor, Mowinckel 
emphasizes the liturgical shape of Israelite life by theorizing that the varying types of 
psalms are parts of a greater liturgical whole at the center of Israel’s culture. This is the 
concept of cult, defined by Mowinckel as “socially established and regulated holy acts 
and words in which the encounter and communion of the Deity with the congregation is 
established, developed, and brought to its ultimate goal.”
10
  His understanding of 
Israel’s annual enthronement festival as the primary D2,Q$2/$J&B&5 of the Psalms allows 
Mowinckel to effectively establish an emphasis on cult lacking in Gunkel’s focus on 
form.
11
 Thus, Brueggemann, from the beginning of his own work, regards Mowinckel’s 
proposal as liturgically important.
12
 
However, Brueggemann is also concerned with the way Mowinckel potentially 
collapses some of the distinctive particularities of the Psalms. The individual psalms of 
                                                 
7 Walter Brueggemann,  15$85,6";?3,2"5$,"$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,0$%!&$4)5"5$)5;$4!62(,2)5$8/)*25),2"5 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 279.  
8 See Hermann Gunkel and Joachim Begrich, 85,6";?3,2"5$,"$-()./(0$%!&$G&56&($"+$,!&$I&.2*2"?($J7623$
"+$8(6)&. (trans. J. D. Nogalski; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997).  
9 Miller, “Introduction,” xii. 
10 Sigmund Mowinckel, %!&$-()./($25$8(6)&.9($P"6(!2> (trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 15. 
11 “…Gunkel—and after him many of his followers—went only halfway. He often stuck too much to the 
mere formal registration and labeling of the single elements of a psalm and did not see clearly enough that 
his own form-historical method demanded that it be developed into a real 3?.,R+?53,2"5).$/&,!";.” See 
Mowinckel, %!&$-()./($25$8(6)&.9($P"6(!2>, 31, italics original.  
12 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 75.  
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lament are a pertinent example. As Crenshaw notes, “(Mowinckel) resolves the problem 
of individual and collective psalms (‘I’ and ‘we’) in the figure of the king, who 
embodies the whole.”
13
 Thus “Mowinckel sees in the piety of the psalms an expression 
of temple singers” and not the expression of individuals or smaller groups who have in 
crisis responded through lament.
14
 As a result Brueggemann critiques Mowinckel for 
too generally classifying the Psalter through one category.
15
 Among possible 
alternatives to Mowinckel, Brueggemann notes particularly the approach of Erhard 
Gerstenberger.
16
  Nevertheless, Mowinckel’s influence on Brueggemann remains 
indisputable in parts of the latter’s work.
17
  
 
iii. Claus Westermann 
 
Aside from Gunkel’s foundational scholarship, Brueggemann’s greatest 
influence is Claus Westermann.
18
 Lament occupies a central place in Brueggemann’s 
work not merely because Gunkel identifies its distinct psalmic form but also because 
Westermann identifies lament as ,!& defining form of the Psalms. This innovation first 
emerges through %!&$ -6)2(&$ "+$ G";$ 25$ ,!&$ -()./(, a monograph based on 
Westermann’s dissertation (of the same name) completed under Walter Zimmerli at 
Zurich in 1949.
19
 Westermann concentrates on the praise and petition characteristic in 
the lament psalms and derives a programmatic focus, “In this analysis of the Psalms, 
‘category’ is primarily neither a literary nor a cultic concept. It is both of these, but only 
                                                 
13 Crenshaw, “Foreword,” xxvi. 
14 Ibid., xxvii.  
15 See Walter Brueggemann, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, Augsburg Old Testament Series (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1984), 18, “Scholarly reaction to (Mowinckel’s) hypothesis is twofold. On the one hand, the 
hypothesis is much too comprehensive and totalitarian, making claims that are too broad and 
incorporating too many psalms of various kinds into a single action. …On the other hand, for all its 
excessiveness, Mowinckel’s hypothesis still occupies the center of the field and still provides the best 
governing hypothesis that we have. Thus we may permit it to inform our work as long as we treat it as 
provisional and are attentive to its imperial temptation.” 
16 Gerstenberger as alternative to Mowinckel is first discussed by Brueggemann in “From Hurt to Joy,,” 
75, “Gerstenberger has argued that the petition is a form of expression used in domestic settings in times 
of need. As elsewhere, he prefers to understand the texts in terms of the needs, resources, and faith of the 
small folk community or clan.”  
17 Engagement with Mowinckel (and Brueggemann’s appreciation for his predecessor) develops to a 
much greater extent in the Brueggemann’s work 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&0$="S"."*7$)*)25(,$8;".),67$)5;$8;&"."*7 
(see Ch. 2 below). 
18 Brueggemann is not alone in high esteem for Westermann. See Patrick D. Miller 85,&6>6&,25*$,!&$
-()./( (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 4, “The most important comprehensive treatment since (the 
Gunkel and Begrich work) is found in the work of Claus Westermann.”  
19 Claus Westermann, %!&$-6)2(&$"+$G";$25$,!&$-()./($(trans. K. R. Crim; Richmond: John Knox, 1965); 
repr. as -6)2(&$)5;$J)/&5,$25$,!&$-()./($(trans. K. R. Crim and R. N Soulen; Atlanta: John Knox, 1981).  
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secondarily. This analysis is determined by the two basic modes of speaking to God: 
praise and petition.”
20
 Brueggemann summarizes what results, “Following the form 
analysis of Gunkel and ignoring the liturgical hypothesis of Mowinckel, Westermann 
has urged that the lament is the basic form of psalmic expression, and that most other 
psalm forms are derived from or responses to the lament.”
21
 Westermann not only finds 
the lament psalm to be the paradigmatic form of the psalter, he also finds this form 
throughout the Old Testament. “As the language of joy and the language of suffering, 
praise and lament belong together as expressions of human existence before God. As 
such, praise of God and lament alike run through the entire Old Testament, from 
primordial history to apocalyptic.”
22
 
Westermann’s method influences Brueggemann beyond the level of form. As 
Miller writes, “Theological concerns come very much to the fore in Westermann’s 
analysis of the laments when compared with other treatments.”
23
 Westermann offers a 
substantial way of understanding lament function as that which “affirms to and for 
Israel that they have to do with a God who is powerful and accessible, whose 
characteristic way of being known is intervention to transform situations of distress.”
24
 
At the start of his own work, Brueggemann credits Westermann for most acutely 
discerning the “power” of lament through its form: 
More than anyone else, Westermann, in -6)2(&$"+$G";, has seen that the power of the 
lament form is in the movement from petition to praise and that these must be regarded 
as two equally important parts in tension with each other, with neither subordinated to 
the other.
25
 
In Westermann’s analysis of form, Brueggemann’s finds an essential starting place for 
understanding the function of lament in Israel’s faith. However, this is not all he finds. 
Westermann also gives Brueggemann a starting place for understanding lament as 
theologically central to the Bible as a whole. 
                                                 
20 Westermann, -6)2(&$)5;$J)/&5,, 35 >)((2/. See also Crenshaw, “Foreward,” xxviii, “Westermann 
reduces the Psalms to two types, praise and petition, corresponding to the two fundamental emotions, joy 
and suffering.” 
21 Brueggemann, '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 18.  
22 Westermann, -6)2(&$)5;$J)/&5,, 11. 
23 Miller, 85,&6>6&,25*$,!&$-()./(, 9.  
24 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,,” 73. Brueggemann also discusses here the “salvation oracle” 
proposed by Joachim Begrich in G&()//&.,&$D,?;2&5$Q?/$1.,&5$%&(,)/&5,<$Tbü 21 (Munich: Chr. Kaiser 
Verlag, 1964), 217-31. Begrich proposes that the two parts of a lament psalm were originally structured 
around the text of a speech mediating the renewed and ongoing presence of Yahweh and an opportunity 
for new life on the behalf of the one lamenting. !
25 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 74. 
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      B. The Centrality of Lament for Biblical Faith 
  
 i. “From Hurt to Joy, From Death to Life”—Brueggemann’s first study 
 
Each of the scholars discussed above—Gunkel, Mowinckel, Westermann, as 
well as numerous others—are cited in Brueggemann’s initial article on the Psalms. 
Miller describes “From Hurt to Joy, From Death to Life” as the way in which 
Brueggemann “works out of the classic form-critical analysis of lament.”
26
 
Westermann’s influence is particularly evident in the title and general direction. The 
transformative motif of petition and praise consistently unifies Brueggemann’s first 
reflections on the form criticism which has preceded him.  
Also as discussed above, Brueggemann utilizes form criticism not simply as his 
chosen method for historical study. He is concerned with how Israel’s laments function 
in present faith, and thus “From Hurt to Joy” begins with a set of functional 
observations. First, “lament manifests Israel at its best, giving authentic expression to 
,!&$6&).$&S>&62&53&($"+$.2+&.”
27
 Second, “Israel unflinchingly saw and affirmed that .2+&$
)($2,$3"/&(<$)."5*$#2,!$T"7(<$2($B&(&,$B7$!?6,…”
28
 Thirdly, the laments demonstrate that 
biblical faith is “?53"/>6"/2(25*.7$)5;$?5&/B)66)((&;.7$;2)."*23. …Nowhere but with 
God does Israel vent its greatest doubt, its bitterest resentments, its deepest anger.”
29
 
For Brueggemann the function of lament in Israel’s faith is three-fold: 1) Israel’s faith 
&S>6&((&($&S>&62&53& 2) Israel’s faith expresses )..$experience, 3) Israel’s faith expresses 
all experience ,"$G";$)5;$&S>&3,($G";$,"$6&(>"5;U 
Such an encompassing function contrasts sharply with the “one-sided liturgical 
renewal of today.” 
The study of lament may suggest a corrective to the euphoric, celebrative notions of 
faith that romantically pretend that life is sweetness and joy, even delight. It may be 
suggested that the one-sided liturgical renewal of today has, in effect, driven the hurtful 
side of experience either into obscure corners of faith practice or completely out of 
Christian worship into various forms of psychotherapy and growth groups.
30
 
                                                 
26 Miller, “Introduction,” xiii-iv. 
27 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 67, italics original. 
28 Ibid., italics original. 
29 Ibid., 68, italics original. 
30 Ibid. 
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Brueggemann further finds that the loss of lament from liturgical and devotional 
practice significantly effects how faith is understood in the modern church.  
So little do our liturgies bring to expression our anger and hatred, our sense of betrayal 
and absurdity. But even more acutely, with our failures of nerve and our refusal to 
presume upon our partner in dialogue, we are seduced into nondialogic forms of faith, 
as though we were the only ones there; and so we settle for meditation and reflection or 
bootstrap operations of resolve to alter our situation.
31
 
Contemporary faith, in Brueggemann’s view, has lost the liturgical nerve to honestly 
address God. “The faith expressed in the lament is nerve—it is a faith that knows that 
honest facing of distress can be done effectively only in dialogue with God who acts in 
transforming ways.”
32
 
The comparison of present practice to biblical faith is underwritten by an 
understanding of lament function. This analysis of function is, in turn, underwritten by 
the legacy of form criticism. “[A]n understanding of the form will help us understand 
both how Israel’s faith understood and experienced hurt and how it interpreted that hurt 
in the context of its faith.”
33
  
Therefore a three-fold reflection on form further develops the previous trio on 
function. First, the initial address of the lament “establishes the dialogic, covenantal 
context.”
34
 Relying on Begrich’s observations about the distinctiveness of Israel’s 
laments, Brueggemann writes, “The speaker establishes the right to expect some action 
from God; in doing so the speaker does not so much flatter the deity as appeal to 
previous mutual commitments, which are now recalled and invoked.”
35
 Second, while 
the lament is a “cry of desperation,” Brueggemann also asserts that “characteristically 
the entire sequence complaint-petition-motivation is to be understood as an act of 
faithfulness.”
36
 The lament demonstrates faith exactly because “[t]he speaker is helpless 
and does not doubt that Yahweh can and may transform the situation.”
37
 Third, the form 
typically ends in acknowledgement of Yahweh’s transformation. “The structure of the 
whole begins in bold confidence even to address Yahweh. It culminates in grateful 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 69. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 70. 
35 Ibid. Begrich, in comparing Israel’s laments with those of Babylon, finds that Israel’s do not require 
flattery of the deity. See Begrich, “Die Vertrauensäusserungen im israelischen Klagelied des Einzelen und 
in seinem babylonischen Gegenstück,” V&2,(3!62+,$+W6$;2&$1.,,&(,)/&5,.23!&$P2((&5(3!)+, 46 (1928), 
221ff. 
36 Ibid., 71. 
37 Ibid. 
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trust.”
38
 Thus lament form functions as an interplay of boldness in address, faithful 
affirmation, and transformation, and this triad of function is mediated through the 
typical dual form of petition and praise. 
 In the fifth section of “From Hurt to Joy,” Brueggemann outlines how the dual 
form of petition and praise characterizes Israel’s faith as a whole: 
The people of Israel perceived their entire existence in the form of petition and thanks. 
They were aware of distress, but more aware of Yahweh’s powerful deliverance. In the 
development of their literature of self-understanding, they presented their experience in 
this form that expressed their central convictions.
39
 
Here Brueggemann lays out “the lament-deliverance relationship as a basic structure of 
Israel’s faith that is not only prominent in the psalms but runs throughout the Old 
Testament.”
40
 As evidence, several aspects of Israel’s history (the Exodus, tribal period, 
Elijah narrative, disaster of 587) are presented. Brueggemann concludes, “Israel’s 
history is shaped and interpreted as an experience of cry and rescue” which is “a way of 
self-understanding not different from the theological and liturgical understandings of the 
Christian community.”
41
 
 Consequently, the sixth and final section connects the praise and petition of 
lament form to “the actions of Jesus…as God’s mighty saving deeds in response to the 
cry of distress.”
42
 Brueggemann briefly provides New Testament examples (the cries of 
the blind, the demon-possessed, Peter in Matt. 14:30) but none more crucial than the 
cross and resurrection.  
Finally, we may suggest that the structure of cry-response that gets expressed as petition 
and praise dramatizes the movement that came to be experienced by the early church as 
crucifixion-resurrection. The psalms of lament in their two principal parts of 
before/after reflect precisely the experience of death and the gift of new life. The 
church’s resurrection faith is consistent with Israel’s petition and praise, the sure 
conviction that God hears and sees and acts decisively.
43
  
The response of the church to Christ’s redemption, anticipated in the form of Israel’s 
faith, is a response through transformation from hurt to joy and from death to life. 
Through this first study Brueggemann demonstrates that the encompassing 
scope of the lament psalm derives from the prevalence of its form throughout the bible. 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 72. 
39 Ibid., 77. 
40 Miller, 85,&6>6&,25*$,!&$-()./(, 11. 
41 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 82. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 83. 
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This form of the text presents the transformative shape of Israel’s faith amidst suffering: 
B".;5&(( in addressing all experience to God as an )3,$"+$+)2,!, and +)2,!+?..7$&S>&3,25*$
)5;$ )3L5"#.&;*25*$ ,6)5(+"6/),2"5. Israel’s lament functions as “a pattern of rhetoric 
that shaped their anguish and brought it to expression so that it could be dealt with.”
44
 
The dual form of petition and praise therefore “shapes” Israel’s faith around address to 
God and expectation of God’s response. Additionally, Brueggemann argues that the two 
parts of lament “reflect precisely” the transformation of Christian faith in light of the 
cross and resurrection. Like Israel, we see in this form the shape of our faith in Christ.   
Nevertheless, despite a form and function which anticipate the response to God 
claimed by the Christian faith, lament seemingly has no function in much contemporary 
church practice.  While each of the previous points above emerge out of engagement 
with form criticism as refined by Westermann, this last point also arises with 
Westermann’s scholarship, quite literally, very nearby.  
 
 ii. “The Role of Lament in the Old Testament”—Westermann’s mature 
statement 
 
“From Hurt to Joy, from Death to Life” is first published$with Westermann’s 
“The Role of the Lament in the Theology of the Old Testament,”
45
 in the same issue of 
85,&6>6&,),2"5 which focuses on lament. Here, alongside Brueggemann, Westermann 
outlines the results of his influential work and makes a definitive call for renewed 
practice of lament in Christian faith.  
Westermann begins by decrying the lack of emphasis on lament in Old 
Testament studies despite the focus of major scholars (such as Von Rad and Zimmerli) 
on God’s deliverance. The root cause is identified as a certain Western bias and 
contrasted with soteriology in Israel’s scripture: 
The Old Testament cannot pin God down to a single soteriology; it can only speak of 
God’s saving acts within a whole series of events, and that necessarily involves some 
kind of verbal exchange between God and man. This latter includes both the cry of man 
in distress and the response of praise which the saved make to God.
46
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 67. 
45 Claus Westermann, “The Role of Lament in the Old Testament,” 85,&6>6&,),2"5, 28 (1974): 20-38. 
46 Ibid., 22. 
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Westermann further demands to know why lament has disappeared as a vital part of the 
Christian faith. “It would be a worthwhile task to ascertain how it happened that in 
Western Christendom the lament has been totally excluded from man’s relationship 
with God, with the result that it has completely disappeared above all from prayer and 
worship.”
47
 This cannot be because the New Testament forbids it because Westermann 
knows “of no text in the New Testament which would prevent the Christian from 
lamenting or which would express the idea that faith in Christ excluded lamentation 
from man’s relationship with God.”
48
 Westermann concludes that lament’s 
disappearance results as theological emphasis on sin relegates suffering to an 
afterthought: 
The result of this is that both in Christian dogmatics and in Christian worship suffering 
as opposed to sin has receded far into the background: Jesus Christ’s work of salvation 
has to do with the forgiveness of sins and with eternal life; it does not deal however 
with ending human suffering. Here we see the real reason why the lament has been 
dropped from Christian prayer. The believing Christian should bear his suffering 
patiently; he should not complain about it to God. The “sufferings of this world” are 
unimportant and insignificant. What is important is the guilt of sin. …We must now ask 
whether Paul and Pauline oriented theology has not understood the work of Christ in a 
onesided manner.
49
 
Out of these conclusions, Westermann issues a call for correction:  
On the basis of these observations we would have to decide anew whether the 
onesidedness of relating the work of Christ to sin alone, to the exclusion of any relation 
to man’s suffering, actually represents the New Testament as a whole and, if so, 
whether that understanding would not have to be corrected by the Old Testament. A 
correction of this sort would have far-reaching consequences. One of these would be 
that the lament, as the language of suffering, would receive a legitimate place in 
Christian worship, as it had in the worship of the Old Testament.
50
  
Such a correction is needed to adequately articulate “a history which ultimately reaches 
the point where God, as the God of judgment, suffers for his people.”
51
 
This mature statement of Westermann’s theology substantiates the direction of 
Brueggemann’s work in “From Hurt to Joy.” The centrality of lament throughout the 
shape of the scriptures is once again emphasized. Westermann, perhaps even more 
considerably than Brueggemann at this early date, also calls for a correction in 
contemporary Christian faith. As an elder statesman of Psalms scholarship, 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 25. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 33.  
50 Ibid., 34. 
51 Ibid., 38. 
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Westermann’s strong words carry the weight of a challenge already implied by his 
wider body of work. He demands that Christian theology not ignore suffering and its 
liturgical manifestation in lament. 
Nevertheless, in the practicalities of relating ancient form to contemporary 
function, Westermann’s scholarship does not, in Brueggemann’s view, properly follow 
through on this challenge. He later comes to conclude, “Westermann has not explicitly 
articulated the relational dynamics that go along with the structural elements.”
52
 A 
contemporary function for lament, and with it a renewed legitimacy for lament in 
Christian faith, never fully emerges from Westermann’s analysis of form. The desired 
correction thus remains significantly unfulfilled. 
By contrast, Brueggemann’s earliest work on lament already anticipates the 
undertaking of such a challenge. He believes that “The psalms of lament in their two 
principal parts of before/after 6&+.&3,$ >6&32(&.7$ ,!&$ &S>&62&53& of death and the gift of 
new life” which are known in the cross and resurrection.
53
 While Westermann 
highlights the structure of lament as a movement from plea to praise, Brueggemann will 
focus much more on the theological ramifications of such movement in human 
experience.
54
 Perhaps, the best early indicators are the respective titles of these two 
articles presented side by side here. Brueggemann is always indebted to Westermann’s 
formal articulation of the role of lament. But from the very beginning, Brueggemann is 
concerned not just with the textual form, but with how faith transforms hurt to joy and 
death to life.  
 
II. Forming a New Approach 
 
Brueggemann’s debt to form criticism remains significant. His greatest honor 
goes to Gunkel as founder and Westermann as paramount innovator. However, in 
                                                 
52 Walter Brueggemann, “The Costly Loss of Lament” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. 
Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 99; repr. from A"?65).$+"6$,!&$D,?;7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,$36 (1986): 
57-71. 
53 Op. cit., italics mine. 
54 Miller, “Foreward,” xiii. “Brueggemann is indebted also to Claus Westermann, though the latter is less 
interested in exploring various human experiences and contexts—particularly the social contexts—in 
which the dialectic (of praise and petition) operates.”  
Nevertheless, Westermann does continues to note (but not explicitly develop) the relevance of 
lament for contemporary culture. Cf. Westermann, %!&$J2@25*$-()./($(trans. J. R. Porter; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1989), 67, “Suffering is brought to our attention in all sorts of ways in public life, in the 
media, in many institutions, in demonstrations, so that attention is again being paid to the Biblical psalms 
of lament and they are being understood once more in their own right.” 
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Brueggemann’s estimation, neither scholar adequately addresses that which quickly 
becomes Brueggemann’s primary concern in interpreting the Psalms—connecting faith 
in ancient Israel to faith in contemporary human life. He explains in 15 85,6";?3,2"5$,"$
,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, “My own effort at Psalm interpretation has been to suggest ways in 
which Gunkel’s normative genre analysis can be related to the immediate dynamics of 
lived human reality.” In this endeavor he brings Westermann’s emphasis on lament to 
bear. “The major contribution of Westermann for our study is the discernment of a 
literary dynamic in the movement of the Psalms that corresponds to and gives voice to 
the dynamic of faith that we know in our experience with God.”
55
 Again, Brueggemann 
believes that this dynamic “reflects precisely the experience” that Christians know 
through the cross and resurrection. Therefore, Gunkel’s normative analysis combined 
with Westermann’s discernment of plea and praise continues to play a major role in 
Brueggemann’s development, even as Brueggemann works through the practicalities of 
picking up where he perceives the legacy of form criticism to leave off.  
Brueggemann’s next article on lament builds upon his work in “From Hurt to 
Joy.” The first study demonstrated that the typical dual form of lament presents Israel’s 
faith through boldness of address and the expectation and acknowledgement of God’s 
transformation. This form, therefore, has a “shaping” function; lament shapes Israel’s 
faith in response to God even amidst suffering. In “The Formfulness of Grief,” 
Brueggemann further develops this understanding of function through engagement with 
sociology. 
In considering the interaction of form and function, we are helped by the sociologists 
who see regularized language as the way a community creates and maintains a life-
world…It is this form that &5!)53&( experience and brings it to articulation and also 
.2/2,( the experience of suffering so that it can be received and coped with according to 
the perspectives, perceptions, and resources of the community.
56
  
By relying on sociology to provide a common language, Brueggemann’s article 
proposes ties between what the lament form ;2;$ in Israel and what the form of human 
grief (,2..$;"&( today. The goal here is to demonstrate how “the function of the form is 
definitional.”
57
 
                                                 
55 Brueggemann, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 18. 
56 Walter Brueggemann, “The Formfulness of Grief” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. 
Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 86; repr. from 85,&6>6&,),2"5, 31 (1977): 263-75. 
57 Ibid., 86. 
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As with “From Hurt to Joy,” he begins by stressing three ways in which the 
function of Israel’s lament is established by its form: “(a) as Joachim Begrich has noted, 
in Israel there is no attempt to flatter the deity, as there was in Babylon; (b) an 
affirmative ending is characteristic in Israel; and (c) the God of Israel’s laments may 
enter the pathos with Israel.
58
 These observations produce the following conclusions: 
Form permits the community to have a different experience: (a) no flattery means that 
Yahweh can be confronted directly and with bold confidence; (b) the affirmative ending 
shows it is a believable complaint, focused on fidelity and not primarily on anger; to 
address Yahweh, even in anger,  is to make an affirmation about Yahweh’s character; 
Gerstenberger has made the important distinction between lament (X.)*&) and 
complaint (15L.)*&); Israel characteristically complains and does not lament—that is, it 
expects something; Israel hopes for an intrusion that will fulfill the petition; finally, (c) 
the pathos of God in response to the trouble of the speaker is a theme not yet seriously 
explored; God’s response indicates God’s involvement and so makes an important 
assertion about the character of Yahweh…
59
 
Once again faithfulness in both boldness of address and expectation of transformation is 
at hand. Newly added to the last is the suggestion of God’s pathos, gleaned from 
Abraham Heschel and noted in the theology of Jürgen Moltmann, as an indication that 
God involves himself in rectifying human troubles.
60
 The implication of all three is that 
form indicates the way in which the community understands God, and in terms 
amenable to sociology, Brueggemann provides a general definition of function, “The 
function of the form is (a) to give a new definition of the situation, and (b) to get some 
action that is hoped for because of this peculiar definitional world.”
61
  
This relationship between form and function is then examined in the sociology 
of Elizabeth Kübler-Ross who “has observed (and urged) that the grief and death 
process tends to follow a fairly regular form.”
62
 The five stages of grief proposed by 
Kübler-Ross—denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance—are correlated with 
and considered in light of lament form. Her example of a chaplain tending to a hospital 
patient is found analogous to the cry of Israel and the rescue of Yahweh. “In 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 86-7. 
59 Ibid., 87-8. Brueggemann, 87, nt. 13 further describes Gerstenberger’s differentiation between lament 
and complaint by citing the latter’s article, “Jeremiah’s Complaints,” A"?65).$"+$O2B.23).$J2,&6),?6&$82 
(1963): 405, nt. 50, the lament “bemoans a tragedy which cannot be reversed, while a complaint entreats 
God for help in the midst of tribulation.” 
60 Ibid., 87, nt. 11. “Abraham Heschel has introduced the notion of the pathos of God into our awareness 
(%!&$-6">!&,($[New York: Harper and Row, 1962]). More recently the pathos of God and the apathy of 
modern persons with a technological consciousness have become important to theology. See Jürgen 
Moltmann, %!&$46?32+2&;$G"; (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 267-90...”  
61 Ibid., 88. 
62 Ibid. 
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Israel…[t]he use of the form is an activity in the maintenance of this life-world that has 
at its center the abiding, transforming presence of Yahweh.”
63
 Both the role of Yahweh 
and the dialogue partner in the final two Kübler-Ross stages show that “[t]his form also 
is a response to the yearning for assurance that the experience is not formless, that there 
is something that endures outside the experience of loss.”
64
 
But this biblical and sociological comparison is not simply parallel. 
Brueggemann finds the ancient liturgy of Israel to offer no little critique of modern 
sociology: 
The ;2((2/2.)62,2&($ are all the more striking: (a) Israel practices covenantal address 
instead of denial; (b) Israel engages in expectant petition instead of depression; (c) in 
Israel, the form itself centers in intervention, whereas Kübler-Ross must treat the 
intervention ambiguously and gingerly because the context of modernity must by 
definition screen it out; and (d) in Israel, the form of the rhetoric, like the form of the 
event, is undeniably covenantal. As such, the form serves to set the experience of grief 
and suffering in a context of covenant, which means that expected transforming 
intrusion by the covenant partner is a legitimate and intentional extrapolation from the 
form itself. This of course Kübler-Ross has not found in the parallel form and cannot. 
Modernity cannot anticipate a “breakthrough.”
65
 
Brueggemann later soft-pedals this critique of Kübler-Ross and sociology, emphasizing 
instead the discernment here of “Israel’s reliance on form.”
66
 However, this reliance is 
seen to challenge the formlessness of much modern society, an observation beyond the 
typical results of form criticism. “Form critics might appropriately consider their work 
not simply as a part of historical research, but as a major issue in the formlessness and 
antiform mentality of urban technological consciousness.”
67
 
 By the end of the “Formfulness of Grief,” Brueggemann’s own methodology 
regarding the psalms has not quite yet taken a recognizable shape, but it does continue 
to develop significant contours. His use of the sociology allows general connections 
between the structure and function of language to surface thus giving him new ways to 
reflect on lament in light of contemporary life.
68
 Westermann’s priority on dual form 
remains firmly in view as does Brueggemann’s emerging tripartite concept of function. 
He concludes: 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 93. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 93-4. 
66 Ibid., 95. 
67 Ibid., 97. 
68 Ibid., 96, “While the form is surely liturgic in some sense, it is also to be understood sociologically. The 
community asserts that life in all its parts is formful and therefore meaningful. Attention to language is 
crucial for a community’s certainty of meaning.” 
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This form, with its societal power, is likely not simply one form in a vast repertoire but 
is one of the constitutive forms of biblical faith. It affirms that the holy God is moved 
by such address, is covenantally responsive to covenant claims, and that Israel lives by 
this God’s transforming word. Yahweh is not an apathetic God who is either silent or 
must be flattered.
69
 
Lament as a “constitutive form” shapes Israel’s faith by affirming who God is to Israel. 
This is the basis for Brueggemann’s conclusion that the function of lament form is not 
only definitional but “inevitably theological…The form itself defines theological 
reality.”
70
 His priority on the function of lament in Israel therefore theologically 
critiques the loss of lament in the formlessness of modernity. Here he already begins to 
advance past Westermann and the tradition of form criticism by bringing the realities of 
Israel’s lament beyond mere “historical research.”  
What remains to be seen, however, is exactly what Brueggemann means by 
“theological reality,” especially in relation to form. Towards the end of the article he 
writes, “The form is sufficient for Israel. No speculative probing beyond the form is 
needed.”
71
  This follows a few pages after a related statement, “…expected 
transforming intrusion by the covenant partner is a legitimate and intentional 
extrapolation from the form itself.”
72
 While Brueggemann makes much of this 
transformation (a transformation which “the context of modernity must by definition 
screen…out”
73
), he is not clear as to how it is to be extrapolated from the form itself. 
Exactly which aspects of the transforming intrusion are definitive and which are 
speculation? Again, Brueggemann is concerned with not only how the lament expresses 
Israel’s faith but also with how it is involved in shaping that faith amidst suffering. He 
wants to emphasize that the language of lament describes transformation through its 
form and that this transformation in some way comes to define Israel’s experience. 
However, he is still struggling to express his interpretation of language which he 
believes not only describes the extremity of human experience but, in so doing, 
somehow becomes a means for human transformation.   
                                                
Unresolved theological issues linger here, especially along the lines of 
hermeneutics. Consequently, Brueggemann’s struggle to move beyond the forms 
defined by his predecessors to a truly definitive understanding of function takes a 
 
69 Ibid., 97. 
70 Ibid., 96. 
71 Ibid., 96-7. 
72 Op. cit. 
73 Op. cit. 
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hermeneutical turn when he proposes his own programmatic approach in “Psalms and 
the Life of Faith.”  
 
III. The Message of a New Typology  
 
 In early articles on lament Brueggemann experiments with the implications of 
form critical analysis but remains largely tied to the analysis of form criticism which he 
inherits. With the article “Psalms and the Life of Faith: A New Typology of 
Function,”
74
 Brueggemann offers a “fresh adaptation of that analysis into a new 
typology.”
75
 The result is his first statement of an innovative way forward in Psalms 
scholarship which later yields a book-length “theological commentary,” %!&$'&(()*&$"+$
,!&$-()./(. He summarizes the aim of his new approach in the introduction to this latter 
work: 
What seems to be needed (and is here attempted) is a >"(,362,23). interpretation that lets 
the devotional and scholarly traditions support, inform, and correct each other, so that 
the formal gains of scholarly methods may enhance and strengthen, as well as criticize, 
the substance of genuine piety in its handling of the Psalms.
76
 
Brueggemann finds such devotional and scholarly interpretation through the 
culmination of his previous efforts: a methodology for recovering lament’s function in 
both critical analysis and contemporary faith practice.
77
  
 
 A. “Psalms and the Life of Faith” 
 
 This programmatic article begins with what is essentially the pivotal question of 
Brueggemann’s prior work. “What has been the function and intention of the Psalms as 
they were shaped, transmitted, and repeatedly used? …To ask about the function of the 
                                                 
74 Walter Brueggemann, “Psalms and the Life of Faith: A Suggested Typology of Function” in %!&$
-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 3-32; repr. from 
A"?65).$+"6$,!&$D,?;7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5, 17 (1980): 3-32. 
75 Miller, “Introduction,” xiv. 
76 Brueggemann, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, Augsburg Old Testament Series (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 
1984),$16, italics original. 
77 Between publication of “Psalms and the Life of Faith” and '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, Brueggemann also 
authors a small book entitled, -6)725*$,!&$-()./( (Winona, MN: St. Mary’s, 1982). While this work 
features an early discussion of Brueggemann’s tripartite Psalms typology, it does not represent a 
significant advance or differentiation beyond either his earlier programmatic article or his subsequent 
development of this typology in '&(()*&. For this reason, and due to limitations of space, this work is not 
treated here. 
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Psalms means to move away from direct textual evidence and to engage in some 
tentative reconstruction.”
78
 Another discussion of modern Psalms scholarship follows, 
particularly focused by Gunkel’s chief categories of form and setting in life. After also 
discussing Mowinckel, Westermann and others, Brueggemann concludes the form 
critical consensus on setting to be “fairly stable” and “in any case firm enough to 
provide a basis from which to consider the question of function.”
79
  
 Because function arises in “a convergence of a 3"5,&/>"6)67$>)(,"6).$)*&5;) 
with a more !2(,"623).$ &S&*&,23).$ 25,&6&(,<” Brueggemann for the first time asserts, 
“Thus the question of function is put as a hermeneutical issue.”
80
 Specifically at issue 
are the distinctive interpretive realities of the Psalms which Brueggemann discerns not 
only in reflection on ancient Israel but also through the history of “liturgical, devotional, 
and pastoral uses.”
81
 He thus indicates how he will step out on his own. “In this 
discussion we hazard the provisional presupposition that modern and ancient uses of the 
Psalms share a common intent and function even though other matters such as setting 
and institution may be different.”
82
 Here is Brueggemann’s first stride through a 
doorway constructed of materials given to him by preceding form criticism and his own 
proclivities towards contemporary sociology. That which finally joins the structure 
together is hermeneutics:  
The hermeneutical possibility of moving back and forth between ancient function and 
contemporary intentionality exists because the use of the Psalms in every age is for 
times when the most elemental and raw human issues are in play. The intended function 
and resilient practice of the Psalms reflect their peculiar capacity to be present to those 
elemental and raw human issues.
83
 
Because the Psalms’s “peculiar capacity to be present” is of particular concern, 
Brueggemann relies not simply on the work of biblical scholars or sociologists but 
crucially on the hermeneutical reflections of Paul Ricoeur.  
 The relationship appears compatible from the start. Language and human reality 
is a primary nexus of Ricoeur’s substantial philosophical work as well as 
Brueggemann’s psalms scholarship. The latter’s prior emphasis on the lament form of 
petition/praise thus finds a comfortable fit in the former’s existential schema. “Ricoeur 
                                                 
78 Brueggemann, “Psalms and the Life of Faith,” 3. 
79 Ibid., 6. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 7. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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understands the dynamic of life as a movement, dialectic but not regular or patterned, of 
disorientation and reorientation.”
84
 This also connects handily to earlier descriptions of 
lament function through a triad of faithful affirmation, boldness and transformation. The 
latter gives way to a new statement of Psalms typology, “I propose that the sequence of 
"62&5,),2"5R;2("62&5,),2"5R6&"62&5,),2"5$ is a helpful way to understand the use and 
function of the Psalms.”
85
  
While a preliminary discussion of the Psalms as categorized by these three types 
follows (a much fuller discussion is on hand in %!&$ '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./(), 
Brueggemann spends more time developing this new method in light of Ricoeur. 
Through philosophical categories which Ricoeur labels hermeneutics of suspicion and 
hermeneutics of representation, Brueggemann sees a dialectic which is also 
paradigmatic of the Psalms. “Ricoeur’s model can help in understanding both what is 
going on in the text of the psalms and what is going on in the life of the user(s) of the 
psalms, for as Ricoeur argues, it is the &S>&62&53&$ "+$ .2/2, that is important to the 
&S>6&((2"5$ "+$ .2/2,.”
86
 Because Brueggemann observes that “psalms of disorientation 
and reorientation may be regarded as expressions of limit,” he relates the function of 
these psalms (defining certain psalms yet again even more explicitly as expressing 
dislocation and celebration) to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and concludes that “[t]he two 
functions, as the two hermeneutics, belong together.”
87
  
However, even dialectical ability to express the limits of human experience is 
not the full nature of language, and this leads to a final gain from hermeneutics—
Brueggemann finds language not only describes reality B?,$).("$>.)7($)$36?32).$6".&$25$
36&),25*$2,U “Thus this language has a creative function. It does not simply follow reality 
and reflect it, but it leads reality to become what it is not.”
88
 Accordingly language has 
two functions in the Psalms: 
I should argue (in Ricoeur’s terms of ;&/7(,2+725*$)5;$6&>6&(&5,25*) that the function 
of the Psalms is twofold. First, the Psalms bring human experience to sufficiently vivid 
expression so that it may be embraced as the real situation in which persons must live. 
This applies equally to the movement in the life of an individual person and to the 
                                                 
84 Brueggemann, “Psalms and the Life of Faith,” 8. 
85 Ibid., 9, Brueggemann garners these concepts particularly from the Ricoeur article “Biblical 
Hermeneutics,” D&/&2), 4 (1975), 114-24. 
86 Ibid., 18. Brueggemann cites this language from Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 127. 
87 Ibid., 24. Brueggemann notes the problem of coordinating this dialectic with his tripartite method, but 
he suggests a solution. “I have no term to describe a hermeneutic for the ‘psalms of orientation’ reflecting 
stable life. Perhaps such a view is a ‘hermeneutic of convention’.” (30). 
88 Ibid., 26. 
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public discernment of new reality…Second, the language of these poems does more 
than just help persons to embrace and recognize their real situation. In dramatic and 
dynamic ways, the songs can also function to evoke and form new realities that did not 
exist until, or apart from, the actual singing of the song. Thus the speech of the new 
song does not just recognize what is given, but evokes it, calls it into being, forms it.
89
 
From Ricoeur’s influence Brueggemann is able, more substantially than before, to 
propose that the psalms both describe the form of faith and also function to “form new 
realities” of faith. 
 Here, a development in how Brueggemann understands human expression and 
expectation through the psalms of lament begins to come into play. Functional aspects 
of the form as both expression of suffering and expectation that God responds to 
suffering move closer together because the human response of linguistic expression 
itself is understood to be the context in which both arise. Yet, despite the centrality of 
hermeneutics for his proposal, Brueggemann is not uncritical about the extent to which 
language )3,?)..7 evokes and creates faith: 
In utilizing Ricoeur’s theory of language, and to relate the Psalms to that tradition of 
scholarship, we must not proceed without a critical awareness. The discussion of 
language and hermeneutics has proceeded too much on purely formal grounds as 
though language per se had evocative qualities. That may be so, but it is not the 
assumption made here. That is, our formal understandings of language must be 
informed by the substantive claims made by the content, use, and function of quite 
3"536&,& language. That is, I am helped by Ricoeur’s suggestions, but my argument is 
not about language in general but about the Psalms of Israel in the faith and life of 
Israel. What gives language its evocative power for Israel are the memories of Israel, 
the hopes of Israel, and the discernment of the gifts, actions, blessings, and judgments 
of God at work in their common life. Speech has this power because it correlates with 
the realities in which Israel trusted. The language itself is not the reality but it is the 
trusted mode of disclosure of that reality.
90
 
Brueggemann seems to clarify here that language, in and of itself, cannot explain the 
“evocative power” on offer in the Psalms. Another$6&).2,7 is at work, (i.e. Israel’s hopes, 
memories, and discernments of God) of which language is merely “the trusted mode of 
disclosure.” 
 More reflection as to the nature of this reality is not on offer here.
91
  This lack of 
clarification notwithstanding, Brueggemann is clear that language manifests power 
because it +?53,2"5($ in certain ways. Through hermeneutics and specifically Ricoeur, 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 27-8. 
90 Ibid., 26. 
91 A possible exception may be on p. 31, nt 81. “As it stands, the proponents of the New Hermeneutic 
seem uninterested in the actual shape of the new world. The practice of linguistic imagination, however, 
must be coupled with political and economic realities. …Imagination is not an end in itself but serves the 
new concrete human world that is promised and given by God.” 
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Brueggemann’s new typology of the Psalms goes beyond previous form criticism to 
connect psalmic function in the past to faith in the present, founding this connection 
upon “the ground of the linkage between language and experience.”
92
 
 
 B. %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./($
$
$ Work begun in “Psalms and the Life of Faith” is more widely developed by %!&$
'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(,$albeit in a particular way. The article is primarily a statement on 
hermeneutics which bridges the realities of psalm form and function in a way crucially 
important to Brueggemann’s developing typology. The subsequent book, subtitled a 
“theological commentary,” largely assumes the hermeneutics proposed in the article 
(Ricoeur’s considerable influence is only mentioned in footnotes) and on that basis 
builds out more detailed biblical and theological analysis of Brueggemann’s proposal on 
the Psalms. 
 As earlier stated, Brueggemann introduces the book as a “postcritical” approach, 
an effort to join contemporary biblical scholarship with the long traditions of church 
practice. “That is, we shall try to take full account of the critical gains made by such 
scholars as Gunkel, Mowinckel, and Westermann, without betraying any of the 
precritical passion, naivete, and insight of believing exposition.” 
93
 Text criticism 
therefore comes alongside theology. “Specifically there is a close correspondence 
between ,!&$)5),"/7$"+$,!&$.)/&5,$>()./ (which Westermann as a critical scholar has 
shown to be structurally central for the entire collection) and ,!&$)5),"/7$"+$ ,!&$ ("?. 
(which Calvin related to his discernment and presentation of biblical faith).”
94
 The 
function of the Psalms, discerned in light of lament psalm form, provides the way 
towards correspondence between biblical criticism and theological tradition: 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 31. “It likewise makes sense to follow Mowinckel in the notion that the festival of the cult is 
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which sought an adequate and imaginative expression of faith. It is in the Psalms that he found the whole 
faith of the whole person articulated. He was able to say that the Psalms are an ‘anatomy of the soul,’ 
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preface to his 4"//&5,)67$"5$,!&$-()./( as cited by Ford L. Battles and Stanley Tagg, %!&$-2&,7$"+$A"!5$
4).@25$(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1978), 27. 
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To pursue that close correspondence, we shall propose a movement and dynamic 
among the Psalms that suggests an interrelatedness, without seeking to impose a rigid 
scheme upon the poems, which must be honored, each in its own distinctiveness. Above 
all, we intend our interpretation to be belief-full, that is, in the service of the church’s 
best, most responsible faith. The point is to let the text have its evangelical say, to make 
its evangelical claim.
95
 
“Movement and dynamic” are crucial possibilities implied by the hermeneutics of 
Brueggemann’s newly-minted tripartite typology—a typology built to accomplish the 
recovery of lament which Westermann’s work called forth but could never truly 
complete. Brueggemann’s interpretive goal is no less than to underwrite “the church’s 
best, most responsible faith.” 
 The three categories of his typology—psalms of orientation, disorientation, and 
reorientation—comprise the essential structure of the book. From the outset 
Brueggemann asserts that these are primarily categories of function discerned in the 
paradigmatic form of the lament psalm. Hearkening back to earlier observations of the 
power of petition and praise, Brueggemann discerns “,#"$ ;&32(2@&$ /"@&($ "+$ +)2,!” 
throughout the Psalter: 
One move we make is "?,$"+$)$(&,,.&;$"62&5,),2"5$25,"$)$(&)("5$"+$;2("62&5,),2"5… It is 
that move which characterizes much of Psalms in the form of complaint and 
lament…The other move we make is a move +6"/$)$3"5,&S,$"+$;2("62&5,),2"5$,"$)$5&#$
"62&5,),2"5, surprised by a new gift from God, a new coherence made present to us just 
when we thought all was lost…This second move also characterizes many of the 
Psalms, in the form of songs of thanksgiving and declarative hymns…
96
 
Because Brueggemann’s three types arise as descriptors of function, he is able to 
propose why critical analysis and faith practice belong together. “In ordering the Psalms 
in such a way, I hope to suggest a link between critical study of forms and precritical 
awareness of experiences of well-being and betrayal, of despair and surprise.”
97
 %!&$
'&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./( thus, in exegetical and theological practice, strives to 
demonstrate what “Psalms and the Life of Faith” articulates in theory: the hermeneutical 
link of language and experience for faith.  
 
 i. Psalms of Orientation 
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96 Ibid., 20-1, italics original. 
97 Ibid., 21. 
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 Well-being is the subject of the psalms of orientation, and Brueggemann 
believes these Psalms to have both a sociological and an eschatological function. He 
presents five sub-types—songs of creation, songs of Torah, wisdom psalms, song of 
retribution and occasions of well-being—and asserts, “The function of this kind of 
psalm is theological, i.e., to praise and thank God.”
98
 Sociologically, these psalms 
create for the faith community “a canopy of certitude—despite all the incongruities of 
life.”
99
 He gleans this insight from Mowinckel. “This is a major gain of Mowinckel’s 
work on the creative power of public worship. Such worship is indeed ‘world-making.’ 
These psalms become a means whereby the creator is in fact creating the world.”
100
 But 
this intertwining of text and theology of creation has a downside; “It follows that these 
psalms may not only serve as ‘sacred canopy’ to permit communal life. They may also 
serve as a +"6/$ "+$ ("32).$ 3"5,6".… Creation faith is most usually articulated by the 
powerful people in society.”
101
 Brueggemann is ever concerned for possible misuse or 
even abuse of certain aspects of the text “to justify morally the view that those who do 
not prosper in the world are those who live outside the parameters and priorities of 
God’s creation.”
102
 
Potentially abusive control is only prevented by also understanding psalms of 
orientation in terms of eschatological function: 
These same psalms provide a point of reference even for those who share in none of the 
present “goodies,” but who cling in hope to the conviction that God’s good intention for 
creation will finally triumph and there will be an equity and a Sabbath for all God’s 
creatures… Such an eschatological note, I suggest, moves the psalm from its original 
social function of social 3"5(,6?3,2"5$)5;$/)25,&5)53&$to this broader more widespread 
use concerning ,6)5(+"6/),2"5$and new creation.
103
 
Brueggemann, following Childs here, believes that all orientation in the psalms, 
including the very orientation of the psalter itself, must be understood 
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99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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eschatologically.
104
 Thus Brueggemann writes, “The eschatological and cultic 
dimensions must be held together or both will be misunderstood.”
105
  
 
 ii. Psalms of Disorientation 
 
Betrayal and despair are the subjects of the psalms of disorientation. These 
individual and communal laments touch both “faith moves” at the heart of 
Brueggemann’s proposal. They express in relation to themselves both the movement 
from orientation to disorientation and the transforming movement into reorientation. 
Disorientation also gets the most attention from Brueggemann because these psalms 
offer “the part of the Psalter that has most been neglected in church use.”
106
 It is their 
significance Brueggemann upholds and their loss which he himself continues to lament:  
It is a curious fact that the church has, by and large, continued to sing songs of 
orientation in a world increasingly experienced as disoriented. That may be laudatory. 
…But at best, this is only partly true. It is my judgment that this action of the church is 
less an evangelical defiance guided by faith, and much more a frightened, numb denial 
and deception that does not want to acknowledge or experience the disorientation of 
life. The reason for such relentless affirmation of our orientation seems to come, not 
from faith, but from the wishful optimism of our culture.
107
 
The root of Brueggemann’s recovery of lament is his belief that no biblical text or 
human reality should be neglected. “Thus these psalms make the important connection: 
everything must be B6"?*!,$ ,"$ (>&&3!, and everything brought to speech must be 
);;6&((&;$ ,"$G";, who is the final reference for all of life.”
108
 This is the lesson of 
Israel’s faith as expressed in the Psalms. “The remarkable thing about Israel is that it did 
not banish or deny the darkness from its religious enterprise. It embraces the darkness as 
the very stuff of new life. Indeed, Israel seems to know that new life comes nowhere 
else.”
109
  
                                                 
104 “However one explains it, the final form of the Psalter is highly eschatological in nature.” See Brevard 
S. Childs, 85,6";?3,2"5$,"$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,$)($D362>,?6&$(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 518, as 
cited by Brueggemann, '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 181-2, nt 11.  
105 Ibid., 181-2, nt 11. Ibid., 28, also states that this theological understanding is necessary to proper 
interpretation. “Thus the very psalms that may serve as ("32).$3"5,6". may also function as a ("32).$
)5,232>),2"5, which becomes ("32).$362,232(/. But that requires that we be aware and intentional in our 
usage and the orientation that we articulate through them.”  
106 Ibid., 123. 
107 Ibid., 51. 
108 Ibid., 52. 
109 Ibid., 53. 
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 Much as before, Brueggemann emphasizes the shape of Israel’s faith in the form 
of lament. This begins with boldness in address to God. “First, the gamut of expressions 
employed here never escapes the address of Yahweh.”
110
 All of this speech can and 
should be directed to Israel’s God because “Yahweh does not have protected 
sensitivities. Yahweh is expected and presumed to receive the fullness of Israel’s 
speech.”
111
 The form also presents Israel’s faith in expectation of transformation. 
“Second, though this speech is liberated and expansive, it tends to come to expression in 
rather consistent and rigorous forms.”
112
 This does not indicate a lack of creativity in 
Israel, but demonstrates a kind of ordering which generations of psalms readers rely on 
even in disorientation. “The speech serves in a remarkable way, both to speak about the 
collapse of all oriented forms, and yet to assure that even in the chaos of the moment 
there is Yahweh-directed order.”
113
 From this exposition of lament form Brueggemann 
makes his consistent conclusion, “Thus the sequence of complaint-praise is a necessary 
and legitimate way with God, each part in its own, appropriate time. But one moment is 
not less faithful than the other.”
114
 
 Brueggemann also evaluates what the transformation from plea to praise means. 
While the more formal concerns of Begrich’s hypothesis are considered, Brueggemann 
focuses on how the transformative move expressed in the text translates to human 
experience. 
What is clear in the text is that there is a covenantal-theological move from one part of 
the text to the next. Beyond that, we are engaged in speculation. We do not know 
concretely how this covenantal-theological move was made. What we do know, both 
+6"/$,!&$(,6?3,?6&$"+$,!&$,&S, and "?6$"#5$&S>&62&53&, is that grievance addressed to an 
authorized partner does free us. That is the insight behind Freud’s theory of talk-
therapy, that we do not move beyond the repressed memory unless we speak it out loud 
to one with authority who hears. In our culture we have understood that in terms of one-
on-one therapy. We still have to learn that this is true socially and liturgically. These 
psalms provide important materials for that learning.
115
 
Here Brueggemann does not allow theological ambiguity over !"# human 
transformation actually !)>>&5( to obscure his description of the transforming result of 
the lament psalm form.  This is the implication of the social and liturgical learning he 
calls for; the function of lament in the Christian church should mirror its role in Israel. 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., 54. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 56. 
115 Ibid., 58, italics original. 
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True joy which enriched the life and faith of Israel, and which enriches the life of 
Israel’s descendant, the Church as the Body of Christ, comes not through suppressing 
sorrow but in its expression unto God. We are “free” to praise God only to the extent to 
which we bear witness to the suffering and sorrow we experience. Expectation of God’s 
response to suffering which arises from within the form is further tied to human 
expression of suffering. “It is the honest address to God that moves the relationship to 
new possibilities of faithfulness that can only be reached through such risky honesty. In 
the full relationship, ,!&$ (&)("5$ "+$ >.&) must be taken as seriously as the (&)("5$ "+$
>6)2(&.”
116
  
 
 iii. Psalms of New Orientation 
 
 Surprise characterizes the psalms of reorientation, which Brueggemann here 
labels “new orientation.” Through songs of thanksgiving and hymns of praise, these 
psalms “bear witness to the surprising gift of new life just when none had been 
expected. That new orientation is not a return to the old stable orientation, for there is no 
such going back.”
117
 Brueggemann qualifies this description with two methodological 
factors. “First, one must make an exegetical decision, not always objectively, whether a 
psalm speaks of old orientation or new orientation.”
118
 He acknowledges that such 
decisions reflect the “dynamic” nature of a typology based on function rather than form. 
“Second, it is evident that the psalms of new orientation offer a variety of solutions on a 
continuum of continuity and discontinuity. The new orientation is seldom utterly 
removed from the old orientation.”
119
 Brueggemann’s methodology attempts 
simultaneously to encompass all possibilities while emphasizing the extremity of 
celebration. “We shall see that the experiences and expressions of new orientation are 
rich and varied, for the newness of the treasure outdistances all the conventional modes 
of speech.”
120
 
                                                 
116 Ibid.<$57, italics original. 
117 Ibid., 123-24. 
118 Ibid., 125. Brueggemann cites John Goldingay who has insisted that the typology of specific psalms is 
not static, but may have functioned differently according to context. See Goldingay, “The Dynamic Cycle 
of Praise and Prayer in the Psalms,” A"?65).$+"6$,!&$D,?;7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5, 21 (1981): 85-90, and 
Walter Brueggemann, “Response to John Goldingay's ‘The Dynamic Cycle of Praise and Prayer’,” (20, 
85-90 1981),” in A"?65).$+"6$,!&$D,?;7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,$ 22 (1982): 141-42. 
119 Brueggemann, '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 125. 
120 Ibid. 
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 Because the surprise of these psalms emerges from the transformation of 
disorientation, Brueggemann again stresses that the function of reorientation is 
anticipated in the lament form. “That is, we can have free-standing statements of new 
orientation for which God is gladly credited, but we will be helped to see that such 
statements of new orientation always have in their background statements of 
trouble.”
121
 Thus, as he did from the side of disorientation, Brueggemann now reflects 
on the experience of transformation in light of reorientation.  
                                                
The break point of the lament form which turns +6"/$ >.&)$ ,"$ >6)2(& is of course a 
literary phenomenon, but it does not illuminate how we receive the new experience of 
orientation. It simply gives expression to it. The question of how the move is made is 
not a literary, but a theological matter. …No amount of literary form or structure or 
habit will account for the new experience. Along with ,!&$ .2,&6)67$ !)B2, which 
dominates these psalms comes ,!&$ ,!&"."*23).$ &S>&62&53& of the will and power to 
transform reality. All these prayers and songs bespeak the intervening action of God to 
give life in a world where death seems to have the best and strongest way. The songs 
are not about the “natural” outcome of trouble, but about the decisive ,6)5(+"6/),2"5 
made possible by this God who causes new life where none seems possible.
122
 
As before, Brueggemann appears to differentiate the experience of transformation from 
the expression of it. More clearly here he states that “how we receive” reorientation is a 
“,!&"."*23).$ &S>&62&53&” which differs from a merely literary expression of that 
experience. Nevertheless, Brueggemann offers no further reflection on the theological 
nature of transformation other than to continue to emphasize the functional results: “In 
that movement of transformation are found both the power of life and the passion for 
praise of God.”
123
 
 
       C. The Concluding Message  
 
Beyond analyzing psalm function in ancient Israel, the typology of orientation, 
disorientation and reorientation developed in %!&$ '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./($ connects 
language and experience in such a way to become, in short, a biblical theology of 
transformation amidst suffering. The form of the lament and the overall shape of the 
Psalter convey a distinct understanding of faith amidst the most extreme realities of life, 
including that reality which most decisively shapes Christian faith—the life, death and 
 
121 Ibid., 124. 
122 Ibid., 124-25. 
123 Ibid., 128.  
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resurrection of Christ. In the preface, Brueggemann describes his conclusions 
accordingly: 
My main interest has been theological. I have concluded at the end of the study (and not 
as a presupposition) that the shape and dynamic of the Psalms can most usefully be 
understood according to the theological framework of crucifixion and resurrection. By 
that I do not want to turn the Psalms into a “Christian book,” for I have repeatedly 
stressed the profoundly Jewish character of the material. Rather, I mean the 
following…The moves of orientation-disorientation-new orientation are for Christians 
most clearly played out in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, but not exclusively there. I find 
Phil. 2:5-11 a helpful articulation of this movement. It can without any forcing, be 
correlated: 
Orientation: “Though he was in the form of God…” 
Disorientation: “He emptied himself.” 
New Orientation: “Therefore God has highly exalted him…” 
I do not understand that in any ontological way and am not interested in Christological 
speculation. Rather, the life of Jesus, and especially the passion narrative, does portray 
his life in precisely that fashion, perhaps with special affinity to the liturgical destiny of 
the king.
124
 
As an Old Testament scholar, Brueggemann makes clear he is not simply trying to 
“Christianize” Israel’s texts, but he still wants to understand their efficacy in Christian 
theology and practice. He further summarizes his conclusions in the introduction: 
The theological dimension of this proposal is to provide a connection among Y)Z focal 
moments of Christian faith (crucifixion and resurrection), YBZ decisive inclinations of 
Jewish piety (suffering and hope), Y3Z psalmic expressions that are most recurrent 
(lament and praise), and Y;Z$seasons in our own life of dying and being raised. If the 
Psalms can be understood with these knowing sensitivities, our own use of them will 
have more depth and significance in the practice of both Jewish and Christian forms of 
biblical faith.
125
 
For Brueggemann, it is these “knowing sensitivities” which operate to make function 
itself the core reality of the Psalms in the life of faith. The point of joining language and 
experience via hermeneutics is so that such sensitivities may be understood through the 
Psalms in a way which then properly applies to !"# biblical faith transforms human 
existence. Such a move in regards to biblical texts is always one which is theological, 
and in this sense, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./($truly is a “theological commentary.” 
 Nevertheless, proposing that language expresses transformation through faith, 
and even proposing that language shapes or evokes human response in transformation, 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 10-11. 
125 Ibid., 21-22. 
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does not reveal all of the aspects of !"# faith transforms. As Brueggemann writes about 
the psalms of new orientation, “No amount of literary form or structure or habit will 
account for the new experience. Along with ,!&$ .2,&6)67$ !)B2, which dominates these 
psalms comes ,!&$,!&"."*23).$&S>&62&53& of the will and power to transform reality.”
126
 
An adequate account of how ,!2( theological experience functions remains yet to be 
found amidst Brueggemann’s significant study of the Psalms. In the coming chapter, we 
will explore the ongoing development of Brueggemann’s theology in the light of this 
concern. The innovations acquired through his Psalms scholarship, derived from his 
emphasis on lament, will take on new directions as he continues to wrestle with how 
scriptural expressions of joy and suffering function in faith. 
The evolving nature of Brueggemann’s theological method does not, however, 
undermine the reinvigoration which his typological proposal shoots through veins of 
contemporary study of the Psalms. Patrick Miller concludes that in Brueggemann “we 
have a significant alternative to Gunkel’s categories” which may be used by pastors and 
scholars alike.
127
 Brueggemann’s analysis of the psalms of lament as a typical form 
which shapes human expression of suffering towards expectation of God’s response 
becomes the basis for describing how the psalter as a whole functioned in Israel and 
continues to function in the Christian church today.  This allows him to bridge the often 
wide gap between contemporary practioner and academic by not allowing the latter to 
reduce the Psalms to relics of history or the former to ignore the relevance of these texts 
for contemporary faith.
128
  
Furthermore, his Psalms scholarship allows Brueggemann the means to 
powerfully reconnect faith in the Old Testament to that of the New. Bernhard Anderson 
describes the theological circumstance which confronts all Christian interpretation of 
the Psalms: 
The New Testament, of course, proclaims that God has spoken decisively in Jesus 
Christ, thereby endorsing the promises made to Israel. But the Christian community 
also finds itself living in the interim between the inauguration of God’s kingdom and its 
                                                 
126 '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 124-25. 
127 Miller, “Introduction,” xii. 
128 See H. G. M. Williamson, “Reading the Lament Psalms Backwards” in 1$G";$D"$F&)60$E(()7($"5$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*7$25$M"5"6$"+$-),623L$=U$$'2..&6, Brent A. Strawn and Nancy R. Bowen, eds. (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003) 4.  “I know, for instance, that I am not alone in having found Walter 
Brueggemann’s essay “Psalms and Life of Faith: A Suggested Typology of Function” to be a shaft of 
light, penetrating the darkness that had settled over the responsible use of the psalms in personal and 
pastoral practice after the pall cast by the overly wooden and historicist application of some form-critical 
approaches.”  
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final realization, between the first break of dawn and the full light of day. …Therefore 
the church knows too the trials of faith that are poignantly expressed in the laments of 
the Psalter.129  
For Brueggemann, Christian theology must never forget that faith is lived “in the 
interim,” a reality which continually necessitates the kind of faith expressed in the 
psalms of lament. These texts, shaped through the form of petition and praise, 
demonstrate that ).. human experience, both joy )5;$suffering, should be addressed to 
God and this boldness of expression is as much an act of faith as is the bold expectation 
that God will respond in transformation. This is first and foremost the message which 
Brueggemann finds in the Psalms as he strives to articulate how this biblical faith 
enables transformation from “hurt to joy, from death to life.” 
 
129 Bernhard W. Anderson with Steven Bishop, :?,$"+$,!&$=&>,!(0$%!&$-()./($D>&)L$+"6$[($%";)7, (3rd 
ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 55. 
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~2~ 
 
 A Faithful Response or the Constitution of Our Faith? The Lament 
Psalm in Brueggemann’s Theology 
 
 
I. Brueggemann’s Theology in Transition 
 
The previous chapter traced the development of Walter Brueggemann’s 
theological understanding of biblical faith through his study of human joy and suffering 
expressed in the Psalms. Specifically, Brueggemann proposes how the typical form of 
the lament psalm functions to “shape” faith in response to God amidst the most extreme 
human experiences—a focus which arises relatively early in his career as a biblical 
scholar, and from the beginning of his significant work on the Psalms.  
Over a decade later, around the time %!&$ '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./( is being 
published, Brueggemann is undergoing a period in his life and career which he later 
describes as a “reeducation” in the field of Old Testament studies. This is not a 
complete dismissal of previous influences or methods but rather a “new attentiveness” 
illuminated by further interdisciplinary engagement. He writes, “…in 1985… I was 
being reeducated in my work, away from a singular preoccupation with historical 
criticism and toward a new attentiveness to rhetorical and sociological dimensions of 
interpretation.”
1
 Perhaps then it is no surprise that Brueggemann seems not entirely 
settled upon the theological nature of his proposals in '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./(. 
Nevertheless, his intentions become increasingly apparent as that work and others apply 
literary theory and the social sciences to theological interpretation. “Rather, I have 
wanted to use these methods to pursue… matters of epistemology and interpretive 
theory. Here I am attempting to take the Bible seriously on its own terms and to insist 
that every part of the text must be taken with theological seriousness.”
2
 
 Such theological seriousness appears to be at the center of Brueggemann’s 
continued emphasis on the form of the lament psalm and its role in deriving his 
proposed typology of Psalm function. He finds the form of lament to indicate, in 
                                                 
1 Walter Brueggemann, “Preface to the Second Edition,” =)@2;9($%6?,!$25$8(6)&.9($8/)*25),2"5$)5;$
'&/"67 (2nd ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), ix.  
2 Walter Brueggemann, “Preface to the First Edition,” =)@2;9($%6?,!$25$8(6)&.9($8/)*25),2"5$)5;$'&/"67 
(2nd ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002; repr. from 1st ed., 1985), xix. 
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miniature, the shape of faith manifest by “every part of the text” from the depths of 
sorrow to the ecstatic heights of joy. However, exactly how Brueggemann finds faith to 
take shape ,!6"?*! this form remains unclear. Following Ricoeur’s work in 
hermeneutics Brueggemann regards the language of the Psalms to be descriptive and 
evocative of reality. To be sure, both the typical lament psalm form and the Psalter as a 
whole ;&(362B& faith as response to God in bold petition for, expectant hope of, and 
joyful praise in transformation. In this sense language &@"L&( a certain shape of faith—a 
faith which fittingly responds to God in every experience of life. Yet how does this 
response arise ,!6"?*! faith? As '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./($states, “No amount of literary 
form or structure or habit will account for the new experience. Along with ,!&$.2,&6)67$
!)B2, which dominates these psalms comes ,!&$ ,!&"."*23).$&S>&62&53& of the will and 
power to transform reality.”
3
 Brueggemann has yet to adequately account for this 
transforming “will and power”. Therefore, the serious theological question which 
remains is not simply how faith transforms the human experience of suffering, but, 
crucially, #!"$/)L&($>"((2B.&$(?3!$,6)5(+"6/25*$+)2,!. 
This chapter traces how the social sciences increasingly influence the 
development of precisely this issue in Brueggemann’s theology. According to Miller, 
“The Psalms, for (Brueggemann), are not simply ancient texts or routinized elements of 
a liturgy. As they come to speech, as they are read, they make claims about reality, 
indeed shape reality in ways more potent and shocking than we usually realize.”
4
 As 
Brueggemann’s sociological engagement evolves, so does his own theological 
realization of the evocative function of lament psalm form. At stake is nothing less than 
his understanding of how response, both human and divine, constitutes the reality of 
faith itself. 
 
A. Seeking the Proper Shape of Faith 
 
i. Reshaping the Message 
 
Already in the final chapter of %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, which Brueggemann 
labels a “retrospect,” he begins to indicate the changing direction of his theology. Faith 
                                                 
3 Brueggemann, '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 124-5. 
4 Patrick D. Miller, “Introduction,” %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,!, xii. 
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amidst human suffering remains at the forefront as he worries that his own “very 
selected reading” has not been able to “fully take into account the decisively Jewish 
character of the Psalms.”
5
  Brueggemann thus reconsiders his previous work through a 
sociological examination of theodicy. 
These concluding comments explore the ways in which the notion of (>262,?).2,7$ is 
treated in the Psalms in relation to the issue of ,!&";237. I do not want to schematize 
excessively, but I suggest that theodicy is a characteristically Jewish concern that may 
correct or discipline a Christian restriction of the Psalms to privatistic, romantic 
spirituality. That is, 3"//?52"5$#2,!$G"; cannot be celebrated without attention to the 
5),?6&$"+$,!&$3"//?52,7, both among human persons and with God. I&.2*2"?($!?5*&6($
in Israel never preclude T?(,23&$K?&(,2"5(. Indeed, it is through the question of T?(,23& 
that 3"//?52"5$is mediated…
6
 
While noting  “[t]he conventional idea of theodicy concerns God in relation to evil,” 
Brueggemann is not focused simply on “a narrow question about God” but also “the 
character of God as practiced in the system of values in the social matrix.”
7
  
This particular approach to theodicy allows Brueggemann to make connections 
between the spirituality of his psalms typology and their sociological function in 
relation to suffering. He notes that while theodicy can legitimate societal structure, any 
suffering which goes unaddressed by theodicy can bring such structures into question. 
“A ,!&";237$ "+$ 3"5(&5(?($ is operative in every stable society. …The shift from a 
3"5(&5(?($)B"?,$ ,!&";237 to a 362(2($ 25$ ,!&";237 can be indentified in every liberation 
movement that questions the old settled arrangements.”
8
  He then aligns “consensus” 
with psalms of orientation and “crisis” with psalms of disorientation. The latter provide 
a necessary function for societal renewal: 
What is important in this analysis is that the aim is to “bring into being a new system of 
meaning for society as a whole.” But a new system of meaning will not come without 
abrasion, and that is what these psalms offer. A disruptive break with the ,!&";237$"+$
3"5(&5(?( is a prerequisite to a new ,!&";237$"+$T?(,23&.
9
  
This third category of “justice” therefore connects to the psalms of new orientation. 
The psalms of new orientation celebrate a new settlement of the issue of theodicy. The 
crisis is past, and there is again a stable paradigm for social life. Revolutions do not so 
                                                 
5 Brueggemann, '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 168 
6 Ibid., 169, italics original. 
7 Ibid., 169, 170. 
8 Ibid., 171. 
9 Ibid., 175. 
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readily succeed, but in the life of the liturgy, one advances the hunch and hopes that this 
result will come. The liturgical event is a foretaste of the real settlement.
10
 
Finally, in exploring sociological connections to theodicy through the Psalms, 
Brueggemann concludes that he is in fact seeking to contextualize biblical faith in 
relationship to God. “This does not detract from the conviction that God is powerful 
Spirit. It does not reduce the Psalms to political documents. It rather insists that our 
spirituality must answer to the God who is present where the questions of justice and 
order, transformation and equilibrium are paramount.”
11
 
 Despite an analysis of suffering explicitly focused through sociological methods, 
Brueggemann doggedly remains committed to understanding the theological articulation 
of faith in the Psalms. Again, his goal is not reduction to mere “political documents,” 
and he emphasizes the power of God’s presence for the biblical spirituality derived here. 
But how does God’s presence and power truly shape human faith? This remains a live 
issue as Brueggemann produces two programmatic articles on theology of the Old 
Testament. 
 
ii. “A Shape for Old Testament Theology” 
 
The issue of suffering at the nexus of sociology and theology is on hand as 
Brueggemann proposes that the “question of pain…is the main question of Old 
Testament faith” in a pair of articles published in different issues of %!&$ 4),!".23$
O2B.23).$ \?)6,&6.7 in 1985.
12
 Both share the title “A Shape for Old Testament 
Theology” while respectively proposing aspects of the dual shape emphasized in 
Brueggemann’s emerging method of interpretation.  
Any theology must be bipolar to reflect the central tension of the literature. The bipolar 
construct I suggest is that Old Testament faith serves both to legitimate structure and to 
embrace pain. It will be clear that this argument is informed by the work of 
Westermann, Terrien, and Hanson, but I wish to suggest very different nuances.
13
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 176. 
12 Walter Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I: Structure Legitimation,” 4O\ 47 
(1985): 28-46, and “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” 4O\ 47 (1985): 395-
415; repr. in :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$%&S, (ed. Patrick D. Miller; 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992). All following pagination reflects the later publication. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
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The reference to Westermann and the necessity of a “bipolar” tension indicate how 
Brueggemann’s previous emphasis on the dual nature of lament psalm form is becoming 
a wider factor in his study of the Old Testament. Brueggemann seeks to come to terms 
with how all of Israel’s scripture expresses faith amidst human tension—tension 
generated by trying to reconcile experiences as divergent as suffering which provokes 
petition and joy which evokes praise.
14
 As Miller writes, “Brueggemann has taken his 
place among a number of Old Testament theologians…who understand that the 
theology of the Old Testament develops not out of a particular central or foundational 
point but in various kinds of tensions and dialectics.”
15
  
 
a. Structure Legitimation 
  
 This first article outlines the overall scope of the interpretive issues at hand. As 
noted above, Brueggemann follows Westermann, Terrien, Hanson and others in a 
dialectical approach to Old Testament theology. Additionally, he is influenced by what 
he sees as the opposing approaches of Brevard Childs and Norman Gottwald. His 
inclination is to join them together dialectically: 
Both Childs and Gottwald must be taken seriously. The point is not to choose one to the 
disregard of the other although holding them together is not easy. With Gottwald, it is 
important to see that the text has reached its present form and shape by being 25$ ,!&$
+6)7. These theological claims did not come out of the sky, nor did they have any prior 
claim to authority; but with Childs, it can be argued that the text as we have it is )B"@&$
,!&$ +6)7, the fray of historical interaction and historical-critical analysis. Whereas 
Gottwald is sociologically relentless, Childs is theologically reassuring. That tension is 
part of the richness of this faith claim and is also part of its problematic that we must 
study.
16
 
Beyond the fact that this tension of “)B"@&$,!&$+6)7” and “25$,!&$+6)7” readily connects 
to Brueggemann’s dialectical tendencies, it also has a profound effect on how 
                                                 
14 Of course, Brueggemann does not find lament form, as the duality of petition and praise, to be the only 
manifestation of bipolar function in the Old Testament. Westermann here is discussed with particular 
reference to “blessing” and “deliverance.” References to Terrien and Hanson also indicate other 
dialectical modes of scholarship which influence Brueggemann (see pg. 2 and nt 4). For more elaboration 
on the convergence of these three scholars see Brueggemann, “A Convergence in Recent Old Testament 
Theologies,” AD:% 18 (1980): 2-18; repr. in in :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$
%&S, (ed. Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 95-110. 
15 Miller, introduction to$:.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$%&S,, by Walter 
Brueggemann (ed. Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), xv. Miller also points out that this 
concept of dialectic first appears in Brueggemann’s theology via %!&$-6">!&,23$8/)*25),2"5$
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1978), 14 and passim. 
16 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I,” 3, italics original. 
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sociological considerations enter into methodological discussions of theology. 
Specifically, in seeking the proper shape of Old Testament theology, Brueggemann 
finds that the “connection” between the sociological approach of Gottwald
17
 and the 
theological assumptions of Childs
18
 creates a tension which is ultimately irresolvable. 
“A careful understanding of the literature shows that we are 5",$ +6&&$ ,"$ 6&(".@& the 
tension… The Old Testament both enters the fray of ambiguity and seeks distance from 
the fray to find something certain and sure.”
19
 
 This first article presents the first half of Brueggemann’s proposed dialectical 
shape—the movement towards structural legitimation in theology. Discussion focuses 
on the 3"//"5$ ,!&"."*7 articulated by Morton Smith who emphasized the regular 
pattern of ancient Near Eastern cultures in bolstering the respective claims of their 
religions.
20
  Brueggemann finds usefulness in Gottwald’s sociological appropriation of 
Smith:  
Gottwald has taken the elements of Smith’s analysis and expressed them now in terms 
of his sociological analysis, an element admittedly absent in Smith’s presentation. 
…Theological categories are understood to have social and political counterparts so that 
these statements about God now are also understood as statements about the /2(?(&($"+$
!?/)5$>"#&6 and the >6">&6$?(&$"+$!?/)5$>"#&6; that is, the high claims for God are 
now understood also as high claims for political authority in Israel. …So I suggest, 
following Gottwald, that biblical theology needs to reconsider its understandings of 
God in relation to sociological spin-offs that are implicit in those understandings.
21
 
While Gottwald effectively establishes links between sociology and theology, this is yet 
not enough for Brueggemann. “In a way Gottwald does not press, however, we must 
know that these matters are genuinely theological issues. …Gottwald’s argument is 
largely sociological; that is, he does not address frontally questions of the character of 
God.”
22
 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 4, “Insofar as this faith enters the fray of Israel’s experience, it reflects the )/B2*?2,7$"+$"?6$
&S>&62&53&( about structure and pain caused by structure. I understand this to be at the heart of Gottwald’s 
argument that Israel’s sense about God has arisen precisely in connection with the ambiguity and pain of 
historical experience.” (italics original). 
18 Ibid., 5, “Insofar as this faith makes claims beyond the fray of experience, it offers to the faithful 
community )$5"6/),2@&$(,)5;25*$>.)3& that may not be derived from the common theology but that 
articulates a normative truth about God not subject to the processes of the articulation. I understand this 
point to be implied in the canonical position of Childs.” (italics original). 
19 Ibid., 5, italics original. 
20 Ibid, 5. “Smith offers a critique of those who work too intently at the distinctiveness of the Old 
Testament. Smith argues that the structure of belief found all over the Near East and in the Old Testament 
has a common pattern and varies only in detail from culture to culture.” Brueggemann cites Smith, “The 
Common Theology of the Ancient Near East,” A"?65).$"+$O2B.23).$J2,&6),?6& 7 (1952): 35-47. 
21 Ibid., 7-8, italics original. 
22 Ibid., 8-9. 
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 The character of God is precisely Brueggemann’s theological concern. “To do 
Old Testament theology, however, one must ask not only about Yahweh as a function of 
social processes but about the character of Yahweh as a +6&&$)*&5, who has a life and 
interiority all God’s own.”
23
 Brueggemann remains unwilling to conceive of God as 
solely a sociological construct and concludes that the dialectical shape which he 
proposes must be understood as a distinctive theological reality. “The tension is not just 
in social processes. If theology is to have an integrity of its own, then Old Testament 
faith is God’s ongoing decision about the matter.”
24
 
 Divine reaction to existing religious structures in the light of human pain thus 
becomes the way in which Brueggemann finds a dialectical shape to the Old Testament. 
Precisely at this juncture, he reemphasizes the form and function of the lament psalms.  
I suggest that this question of pain, a pain experienced as personal hurt and expressed in 
the lament psalms and in the public outcry that leads to liberation (cf. Exod. 2:23-25), is 
the main question of Old Testament faith. …The issue that Israel and Israel’s God (and 
those who continue this line of reflection) must always face concerns pain—whether 
pain is simply a shameful aberration that can be handled by correction or whether it is 
the stuff of humanness, the vehicle for a break with triumphalism, both sociological and 
theological.
25
  
The cry of pain is the climax across which Brueggemann proposes the theological 
reality of tension even while understanding it sociologically. 
Doing Old Testament theology, however, requires that the issue should be stated not 
only with reference to social processes. …So it is to be noted and stressed that the new 
social movement begins with a cry of pain (Exod. 2:23-25) that is heard, perhaps 
surprisingly, by this nonimperial God upon whom the cry of pain can impinge. The 
narrative makes clear that this >)25$ @"23&;$ )5;$ >6"3&((&; is the stuff of this new 
relationship and this new social experiment.
26
  
God confronted by human pain is the theological nexus from which Brueggemann’s 
sociological possibilities emerge. “The new social possibility depends also upon the 
remarkable response of this God who takes this hurt as the new stuff of faithfulness. In 
response, this God makes an intervention in the historical process against the 
legitimated structures of the day and delegitimates them.”
27
 
 
b. Embrace of Pain  
                                                 
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 18-19. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ibid., 20. 
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 This second article begins by connecting the first and second half of 
Brueggemann’s dialectical proposal. Old Testament theology “fully partakes in the 
common theology of the ancient Near East,” and in doing so “[t]his theology provides 
an ordered sense of life that is lodged in the sovereignty of God, beyond the reach of 
historical circumstance. It is a way of speaking about God’s nonnegotiable 
governance.”
28
 The “nonnegotiable governance” of God does not, however, imply that 
all theological issues are settled. Rather, Brueggemann believes that the (,6?3,?6&$
.&*2,2/),2"5 characteristic of common theology must not be understood apart from that 
which he discerns to be the &/B6)3&$"+$>)25.  
My argument, therefore, in this second of two chapters is that Old Testament theology 
must attend to the embrace of pain as a posture of both Yahweh and Israel. By &/B6)3&$
"+$>)25 is meant the full acknowledgment of and experience of pain and the capacity 
and willingness to make that pain a substantive part of Israel’s faith-conversation with 
its God. Such an act of embrace means to articulate the pain fully, to insist on God’s 
reception of the speech and the pain, and to wait hopefully for God’s resolution.
29
 
Brueggemann finds that these two realities shape the tension of Old Testament theology 
which must never be resolved. 
The practice of pain embrace /?(,$ ).#)7( B&$ 25$ ,&5(2"5 with the legitimation of 
structure, never in place of it. …simply to choose the embrace of pain instead of 
legitimation of structure as a rubric for theology is romanticism. Israel will have none 
of that. The tension must be kept alive and visible.
30
 
From the other side, Brueggemann asserts, “Where there is only the legitimacy of 
structure without pain-embrace, there is only the good news that the system is the 
solution, whether the solution is in heaven or earth. Good biblical theology…keeps alive 
the tension that dares not be resolved.”
31
 
 The embrace of pain is centrally expressed through Israel’s .)/&5,. “The 
laments of Israel, as Claus Westermann has seen, are not marginal but decisive for the 
faith of Israel.”
32
 Brueggemann prioritizes lament because “in these speeches trouble is 
presented in such a way that it impinges upon Yahweh. Yahweh is no longer free to be a 
                                                 
28 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II,” 22. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 26. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 27. 
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trouble-free God who presides over untroubled legitimated structures…”
33
 Instead, ,!&$
@&67$3!)6)3,&6$"+$])!#&!$2($6&@2(&;. “Israel’s laments force God to recharacterization. 
This act of forcing God to recharacterization is not an unproblematic venture, 
theologically. It is in deep tension with the reality of God’s sovereign freedom to be 
whom God chooses to be.”
34
 M&6&$6!&,"623$)5;$,!&"."*7$).("$B&*25$,"$3"/&$,"*&,!&6U$
“Although this pattern is a matter of literary interest, it is also a matter of theological 
marvel and lives in tension with more static theological categories.”
35
 
 Through the remainder of the article Brueggemann discusses examples from the 
text of both Israel and God’s restlessness in and through lament. He concludes by again 
stressing that “tension must be kept alive in all faithful biblical theology. I do not 
believe one can say there is a development from one to the other, but there is an ongoing 
tension, unresolved and unresolvable.”
36
 Finally, Brueggemann indicates broad 
theological applications for this tension. “This double focus can be carried through in a 
biblical theology that probes what structure legitimation and pain-embracing mean for 
our understanding of God, of Israel, of human personhood, of church, of creation.”
37
 
 
iii. The Shape of Faith to Come 
 
 As Brueggemann traces the theological shape emerging from his study of the 
Old Testament, it is hard to overestimate the priority he gives to a growing 
conceptualization of textual dualities in tension.
38
 Brueggemann, of course, understands 
such tension to be a key feature of the psalms of lament, and he begins to more 
explicitly comment upon the sociological function of this aspect in the retrospect to %!&$
'&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./(.
39
 In his subsequent “Shape” articles, the categories of 
“structural legitimation” and “embrace of pain” seem inversely to coordinate with 
aspects of the petition and praise central to his understanding of lament psalm form, but 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 29. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 42. 
37 Ibid., 43. 
38 In another 1985 article he writes, “I submit that the matter of two trajectories in tension is likely to be 
an emerging scholarly paradigm that will dominate theological exposition for the coming decades.” See 
Brueggemann,$“Old Testament Theology as a Particular Conversation: Adjudication of Israel’s 
Sociotheological Alternatives,” in :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$%&S, (ed. 
Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 140; repr. from %!&"."*7$=2*&(,$32 (1985): 303-25. 
39 “But a new system of meaning will not come without abrasion, and that is what these psalms offer.” 
Brueggemann, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 175, op. cit. 
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their very inversion indicates an ongoing evolution in Brueggemann’s understanding of 
how the form functions. Whether in the lament psalm form or in the wider overall 
context of the Old Testament, for Brueggemann, the tension between dualities is 
becoming as important as the particular response each provides. 
 This new emphasis on tension gives a different contour to the way Brueggemann 
understands the shape of Israel’s faith. In terms of the lament psalm form, by looking 
beyond petition and praise understood merely as faithful responses, Brueggemann finds 
himself better able to track the social aspects of how the need for petition arises in the 
first place. In the language of his psalms typology, praise can express the surprise of 
reorientation (also called new orientation), but it can also undergird orientation, that 
which Brueggemann is now more comprehensively labeling “structure legitimation.” 
The petition becomes expressed when such structures become harmful or hurtful, and 
this is the move from orientation to disorientation, that which Brueggemann is now 
calling “embrace of pain.” Moreover, Brueggemann is now acutely emphasizing the 
tension at the root of this particular move so that sociological issues might be clearly 
identified.
40
  
 Even as his approach evolves, Brueggemann still appears expressly concerned 
with the theological amidst the social.
41
 As he writes, “The tension is not just in social 
processes. If theology is to have an integrity of its own, then Old Testament faith is 
God’s ongoing decision about the matter.”
42
 Nevertheless, properly understanding 
“God’s ongoing decision” means that any resolution implied by the form of lament 
cannot ultimately resolve the tension becoming so important for his theology. 
Following the lead of Westermann, a number of scholars have now seen that the 
structure of the lament psalm characteristically moves to resolution of the trouble, to 
praise, and to a restored, though changed, relationship. This, however, does not argue 
against embrace of pain, nor does it mute the power of such speech. Rather, it is to 
                                                 
40 Only a few years after this present pair of articles, Brueggemann writes, “Israel dared to imagine that 
such !?6,$2($)$3"//"5$&S>&62&53& generated wherever there are skewed power relations.” Here 
sociological models such as those of Gottwald seem to take firmer hold. See Brueggemann, “The 
Rhetoric of Hurt and Hope: Ethics Odd and Crucial,” in$:.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$
%!&/&<$)5;$%&S, (ed. Patrick D. Miller, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 49, italics original; repr. from %!&$
155?).$"+$,!&$D"32&,7$"+$4!62(,2)5$E,!23( (1989): 73-82.  
41 Miller, “Introduction,” :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*7, xiii, states, “The essays and articles collected here, 
however, reveal that he is an Old Testament theologian also in a broader—although no more important—
sense in that he believes that the Old Testament is a ,!&"."*23).$document in every sense of the word. Its 
subject matter is theological and its appropriation is theological. Brueggemann moves freely back and 
forth from scholarly and academic writing to the general and the popular. In neither case, however, does 
he ever fail to life up theological issues in the text or texts before him.” 
42 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I,” 9. See op. cit. 
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notice that embrace of pain is the only way in which pain can be submitted to God and 
thus resolved.
43
 
Brueggemann is quick to stress here that his understanding of lament does not allow the 
second half to unwind the power of the first. Again, in the language of his psalms 
typology, reorientation does not overrun disorientation. Rather he appears to understand 
the power of the form to depend upon Israel’s initial willingness to risk confrontation 
with God. 
It takes not only nerve but a fresh hunch about this God. The hunch is that this God 
does not want to be an unchallenged structure but one who can be frontally addressed. 
Such is the hope of lamenting Israel. The outcome of such challenge is not known in 
advance, not known until the risk is run to test the hunch.
44
 
As in all previous work, Brueggemann consistently demonstrates the brazenness with 
which Israel makes demands of God.  
 However, locating the hope in these demands is becoming more complicated. 
For Brueggemann, hunches and hopes in God initially seemed to be a part of the lament 
psalm from the very beginning, an orientation to a God who indeed transforms us “from 
hurt to joy, from death to life.” Yet, the %!&$ '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./(’s retrospect 
indicates how an evolving understanding of his typological categories parallels an 
evolving understanding of God in light of human experience: 
The format for our presentations of the Psalms has assumed that authentic spirituality, 
i.e., genuine communion with God, is never removed from the seasons, turns, and crises 
of life. So the modes of God’s presence (and absence) and the quality of communion 
are very different in times of orientation and disorientation.
45
 
Brueggemann pushes this understanding of the divine even further in his pair of 
“Shape” articles by proposing that “Israel’s laments force God to recharacterization.”
46
 
Such forced recharacterization of the divine may appear to beg the question of how such 
things as hunches and hopes can even properly arise. Do not hunches and hopes rest on 
characterizations of the object of hope which have been acquired over time?  
Here we should recall how Brueggemann earlier articulated hope in not only 
psalms of disorientation but also those of orientation.  
                                                 
43 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II,” 27 nt. 8. 
44 Ibid., 28. 
45 Ibid., 168. 
46 Ibid., 29. See op. cit. 
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These same psalms [of orientation] provide a point of reference even for those who 
share in none of the present “goodies,” but who cling in hope to the conviction that 
God’s good intention for creation will finally triumph and there will be an equity and a 
Sabbath for all God’s creatures… Such an eschatological note, I suggest, moves the 
psalm [of orientation] from its original social function of social 3"5(,6?3,2"5$ )5;$
/)25,&5)53&$ to this broader more widespread use concerning ,6)5(+"6/),2"5$and new 
creation.
47
 
Brueggemann’s understanding of orientation through %!&$ '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./( 
already anticipates the type of social concerns encompassed in his newer category of 
“structure legitimation.” In the earlier work he appears to allow for the possibility of 
proper hope arising in such orientation. “Thus the very psalms [of orientation] that may 
serve as ("32).$3"5,6". may also function as a ("32).$)5,232>),2"5, which becomes ("32).$
362,232(/. But that requires that we be aware and intentional in our usage and the 
orientation that we articulate through them.”
48
 But later, as the suggestions of his 
concluding retrospect are followed through upon in his pair of “Shape” articles, 
Brueggemann is clear that social criticism is encompassed in his category of “embrace 
of pain” which only clearly relates to disorientation. This leaves unclear his earlier 
suggestion that “structure legitimation” might provide the possibility of social 
anticipation, and therefore social critique.  
 Perhaps most clear through this particular pair of articles is Brueggemann’s 
increasing tendency to evaluate theological issues through the lenses of social science. 
This growing relationship has no little impact on how Brueggemann comes to 
understand God and faith found in the fray of human suffering and not just above it.
49
 
 
B. Reshaping Faithful Response to Suffering  
 
i. “The Costly Loss of Lament” 
 
 The evolution of Brueggemann’s theological methodology continues in this 
important 1986 article on lament. The purpose is clear from the outset: “I will explore 
the loss of life and faith incurred when the lament psalms are no longer used for their 
specific social function.”
50
 As is his custom, he begins with the current state of 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 28, italics original. 
48 Ibid. 
49 As we see in Ch. 3 below, Brueggemann’s festschrift is titled G";$85$,!&$N6)7.  
50 Walter Brueggemann, “The Costly Loss of Lament” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. 
Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 98; repr. from AD:% 36 (1986): 57-71. 
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scholarship which now quickly yields to critique that “scholars have only walked 
around the edges of the theological significance of the lament psalm. We have yet to ask 
what it means to have this form available in this social construction of reality.”
51
 
 This question becomes Brueggemann’s jumping off point for refining 
theological emphasis on lament through the social sciences.  
What difference does it make to have faith that permits and requires this form of 
prayer? My answer is that it shifts the calculus and 6&;6&((&($,!&$;2(,62B?,2"5$"+$>"#&6$
between the two parties, so that the petitionary party is taken seriously and the God who 
is addressed is newly engaged in the crisis in a way that puts God at risk.
52
 
Several assertions about how lament constructs reality are already at work here: the 
“redress” of power, leading to petition “taken seriously,” and God “newly engaged” and 
“at risk.” Each is developed later in the article but not before Brueggemann posits the 
conclusion that “[s]uch a speech pattern and social usage keep ).. power relations under 
review and capable of redefinition.
53
 Social realties seem to lead the way for theological 
definition, and Brueggemann pauses to propose why lament understood in this way is 
necessary.  
What happens when the speech forms that redress power distribution have been 
silenced and eliminated? The answer, I believe, is that a theological monopoly is 
reinforced, docility and submissiveness are engendered, and the outcome in terms of 
social-practice is to reinforce and consolidate the political-economic monopoly of the 
status quo.
54
  
Without lament, Brueggemann finds faith not only off balance but destructive, 
reinforcing harmful psychological and social realities. He consequently endeavors to 
mine the fields of psychology and sociology for “two possible gains for the recovery of 
lament.”
55
 
Beginning with psychology Brueggemann establishes the priority of lament in 
terms of relationship between God and believer. He observes that when lament is lost so 
is “*&5?25&$3"@&5)5,$25,&6)3,2"5.”
56
 When praise is allowed but not petition, faith loses 
its proper shape and condones only the existence of a joy which is inevitably false.  
                                                 
51 Ibid., 101. Brueggemann explicitly refers here to the “understanding of the social power of speech 
forms” proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, %!&$D"32).$4"5(,6?3,2"5$"+$I&).2,7 (Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1966). See ibid., nt. 15. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 101-2, italics mine. 
54 Ibid., 102. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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“Since such a celebrative, consenting silence does not square with reality, covenant 
minus lament is finally a practice of denial, cover-up, and pretense, which sanctions 
social control.”
57
  
Brueggemann addresses this problem through the “heuristic gain” of object-
relations theory and particularly the work of D. W. Winnicott.
58
 In Winnicott’s 
developmental analysis of the mother/child relationship, Brueggemann finds a parallel 
to the interaction exemplified by Israel and Yahweh in lament.  
We can draw a suggestive analogy from this understanding of the infant/mother 
relationship for our study of lament. Where there is lament, the believer is able to take 
initiative with God and so develop over against God the ego-strength that is necessary 
for responsible faith. But where the capacity to initiate lament is absent, one is left only 
with praise and doxology. God then is omnipotent, always to be praised. The believer is 
nothing, and can praise or accept guilt uncritically where life with God does not 
function properly. The outcome is a ‘False Self,’ bad faith that is based in fear and guilt 
and is lived out as resentful or self-deceptive works of righteousness. The absence of 
lament makes a religion of coercive obedience the only possibility.
59
 
This “suggestive analogy” illustrates why Brueggemann believes that lament has not 
only a descriptive function but also an evocative one. Just as a mother’s response to her 
child creates the possibility for the child to take initiative and thus come to maturity, so 
does God’s willingness to receive lament evoke the development of “responsible faith.” 
Lament, as both petition and praise, is a necessary form of response for the faithful to 
nourish “genuine obedience, which is not a contrived need to please, but a genuine 
yielding commitment.”
60
 
Brueggemann thus begins to clarify the conditions he believes are necessary for 
faithful response to suffering. The experience of omnipotence plays a critical role in 
connecting Brueggemann’s analogy between object relations theory and his 
understanding of lament. Just as the infant must experience omnipotence in relation to 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Object relations theory traces it beginnings to the early 20th century and Melanie Klein’s reactions to 
Freud’s psychoanalytic thought. While agreeing with the essential dynamics of human impulses proposed 
by Freud’s “drive” theory of human development, Klein found Freud’s internally-oriented thinking 
inadequate to describe the nature and influence of external relations upon people. Klein theorized 
impulses not as objectively isolatable realities, but rather realities rooted in and related to the objects from 
which they emerge.  
Winnicott was one of several theorists who “built on Klein’s vision of an infant wired for human 
interaction. Yet they also all broke with Klein’s premise of constitutional aggression deriving from the 
death instinct, proposing instead an infant wired for harmonious interaction and nontraumatic 
development but thwarted by inadequate parenting.” See Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black , 
N6&?;$)5;$O&7"5;0$1$M2(,"67$"+$'";&65$-(73!")5).7,23$%!"?*!, (New York: Basic Books, 1995),  113-
14. 
59 Brueggemann, “The Costly Loss of Lament,” 103-104. 
60 Ibid., 104. 
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the mother so must the believer actualize this experience before God. Without the 
petition of lament God becomes identified as “omnipotent, always to be praised.” This 
false relating to God leaves the believer with “a false narcissism that keeps hoping for a 
centered self but lacks the ego-strength for a real self to emerge.”
61
 Alternatively, 
Brueggemann’s analogy suggests “that the God who evokes and responds to lament is 
neither omnipotent in any conventional sense nor surrounded by docile reactors.”
62
 To 
underscore this point, Brueggemann even invokes the name of Calvin, “What is at issue 
here, as Calvin understood so well, is a true understanding of the human self but, at the 
same time, a radical discernment of this God who is capable of and willing to be 
respondent and not only initiator.”
63
  
  When Brueggemann moves on to sociology he observes that what results 
through “the absence of lament is the (,2+.25*$"+$,!&$K?&(,2"5$"+$,!&";237.”
64
 As with the 
retrospect in %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, and his previous pair of “Shape” articles, he is 
not implying here “esoteric” issues of God and evil but “[r]ather, I mean the capacity to 
raise and legitimate questions of justice in terms of social goods, social access, and 
social power.”
65
 Brueggemann’s psychological understanding revitalizes the social 
aspect of lament as a petitionary power against systemic injustice. “Lament occurs when 
the (systemic) dysfunction reaches an unacceptable level, when the injustice is 
intolerable and change is insisted upon.”
66
 In particular, Psalm 88 and Psalm 109 
exemplify Israel’s method of response to injustice.  
The God addressed is either the legitimator and the guarantor of the social process (as 
in Psalm 88) or the court of appeal against the system (as in Psalm 109). The claims and 
rights of the speaker are asserted to God in the face of a system that does not deliver. 
…In regularly using the lament form, Israel kept the justice question visible and 
legitimate.
67
  
From these psalms as well as examples of cry and rescue in the Exodus narrative, he 
draws the conclusion that “[w]hile the cry is addressed to Yahweh, it is clear that the cry 
is not merely a religious gesture but has important and direct links to social 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., italics original. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 105. 
67 Ibid., 106. 
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processes.”
68
 In contemporary application Brueggemann finds that “[w]hen the lament 
form is censured, justice questions cannot be asked and eventually become invisible and 
illegitimate… The point of access for serious change has been forfeited when the 
propriety of this speech form is denied”
69
  
 Finally, Brueggemann’s forays into these two fields of social science propel him 
back to theology. 
With reference to the psychological issues, ego development is not dependent solely on 
a “good-enough” mother but on a God whose omnipotence is reshaped by pathos. With 
reference to social questions, the emergence of justice depends not simply on social 
structures but on a sovereign agent outside the system to whom effective appeal can be 
made against the system. Ego-strength and social justice finally drives us to theological 
issues.
70
 
The end result is a theology which strives to hold together God as “omnipotence 
reshaped by pathos” and “a sovereign agent outside the system.” But the implications of 
such a theological conclusion seem bound to the social system of human relations as 
Brueggemann’s final example of Psalm 39 suggests. “This psalm characteristically 
brings to speech the cry of a troubled earth (v. 12)… The new resolve in heaven and the 
new possibility on earth ;&>&5; on the initiation of protest.”
71
 
 
ii. Rethinking Response both Human and Divine 
 
With “The Costly Loss of Lament,” Brueggemann’s theological understanding 
of lament as faithful human response to God takes some significant turns.  Only two 
years previously he writes in '&(()*&$ "+$ ,!&$ -()./(, “Along with ,!&$ .2,&6)67$ !)B2, 
which dominates these psalms comes ,!&$,!&"."*23).$&S>&62&53& of the will and power 
to transform reality.”
72
 Through this later article the theological experience of will and 
power is reconceived in psychology and sociology derived from the literature itself.  
Brueggemann’s intention is to demonstrate that the expressed will of humanity 
truly has power. Thus, “The new resolve in heaven and the new possibility on earth 
;&>&5; on the initiation of protest.”
73
 But Brueggemann again is not very clear as to the 
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nature of this dependence especially if “the emergence of justice depends not simply on 
social structures but on a sovereign agent outside the system.” His psychological 
understanding seems to imply that God’s sovereignty needs to be reconsidered so that 
we understand the power in human response.  But then again, as he says from the 
beginning, lament’s “speech pattern and social usage keep ).. power relations under 
review and capable of redefinition.”
74
  
Theologically speaking, while the function of language has always been an 
important feature of Brueggemann’s biblical scholarship, language seems to be taking 
on a different theological role here. If in fact the speech-act of lament can truly redefine 
).. power relations, then the form has acquired a new and more powerful function than 
previously articulated by Brueggemann. Much more clearly than before, G";9($ @&67$
3!)6)3,&6$ (&&/($ ,"$ B&$ ),$ (,)L&$ 25$ ,!&$ &@"3),2@&$ +?53,2"5$ "+$ ,!&$ .)/&5,$ +"6/U Still, 
Brueggemann has yet to clearly arrive at !"# he is holding such things as divine 
sovereignty and capability of redefinition together. To establish his theological way 
forward into these social realities, Brueggemann returns to an influence he has largely 
ignored up until this point—Sigmund Mowinckel.$
 
II. Israel’s Praise: Constituting Faith Beyond Response 
  
Two years after “The Costly Loss of Lament,” the social sciences progress 
further to the forefront of Brueggemann’s psalms scholarship via 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&0$
="S"."*7$)*)25(,$8;".),67$)5;$8;&"."*7. This book examines “how the sociology of the 
Psalms, the work of the pastoral office, and the competing symbolizations (of liturgy) 
converge in our present circumstance—in church and society.”
75
 Returning to 
unresolved social questions which stretch back to Gunkel’s innovation of D2,Q$2/$J&B&5, 
he declares the state of Psalms scholarship to be “resting on a plateau” and pursues a 
way forward.  
Here I have tried to take up the sociological question of the Psalms, to suggest that the 
Psalms can only be understood and used rightly if we attend to their social interaction 
and function, not only in their origin but also in their repeated use. My suggestion is 
that the intent and use of a psalm is never only transcendental (e.g., as praise to God), 
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x. 
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but that it functions characteristically and inevitably in the deployment and legitimation 
of social power.
76
 
Concern over the Psalms’ immanent social function leads Brueggemann to reconsider 
the “generative function of the cult” in Sigmund Mowinckel’s hypothesis. A fresh 
conclusion results: “What counts is that the cult (and therefore, praise, which is our 
subject) is understood by Mowinckel as 3"5(,2,?,2@&$and not merely 6&(>"5(2@&.”
77
 
 
 A. Reconsidering Mowinckel—Socially and Theologically 
 
 The liturgical meaning and theological significance of this move is developed in 
the preface and first chapter of 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&. Brueggemann believes that previous 
reactions to Mowinckel have missed the point by failing to focus on “the claim that in 
public worship Israel is engaged in constructing a world in which Israel can viably, 
joyously, and obediently live.”
78
 This action of “constructing,” which Brueggemann 
(following Mowinckel) also terms “world-making,” is the essence of what 
Brueggemann means by “constitutive.”  
…25$#!),$(&5(&$2($>6)2(&$3"5(,2,?,2@&$"+$,!&$#"6.;? I am aware that, theologically, such 
a view is problematic, because it smacks of synergism, wherein the community, or at 
least the king and priest, share in God’s creative work, or indeed, do God’s creative 
work. I do not minimize that problem. But that theological question notwithstanding, 
the constitutive power of praise is anthropologically and sociologically a most 
plausible, attractive, and finally, important idea. …without the cult, that is, a viable 
community that actively processes the claims of the Psalms, they are only dormant 
literature.
79
 
Leaving particular “theological” questioning aside, Brueggemann asserts the actual 
power of the Psalms comes through the Psalms being actualized in the community of 
Israel. What gives life to Israel’s world, that which Mowinckel labels “cult,” is the 
“active processing” of the literary and social dynamics springing from the text. Thus, 
Israel’s rhetoric is not responsive to some external reality per se (though Brueggemann 
does not deny this); Israel’s rhetoric constitutes Israel’s reality.
80
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78 Ibid., 6. 
79 Ibid., 7, italics original. 
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speech.” 
 53
 Still, Brueggemann doesn’t exactly forsake all theological questioning. While he 
does not minimize “the problem” of synergism, he also does not believe that either he or 
Mowinckel is trying imaginatively to conjure a non-intrinsic concept from the 
implications of the text, and at times he remains circumspect about the whole process.  
Notice that Mowinckel is not suggesting that cult "?*!,$ to do this creative work, nor 
indeed that the cult "?*!,$5",$ to do this. It simply does. …The problem is not in the 
character of the cultic act, but in our poor language that can scarcely say what it is we 
do and in our poor epistemology that can scarcely know what it is that we do.
81
 
Despite acknowledging linguistic and epistemological impoverishment, Brueggemann is 
nonetheless able to determine that it is exactly “the character of the cultic act” which 
affectively and effectively counts. 
Mowinckel would, I believe, say that the dramatic work of worship is instituted, that is 
authorized and legitimated, by the power of God to do world-making work which is 
God’s work, but which is processed through intentional, disciplined, obedient human 
action and human speech. It is the process of the authorized word and the legitimated 
action that decisively shapes and articulates the world.
82
 
Brueggemann speaks of both God’s power and God’s work here but only to confirm 
that it is “,!&$>6"3&((…that decisively shapes and articulates the world” (italics mine). 
Any creative or redemptive synergy between God and humanity is manifest "5.7 
through human action in this process. “‘World-Making’ is done by God. That is 
foundational to Israel’s faith. But it is done through human activity which God has 
authorized and in which God is known to be present.”
83
 Response therefore comes to be 
understood in a constitutive way. “Praise is not a response to a world already fixed and 
settled, but it is a responsive and obedient participation in a world yet to be decreed and 
in process of being decreed through this liturgical act.”
84
  
Brueggemann sees his newly constituted understanding of response as part of 
“the shift in scripture study from !2(,"623).$ to .2,&6)67<” as well as the epistemological 
shift in the “valuing of +)3,232,7 to the celebration of 2/)*25),2"5.”
85
 Through this shift 
the reality of response moves away from description to evocation. “As participants in 
the constitutive act, we do not describe what is there, but we evoke what is not fully 
there until we act or speak. The human agent, then, is a constitutive part of the 
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enterprise, which means that the shape of reality in part awaits our shaping 
adherence.”
86
 Theology thus joins sociology, literary studies and psychology as only 
one of several possible ways to explore reality in the constitutive power of praise. 
 However, in the section subtitled “Theological Understandings,” he is not quite 
yet willing to let go of a reality of God constituted B&7"5; human action and speech. 
This discussion starts with the theology of Gordon Kaufman who, according to 
Brueggemann, concludes, “Responsible theology must therefore be a constitutive act, in 
which our discernment of God must be reconstituted in wholly new ways.”
87
  While 
Brueggemann sees this as analogous to his own conclusion, he believes Kaufman 
overstates his case. 
The language Kaufman uses is not without problems. He clearly intends to come very 
close to the language of the ‘reconstitution of God’ through theological articulation. 
Taken ontologically, that is obviously a hazardous claim. Taken practically and 
dramatically, which is in fact how we do theology, each theological articulation intends 
to render God in a more faithful and more available way.
88
 
While emphasizing the practical and dramatic aspects of theology, Brueggemann 
seemingly goes beyond them here by drawing a christological distinction between 
himself and Kaufmann. 
The other methodological urging of Kaufman, which we may note, is a distinction 
between the ‘real referent,’ the holy God in actuality who is always unknown and 
unavailable, and the ‘available referent,’ our imaginative construct of God. Since the 
real referent, in the very nature of God, is unavailable, the available referent is always 
imaginative and always a construct. 
I do not wish to pursue this aspect of Kaufman very far, because I do not agree with his 
argument concerning theological reference. Those of us who are more fully embedded 
in that tradition (which he judges to be inadequate) would affirm that in Jesus Christ, 
the available referent, the real referent is precisely disclosed. The man of Nazareth is 
the available referent and gives access to the real referent. And Jesus ultimately is not 
an imaginative construct. Kaufman is deficient in the christological focus of his 
understanding of revelation, or as we might say, he is ‘soft’ on the !"/""?(2) (‘of like 
substance’) formula. This deficiency is evident in his statement, ‘Hence, if we are to 
understand the meaning and importance of Christ, we shall first have to get clear what 
is meant by ‘God’. Precisely the opposite is true. We affirm the centrality of Christ, and 
in so doing, we get clear on what is meant by ‘God.’
89
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These noteworthy paragraphs speak with an “essential” clarity about christology in 
ways rarely demonstrated by Brueggemann, at least in monographs or major works.
90
 
But latent essentialism is not nearly as important for Brueggemann as his emphasis that 
none of this criticism of Kaufmann “practically” affects the deployment of 
Brueggemann’s constitutive thesis. “Nonetheless, we can learn from Kaufman’s 
argument that theology is constructive and not merely reiterative. Even for one who 
accepts the particularity of Jesus as the clue to the real referent, the practical truth is 
that, even in our discernments of Jesus, we are dealing in important ways with 
imaginative reconstructions.”
91
 
 
 B. The Power of Imaginative Reconstructions 
 
The reconstructive power of Israel’s liturgy is what Brueggemann sets out to 
map over the course of 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&. He begins where Mowinckel does—in the 
commonly-labeled enthronement psalms—to demonstrate the given world of Israel’s 
doxology.
92
 “Israel’s enthronement liturgy is very old, very deep, very weighty, very 
authoritative. For members of the community, the liturgy is simply present at the 
outset.”
93
 Into this tradition new members of the community are born for whom the 
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tradition becomes their own. Here, Brueggemann once again invokes the discerning 
power of hermeneutics: 
This capacity for fresh, imaginative embodiment is what makes hermeneutics so critical 
in the utilization of liturgy. …The liturgy has a way of making a historical memory 
theologically, cosmically, dramatically, grandly significant, so that all the hopes and 
fears of Israel, from generation to generation, are mobilized, gathered, made present and 
available in this particular concrete liturgical event. …The liturgy imposes a pattern of 
meaning on experiences so that Israel’s world is shaped as this world and not some 
other. This liturgy shapes the world so that the old world of inequity, unrighteousness, 
and falsity is always being defeated, and Yahweh’s new world of equity, righteousness, 
and truth is always freshly emerging.
94
 
As before, hermeneutics allows Brueggemann to attend to the “shaping” function of 
Israel’s liturgy which projects faith from past to future.  
Consequently, Israel’s doxology shapes up to be “both promise and threat.” The 
threat, of course, arises as the singularity of Yahweh indicates that “other gods and other 
worlds are excluded from Israel’s social horizon and possibility.”
95
 By promise, 
Brueggemann means political, eschatological, and cultic implications which arise as 
Yahweh is worshipped.
96
 The result is hope. “Thus the doxology is an act of hope. It 
promises and anticipates a hoped-for world that is beyond present reality. Whenever 
Israelites sing this doxology, they commit themselves again to that hoped-for world that 
is sketched in the liturgy before their very eyes.”
97
 Brueggemann believes that this 
analysis puts him into position to properly assess the reality that “the cult does create 
worlds” in Mowinckel’s proposal. He concludes, “A world of justice, mercy, peace, and 
compassion is created in the imaginative act of liturgy. This is the real world, created in 
the moment of liturgy, which asserts that every rival claimant and candidate for the real 
world is false and destructive.”
98
  
  The imaginative process is crucial to reality because all liturgy eventually 
pushes falsely into ideology and idolatry as the powerful attempt to maintain power. 
Such power can only be countered by more primal manifestations of worship, the pain 
and lament of “Doxology inside the ‘Claims of Time and Sorrow’.”  
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In Israel's (>&&3!$ "+$ 3"/>.)25,, Israel's ;2(3&65/&5,$ "+$ G"; and Israel's &/B6)3&$ "+$
6&).2,7 converge. Pain must be processed and not denied or siphoned off into guilt. 
When adequately processed, that is, when God is mobilized, the cry of wretchedness 
has reason to turn to praise and energy.
99
 
Moreover, Israel’s ability to process pain counters ideology and idolatry through 
“counter world-making”: 
Israel's world-making is counter world-making, counter to the empire and its 
oppression, counter to the imperial gods and the exploitative ordering of the regime. It 
is counter to conventional idolatry and routine ideology. Israel's liturgy at its best is not 
triumphalist, not self-serving of Zion, but it must 'tell among the nations' that there is a 
new governance in heaven and in earth.
100
 
Brueggemann finally concludes that the ability to confront false liturgical power with 
true pain in liturgy is evidence not only of theological action but also human potential. 
“To 'tell among the nations' is not only a bold theological act but also is a telling among 
the nations of a new subversive psychology of human possibility and a sociology of 
covenantal alternative.”
101
 
 With 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&, Brueggemann forges a bond between theology and social 
science which makes the two difficult to separate. Both are constituted together in the 
“faithful act of imagination”. 
Missional testimony to the nations cannot take place until a new world of social 
possibility and theological governance is imagined, and that imagining is primarily 
liturgical. When imagined, the new governance may be enacted. Until imagined, the 
new governance will not and cannot be enacted. Without that bold and faithful act of 
imagination, we are consigned to old governances which are predictably idolatrous 
about heaven and ideological about earth.
102
  
Yet the question remains: what for Brueggemann enables such imaginative faith to truly 
hold “social possibility” and “theological governance” together? 
 
 C. Reconstituting Psalm Function in Rhetoric 
 
To summarize, Brueggemann reconstitutes psalm function in 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&$via 
more-or-less a three-fold approach. First, he works through the Old Testament text 
using a multidimensional method which emphasizes the social sciences. This allows 
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him to reflect upon Jewish and Christian tradition at many levels of human existence 
and meaning, not just through the historical criticism or dogmatics which modern 
biblical studies and theology have often previously favored. Second, tracing the text in 
this manner allows him to conceive of liturgy as not merely response to )$ >62"62 
meaning and identity, but as a way of constituting meaning and identity through human 
imagination enacted rhetorically. Third, while Brueggemann does not deny (yet!) a real 
and essential existence of God )$>62"62, this type of question (with few exceptions such 
as his engagement with Kaufman) sharply moves to the periphery in favor of reflection 
upon more “concrete” issues which Brueggemann sees arising from the text prior to any 
theological conceptualization. Concrete issues are becoming their own grounds for 
transforming faith amidst suffering. 
 An example of this three-fold approach at work is nowhere more apparent than 
when Brueggemann talks of Christian theology in the context of Israel’s worship. In the 
chapter entitled, “Doxology at the Edge of Ideology: The King of Majesty and Mercy,” 
Brueggemann goes beyond the innovations of Mowinckel
103
 to narrate the social 
interplay between majestic and marginal interests seen respectively in the royal tradition 
of the enthronement psalms and in texts expressing disoriented voices in Israel at the 
margins of such tradition. This produces “tension between grand claim and concrete 
memory,”
104
 a tension which bears upon not only Israel’s liturgy but Christian worship 
as well. 
When we move from ancient Israel to Jesus, we still struggle to honor the specificity 
which is so embarrassing. John, asking for the entire community, wanted to know if 
Jesus is the one who is to come (Luke 7:18-23). John seems to want a general, certain 
messianic assurance. But the answer Jesus gives is characteristically a recital of 
concrete transformations give in narrative specificity (v. 22): 
 Go and tell John what you have seen and heard: 
  The blind receive their sight,  
  the lame walk, 
  lepers are cleansed,… 
  the deaf hear, 
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  the dead are raised up, 
  the poor have good news preached to them. 
Jesus’ response keeps Christology very close to concrete transformation. Out of that 
concreteness comes the world over which Jesus is king. Out of such a reason, the 
nations are called to praise and trust!
105
 
Brueggemann finds a particular type of power at work here, one that reveals and 
remakes and yet is “concrete.”  But redemption which merely honors narrative 
specificities is not all Brueggemann means to imply. 
This mode of thought, speech, and faith is raw in its power, primitive in its 
epistemology, revolutionary in its world-making. It is raw in its power because it dares 
to discern the power of eternal holiness in the moment of hurt needing to be healed. The 
naivete of such faith did not reflect on transcendence and imminence [(23], on 
!"/""?(2) (“of like substance”). It knew intuitively and trustingly that the One who 
heals is the One who reigns over all.
106
 
At hand is a somewhat subtle but nonetheless key assertion that the fullness of biblical 
faith is prior to any subsequent theological reflections. This faith not only has “power,” 
and is “revolutionary,” but is so because it “dares to discern the power of eternal 
holiness in the moment of hurt.”  
Initially, Brueggemann seems to be simply restating an obvious observation 
about the history of faith. Believers have always understood faith to have power in a 
moment of crisis and harm, a power that doesn’t likely or necessarily include careful 
theological reflection. By the same token, such power, simply by its immediacy, does 
not rule out theology derived from more extended and less urgent reflection. 
Nevertheless, Brueggemann also seems to now be suggesting such power is ,!& power 
of faith, a power established in the daring of discerning rhetoric, and a power which no 
amount of theological reflection will explain. 
This does not stop Brueggemann from later offering his own explanation, 
appropriate to his own theological style. He suggests that the Christian church must 
pursue its “proper vocation” through leading the faithful by the example of Israel’s 
“theological warrant” over and against the pain of existence: 
To engage in evangelical world-making, our proper vocation, to lead the congregation 
B)3L$;"#5 from summons to reason is not to lead them back to slogans and formulae of 
ancient Israel, but to lead them back to their own hurtful experience for which Ancient 
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Israel offers useful forms of articulation. The >)25$ ),$ ,!&$ 3&5,&6$ "+$ >6)2(& has 
theological warrant in Israel in the cries of hurt, rage, doubt, vengeance, and isolation. 
Most importantly, they are cries, not buried, not stifled, but cries passionately addressed 
out of the reality of life.
107
 
Brueggemann alludes above to pain “not buried, not stifled, but cries “passionately 
addressed.” And this is precisely the redemptive, transformational dynamic of faith 
which Brueggemann is trying to highlight. “The situation between Israel and God is 
transformed because it becomes a situation of speaking and hearing and answering. 
Because, and only because, the trouble of the psalmist is brought to speech, it is injected 
into the ongoing life of Israel and Yahweh.”
108
 Here, is the crucial reality of rhetoric on 
which Brueggemann stands; he cannot do otherwise as transformation is “because, and 
"5.7$B&3)?(&, the trouble of the psalmist is brought to speech.”
109
 
 So why is it only a page later Brueggemann tells us that such faith cannot 
explain how transformation happens?  
We are here at the irreducible heart of evangelical faith. We do not know how the 
newness happens. There is something inscrutable and hidden about the ways in which 
God transforms. God's people are not able to give explanations. But they are capable of 
testimony about the possibility of new life.
110
 
The close juxtaposition of statements so difficult to reconcile raises questions which 
increasingly seem to pervade Brueggemann’s interpretive moves: How is it that 
Brueggemann discerns and explains that which he also claims cannot be discerned and 
explained? How is it that Brueggemann understands !"# the ,&(,2/"57 of the text 
+?53,2"5(, if “God’s people” )6&$"5.7$3)>)B.&$"+$"++&625*$(but not reflecting upon) that 
very testimony? How is it that Brueggemann talks of faith in the “inscrutable and 
hidden” ways of God, and yet offers careful scrutiny as to how faith acts vis-à-vis the 
uncertainty of the world?  
Once again, clear answers to such questions are not on offer. Minimally, we may 
observe that rhetoric is becoming a means by which Brueggemann both upholds and 
critiques reality.
111
 Pain is the “concrete” reality which Brueggemann refuses to ignore, 
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and worship sustains a world which deals with this reality.
 
 Language and rhetoric are 
the means by which Brueggemann commendably asks incisive questions about how the 
liturgical texts of Israel confront suffering through faith.  
Yet, Brueggemann’s emphasis on rhetoric also seems to become the theological 
end in itself which justifies the means. By understanding rhetorical tensions expressed 
in the text to imaginatively generate truth about human tensions experienced in the 
world, Brueggemann believes that new realities in God are not merely evoked but also 
enacted. In this context, the Miller quotation at the beginning of this chapter now begins 
to make more sense. In Brueggemann’s view, the manner in which the Psalms shape 
reality is indeed “potent” and “shocking”. Such is the imaginative power he ultimately 
perceives is constituted through the Psalms. 
 
D. Reconstituting Response to God  
 
Such power is not finally without limitations. Towards the end of 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&$
Brueggemann finds a responsive limit to what Israel’s praise can constitute. 
At the extreme edge of its theological radicalness, however Israel’s praise fails. Thus, at 
the end of our analysis, I have had one other thought about the extremity of 
praise….Finally, as in Job 38—41, God must do the praise, for none but God finally has 
a tongue adequate or a horizon sweeping enough to bring the wonder of God to 
praise….Finally, praise must be utterly disinterested, aimed at nothing other than the 
reality of God. Israel is never able to do that fully, and so God alone takes up the full 
doxology which moves beyond utility, beyond manipulation, beyond idolatry and 
ideology.
112
 
Eventually Israel’s response of faith is inadequate to reality. Not only is there a “reality 
of God” beyond what Israel can adequately attain, but furthermore, “The overcoming of 
the alienation in the poem of Job, as in the Psalms, only happens from God side.”
113
  
                                                                                                                                               
apart from the cult. …Mowinckel urges a mode of thought and language which escapes this split of 
subjectivism and rational positivism. It is my urging that we also must escape both subjectivism and 
rational objectivism if worship is to have the centrality that we claim for it and which is promised in our 
theological tradition. It is not a matter of saying that we are in fact subjective rather than realistic, or that 
we are realistic rather than subjective, but that insisting on such a distinction is a major part of the 
problem.” To whatever degree we find agreement with Brueggemann on this point, we cannot lose sight 
of the fact that Brueggemann often moves without addressing latent effects of subject/object dualism in 
his own work, especially in the later development and deployment of his dialectic which we discuss 
below in the next chapter. (i.e. Brueggemann’s understanding of dialectical tension in Christian and 
Jewish faith as an objectively discernible reality to be maintained subjectively; cf. Brueggemann, 
%!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, 400-3.) 
112 Ibid., 154. 
113 Ibid. 
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While Brueggemann appears to be reaching for a theological reality beyond 
what he has already proposed, he also asserts that such a reality can only arise as an end 
to his proposal. 
 But that is only at the end. All along the way Israel’s praise is wrought 
! ,!6"?*!$ethical sensitivity 
! ,!6"?*!$the awareness of moral coherence 
! ,!6"?*! indignation at injustice 
! ,!6"?*! nervy insistence on righteousness in the world 
But in the end—only at the end—praise in Israel bursts out of such categories.
114
 
Though hardly ruling an eschatological interpretation out, the meaning of “the end” here 
is hardly explicit in its eschatology. Rather, it seems to more expressly indicate the 
teleological function of Brueggemann’s constitutive concept. Thus, “I suggest that the 
danger is that a psalm like Psalm 150 (which has no ‘reason’) will be sung too soon. 
Israel can join God in full praise only at the end.”
115
 The yielding which characterizes 
this full praise can only come about as a result of being constituted in Brueggemann’s 
doxological understanding of reality.  
We with Israel speak yielding words to God….But such yielding is possible only after 
the astonishing credos of transformation have been engaged, only after the hurting 
laments have been honestly and harshly spoken, only after the surprised songs of 
thanksgiving have been concretely enumerated. Then Israel may indeed be lost in 
wonder, love, and praise, may indeed surrender in a way that heaven and earth 
recognize the surrender to be a triumph. But it is not a triumph the world expects, for 
there is a yielding. Conversely it is not a yielding the conventional religious world of 
idolatry and ideology recognizes, for it is a hard, demanding yielding.
116
 
The “astonishing credos of transformation,” “hurting laments,” and “surprised songs of 
thanksgiving” are the liturgical pathway to Israel’s final yielding, a yielding only 
possible as it is constituted in the enacting work of human imagination.  
This recontextualizes Brueggemann’s previous scholarship on lament form 
substantially. Brueggemann writes in his early article the “Formfulness of Grief,” “The 
form is sufficient for Israel. No speculative probing beyond the form is needed.”
117
 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 154-55. 
115 Ibid., 155. 
116 Ibid., 156-157 
117 Ibid., 96-7. 
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Looking back at this statement from the end of 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&, we see how 
Brueggemann has developed the “sufficiency” of Israel’s form—sufficiency emerges as 
the form is sociologically deployed through rhetoric. Yet, Brueggemann also earlier 
writes, “…expected transforming intrusion by the covenant partner is a legitimate and 
intentional extrapolation from the form itself.”
118
 The rhetorical way in which 
Brueggemann now understands the form’s legitimacy complicates how one can expect a 
“transforming intrusion by the covenant partner.” The wider theological emphasis 
seems to have shifted from God’s intrusion 6&(?.,25* in the response praise and/or 
thanks which end the typical lament psalm form. Instead, Brueggemann now appears to 
be describing relations with God only )+,&6 reorientation has been accomplished and 
validated through imaginative liturgical enactment. Quoting again from 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&, 
“We with Israel speak yielding words to God…. only after the surprised songs of 
thanksgiving have been concretely enumerated.”
119
 Any reorientation following the 
disorientation of petition now seems accounted for by the surprising imaginative power 
of speech rather than a truly surprising God. 
  
III. Transforming Faith and the Reality of God  
 
 In the years leading up to 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&, an inversion seems to occur in the 
theological trajectory which characterized Brueggemann’s initial Psalms scholarship. 
Rather than examining how faith functions to transform human experience amidst 
suffering, Brueggemann now appears to be pursuing how human experience amidst 
suffering functions to constitute faith’s transforming power. Such a change in course 
alters the theological results: increasingly, !"#$ scriptural expressions of human 
experience are rhetorically deployed and then sociologically actualized becomes the 
basis for determining #!" is behind Brueggemann’s understanding of faith.   
 The evidence of this change emerges as Brueggemann’s concern over the 
function of lament psalm form evolves. In “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: 
Embrace of Pain” Brueggemann asserts the following function of lament for faith: 
“Such an act of embrace means to articulate the pain fully, to insist on God’s reception 
                                                 
118 Op. cit. 
119 Ibid., 156-57. See op. cit. 
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of the speech and the pain, and to wait hopefully for God’s resolution.”
120
 Yet, he later 
adds, “Israel’s laments force God to recharacterization. This act of forcing God to 
recharacterization is not an unproblematic venture, theologically. It is in deep tension 
with the reality of God’s sovereign freedom to be whom God chooses to be.”
121
 The 
evocative power of language seems most powerful here but also raises the question of 
how the human response of hope “for God’s resolution” can come about if Israel’s 
laments so forcefully recharacterize God? Terence Fretheim writes:  
Brueggemann claims that Israel's laments and acts of protest to God stand "in deep 
tension with the reality of God's sovereign freedom to be who God 3!""(&( to be." But 
if God's choosing to be, which must include God's willing, already moves beyond a 
commitment to structure before any lament is heard, then it seems incongruous to speak 
of incongruity. In other words, there is within God a leaning toward Israel and being for 
Israel by virtue of the divine purpose and promise...God's decision-making and actions 
toward Israel and the world will always be informed by that loving purpose and those 
promises.122 
 
Brueggemann proposes an understanding of God which rests on the tension and 
incongruity he finds in the biblical text, but his articulation of this rhetorical 
understanding seems to tend toward theological incoherence. Does humanity respond to 
the “loving purpose” and “promises” of God or does human response constitute the 
meaningful character of that love? Granted Brueggemann is wrestling with the difficult 
hermeneutical issues of such a question, and he seemingly wants to hold both 
possibilities together even when he risks incoherence. Yet as an interpretive norm he 
now seems much more ready to go with the latter possibility than the former.  
Such is the case in Brueggemann’s construal of God in “The Costly Loss of 
Lament.” Brueggemann worries that by losing lament as a practice of faith “we may 
unwittingly endorse a ‘False Self’ that can take no initiative toward an omnipotent 
God.”
123
 Via an analogy between lament form and D. W. Winnicott’s theory of object-
relations psychology, Brueggemann reasons that God, like a mother ceding initiative to 
an infant, risks experiencing the power ceded to those who lament. The immanence of 
this risk derived rhetorically from the form of the text, "@&6$ )5;$ )*)25(, recourse to 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 29. See op. cit. 
122 Terence E. Fretheim, “Some Reflections on Brueggemann’s God” in G";$25$,!&$N6)70$1$%62B?,&$,"$
P).,&6$O6?&**&/)55 (ed. Tod Linafelt and Timothy K. Beal; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998, 24-37), 
30, italics Fretheim. For Fretheim’s own views on the nature and reality of God see Fretheim, %!&$
D?++&625*$"+$G"; (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), especially Ch. 5, “God and World: Presence and 
Power.” 
123 Ibid., 111. 
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divine transcendence, becomes that which psychologically and sociologically reshapes 
his understanding of the omnipotence of God. 
 Reconceiving divine power in reference to human social realities continues to 
develop substantially in 8(6)&.9($ -6)2(&. “‘World-Making’ is done by God. That is 
foundational to Israel’s faith,” writes Brueggemann, “But it is done through human 
activity which God has authorized and in which God is known to be present.”
124
 Divine 
“authorization” here appears to happen through the evocative power of the language of 
the text which impinges on all reality, divine or human, through rhetoric deployed 
sociologically. “Because, and "5.7 B&3)?(&, the trouble of the psalmist is brought to 
speech, it is injected into the ongoing life of Israel and Yahweh.”
125
 He still retains an 
inclination towards divine transcendence through circumspection about any 
transformation to which faith attests; “There is something inscrutable and hidden about 
the ways in which God transforms. God's people are not able to give explanations. But 
they are capable of testimony about the possibility of new life.”
126
 Thus Brueggemann 
still celebrates the move into new orientation, the move “from hurt to joy.” However, if 
)57 divine transformation can become “abiding order”
127
 and so just another form of 
structure legitimation or ideology, then can such testimony ever joyfully express 
)57,!25*$ 5&#? Can we really ever come to expect that God is a God who finally 
responds to human suffering? 
 In the coming chapter we will see how rhetorical conflict in scriptural testimony 
becomes the locus of not only Brueggemann’s mature biblical theology but also his 
understanding of the divine reality at work in faith. Such an approach would never be 
possible without the growing influence of the social sciences on how he understands the 
lament psalm to function through faith amidst suffering. Through the self-declared 
methodological transitions of 1985, Brueggemann writes about his overall organization 
of Old Testament theology, “The model proposed here does not embrace von Rad’s 
conclusion that there is no organizing principle, but it asserts that the organizing 
principle must be found at the interface between theological affirmation and social 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 11. 
125 Ibid., 144, italics mine. 
126 Ibid., 145. 
127 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&, 101-4. 
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vision.”
128
 As Brueggemann’s concept of biblical faith develops at this interface, with 
the question of human suffering ever in view, sociology appears to cast a vision which 
theology must increasingly affirm.
 129
 
 
 
 
128 Brueggemann,$“Old Testament Theology as a Particular Conversation: Adjudication of Israel’s 
Sociotheological Alternatives,” in :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$%&S, (ed. 
Patrick D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 143; repr. from %!&"."*7$=2*&(,$32 (1985): 303-25. 
129 This despite Miller’s conclusion in “Introduction,” :.;$%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*7, xiv, “What is crucial at 
this point is that literary and rhetorical study is, in Brueggemann’s approach, a tool for a theological 
reading of the text and not a replacement of it, which it is in some contemporary literary studies of the 
bible.” 
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~3~  
 
Maintaining the Tension or Tension beyond Maintenance? The 
Lament Psalm in Brueggemann’s Mature Biblical Theology 
 
 
I. Theology of the Old Testament: Faith as “Fundamental Tension” 
 
In just a decade after his publication of 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&, Brueggemann generates 
more than 20 additional books and collections, an overwhelming swath of articles, and 
still finds time to finish the 777 pages of his voluminous magnum opus, %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$
:.;$ %&(,)/&5,$ (subsequently referred to in this chapter as %:%).
1
 Tod Linafelt and 
Timothy K. Beal, editors of Brueggemann’s Festschrift G";$ 25$ ,!&$ N6)7, chart the 
movement of Brueggemann from the mid-1980’s to the 1997 publication of %:%. 
In two programmatic articles in which he began to sketch out a possible “shape” for Old 
Testament theology, Brueggemann presented biblical faith in terms of this fundamental 
tension: on the one hand, one finds affirmations of stability and orientation (what he 
identifies as “structure legitimation”); on the other hand, one finds the powerfully 
disruptive and transformative countervoices of chaos and disorientation (what he 
identifies as “embrace of pain”). This fundamental tension becomes, in Brueggemann’s 
new %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, the drive behind not only Israel’s +)2,! but the very 
inner life of Israel’s G"; as well.
2
 
As the previous chapter of this thesis demonstrated, Brueggemann derives such 
“fundamental tension” from his evolving understanding of Israel’s lament psalm form. 
Thus the following Linafelt and Beal observation: “Such a construal of God has the 
potential to speak to the core of a human existence that, as Brueggemann has articulated 
so clearly in his work on the Psalms, is characterized by the constant inbreaking of 
disorientation.”
3
 
 In the years which lead up to the publication of %:%, Brueggemann’s 
understanding of the lament form has evolved and so has his concept of biblical faith as 
                                                 
1 Walter Brueggemann, %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,0$%&(,2/"57<$=2(>?,&<$1;@"3)37, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997). For a functionally comprehensive (though still selective) bibliography of 
publications by Brueggemann up through 1998 see Clayton H. Hulet’s diligent collection at the end of the 
festschrift G";$25$,!&$N6)70$1$%62B?,&$,"$P).,&6$O6?&**&/)55 (ed. Tod Linafelt and Timothy K. Beal; 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998),  321-340. 
2 Tod Linafelt and Timothy K. Beal, introduction to G";$25$,!&$N6)70$1$%62B?,&$,"$P).,&6$O6?&**&/)55 
(Fortress: Minneapolis, 1998), 5, italics original. 
3 Ibid, 4. 
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response to human suffering.
4
 As his work progresses towards this “fundamental 
tension,” the theological conclusions derived through his Psalms typology of 
orientation, disorientation, and reorientation have been increasingly influenced by his 
interdisciplinary engagements with the social sciences. In a related development, he has 
also granted an increasingly powerful role to rhetoric in his biblical interpretation.
5
 
These shifts in his scholarship and in the work of others are eventually labeled 
“postmodern” by Brueggemann, though he sometimes acknowledges ambivalence about 
the term.
6
 More important for his own work is how such shifts have brought conflict, 
dispute and tension to the forefront of his thinking.
7
  Such become the key conceptual 
                                                 
4 Over this decade, new material on the Psalms is published by Brueggemann which is not discussed in 
depth here because this material chiefly adheres to the ongoing dialectical shape of Brueggemann’s 
theology which shows its most significant manifestation in %:%. For sake of space, %:% is the focus in 
this chapter. However, two key articles deserve brief mention. The first article is “The Psalms as Prayer” 
in Brueggemann, %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. Miller, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1995); repr. from I&+"6/&;$J2,?6*7$)5;$'?(23$23 (1989): 13-26. This extended article ends in a 
noticeably dialectical fashion, “The prayers of Israel subvert, liberate, and dismantle. The sponsors of this 
age find themselves helpless before the power of prayer, spoken at the limits of abandonment and 
insistence, and lived obediently and caringly between those limits” (66). The second article is “Praise and 
the Psalms: A Politics of Glad Abandonment” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. Miller, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995); repr. from two parts in %!&$M7/50$1$A"?65).$"+$4"5*6&*),2"5).$D"5*$
43, no. 3 & 4, 1992, 14-19 (Part 1 in no. 3) and 14-18 (Part 2 in no. 4). This article also deals with 
dialectical themes; see ibid., 117. “Thus basic trust includes both self-abandonment and self-assertion. 
Praise is a happy settlement that should be taken at full value. It is always, however, a provisional 
settlement because even such glad praise does not cause either party to forget what it has taken to arrive at 
this moment.” Both of these articles can be seen as examples of the dialectical theology which is fully 
developed by Brueggemann in %:%. 
5 Brueggemann publishes on what he labels the psalms of historical recital in 1B2;25*$1(,"52(!/&5,0$
-()./(<$'";&652,7<$)5;$,!&$')L25*$"+$M2(,"67 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991). This work is 
not discussed in depth here because it does not affect the evolution of his psalms typology and is better 
seen as an example of the developing rhetorical approach which is at maturity in %:%. See the 
introduction to 1B2;25*$1(,"52(!/&5,, 14, “In the continued reference to and use of the Psalms in the 
church and synagogue, we are participants in a specific practice of rhetoric which is a particular form of 
power.” 
6 See Brueggemann comments on postmodernism in %&S,($[5;&6$F&*",2),2"50$%!&$O2B.&$)5;$-"(,/";&65$
8/)*25),2"5 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), vii, “I have no zeal about the words ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ and take them only as a convenient reference for the widespread erosion of what has been 
most recently seen as ‘given.’ While I am unable to define what is ‘modern,’$like pornography, I think I 
know it when I see it.” However, Trevor Hart makes the following observation about Brueggemann, “Yet 
there is in truth little sense of reluctant resignation or of making a virtue out of an unwelcome necessity in 
this volume. The way in which Brueggemann himself narrates the cultural evolution of the post-
Enlightenment Western world leaves a clear impression that (so far as his own particular set of concerns 
goes) the advent of post-modernity has heralded more benefits and opportunities than it has inflicted 
collateral damage.” See Hart, “(Probably) The Greatest Story Ever Told? Reflections on Brueggemann’s 
%!&$O2B.&$)5;$-"(,/";&65$8/)*25),2"5” in 85,&6>6&,25*$,!&$O2B.&0$M2(,"623).$)5;$,!&"."*23).$(,?;2&($25$
!"5"?6$"+$=)@2;$NU$P62*!, (ed. A. N. S. Lane; Leicester: Apollos, 1997, 181-204) 182. 
7 %:%, 113-114, “It is astonishing to notice, as the exclusive power of hegemonic reading has waned, how 
aware we have become in recent decades about the conflictual dimensions of every phase of text and 
interpretation.”  
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resources for his exploration of the “question of pain…the main question of Old 
Testament faith”
8
 
This chapter traces the focus on rhetorical tension in %!&"."*7$ "+$ ,!&$ :.;$
%&(,)/&5, as the theological culmination of Brueggemann’s long engagement with the 
psalms of lament. Theological focus on tension allows Brueggemann to propose a 
distinct understanding of God not only in the Old Testament but also in the New. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Brueggemann concludes from the lament psalms that 
human initiative impinges upon the person and power of God. Significantly, this 
impingement makes possible the transforming power of faith by moving God to act 
faithfully on behalf of suffering humanity. Yet, in what follows, we will see how 
Brueggemann’s mature theology conceives of God, in sovereignty, as free to choose 5", 
to respond to such impingement. This proposal ultimately has significant implications 
for his concept of biblical faith as response to human suffering. We will conclude our 
examination of Brueggemann’s theology by evaluating this concept along the lines 
initially set out by his study of lament; can Brueggemann’s theology account for faith in 
God which sustains amidst experiences of hurt and joy, death and life? 
 
A. A Metaphor Encompassing Tension—Overview of %:%. 
 
The tension so central to %:%$is apparent in the encompassing metaphor guiding 
Brueggemann’s overall approach—Old Testament theology as a courtroom trial. He 
writes in the preface: 
Alternatively, I have proposed that the coherence required for an Old Testament 
theology, in a way that hopefully avoids premature reductionism, must focus not on 
substantive or thematic manners but on the >6"3&((&(<$ >6"3&;?6&(<$ )5;$ 25,&6)3,2"52(,$
>",&5,2). of the community present to the text. It is for that reason that I have focused 
on the metaphor and imagery of courtroom trial in order to regard the theological 
substance of the Old Testament as a series of claims asserted for Yahweh, the God of 
Israel.
9
 
This metaphor underscores Brueggemann’s belief that conflict integrally shapes Israel’s 
scriptures. “All of these claims share a general commonality but also evidence 
considerable variation, competition, and conflict.”
10
 For Brueggemann, the “truth 
                                                 
8 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I: Structure Legitimation,” in :.;$%&(,)/&5,$
%!&"."*70$E(()7($"5$D,6?3,?6&<$%!&/&<$)5;$%&S, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 18. 
9  %:%, xvi. 
10 Ibid. 
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claims” of the Old Testament are “arrived at through incessant engagement” of 
precisely this kind of conflictual process.
11
  
 The work proper unfolds through five major parts introduced first by an 
extensive two-part historical “Retrospect” tracing interpretive conflict from the 
Reformation to the Enlightenment and on to postmodernity. Against this introductory 
sketch of the past and present theological landscape, Brueggemann asserts his first 
major proposal, “Israel’s Core Testimony.” The starting point here is based in no small 
part on how earlier study of the Psalms has developed Brueggemann’s understanding of 
speech: 
It is remarkable that the Old Testament does not accent thought or concept or idea, but 
characteristically (>&&3!. God is the one about whom Israel speaks. ...In Israel's more 
intimate practice of faith in the Psalms, moreover, the key activity is speech. It is 'a 
joyful noise' (Ps 100:1), 'I will sing'  (Ps. 101:1), 'I said in my prosperity' (Ps. 30:6), 'To 
you, O Lord, I cried' (Ps. 30:8). What we have available to us is the speech of this 
community, which has become text, and which is our proper subject of study.
12
 
Subjecting speech to study is exactly what Brueggemann does as he distills the 
grammatical structure of testimony into four parts, “Thus we have attempted to define 
the grammar of Israel (full sentences, governed by strong verbs, dominated by the 
subjects of the verbs who is an active agent, effecting changes in various direct 
objects)…”
 13
 This speech makes “clear to Israel, moreover, that beyond Yahweh, there 
are no serious candidates for the role of God.”
14
 Instead, Israel’s speech defines itself 
through “the extreme and most sweeping testimony given to Yahweh, namely 
incomparability.”
15
 
The particularity and peculiarity of such speech results in Brueggemann’s 
epistemological priority on testimony in the Old Testament. 
 For the community and its derivative ecclesial communities that purport to 
stand with and under this text, the speech is the reality to be studied….We shall be 
asking, #!), is uttered about God? And this will require us to pay attention to !"# 
Israel uttered about God, for the “what” of Israel’s God-talk is completely linked to the 
“how” of that speech. 
I suggest that the largest rubric under which we can consider Israel's speech 
about God is that of testimony. Appeal to testimony as a mode of knowledge, and 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 117-18. 
13 Ibid., 144. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., see also 206-7, “In all of this variegated, rather disordered picture, this jumble of testimonies, we 
arrive at the conclusion already considered above.” 
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inevitably as a mode of certainty that is accepted as revelatory, requires a wholesale 
break with all positivistic epistemology in the ancient world or in the contemporary 
world. In an appeal to testimony, one must begin at a different place and so end up with 
a different sort of certitude.
16
 
 In language more sweeping and decisive than earlier in his career, Brueggemann also 
maintains a necessity to “bracket out all questions” of historicity, which asks about 
“What happened?”, and of ontology, which ask about the ‘really real.’”
17
 In decidedly 
rhetorical emphasis, Brueggemann willingly leaves all others behind or at least to the 
side. “[F]or Old Testament faith, ,!&$ ?,,&6)53&$ 2($ &@&67,!25*. The utterance leads to 
reality, the reality of God that relies on the reliability of the utterance.”
18
  
Juxtaposed against Israel’s core testimony is the second part of Brueggemann’s 
theology, “Israel’s Countertestimony.” Characterized by “cross-examination,” 
countertestimony forms the opposing pole of a hermeneutical process which emerges, 
so it seems, in the very structure of the text. 
8$>6">"(&$,!),$,!&$>6"3&(($"+$36"((R&S)/25),2"5$2($6&K?26&;$"+$8(6)&.9($;)625*$,&(,2/"57, 
which attests to “mighty acts” whereby Yahweh transforms the world. Moreover, the 
process of cross-examination seems to go on in the Old Testament text itself, the text 
being pervasively disputatious. For Israel, everything depends on the adequacy and 
reliability of its testimony concerning Yahweh.
19
 
Brueggemann articulates countertestimony through a threefold spectrum of 
“!2;;&55&((<$ )/B2*?2,7$ "6$ 25(,)B2.2,7<$ )5;$ 5&*),2@2,7,” which indicates that “Israel’s 
characteristic candor about its life puts its own core testimony in some jeopardy and 
leaves the truth of the matter still to be adjudicated.”
20
 Within this spectrum 
Brueggemann discerns the texts which do the jeopardizing, from the low visibility of 
Yahweh in the wisdom literature to outright accusations of Yahweh’s failure in texts 
like the lament psalms. Countertestimony presumes upon Yahweh’s “hiddenness”, 
“ambiguity” and “negativity” as Israel proposes demanding questions to Yahweh (How 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 119, italics original.  
17 Ibid., 118. “To inquire into the historicity of the text is a legitimate enterprise, but it does not, I suggest, 
belong to the work of Old Testament theology.” See also nt. 4 here, “This decision to bracket questions of 
ontology is parallel to the decision about bracketing questions of historicity. I do not deny that those who 
speak about Yahweh in the Old Testament had made some judgment about the reality and existence of 
Yahweh. But the ontology of Yahweh that is available on the basis of Israel’s testimony in the Old 
Testament is )+,&6 the testimony, based on finding the testimony credible and persuasive. After the 
testimony, the Old Testament provides a rich statement on ontology.”  (italics original). 
18 Ibid., 122, italics original. Concerning the reality of God or any other “reality” outside of utterance 
Brueggmann adds, “…Israel’s claim of reality is as fragile as an utterance, and #&$/?(,$B&$&S3&&;25*.7$
#)67$"+$+.2*!,($+6"/$?,,&6)53&$,"$("/&$>6&(?/&;$>6&R,&S,?).$6&).2,7U” (italics mine).  
19 Ibid., 317, italics original. 
20 Ibid., 318, 319. 
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long?, Why?, Where?, Is?). Here, almost all of %:%’s initial examples are lament 
psalms.
21
   
As with Brueggemann’s understanding of lament, countertestimony is not to be 
understood outside the faith of Israel. “…Israel’s countertestimony is not an act of 
unfaith. It is rather a characteristic way in which faith is practiced.”
22
 Faith is not simply 
a product of the text but also reflective of the very character of Yahweh. At the end of 
his previous section on testimony he writes: 
The reason for this unsettlement is not finally—speaking theologically—that Israel 
speaks with many voices (which it does), or that Israel cannot make up its mind (which 
it cannot); the unsettling quality belongs definitionally to the character of Yahweh. In 
my judgment, the texts permit no overall solution, because self-regard and regard for 
Israel are not, in the end, the same. One might imagine that Yahweh's self-regard is 
given over completely to Israel's well-being. But Israel's text and Israel's lived 
experience keep facing the reality that something like Yahweh's self-regard keeps 
surfacing in demanding ways. This self-regard may emerge as unsurprising moral 
claim, or it may emerge as a kind of wild capriciousness, as sovereignty without 
principled loyalty. It is this propensity in Yahweh, Yahweh's determination to be taken 
seriously on Yahweh's own terms, that precludes any final equation of sovereignty with 
covenantal love or with pathos.
23
 
Furthermore, the dispute of countertestimony necessarily redefines the sovereignty of 
Yahweh to prevent Yahweh from becoming an idol. “…8(6)&.$)($#2,5&(($L5"#($,!),$2+$
])!#&!$2($5",$&5;.&((.7$362,232Q&;$)5;$(?B@&6,&;<$])!#&!$#2..$).("$B&3"/&$)5$)B(".?,&<$
)B(".?,2Q25*$2;"., the very kind about which Moses aimed his protesting, deconstructing 
work at Sinai.”
24
 Brueggemann concludes that the all persons who claim faith through 
the biblical texts must maintain the tension of testimony and countertestimony.
25
  
 The third major part of %:% is “Israel’s Unsolicited Testimony” which, within 
the bounds of Brueggemann’s analogy, concerns extra information given to a court by 
witnesses without the previous solicitation of attorney or judge. Brueggemann’s 
application of this to Israel is as follows: 
Any careful consideration of Israel’s testimony about God indicates that Israel is indeed 
an unrestrained witness who will not stop with testimony about Yahweh. Without 
taking an extra breath, without a pause, in the very same utterance, Israel continues to 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 318-21. 
22 Ibid., 318. 
23 Ibid., 303. 
24 Ibid., 332, italics original. 
25 See ibid., Ch. 12 “Maintaining the Tension,” 400-03. 
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talk about many other matters beyond what has been asked. It is these other matters that 
constitute Israel’s unsolicited testimony.
26
 
Such testimony unfolds via those in relationship to Yahweh (whom Brueggemann terms 
“partners”) including Israel, individual human persons, the nations, and creation. 
Building upon chapters which develop each of these relationships, Brueggemann 
proposes a “dramatic movement” characteristic of all relationships with Yahweh. “The 
drama of brokenness and restoration, which has Yahweh as its key agent, features 
*&5&6"(2,7, 3)5;"6 in brokenness, and resilient !">&, the markings of a viable life.”
27
 
Dramatic pattern suggests metanarrative as Brueggemann tentatively concludes, “I will 
settle for the judgment that the Old Testament is not a metanarrative but offers the 
materials out of which a metanarrative is to be construed.”
28
 
 “Israel’s Embodied Testimony,” Brueggemann’s fourth major category, pushes 
the bounds of testimony in his courtroom analogy to account more fully for the 
mediation of Yahweh. “It is daring of Israel to insist on relatedness with Yahweh. But to 
be specific about that relatedness requires that along with the daring of Israel’s 
utterance, we pay attention, as best we can, to the practices which give the testimony 
3"536&,&$ &/B";2/&5,.”
29
 This “embodiment” is not so much an alternative 
methodological expansion beyond rhetoric as it is an expansion of rhetoric’s 
“operation”. 
In any case, ,!&$ 6!&,"623).$ /&;2),2"5$ "+$ ])!#&!$ 25$ ,!&$ O2B.&$ 2($ 5",$ )$ ;2(&/B";2&;<$
2;&),2"5).$">&6),2"5….Thus, I propose, Yahweh is generated and constituted, so far as 
the claims of Israel are concerned, in actual practices that mediate. The Bible is the 
product generated by a community, and the source that generates and nurtures the 
community as it practices Yahweh-in-relation. Thus the question of mediation is not a 
question of right theology (as in orthodoxy), a great and pervasive theological 
temptation, but it is a question of the characteristic social practice that generates, 
constitutes, and mediates Yahweh in the midst of life.
30
 
Here, the sociological implications of Brueggemann’s rhetoric come to full maturity. “It 
has been my wont to say that Yahweh’s “natural habitat” is the text of the Old 
Testament, and there is no Yahweh outside of this text. Now I intend to push behind that 
textual-rhetorical claim, to say that Yahweh’s habitat is 25$,!&(&$>6)3,23&(.”
31
 Modes of 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 408. 
27 Ibid., 562. 
28 Ibid., 559. For the full discussion of “Materials for a Metanarrative” see pp. 558-64.   
29 Ibid., 568. 
30 Ibid., 574, italics original. 
31 Ibid., 576-77, italics original. 
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mediation are examined in chapters on torah, king, prophet, the cult and the sage, all 
finally leading to Brueggemann’s conclusion, “What I most want to insist on in this 
connection is that in these actual, concrete social enactments, it is Yahweh, in all of 
Yahweh’s density, who is mediated.”
32
 
 Fifth and finally, Brueggemann considers “Prospects for Theological 
Interpretation” in light of his proposals. The conclusion of these prospects, “Moving 
toward True Speech,” anticipates what is next for Old Testament theology. 
Old Testament theology in the future, I have proposed, will be reflection on Israel’s 
disclosing speech that is in a pluralistic context and therefore inescapably disputatious. 
It is my sense that a community of interpretation that engages in a serious undertaking 
of Old Testament theology will itself be a community that attends to disclosing speech 
in a pluralistic context that is inescapably disputatious. I mean by this that Old 
Testament theology is not simply a detached )5).7(2( of an ancient practice of speech, 
but it is )5$&5*)*&/&5,$#2,! those speech practices, in order to adjudicate what is and 
what is not “true speech,” that is, speech about the truth.
33
 
The theological import of an “inescapably disputatious” text is what Brueggemann has 
sought to recover in the practice of the church. “Old Testament theology is, in an 
ecclesial setting, an activity for the recovery of an idiom of speech and of life that is 
congruent with the stuff of Israel’s faith.”
34
 Finally, the book ends by asserting that 
“acknowledgement of Yahweh at the center of life (the life of Israel or the life of the 
world) requires a reordering of everything else.”
35
 
 
B.  A Subtitle Establishing Tension—%&(,2/"57<$=2(>?,&<$1;@"3)37 $ 
 
The above overview, while brief, attends particularly to the manner in which 
tension emerges as the guiding force in Brueggemann’s understanding of faith. While 
neither the latter three-fifths of the work nor the introductory two-part retrospect can be 
disregarded, the dyad of the first two major parts, “Core Testimony” and 
“Countertestimony,” occupies a particular methodological priority in Brueggemann’s 
thought. In dialectical relationship both parts form the driving tension acutely observed 
by Linafelt and Beal, a tension which corresponds to Brueggemann’s earlier 
articulations of orientation/disorientation, structure legitimation/embrace of pain. These 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 700. 
33 Ibid., 743. 
34 Ibid., 747. 
35 Ibid. 
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also correspond to the first two terms of %:%’s subtitle, testimony and dispute. Thus, 
whether it is the “unsolicited” or “embodied” testimony presented in Part III or IV 
respectively, or the work’s potential applications presented in Part V, %!&"."*7$"+$ ,!&$
:.;$ %&(,)/&5,$ finds all of its guiding implications rooted in “the processive, 
interactionist modes of assertion and counterassertion…that together constitute and 
construe the theological substance of Old Testament theology.”
36
 
However, both the subtitle of %:% and Brueggemann’s earlier psalms typology 
contain a third term, advocacy and reorientation, respectively. In light of 
Brueggemann’s growing emphasis on the tensions of claim and counterclaim, how 
should the meaning of such terms now be understood? 
In the previous chapter, we examined Brueggemann’s increasing desires to 
allow the sociological understanding of rhetoric which he discerns in the Psalms, at 
times, to minimize or set aside certain theological concepts. At other times, his 
understanding of rhetoric appears to critique such concepts outright. This eventually 
complicates his understanding of God’s transformation vis-à-vis the reorientation aspect 
of lament psalm form. Because Brueggemann comes to conceive of the form itself 
rhetorically mediating all three aspects of his typology, properly conceiving of the 
form’s transforming intrusion apparently becomes a function of speech )B"?, God. In 
such speech, the sociologically deployed rhetoric of disorientation impinging upon 
orientation comes sharply to the foreground and reorientation becomes less the intrusion 
of a truly divine reality and more about responding to the transforming function of 
language and the human imagination. 
  A decade later Brueggemann’s theological application of rhetoric has come to 
maturity in %:%’s concept of ,&(,2/"57. Whereas he earlier acknowledged theology 
which “smacks of synergism,”
37
 such an observation becomes unnecessary and 
irrelevant in %:%’s$ established priority on speech. “[F]or Old Testament faith, ,!&$
?,,&6)53&$2($&@&67,!25*. The utterance leads to reality, the reality of God that relies on 
the reliability of the utterance.”
38
 However, while the speech of testimony might seem 
to be the first order of Brueggemann’s reality, testimony does not in and of itself reveal 
the power of speech. Notice the reality of God alluded to above does not merely rely on 
the utterance but “on the reliability of the utterance.” Such reliability is engendered by 
                                                 
36 Ibid., xiv. See op. cit. 
37 Brueggemann, 8(6)&.9($-6)2(&, 7. 
38 %:%,122, italics original. See op. cit. 
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dispute. “But where the truth is at issue and at risk, testimony is given by many 
witnesses, witnesses are vigorously cross-examined, and out of such disputatious 
adjudication comes a verdict, an affirmed rendering of reality and an accepted version 
of truth.”
39
  
Thus the power of speech is not so much in the claims of speech but in the 
;2(>?,),2"?($ >6"3&(( by which claims are made. Testimony and countertestimony are 
really not two different entities entirely but more or less two halves of one grand 
reality—disputation which ultimately comes to define God. 
I believe that the root cause of such theological disputatiousness arises from and is 
sustained by the Subject of the conversation, namely Yahweh, who prizes candor and 
rejects all deceiving denial. I understand that this is something of a circular argument. 
But if we are to be theological in our understanding, we are bound to say that no other 
explanation is important, for finally God-talk must be congruent with the God about 
whom it speaks.
40
  
This is a looping restatement of %:%’s previous conclusion that this “unsettling quality 
belongs definitionally to the character of Yahweh,”
41
 which now circles back to confirm 
that “Jewish testimony relishes the disjunction that disrupts the large claim and that 
attends to the contradiction as the truth of the matter.”
42
 Brueggemann’s circularity 
produces a rather straightforward conclusion about %:%’s subtitle: ,&(,2/"57 is simply 
half of ;2(>?,& which is the real theological heart of %:%. 
 But what about$ );@"3)37? From the beginning of the work, Brueggemann 
inextricably links the process of testimony and dispute with advocacy. 
There seems to be no way out of this competitive, conflictual situation; there are no 
“answers in the back of the book” to which all will assent—not critical, not classical, 
not advocacy. Moreover, it is apparent that every such advocacy—whether an admitted 
one (liberationist), or one in the service of the creedal tradition (canonical), or one in 
the service of Enlightenment autonomy (critical)—is readily checked and seemingly 
countered in the treatment of any text by the citation of a countertext, which can most 
often be identified, or by the offer of a counterinterpretation.
43
  
%:%’s proposal of checks and balances is not purely violent in itself, but that which 
offers a way out of the violence into understanding belonging and relationship. Notice 
the following Brueggemann language about the dynamic of Israel’s speech: “In the 
disputatious propensity of Israel, rather, core testimony and cross-examination B&."5*$,"$
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40 Ibid., 325. 
41 Ibid., 303. 
42 Ibid., 325. 
43 Ibid., 63. 
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&)3!$",!&6 and +"6$&)3!$",!&6 in an ongoing exchange.”
44
 Violence is not constituted by 
conflict (conflict is consistently a constructive concept for Brueggemann) but rather by 
the disengaging neglect of sectarianism. 
P&$5"#$6&3"*52Q&$,!),$,!&6&$2($5"$25,&6&(,R+6&&$25,&6>6&,),2"5<$5"$25,&6>6&,),2"5$,!),$2($
5",$25$,!&$(&6@23&$"+$("/&$25,&6&(,$)5;$25$("/&$(&5(&$);@"3)37. Indeed, it is an illusion 
of the Enlightenment that advocacy-free interpretation can exist. Interpretation as 
advocacy is an ongoing process of negotiation, adjudication, and correction. This 
means, most likely, that there can be no right or ultimate interpretation, but only 
provisional judgments for which the interpreter is prepared to take practical 
responsibility, and which must always yet again be submitted to the larger conflictual 
conversation. Therefore any adequate interpretive conclusion is likely to enjoy its 
adequacy only for a moment. Such an interpretive enterprise is a profound departure 
from the older, long-established hegemonic work of interpretations in which one could 
enjoy “assured results.” In my judgment, however, faithful interpretation—that is, 
interpretation congruent with the text being interpreted, requires a willingness to stay 
engaged in such an adjudicating process and not to retreat to a separated interpretive 
community.
45
 
That which advocates for us at the widest level then is engagement in this “adjudicating 
process” which constitutes %:%’s “Yahweh version of reality.”
46
  
Within Brueggemann’s theological inclinations, advocacy and its earlier 
correlate of reorientation, may yet still depend upon the “transforming intrusion by the 
covenant partner.”
47
 He writes, “Israel, moreover, understood that the drama of 
rehabilitation, including the sequence of complaint, petition, and thanks, requires the 
Holy One, over and against whom the human person in extremis must take shrill and 
vigorous initiative.”
48
 However, we now see that this Holy One is arrived at, fully 
formed by, and correctly understood only in the disputatious process of speech.
49
 
Dispute itself becomes advocacy and perhaps Brueggemann’s %!&"."*7$ "+$ ,!&$ :.;$
%&(,)/&5,$can thus be most aptly summarized by a genitive rendering of its subtitle in 
reverse:  of (the) advocacy of dispute of testimony. 
 
 C. A Lament Psalm Focusing Tension—%:%’s Central Role for Psalm 88 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 317-18, italics mine. 
45 Ibid., 63, italics original. 
46 Ibid., xvii. 
47 Walter Brueggemann, “The Formfulness of Grief” in %!&$-()./($)5;$,!&$J2+&$"+$N)2,! (ed. Patrick D. 
Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 93-94. Originally published in 85,&6>6&,),2"5 31 (1977), 263-
75. 
48 Ibid., 476. 
49 Ibid., 64, “Yahweh, in the life of the text, is pulled this way and that by the adjudicating rhetoric of 
Israel. And any theological interpretation must take care not to cover over the process by which the God 
of the Bible is made available to us.”  
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Towards the end of %:%’s section on countertestimony, Brueggemann more 
specifically connects his previous work on lament form to the influence it has on his 
mature theology. In the chapter “Yahweh and Negativity,” he examines the psalms of 
complaint
50
 which he calls “[t]he principal pattern of speech whereby Israel bears this 
element of countertestimony.”
51
 After considering examples of these psalms he 
concludes, “We may notice three elements in the transaction of faith constituted by 
prayers of complaint.”
52
 The first element is incongruity because “8(6)&.$2($>6"+"?5;.7$
)#)6&$ "+$ ,!&$ 253"5*6?2,7$ B&,#&&5$ ,!&$ 3"6&$ 3.)2/($ "+$ 3"@&5)5,).$ +)2,!$ )5;$ ,!&$ .2@&;$
&S>&62&53&$ "+$ 2,($ .2+&.”
53
 As developed in Brueggemann’s typology, such incongruity 
characterizes the movement from orientation to disorientation. The second element 
concerns initiative for “25$,!&$>()./$"+$3"/>.)25,$8(6)&.$!)($/"/&5,)62.7$#6&(,&;$+6"/$
])!#&!$,!&$252,2),2@&$+"6$,!&$6&.),2"5(!2>U”
54
 As demonstrated in his article “The Costly 
Loss of Lament,” as well as in other contexts, Brueggemann understands such human 
initiative as the decisive moment when disorientation impinges upon orientation in the 
hope of reorientation. This leads to the third element. “P&(,&6/)55$!)($)@&66&;$,!),$,!&$
3"/>.)25,($"+$8(6)&.<$#2,!"?,$&S3&>,2"5<$6&3&2@&$)$>"(2,2@&$6&(>"5(&$)5;$6&(".?,2"5$+6"/$
])!#&!U”
55
 Positive response and resolution, of course, corresponds to Brueggemann’s 
concept of reorientation evident in the thanksgiving and praise which most typically 
ends this psalmic form. The ending is so typical, in fact, as to suggest a different 
classification and function for the lament form in %:%’s scheme. “Westermann has 
overstated the case, but on the whole the suggestion is correct…. Such a transaction, in 
normal usage, is a proper and nearly routine way in which Israel’s covenant with 
Yahweh operates. To that extent, laments and complaints are not 3"?5,&6testimony.
”56
 
Yet, Brueggemann takes issue with how resolutely Westermann understands the 
resolution in the form. “Westermann has failed to note, however, that a few psalms to 
the contrary do not work according to the normal patterns of covenantalism.”
57
 
                                                 
50 Here, Brueggemann is working with Gerstenberger’s categories as he writes, “It is important to note 
that these psalms are indeed voices of complaint of judicial protest, and not lamentations, as they are 
often called. In the psalms of complaint, Israel seeks aid and positive treatment (comfort) from Yahweh, 
precisely on the basis of extant covenant agreements to which Yahweh is pledged” See %:%, 374-75. 
51 Ibid., 374. 
52 Ibid., 378. 
53 Ibid., italics original. 
54 Ibid., 380, italics original. 
55 Ibid., italics original. 
56 Ibid., 380, italics original. 
57 Brueggemann, %:%, 380. 
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Brueggemann points to Psalm 88, “an extreme case and a prime example of a summons 
to Yahweh that receives no answer.”
58
 This is a demonstration of the furthest reach of 
Israel’s countertestimony—a complaint psalm with no resolution and thus no adherence 
to the typical form. “Israel is left with its psalm, always to be uttered one more time, 
always more shrilly, uttered as an act of profound need, of intense indignation…”
59
 But 
to this description Brueggemann also adds that Psalm 88 is one “…of relentless, 
insistent hope.”
60
  
Hope in this case comes not from turning aside from Yahweh’s silence, but from 
the incessant nature of Israel’s complaint. At the conclusion of the chapter on “Yahweh 
and Negativity,” Brueggemann compares the faith responses of Ecclesiastes and Psalm 
88. 
The silence [of Yahweh] finally can lead to less energetic, almost phlegmatic 
obedience; or it can on occasion still evoke strident protest. Thus we take our final 
consideration of the voicing of negativity from Psalm 88, a very different kind of “limit 
expression.” Ecclesiastes has lost any passion or impetus to cry out to Yahweh. Perhaps 
that should be our final word on negativity, for with Ecclesiastes we reach, in one sense, 
the end of the Old Testament. But such melancholy is unrepresentative of Israel’s faith 
and even of Israel’s way of negativity. Therefore high-energy protest seems a more 
appropriate conclusion than low-energy, calculating submissiveness….Ecclesiastes, in 
its resignation and coping resolve, is a more modern response to the absence and the 
silence of God, but Psalm 88 is more characteristically Jewish. Ecclesiastes’ 
countertestimony has a terminus, but Psalm 88 has no end. The cry of the psalm will 
continue.
61
 
Ever-continuing, “high-energy protest” turns on possibility and on risk. Despite the 
reality of silence complained about in Psalm 88, the possibility remains that Yahweh 
3"?.;$ answer. In a telling note, Brueggemann cites Elie Wiesel’s recounting of “one 
exchange in rabbinic teaching”: 
“So long as he cries, he can hope his father will hear him. If he stops, he is lost….” 
 “Believe me, I have never ceased to cry out….” 
 “May the Lord be praised…Then there is hope.”
62
 
Hope is always possible in that God may hear and answer, but such hope, in both the 
above rabbinic teaching and Psalm 88, seems to depend &S3.?(2@&.7$ on the one who 
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cries out to God; again, “If he stops, he is lost…” Hope arises from a petitioner who, in 
risky circumstances, is willing to take on the additional risk of complaining to God. 
Moreover, such action reveals risks for Yahweh. Psalm 88 proposes, according to 
Brueggemann, that “if Yahweh allows the death of the speaker, Yahweh will lose a 
witness to Yahweh’s !&(&;.…There will be losses as well +"6$ ])!#&!, who will no 
longer be praised.”
63
 Thus in Psalm 88, the far end of Brueggemann’s description of 
countertestimony, hope remains because “Israel, in this version of countertestimony, 
does not propose to stop now…or ever.”
64
 
With this understanding of hope in hand, Brueggemann concludes the discussion 
of countertestimony with a chapter titled “Maintaining the Tension.” He makes explicit 
links between the Old Testament and Christian faith but begins by defining biblical 
tension as ,!& interpretive norm:   
“The tension between the core testimony and the countertestimony is acute and 
ongoing. …Lived faith in this tradition consists in the capacity to move back and forth 
between these two postures of faith, one concerned to submit to Yahweh, culminating 
in (&.+R)B)5;"525*$ >6)2(&<$ the other concerned to assert self in the face of God, 
culminating in (&.+R6&*)6;25*$3"/>.)25,$that takes a posture of autonomy.”
65
  
This results in a dialectic which “requires both centrist and marginated interpreters” and 
maintains a tension as true for Christianity as it is for Israel despite that in “high claim 
made through Jesus, the countertestimony of Israel seems to be silenced.”
66
  
 This is not %:%’s first statement on countertestimony and Christian faith. In the 
introductory chapter to countertestimony (Ch. 8), Brueggemann acknowledges the 
problem of conceiving relentless dispute within the context of Christianity. “The matter 
is not so easy for Christian theology. It is not so easy because Christian faith is 
relentless in the absolute claim it makes for Jesus of Nazareth. …It is not usual for 
Christians to engage in theological countertestimony of the claims of their own faith.”
67
 
As an avowed Christian theologian, Brueggemann introduces a particular view of 
christology to resolve this problem: 
Christian faith, however, is not without resource. It does have a key access point to this 
disjunctive enterprise. Christian faith is centered on Good Friday and on the crucifixion, 
in which we speak of “the Crucified God.” Friday is of course linked to Sunday, and 
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death is tailed by the eruption of new life. But the scar tissue of Friday lingers in the 
body of Christ, and it protests against every totalizing, triumphalist, and absolutizing 
ambition. In living in the midst of Friday, Christians reach back as far as the command 
issued at Sinai against idols. And they reach forward as far as Parisian deconstruction in 
its Jewishness [here, B is referencing Derrida]. The cross-examination will not defeat 
the testimony…probably. But it will cause the testimony to be issued in a sobered, 
trembling voice. It may be more than a play on words that the 36"((R&S)/25),2"5 is 
matched to the 36"(($of Friday.
68
   
The position proposed here clearly relies on the tradition of Luther’s theology of the 
cross, an influence prevalent in much contemporary theology, perhaps none more 
famous than Jürgen Moltmann’s %!&$46?32+2&;$G";.  
Even so, Brueggemann stakes out his own ground. He eventually connects his 
own understanding of the cross and resurrection to the tension so central in %:%. “There 
is a sense that Sunday resolves Friday, that the core testimony resolves the 
countertestimony…But in our honest reading of the New Testament, and in our honest 
liturgic reckoning, the Friday of negativity persists to make its claim.”
69
 This idea of 
“honest” New Testament reading, in which the cross of Christ is affirmed as 
3"?5,&6,&(,2/"57, leads to the sweeping claim that “the unresolve is as profound in the 
New Testament as in the Old.”
70
 Alternatively, he suggest that Christians should wait 
through “liturgic reckoning,” which he derives from the implications of such a 
confession as “Christ has died, Christ has risen, Christ will come again.” He asks, “Is 
that waiting not in close proximity to the waiting of Psalm 88, which does not doubt, in 
its persistence and shrillness and stubbornness, that there will be a hearing and an 
answer?”
71
 He follows with an answer to his own question: “Thus Christians, for all the 
claim of the core testimony of Easter, still wait for resolution very sure, but sure only in 
hope.”
72
  
All of this, of course, has significant implications for how Brueggemann 
understands the practice of Christian faith.  
Thus I submit that in the end, if we keep our Christian confession close to the text and 
to lived reality, all the communities propelled by this testimony wait together. All wait 
in the conviction that the core testimony of faithful sovereignty and sovereign fidelity 
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will defeat hiddenness, ambiguity, and negativity. It is a waiting done in profound hope, 
but it is nevertheless a waiting.
73
 
Togetherness with other faith communities “propelled by this testimony” is encouraged, 
and that which seems to unite them is a common conviction derived from a common 
wait. “The waiting is inescapable because of the unresolved condition of life in the 
world, an unresolve shared by Christians with Jews and with all others.”
74
 In this 
hermeneutic of tension, whereby hope as understood through the exceptional lament 
form of Psalm 88 serves as the rule, Brueggemann concludes that “All wait not 
doubting, but having nothing in hand except this rich, complex, disturbing testimony.”
75
   
  
D. An Evolution of Reorientation into “Maintaining the Tension” 
 
 “Maintaining the Tension” is not merely the conclusion of Brueggemann’s 
dialectical concept of Israel’s testimony. It also fully manifests how form and function 
in his Psalms typology has modulated since the article “Psalms and the Life of Faith.” 
There, Brueggemann was able to offer the following description of reorientation: 
Israel has the capacity to exploit the fullness of language in the service of reorientation 
and new creation. Such a practice affirms that we do not need to be forever reductive, 
demystifying, critical, and exposing. There is a time when this work is done….Or to 
move from hermeneutic to the Psalms, Israel must not forever lament, complain, 
protest, and question. There is a time for affirmation and rejoicing, a time to end the 
criticism, to receive the gift, and to sing a doxology (see Eccl. 3:2-10).
76
 
Later in %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, Brueggemann contextualizes reorientation, labeled 
“new orientation,” in the “,#"$;&32(2@&$/"@&($"+$+)2,!”: 
One move we make is "?,$"+$)$(&,,.&;$"62&5,),2"5$25,"$)$(&)("5$"+$;2("62&5,),2"5… It is 
that move which characterizes much of Psalms in the form of complaint and 
lament…The other move we make is a move +6"/$)$3"5,&S,$"+$;2("62&5,),2"5$,"$)$5&#$
"62&5,),2"5, surprised by a new gift from God, a new coherence made present to us just 
when we thought all was lost…This second move also characterizes many of the 
Psalms, in the form of songs of thanksgiving and declarative hymns…
77
 
Thus along with the move into tension comes a resolving move out of tension. 
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Along with ,!&$ .2,&6)67$ !)B2, which dominates these psalms comes ,!&$ ,!&"."*23).$
&S>&62&53& of the will and power to transform reality. All these prayers and songs 
bespeak the intervening action of God to give life in a world where death seems to have 
the best and strongest way. The songs are not about the “natural” outcome of trouble, 
but about the decisive ,6)5(+"6/),2"5 made possible by this God who causes new life 
where none seems possible.
78
 
'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./($concludes, “In that movement of transformation are found both 
the power of life and the passion for praise of God.”
79
 
 Over the years leading up to %!&"."*7$ "+$ ,!&$:.;$ %&(,)/&5,, Brueggemann’s 
notions of “.2,&6)67$ !)B2,” and “,!&"."*23).$ &S>&62&53&” increasingly converge as his 
understanding of these “two decisive moves of faith” evolves. The first movement from 
orientation to disorientation increasingly becomes defining of faith in a new way. That 
is, the first movement seems to generate the transforming possibility of the second 
movement from disorientation to reorientation.  Moreover, the second is a result already 
apparently encompassed by the first. Linafelt and Beal write: 
In short, disorientation encompasses both threat and promise, and it is impossible to 
have one without the other….The refusal to choose constitutes the fundamental 
ambivalence of God, an ambivalence that is never resolved in some middle-ground 
synthesis but instead reels back and forth between the two. Walter Brueggemann has 
understood more than anyone that this tension, this fiercely imagined disjunction, is 
what drives the life of the divine…
80
 
Reorientation, for Brueggemann, effectively becomes about “maintaining the tension” 
discerned primarily in the Old Testament text but also in the New Testament narratives 
of Christ’s cross and resurrection. %:%’s final chapter states: 
That is, in the end, theological interpretation that engages the theological claims of the 
text must host the testimony in all its oddness, and must be engaged in the practice of 
the core testimony and countertestimony, in practice and in obedience, in protest and 
complaint, with its whole life. The phrase “engaged in practice” means for me not only 
hearing the text, but .2@25*$25,&5,2"5)..7$25$6&(>"5(&$,"$2,($>6">"(&;$#"6.;U
81
$
This proposed world is one where responses addressed to and from the God of scripture 
are theologically meaningful and proper "5.7 as they are understood through 
Brueggemann’s scheme of core testimony and countertestimony.  
 
II. Tension Beyond Maintenance: Who is God Amidst Human Suffering? 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 124-25. 
79 Ibid., 128.  
80 Linafelt and Beal, “Introduction,” 4-5. 
81 Brueggemann, %:%, 744, italics mine. 
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A.  The Culmination of Lament in Brueggemann’s Theology 
 
Having concluded our exposition of Brueggemann’s mature theology in %:%, 
we now offer a response to this theological culmination of his long-standing biblical 
engagement with lament as a response of faith amidst human suffering. To review<$we 
saw in Chapter 1 that Brueggemann’s study of lament began with the legacy of form-
criticism and the particularly influential work of Claus Westermann. These influences, 
combined with Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy, led to the emergence of 
Brueggemann’s new typology of psalm function. The tripartite structure of this 
typology—articulated through the categories of orientation, disorientation, and 
reorientation—proposed the function of the typical lament psalm as parallel to the entire 
Psalter and all of biblical faith. In Chapter 2, we traced Brueggemann’s continuing 
efforts to refine his Psalms typology, and indeed his whole theology, through growing 
engagement with both social-scientific and rhetorical criticism. Once again lament form 
played a crucial role as the dialectical categories of “structural legitimation” and 
“embrace of pain” produced a defining theological shape for Brueggemann’s 
understanding of the Old Testament. Correspondingly, tension between orientation and 
disorientation in Brueggemann’s typology began to emerge as a reorienting of all 
reality, divine or human, through Brueggemann’s increasing emphasis on the power of 
rhetoric deployed sociologically. Over the course of Chapter 3, we have proposed how 
the developments of Chapters 1 and 2 become a “foundational tension” in %!&"."*7$"+$
,!&$ :.;$ %&(,)/&5,. Rhetoric fully emerges as the provider of theological and social 
reality in Brueggemann’s mature work, leading to his preeminent priority on the 
utterance of the text. Yet the power of that rhetoric (which Linafelt and Beal call “the 
drive” behind Israel’s faith and Israel’s God
82
) lies in the dialectical shape of Israel’s 
text categorized as core testimony and countertestimony. At the heart of this dialectic is 
his extended and evolving engagement with the realities of praise and petition in the 
lament psalm form. 
Looking back from the end of %:% allows us to see that Brueggemann has never 
ceased in his intention to recover lament as a resource for contemporary faith. We return 
                                                 
82 See Linafelt and Beal, “Introduction,” 5. See op. cit. 
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to the words with which our examination of Brueggemann began—the opening lines of 
his initial article on lament. 
It is the lament that preserves for us Israel's most powerful and eloquent statements of 
the effort both to survive and to be transformed as a people of faith. The study of lament 
can provide important resources for our contemporary work of theology and ministry.
83
 
Yet we have also seen how he has gone far beyond merely recovering lament as a 
6&("?63&. Brueggemann ultimately has come to ascribe the tension he finds through the 
form of this text not only to biblical faith but to the very God to whom the Bible attests. 
N)2,!$ in ,!2($G";$grounds %!&"."*7$ "+$ ,!&$:.;$ %&(,)/&5,’s central, final claim: “the 
acknowledgement of Yahweh requires reordering everything else.”
84
 Moreover, 
acknowledgement of the divine in the Old Testament encompasses “in all its radicality” 
)57$divine claims made by the New.
85
  
Brueggemann has argued that suffering is$ the main question of Old Testament 
theology, and his theology has undertaken the task of answering this question through 
examining #!" the Bible proclaims God to be. Acknowledging ,!2( God is not only the 
conclusion of his greatest work but also the very root of Brueggemann’s concept of Old 
)5; New Testament faith. Through lament, this is the God to whom we respond amidst 
suffering and from whom we expect a response. Consequently, any theological 
evaluation or critique of Brueggemann’s proposal must follow along a specific 
theological line of inquiry: M"#$;"&($O6?&**&/)559($>6">"().$+"6$B2B.23).$+)2,!$6&(?.,$
+6"/$#!"$!&$?5;&6(,)5;($G";$,"$B&$)/2;(,$!?/)5$(?++&625*_ $
 
B. God as “the Fray”: Dividing Divine Fidelity and Sovereignty$
  
Throughout all of his work, Brueggemann continually posits faith as an 
affirmation of God’s transforming response to human suffering. In %:%$ he even 
attributes a certain “constancy” to Yahweh in Israel’s testimony, despite his 
fundamental assertion that “Israel’s knowledge of God is endlessly elusive.”
86
 
                                                 
83 Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 67.  
84 %:%, 747. 
85 Ibid., 302, “…whatever may be claimed for the radicality of God in the New Testament is already 
present in all its radicality in these Jewish witnesses to the character of Yahweh.” 
86 Ibid., 725. 
 86
This peculiar world of utterance, with Yahweh at its center, has a quality of constancy 
to it through time, and it is this constancy that constitutes the material of Old Testament 
theology. Two features of this constancy are in deep tension….This quality of 
constancy as both 2;&"."*7$and &.?(2@&5&(( is a rich interpretive invitation. I suppose, in 
the end, we must make a crucial judgment about whether ideology or elusiveness has 
the last word. In my own reading, I find that no ideological statement of Yahweh is 
finally permitted to prevail, always being undermined by elusiveness…it may be simply 
that the issue of ideology and elusiveness is the very marking of constancy that belongs 
to Yahweh who is endlessly responsive and available and at the same time 
intransigently sovereign. That unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, issue is precisely 
what is so compelling and so maddening about Old Testament theology.
87
 
This allusion to “constancy” raises an important question: Brueggemann’s commitment 
to theological irresolution may be undisputable, but does not such a commitment 
produce a resolution of its own?  He apparently 6&.2&($"5$!2($"#5$3&6,2,?;&$about the 
text based neither in history or ontology but in the tension of his rhetoric. Different 
though the certitude of this “idiom” may )>>&)6 to be, it ">&6),&( essentially the same 
as any other understanding of certitude by proposing universally valid assumptions as 
applied to any and all situations over time.
88
 Brueggemann is thus able to conclude that 
his theology is about recovering not just any faith response, but the only viable 
approach to the correct response and practice of faith which produces certain results.
89
 
Such resolution seems manifest even when Brueggemann most acutely 
proclaims the unresolved nature of biblical faith. A crucial example occurs in the 
“Maintaining the Tension” section of %:%: “All [biblical faiths] wait in the conviction 
that the core testimony of faithful sovereignty and sovereign fidelity will defeat 
hiddenness, ambiguity, and negativity. It is a waiting done in profound hope…”
90
 If 
“conviction” and “profound hope” for the ;&+&),$ of all “negativity” are in “faithful 
sovereignty and sovereign fidelity” then Brueggemann would seem to argue that 
biblical faith, far from maintaining tension, 2($ ).#)7($ ).6&);7$ 6&(".@&;$ that God’s 
faithfulness will overcome such tensions, even from within “the fray.” $
The faithfulness of God from within human experience is, of course, the heart of 
Christian testimony regarding the person and work of Christ. With this in mind 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 724. 
88 Ibid., 746, “For all its variation through time and in different circumstances, there is a recognizable 
idiom to Israel’s testimony, especially as some texts take great liberties with it. …The combination of 
core testimony and countertestimony constitutes the idiom of Israel’s faith. It is, then, this idiom that may 
be practiced in an ecclesial community of interpretation.” 
89 Ibid., 750, “Testimony leads reality and makes a decision for a 3&6,)25 kind of reality both possible and 
25&(3)>)B.&.” (italics mine). See also ibid., 125, nt. 18. See also Brueggemann, “A Prompt Retrospect,” 
319, section IV. 
90 %:%, 402. 
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Brueggemann proposes three “crucial” distinctives for a christology which takes 
seriously the concerns of proper Old Testament interpretation: 
In any case, three caveats are crucial as one moves from the Old Testament to 
christological claims. First, care must be taken that Easter does not issue in a Friday-
denying triumphalism, or in an easy victory that does not look full in the face at Friday 
and its terrible truth. Second, it must be borne in mind that the Friday-Sunday dialectic 
of reconciliation in Christian faith has its complete anticipation in the Old Testament in 
the mystery of exile and homecoming. That mystery of exile and homecoming 
dominates the liturgic rhetoric of complaint and response in every period and in every 
season of Israel’s life. Israel characteristically complains at the trouble given by 
Yahweh. Yahweh characteristically responds in healing, saving resolution. Third, in the 
end, from the perspective of the final form of the text, fidelity dominates the vision of 
Israel. This conclusion is as unambiguous in the faith of Israel as it is in the Easter 
affirmation of the church. In the Old Testament the God who abandons is the God who 
brings home to well-being.
91
 
Given his overall approach in %:%, the first two “caveats” are unsurprising.$In the first 
he is concerned, of course, with any Christian triumphalism which might become the 
basis for the kind of supercessionism which concerns him in the second caveat. He 
wants us to understand the tension Christians face in their own “terrible truth,” (again, 
%:% later describes the cross of Christ as “countertestimony”) and to understand that 
such tension is already 3"/>.&,&.7$)5,232>),&; by the Old Testament (especially in, say, 
psalms of complaint/lament). 
 The third “caveat” deserves particular consideration here. On the surface, it 
seems that Brueggemann is simply following his second caveat with still another claim 
to ward off supercessionism, this time along the lines of God’s fidelity. However, in 
light of all that we have previously examined—the evolution of Brueggemann’s lament 
scholarship, the sociological and theological shifts in how he understands his own 
psalms typology over time, and the overall way in which such changes are appropriated 
in the rhetorical emphasis of %:%—we must now ask how Brueggemann draws 
conclusions B)(&; on divine fidelity in either the lament psalm or the person and work 
of Christ. On his account,$&S)3,.7$#!),$L25;$"+$+2;&.2,7$3)5$;"/25),&$,!&$@2(2"5$"+$8(6)&.<$
)5;$!"#$3)5$(?3!$+2;&.2,7$B&$?5)/B2*?"?($25$&2,!&6$,!&$+)2,!$"+$8(6)&.$"6$,!&$4!62(,2)5$
3!?63!?  
Ambiguity is how Brueggemann explicitly describes the nature of God
92
 and 
also appears inherent to the following thesis about the divine: “%!&$(?B(,)53&$"+$8(6)&.9($
,&(,2/"57$ 3"53&6525*$ ])!#&!<$ 8$ >6">"(&<$ 72&.;($ )$ 4!)6)3,&6$ #!"$ !)($ )$ >6"+"?5;$
                                                 
91 Ibid., 312. 
92 See “Embrace of Pain,” 43, as Fretheim notes in “Some Reflections,” 27. See also %:%, 359-72. 
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;2(T?53,2"5$),$,!&$3"6&$"+$,!&$D?BT&3,9($.2+&.”
93
 We have seen such disjunction in relation 
to God variously developed over time by Brueggemann in terms of 
orientation/disorientation, structure legitimation/embrace of pain, above the fray/in the 
fray, and testimony/countertestimony. In %:% all ambiguity and disjunction come to a 
head under the following proposal for the divine life: “…Yahweh has at Yahweh’s core 
an unsettled interiority of fidelity and sovereignty.”
94
 This “unsettled” division of divine 
fidelity from sovereignty results from two opposing theological conclusions, both of 
which demonstrate how Brueggemann’s understanding of faithfulness, divine and 
human, has evolved from engagement with lament and his subsequent Psalms typology.  
First, 25$ +2;&.2,7<$ )5;$ "@&6$ )5;$ )*)25(,$ ;2@25&$ ("@&6&2*5,7<$ G";$ 6&(>"5;($ ,"$
!?/)5$(?++&625*$#!&5$+)2,!+?..7$ 2/>25*&;$?>"5$B7$!?/)52,7. We have seen this again 
and again in Brueggemann’s emphasis on lament. Beyond mere trustworthiness and 
reliability, divine fidelity “is what it means for Yahweh to be moved to compassion by 
Israel’s petition.”
95
 It is comprised of God’s “decision to be in a covenant, and the 
further decision to let this covenant emerge toward pathos.”
96
 Covenant is herein 
defined as “an enduring relationship of fidelity and mutual relationship” which provides 
God a people and “thus enhance(s) Yahweh’s sovereignty.”
97
 Yet such covenantal 
fidelity also operates over and against divine sovereignty for “(t)his relationship of 
enduring fidelity seems regularly to qualify, if not subvert, Yahweh’s sovereignty and 
self-regard.”
98
 Pathos, as we have seen since the article “The Formfulness of Grief,” 
refers to Yahweh’s “propensity to suffer with and suffer for, to be in solidarity with 
Israel in its suffering, and by such solidarity to sustain a relationship that rightfully 
could be terminated.”
99
 Divine pathos also appears to operate against divine 
sovereignty.
100
  
Moreover, through covenant and pathos, divine fidelity becomes a conflictual 
and interactive process which takes lament psalm form as a key archetype.
101
  It 
confronts all modern impetus to human autonomy
102
, but remains “mutual” by 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 268, italics original. 
94 Ibid., 459. 
95 Ibid., 324. 
96 Ibid., 302., See also ibid., 226. 
97 Ibid., 297. 
98 Ibid., 296. 
99 Ibid., 299.  
100 Ibid., 301, “It is pathos which preserves the covenant in the face of affronted sovereignty.” 
101 See Brueggemann, “Prompt Retrospect,” 310.$
102 %:%, 451.  
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maintaining the power of human initiative, particularly amidst suffering, to impinge 
upon God.
103
 This latter is Yahweh’s “+2;&.2,7$ /"@25*$ ,"#)6;$ >),!"(, 
humankind…authorized to freedom and initiative”
104
 and manifest powerfully through 
the human action of petition and complaint.
105
 Human assertion, in tension with 
abandonment to God, is exactly the dynamic of faith which Brueggemann wants to 
recover within Christian tradition and practice as the anthropological “3"?5,&6>)6,” to 
the unsettled nature of the divine.
106
 Again, human assertion against God is how faith 
“mobilizes” the power of God’s fidelity amidst suffering.
107
 So the disorientation of 
lament can encompass “both threat and promise.”
108
 
Yet beyond the threat of faithful human impingement and the promise of God’s 
fidelity, lies Brueggemann’s second conclusion about the divine: 85$ ("@&6&2*5,7<$G";$
3)5$ "@&662;&$ ;2@25&$ +2;&.2,7$ ("$ ,!),$G";$ ;&32;&($ 5",$ ,"$ +)2,!+?..7$ 6&(>"5; ,"$ (?++&625* 
)5;`"6$ &@&5$ 3!""(&($ ,"$ >&6>&,6),&$ 2,U God’s sovereignty accords with orientation and 
structure legitimation.
109
 As such, Brueggemann appears to work from a more 
traditional assumption that God can condone suffering as just reward for violation of 
covenant. “The very God whose righteousness is marked by fidelity and compassion is 
surely the God who shows a recurring streak of self regard…harsh enactments of 
sovereignty are in defense of Yahweh’s legitimate imperium.”
110
  
But$ this is not all his second conclusion entails.$'"(,$ 2/>"6,)5,$ 25$ 6&*)6;$ ,"$
O6?&**&/)559($>6">"()., God, in sovereignty, can also choose 5", to act in covenant 
relationship but, in fact, #2,!;6)# from it, apparently even if God’s human counterparts 
in covenant ?>!".;$ ,!&26$ &5;$"+$ ,!&$ 6&.),2"5(!2>U
111
 Any faithful impingement on our 
part /)7$5", result in God’s own faithful response to our suffering. Such is the “extreme 
case” with Psalm 88. “In this text, at least, Israel leaves testimony of radical unresolve, 
in which the countertestimony is not answered. Yahweh does answer often…but not 
always.”
112
 Brueggemann is not proposing here that this unresolve occupies the time of 
                                                 
103 Ibid., 458, 473., 
104 Ibid., 458. 
105 Ibid,, 473.  
106 Ibid., 459.  
107 Ibid., 226. 
108 Linafelt and Beal, 4. See op. cit. 
109 See %:%, 233.  
110 Ibid., 274. See also ibid., 271-2. 
111 Ibid., 410, “Because this commitment of fidelity to the partner is undertaken in sovereign freedom, it 
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112 Ibid., 381. 
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the “not yet.” He is instead decidedly locating this discord in the very nature of the 
divine. 
The challenge of biblical theology for Brueggemann is holding these two 
conclusions about the divine together. Matthew Schlimm writes: 
…Brueggemann does not believe that God tends toward infidelity. He believes that the 
divine life is fraught with tension and that no one characteristic always prevails, 
including any that entail fidelity or its loss. …The following comment summarizes well 
Brueggemann’s thoughts about divine fidelity: “In the end, Yahweh is faithful, if not all 
the way through.” God tends toward faithfulness, but is not confined by it.
113
 
Yet even if faithfulness is God’s “tendency,” Fretheim asserts, “Sovereignty clearly 
takes priority over fidelity in such formulations.”
114
 For his part, Brueggemann has 
earlier stated that God is “).#)7($25$,!&$>6"3&(($"+$;&32;25*” what kind of God to be.
115
 
157$ textual resolution, like the reorienting praise and/or thanksgiving which ends a 
typical lament psalm, is “3!)6)3,&62(,23)..7$ >6"@2(2"5).$ )5;$ ,&5?"?(<$ .2L&.7$ ,"$ B&$
?5(&,,.&;$ 25$ ,!&$5&S,$362(2(<$?5;"5&$B7$ ,!&$5&S,$ ,&S,.”
116
 While noting that eschatology 
“is largely unspecified in Israel’s testimony and enormously open,”
117
 he elsewhere 
more provocatively describes the future of Yahweh’s relationship with Israel as 
“characteristically ominous” because “Israel (and perhaps Yahweh) cannot know how 
this unresolved tension will be enacted in any particular circumstance.”
118
  
 Perhaps most provocative of all, especially from Brueggemann’s own Christian 
perspective, is his insistence that such tension applies directly to Christian affirmation 
                                                 
113 Matthew R. Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Hermeneutics in 
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117 Ibid., 480. 
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problematic view of divine freedom. “What is fundamentally in question here is whether the concept of 
freedom of choice can really be applied to God’s eternal and essential liberty. …What concept of freedom 
is appropriate to God? If we start from the view of thh ((23) point of view of the created being, the Creator 
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of the person and work of Christ.
119
 In his “Prompt Retrospect” to %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,, Brueggemann reiterates his claim “that the endless negotiation of core 
testimony and countertestimony, in Christian mode, takes the form of the dialectic of 
Friday and Sunday.”
120
 As in %:%’s section, “Maintaining the Tension,” the explicit 
goal here is emphasis on the suffering continued to be confronted by all humanity. 
Nevertheless, when Christ’s cross is labeled “countertestimony,” it becomes aligned 
with the division between divine sovereignty and fidelity which Brueggemann finds 
intrinsic to the biblical text. Thus Breuggemann’s theological emphasis moves beyond 
the the harsh reality of Christ’s human suffering and death and apparently puts into 
question even these events as an act of God’s own faithfulness. 
 
C. Faith in Excess of “the Fray”: Human Expression of Suffering and 
Expectation of Divine Response 
 
From out of the culmination of Brueggemann’s long engagement with the form 
of the lament psalm, and the related “profound disjunction” which he proposes to 
constitute the very nature of God, emerges a strikingly divided response to the “question 
of pain…the main question of Old Testament faith”
121
 On the one hand, is the 
;&>&5;&53& of divine fidelity on the human response of faith amidst suffering. 
Brueggemann’s account of relationship with God not only allows for and invites honest 
expression of the human experience of pain, but apparently 6&K?26&( such expression to 
move God towards faithful redemption. On the other hand, is the 25;&>&5;&53& of 
divine sovereignty from divine fidelity and therefore any impingement upon that fidelity 
by faithful human response. Through such a conclusion, the “extreme” 
countertestimony of Psalm 88 goes beyond simply leaving Israel “with no answer 
against this reality of experience.”
122
 God is presented as indecisive about faithfulness, 
and Brueggemann appears to allow that God is 5"# not even sure about what is 5",$7&,. 
This divine disjunction is precisely what becomes difficult for even 
Brueggemann’s theology to maintain. Why? Because crucial parts of Brueggemann’s 
                                                 
119 This concern was made particularly clear to me by my thesis examiner Walter Moberly. 
120 Brueggemann, “%!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,: A Prompt Retrospect,” in G";$25$,!&$N6)70$1$%62B?,&$
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theology (,2..$ )>>&)6$ ,"$ 6&.7$ "5$ )5$ ?5(#&6@25*$ &S>&3,),2"5$ "+$ ;2@25&$ +2;&.2,7. His 
understanding of worship and ethics appears to function out of Israel’s faith in God’s 
fidelity.
123
 He seems to agree (following Gerstenberger) that the human response of 
lament depends on “complete” confidence in God’s faithfulness.
124
 The future of 
humanity arises as “peaceable confidence” because of “the faithful sovereignty of 
Yahweh already known in Israel’s core testimony.”
125
  According to %:%, “Yahweh is 
in fact the very (?B(,)53& of (Israel’s) hope” for all which is not yet.
126
 $ 
As we have seen such expectation of God’s “reliability,” held together with the 
expression of suffering to God, was the basis for Brueggemann’s original understanding 
of lament form function.
127
 Such expectation was integral to his original proposal for 
the distinctiveness of Israel’s faith in lament.
128
 Expectant hope through lament was 
understood as the distinct result of Yahweh’s identity.
129
 In terms of Brueggemann’s 
Psalms typology, expectation is an enduring orientation of faithfulness to a yet-
unrealized new orientation. And as %:%$asserts, through hope, faith finally enables joy. 
“It is the central conviction of Israel that human persons in the Pit may turn to this One 
who is powerfully sovereign and find that sovereign One passionately attentive. That is 
the hope of humanity and in the end its joy.”
130
  
However, if God, in sovereignty, is not bound to attend to human suffering, 
passionately or otherwise, then how can such hope and joy arise? How can there be any 
expectation for such a God to be faithful? As Fretheim observes, 
…(Brueggemann’s) language suggests that, whatever is said about divine fidelity, 
sovereignty admits of no qualification by the relationships with Israel and the world 
into which God has entered. Brueggemann does speak of partial qualifications of divine 
sovereignty by the divine fidelity in some texts, but these seem not to be 
hermeneutically significant for the larger biblical picture. Countertestimony finally has 
just as much standing as core testimony.
131
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130 Ibid., 491. See also ibid., 200. 
131 Terence Fretheim, “Some Reflections on Brueggemann’s God” in G";$25$,!&$N6)70$1$%62B?,&$,"$
P).,&6$O6?&**&/)55, Tod Linafelt and Timothy K. Beal eds., (Fortress: Minneapolis, 1998), 33. 
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A consistent presentation of Israel’s “/)((2@&$ M".7$ -6"B.&/” would seem then to 
expose a “terrible awareness” that human suffering may never be resolved, at least by 
God.
132
  Amidst this irresolution Fretheim finds perhaps the most problematic issue for 
Brueggemann’s theology: 
Again, no distinctions are made within the divine will; it is as if love and violence 
belong eternally together in God (an eternal dualism is close at hand). …Criteria must 
be developed to sort out these testimonies, to make distinctions regarding 
appropriateness among images of God. Without this ).. talk about Israel’s unsettling 
testimony regarding God is called into question .
133
 
By staking interpretive methodology on an approach which allows the meaning of any 
particular text about God to be undone by any other, Brueggemann cannot avoid the 
possibility that injustice, abuse and any other violation of faithfulness could well turn 
out to be part and parcel of God’s enduring nature. So even when he speaks of Easter in 
the light of Good Friday, his priority on divine indecision, while downplayed, still 
remains: “The cross-examination will not defeat the testimony…probably.”
134
  What the 
Bible tells us to expect about God is that we cannot ever know what to expect. 
The nature of Brueggemann’s priority on rhetoric now becomes more clear. As 
Fretheim again observes, “This direction of thought opens up the possibility that the 
interpreter can decide where and when God is acting faithfully to the divine purpose and 
promises.”
135
 Such decisions constitute faith through ongoing interpretive acts, the 
social process of human response, over and against ever contradictory experiences of 
the divine. Fretheim finds the concept of God which results from this process to be “a 
>"(,/";&65$ 6&(,),&/&5,$ "+$ ("@&6&2*5,7” but wonders whether Brueggemann “has 
sufficiently followed through on his own emphases.”
136
 Levenson questions how 
postmodern Brueggemann’s approach can truly be: 
What we have, in other words, is not really a “pluralistic interpretive context” in the 
postmodern sense, in which there is no bedrock of truth to which interpretation must 
either prove faithful or fall into discredit. Rather, we are confronted with something 
more akin to a capitalistic market place, in which rival interpretations engage in 
“conflict and competition” until one of them—Brueggemann hopes it will be “the 
metanarrative of the Old Testament (or of the Bible or of the church)”—emerges 
triumphant. In spite of Brueggemann’s frequent employment of the postmodernist 
rhetoric of subversion, protest, and plurality, what he actually envisions is more like the 
                                                 
132 %:%, 311. 
133 Fretheim, “Some Reflections,” 34-5, italics original.  
134 %:%, 332 
135 Ibid., 31. 
136 Ibid., 25. 
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liberal vision of a public space in which different interpretations compete freely in ,!&$
+26/$3"5@23,2"5$,!),$,!6"?*!$,!2($>6"3&(($,!&$,6?,!$#2..$&@&5,?)..7$#25$"?,.
137
 
For his own part, Brueggemann actually states that he is arguing against, among other 
things, such liberalism. 
It is possible to transpose the testimony of Israel about Yahweh…so that Yahweh is 
made to be so anemic that there can be no conflict. The transposition of this testimony 
into an innocuous text can take place in many ways, such as the distancing effect of 
critical study that recognizes everything except the main claims, or scholastic theology 
that turns elusive testimony into closed system, or what I call “horizontal liberalism,” in 
which the agency of Yahweh evaporates into social ideology.
138
 
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how he has not done the very thing he forswears—a 
transposition of “the agency of Yahweh” into a type of social ideology defined by 
rhetorical tension.
139
  
When expectation for divine response to suffering can no longer be 
meaningfully expressed through the lament psalm or the Bible as a whole, and when 
there can be no true hope in God now for what is not yet redeemed, then little remains 
beyond how humanity expresses its own rage at the pain of existence. Nowhere does 
this become more evident than when Brueggemann confesses that he does 5",$believe 
that, in practice, lament and praise function &K?)..7 in his dialectic of biblical faith. The 
former must be allowed a +?53,2"5).$>62"62,7 over the latter. 
We must note well that such an act of self-abandonment to Yahweh is dialectically 
related to an act of self-assertion against Yahweh. Because the two markings, expressed 
as complaint and as hymn, are genuinely dialectical, one may not give priority to either. 
In trying to understand how this peculiar Yahwistic dialectic )3,?)..7 +?53,2"5(, 
however, 8$(?**&(,$,!),$>6)3,23)..7$)5;$>6"@2(2"5)..7<$>62"62,7$25$,!&$;2).&3,23$B&."5*($,"$
,!&$ 3"/>.)2525*$ )3,2@2,7$ "+$ (&.+R6&*)6;U I make this suggestion because (a) in object 
relations theory this primal experience of omnipotence is pivotal for a self that is 
adequate to practice covenant; (b) one must have a self in order to yield a self; and (c) 
Western Christian piety has given this facet of Yahwistic humanness short shrift. I 
suggest this as a practical matter, but do not want to detract from the more important 
recognition that, seen as a whole, the two maneuvers of Yahwistic humanness are 
indeed genuinely dialectical.
140
 
                                                 
137 Jon D. Levenson, “Is Brueggemann Really a Pluralist?” in M)6@)6;$%!&"."*23).$I&@2&# 93 (2000):  
266, italics mine. 
138 %:%, 741-42. 
139 See Levenson, 269, nt 17, “It is one thing to say that social factors have reduced or eliminated our 
awareness of certain valuable interpretations (a liberal view). It is quite another thing to say that social 
factors &S!)?(,2@&.7$&S>.)25 and thus help deconstruct certain interpretations (a radical view). Though 
Brueggemann leaves it unclear which of these two very different positions he is taking, he gives the 
impression that he is closer to the latter, more radical view.” (italics mine).  
140 %:%,$478-79, italics mine. 
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Disclaimers about the conceptual importance of his dialectic aside, the rationale of 
Brueggemann’s approach to biblical faith would ultimately seem to come down to a 
contemporary sociological priority on human autonomy, at least functionally speaking.  
Ironically, no culture has functioned to realize autonomous self-regard more 
pervasively than the one Brueggemann so often seeks to critique—modern Western 
society. With nothing but ourselves to restrain doubt, skepticism and suspicion, the 
practice of covenant becomes merely a reflexive exercise in human self-reliance. There 
is no reason to believe that it is actually “])!#&!9( passion” which “will refuse to come 
to terms with the power of death, no matter its particular public form or its ideological 
garb.”
141
 There is no reason beyond self-preservation for humanity not to be resigned to 
senseless violence and destruction, or to understand lament as anything more than 
psychological catharsis or a strategy of political power play.
142
 There is no real reason 
for humanity to depend on anything other than its own interpretive autonomy rather 
than faith in the one true and living God.
143
 
Brueggemann’s theology eventually falters along the lines where his lament 
scholarship sought most to succeed—a recovery of the ,!&"."*23). function of lament 
for faith. Human expression of suffering and expectation of God’s response are critical 
to how Brueggemann develops the typical dual form of the lament psalm as petition and 
praise into his tripartite typology of psalm function. His typology is at its most 
successful in showing how biblical text functions to direct and indeed “shape” faith 
towards God’s response through all human experiences and circumstances. As he writes 
about psalms of disorientation in %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, “Thus these psalms make 
the important connection: everything must be B6"?*!,$,"$(>&&3!, and everything brought 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 741, see op. cit. 
142 Can the overall interpretive emphasis of Brueggemann support his conclusion %:%, 472-73? 
“Everything depends on mobilizing the ?5;"?B,&;$power of Yahweh…. Israel’s understanding of 
complaint and petition rules out any resignation. It also rules out the notion that this action by the troubled 
person is simply cathartic or…a political stratagem to be overheard by powerful people.” (italics mine). 
143 See James Barr, %!&$4"53&>,$"+$O2B.23).$%!&"."*7$(London: SCM, 1999), 561, “And it is not so clear 
in any case that Brueggemann has stayed clear of the temptations of the Enlightenment. Nothing is worse, 
according to him, than )?,"5"/7 (expressly forbidden by Yahweh, 556). But then, if so, why is !&*&/"57 
so bad a thing? Because it infringes on the autonomy of others. So autonomy is the basis of the whole set 
of values after all. (Perhaps Childs perceived this when he said that Brueggemann was ‘a most eloquent 
defender of the Enlightenment’, a judgement that previously struck me as absurd.)” Barr quotes here from 
Brevard Childs, O2B.23).$%!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$)5;$F&#$%&(,)/&5,(0$%!&"."*23).$I&+.&3,2"5$"5$,!&$
4!62(,2)5$O2B.& (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 73, “The saddest part of the proposal is that Walter 
Brueggemann is sincerely striving to be a confessing theologian of the Christian church, and would be 
horrified at being classified as a most eloquent defender of the Enlightenment, which his proposal 
respecting the biblical canon actually represents.”  
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to speech must be );;6&((&;$,"$G";, who is the final reference for all of life.”
144
 In this 
way, Israel’s lament, no matter how boldly or egregiously expressed, is never 
understood apart from expectation of Yahweh who has delivered Israel before and may 
always yet deliver Israel again. As the early article, “The Formfulness of Grief” states, 
“In Israel…[t]he use of the form is an activity in the maintenance of this life-world that 
has at its center the abiding, transforming presence of Yahweh.”
145
 
Yet Brueggemann’s problem lies in exactly how he uses the rhetoric of the 
lament form to turn any human expectation of divine transformation in upon itself.
146
 
By perceiving a ,!&"."*23)..7$266&(".@)B.& tension between the expressions of praise and 
petition, and related categories such as orientation/disorientation and structure 
legitimation/embrace of pain, Brueggemann proposes God’s sovereignty is unresolved 
towards God’s fidelity. Thus, lament is no longer merely presented as a faithful 
response to God accompanied by the expectation that God will faithfully respond. The 
human expression of lament manifests the dialectical dynamic which Brueggemann now 
believes to be the only expectation of the divine which the Bible can offer. In his later 
work, he appears to invert the terms he earlier articulated: more or less, Brueggemann 
now proposes that the transforming presence of Yahweh has at its center the 
maintenance (of the tension) of this life-world.  
Behind this dialectic, human disorientation becomes the )B(".?,& orientation of 
Brueggemann’s theology.
147
 Such a conclusion appears unavoidable, because when 
pressed as to how this dialectic actually functions, the tension finally becomes too much 
for even Brueggemann to maintain. The practice of biblical faith must rely upon the 
rhetoric of dispute as raw human determination before the empty sign of covenant, now 
devoid of the divine faithfulness necessary to underwrite such a relationship.
148
 If we 
cannot depend upon God to respond to suffering, theology can have no legitimacy, 
                                                 
144 Walter Brueggemann, %!&$'&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, Augsburg Old Testament Series (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, 1984),$52. 
145 Brueggemann, “The Formfulness of Grief,” 93. 
146 Contra his own claim in %:%$that “it is the promises of Yahweh, in which Israel hopes, which keep 
this community from turning in on itself, either in despair or self-congratulation.” 
147 Christopher Seitz concludes, “Methodological impasse and crisis and disorder have become in 
Brueggemann’s hands first-order theology.” See Seitz, “Scripture Becomes Religion(s): The Theological 
Crisis of Serious Biblical Interpretation in the Twentieth Century,” in I&5&#25*$O2B.23).$85,&6>6&,),2"5$
(ed. Colin Greene, Craig Bartholomew, Karl Moller; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 55. 
148 Miroslav Volf states, “Covenant may morally structure communal life, but the decisive question is 
surely #!),$#2..$/"6)..7$(,6?3,?6&$,!&$3"@&5)5,$2,(&.+ so as to make it a covenant of justice rather than 
oppression, of truth rather than deception, of peace rather than violence.” See Volf, ES3.?(2"5$)5;$
E/B6)3& (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 150-1, italics orginal.   
 97
structural or otherwise, before suffering. Our pain can only be embraced by an 
anthropological cry against the theological. 
For faith to truly function )($ +)2,!, especially in moments of suffering, 
something must be expected to transcend that which imminently threatens to diminish 
and destroy human existence. Faith’s very existence depends on hope.
149
 Moreover, for 
faith to function )($ +)2,!$ 25$G";, that which endures must be nothing less than divine 
fidelity. Without hope in God’s faithfulness, human faith in God cannot be sustained.  
The embrace of human pain and disorientation is central to the Christian account 
of faith in Christ, not least of all through the gospel portrayal of Christ’s lament from 
the cross. Yet Christian theology should not endorse a biblical methodology which 
allows covenant expectation (as claimed by the psalmists) and the particular climax of 
that covenant through Christ (as claimed by the New Testament writers) to be subsumed 
into the rhetoric of an unresolvable existential tension—a perspective on faith which 
claims that true expression of human suffering effectively requires a sacrifice of any 
hope which exceeds it. As we will examine further in respect to Ford, and especially in 
our final chapter, this is precisely why Christian theology proclaims the cross not as 
countertestimony but as God’s faithful response through Christ’s ),"5&/&5,.
150
  
Nevertheless, in concluding this present examination of Brueggemann, affirming 
Christ in relationship to human suffering would seem to return us simply to the point of 
his gravest concern. Note the nature of H. G. M. Williamson’s conclusions about the 
psalms of lament, 
…the broader outlook of the psalmists, as indeed of most biblical literature, is 
ultimately one of praise for deliverance experienced. This is not in any way to 
downplay the reality with which the writers face the darker sides of human existence; 
their recall of the past in the lament elements remains as expressive as ever, and they 
testify to having lived through, not skated around, those situations. But, if the language 
of Christian theology may be introduced, the passion narrative is read in the light of the 
resurrection. However imaginatively we seek to recreate the events and atmosphere of 
Holy Week and Good Friday, we cannot avoid the fact that the testimony on which we 
rely reaches us from witnesses who are already convinced of the reality of a risen 
Lord.
151
 
                                                 
149 Cf. Hebrews 11:1. 
150 Volf, ES3.?(2"5$)5;$E/B6)3&, 155, “For the narrative of the cross is not a ‘self-contradictory’ story of 
a God who ‘died’ because God broke the covenant, but a truly incredible story of God doing what God 
should neither have been able nor willing to do—a story of God who ‘died’ because God’s all too human 
3"@&5)5,$>)6,5&6 broke the covenant” (italics original).  
151 H. G. M. Williamson, “Reading the Lament Psalms Backwards” in 1$G";$D"$F&)60$E(()7($"5$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,$%!&"."*7$25$M"5"6$"+$-),623L$=U$$'2..&6, Brent A. Strawn and Nancy R. Bowen, eds. (Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003), 14. 
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The “broader outlook” which Williamson draws attention to here requires excessive, 
indeed overflowing, expectations. In terms of Brueggemann’s psalms typology, such 
faith could be described as an orientation to new orientation in Christ even amidst 
ongoing realities of human disorientation. Yet, must Christian faith, through such 
“praise for deliverance experienced,” therefore inevitably become a structure for 
legitimating oppression of the suffering and suppression of cries of pain? With this vital 
question in mind we now turn to consider Christian praise and joy in the theology of 
David Ford. 
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~4~  
 
Faith Overflowing: Praise in Ford’s Early Collaborative Theology 
 
 
 The centrality of praise for the Christian life of faith is an early concern in the 
career of Irish Anglican theologian David F. Ford. Following the publication of his 
dissertation on Barth and narrative,
1
 his first major work is a collaboration with his 
father-in-law Daniel W. Hardy entitled A?B2.),&0$%!&"."*7$25$-6)2(&.
2
 This work claims 
the all-encompassing nature of praise from the very beginning. 
When the importance of praise becomes clear, there is likely to be, as with many other 
significant discoveries, a sense of obviousness, an “of course”. If God is God, then of 
course praise of God is central. Of course it should be the tone of the whole of life, and 
of course Christian tradition has always said so. …Above all, the joy of God needs to be 
celebrated as the central and embracing reality of the universe, and everything else seen 
in the light of this.
3
 
A?B2.),&$has remained a prominent theological articulation of faith through praise since 
its initial publication in 1984, and has recently been reprinted under the new title J2@25*$
25$-6)2(&0$P"6(!2>>25*$)5;$X5"#25*$G";. Ford’s other early collaboration, '&)525*$
)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5(, authored with Frances M. Young, does not deal overtly with 
praise but is instead a theological commentary focused on Paul’s understanding of the 
glory of God.
4
 However, within this work Ford significantly develops theological 
aspects of faith and worship first made explicit in his partnership with Hardy.   
From the outset, the centrality of praise in Hardy and Ford’s theology appears to 
run methodologically counter to the approach of Walter Brueggemann’s biblical 
theology. As preceding chapters demonstrated, Brueggemann, particularly in light of the 
Psalms, makes theological claims based upon his understanding of tension between 
petition and praise in the typical form of lament. This tension is rhetorically formed 
through the experience of human sorrow impinging upon joy. In turn, we observed that 
                                                 
1
 David F. Ford, O)6,!$)5;$G";9($D,"670$O2B.23).$F)66),2@&$)5;$,!&$%!&"."*23).$'&,!";$"+$X)6.$O)6,!$25$
,!&$4!?63!$="*/),23( (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1981).  
2 Daniel W. Hardy and David F. Ford, A?B2.),&0$%!&"."*7$25$-6)2(& (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1984). Originally published in North America as -6)2(25*$)5;$X5"#25*$G"; (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1985). Reprinted as David F. Ford and Daniel W. Hardy, J2@25*$25$-6)2(&0$P"6(!2>>25*$)5;$
X5"#25*$G"; (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005).  
3 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 8 (6), 17 (13). Where applicable to all editions of the work, all following 
pagination in notes corresponds to the more recent J2@25*$25$-6)2(& followed by pagination from A?B2.),& 
in parentheses. The original title A?B2.),& is generally used for citations.  
4 Frances M. Young and David F. Ford, '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5( (London: SPCK, 1987).  
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such tension itself becomes a reality which theologically impinges upon &@&67$aspect of 
the Bible and Christian faith. By contrast, Hardy and Ford propose praise as the primary 
theological reality of biblical faith.  
…praise is the comprehensive activity for man in relation to God. It is to be in each 
place and time and in every place and time, in each and every activity of man. It is 
therefore mistaken to limit the notion of praise to those situations where it is explicit, as 
in the Psalms, and thereby to lose sight of its presence as the essential dynamic of 
man’s relationship with God. For this to ‘frame’ praise, both as a notion and a complex 
of activities, by reference to some more primary reality, and thus to delimit the sphere 
of praise to a place within this reality, instead of understanding that it is the essential 
dynamic of reality itself. Thus ‘framing’ of praise is what is done when, for example, 
the everyday life-world of man is seen as ‘reality’, and praise seen as something done 
within that. It is exactly this which the Psalms attempt to defeat, as they make it clear 
that praise is due always and everywhere. There is nothing, in other words, which 
stands outside praise.
5
 
Here, Hardy and Ford are not responding directly to Brueggemann, but the fundamental 
difference in their approach is nonetheless clear.
6
 Hardy and Ford constantly articulate 
reality within praise, and in particular, Christian praise. “After having seen praise in a 
preliminary approximation in the Psalms…it is important to see the transition which it 
undergoes in the New Testament, as it is given its primary content by Jesus…”
7
 
Yet A?B2.),&’s distinct approach to Christian faith is not as far from the 
theological concerns of Brueggemann as it might initially seem. Beyond his emphasis 
on the rhetoric of the text, Brueggemann so adamantly prioritizes the tension between 
lament and praise out of a theological concern for the reality of suffering and evil in the 
world. As we will see, such concerns are never far from Hardy and Ford even in their 
resolute emphasis on praise.
8
 While they propose a Christian vindication of God and 
                                                 
5 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, “Appendix A,” 174. 
6 Nowhere in A?B2.),&$is Brueggemann addressed or cited. A?B2.),&’s original publication in 1984 falls 
before any of Brueggemann’s extended treatments on the Psalms such as '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./( 
published in 1985. 
7 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, “Appendix A,” 175. 
8
 Concerns over faith, human responsibility and suffering already lie just below the surface of the central 
issues in Ford’s earliest work, O)6,!$)5;$G";9($D,"67. We briefly note here two key examples. First, in 
Chapter 5, “Election and Rejection,” Ford’s literary analysis of biblical narrative in relation to Barth’s 
proposal for Judas’ election produces the following conclusion: “Barth’s bias towards stressing 
‘objective’ atonement and salvation here leads him into an interpretation which is bound to devalue 
subjective responsibility and faith” (92). Second, in Chapter 7, “The Two Natures of Jesus Christ,” pp. 
129-32, human suffering comes to the fore through Ford’s critique of Barth’s literary method of 
identifying divinity and humanity in Christ. “Barth seems to be making a paradox and “scandal” where 
the Gospels have none. He wants to see Jesus’ compassion as his action of L),)$,!&"5 and also as fully 
human, but apparently has no way of doing this without seeming to devalue human suffering other than 
Jesus’. There is no hint of this in the Gospels. It is hard to conceive of any statement which one could put 
into the stories of Jesus’ compassion that would count as evidence that the human sufferings are not 
superfluous. Barth’s method of abstracting the eternal identity of Jesus Christ from the Gospels is 
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humanity, Hardy and Ford also argue that the renewing of praise in Christ confronts all 
evil and suffering, including suffering perpetuated through false Christian forms of 
worship. According to Hardy and Ford, true Christian praise does not ignore suffering 
but willingly suffers it that praise may abound all the more. The “overflowing” nature of 
praise, A?B2.),&’s key theological concept, is how Christian faith is known through 
worshipping a faithful God. 
In '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5(, Ford’s collaboration with Young further 
substantiates his theological understanding of how faith overflows in praise. With Paul’s 
epistle as a guiding scriptural context, Ford develops his doctrine of God, his 
christology, and the interrelationship of both in human redemption. Ford also introduces 
an innovative understanding of the “face of Christ” as means by which to properly 
propose the overflow of faith )/2;(,$(?++&625*. This concept grows only more influential 
as Ford’s theology matures and, as we will argue in the next chapter, also later creates 
problems for how Ford understands praise to result from Christ’s atoning response to 
suffering on our behalf.  
For now, we begin with the collaboration of Hardy and Ford, and we turn to 
Brueggemann himself to introduce this generative and abundant “theology in praise.” 
 
I. Jubilate: Ford’s Collaboration with Daniel Hardy 
  
 A. Theological “Mosaic” of Praise 
 
 Brueggemann, a significant proponent of Hardy and Ford’s work together,
9
 
states in his own review of A?B2.),&, “…this book is a thoughtful insistence that the core 
and center of Christian faith is a relation with God that focuses on praise of God that 
                                                                                                                                               
therefore invulnerable to disproof from passages in those same Gospels. It thus is something with the 
characteristics of those ‘general concepts’ which he so often attacks. For the trouble with general 
concepts is that they refuse to be governed by the particularities of the story, and now Barth has made it 
impossible to understand particularities such as Jesus’ response to human suffering in the way the 
narrative presents them. …for I am granting that Barth does wish to affirm genuine human action but fails 
to prevent the literal sense of a text from being swallowed up by the typological” (130-1). 
9 A?B2.),&’s recent reprinting as J2@25*$25$-6)2(& quotes Brueggemann on the back cover, “I have been fed 
and led for a very long time by this book. …In this offer of a ‘taxonomy of praise’ they move easily back 
and forth between biblical tradition and contemporary context.” Brueggemann, %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,, 478, nt. 56, cites “the theological significance of praise” in Hardy and Ford. Brueggemann, 
1B2;25*$1(,"52(!/&5,, 78, nt. 77 declares that A?B2.),&$discerns “counter-modes of knowledge…quite in 
contrast to the autonomous modes of scientific and imperial knowledge.” 
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‘perfects perfection’ of God and transforms the one who praises.”
10
 He concludes that 
the book, “demands hard work. But I am convinced it is now the proper work of serious 
believers. It has been a long time since I have read a book that so displaces the 
categories of my thought and work.”
11
 
 Other reviewers$have similar reactions to the proposal and structure of A?B2.),&. 
Diverse but similar descriptors for A?B2.),&—difficult but new,
12
 “unusual mix of 
resources,”
13
 “uneven”
14
—all demonstrate a style which Brueggemann aptly labels not 
simply an argument but a mosaic. 
This is not an easy book. At times, the argument seems disjointed, perhaps because the 
book tries to do too much. And the themes are treated in rather odd configurations, so 
that there is not a sustained cognitive argument but rather the presentation of a mosaic 
in which the argument is pieced together from a rich and surprising diversity of 
materials. It is not a book that can be read, but it must be studied and pondered.
15
 
The analogy of piecing together a mosaic complements the authors’ own description of 
their process of writing,
16
 yet as Brueggemann observes above this does not make 
A?B2.),& an easy book. The nine chapters in the original edition are followed by two 
substantial appendices suggesting the many further directions the author’s themselves 
were unable to incorporate into the main body of the book.
17
 Working through the 
argument requires seeing the many different theological slivers presented as A?B2.),&’s 
“condensation of ideas, its patterns of thought, and its ways of approaching the Bible, 
tradition, the Church, poetry, philosophy, science, history, ethics and ordinary living.”
18
 
Patterns do emerge, but they are not always concisely offered or organized. To 
                                                 
10 Walter Brueggemann, review of Daniel W. Hardy and David F. Ford, -6)2(25*$)5;$X5"#25*$G";, 
%!&"."*7$%";)7, vol. XLIII, 1 (1986): 99-100. 
11 Ibid., 100. 
12 Cyril S. Rodd, review, %!&$ES>"(2,"67$%2/&( 96 (Jan 1985): 98. 
13 Charles M. Wood, review,  '";&65$%!&"."*7 2 no 4 (Jl 1986): 366-67. 
14 Alan Dunstan, review, %!&"."*7 88 (S 1985): 411-13. 
15 Brueggemann, review, 99.  
16 Hardy and Ford, J2@25*$25$-6)2(&, “Preface to the Second Edition,” vii, “The book was written slowly, 
with much discussion of drafts and revisions, and even before its first publication we were unable to 
disentangle what each of us had contributed. Any attempt to give an account of a seven-year conversation 
was always hopeless, but we aimed at something like a distillation. We hope that the style gives some 
sense of the sustained intensity of those years of engagement with the interplay of worshipping, thinking 
and living.” 
17 Both the original publication of A?B2.),& as well as the North American publication of -6)2(25*$)5;$
X5"#25*$G"; contain an “Appendix A: The Systematics of Praise” and “Appendix B: A Review of 
Relevant Literature”. These appendices are omitted from J2@25*$25$-6)2(& and replaced by an epilogue 
subtitled “After Twenty Years.” 
18 “Preface to the Second Edition”, J2@25*$25$-6)2(&, vii. 
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understand what cements this variegated theology together requires a careful look at 
how these patterns of praise are presented.  
  
  i. Praise in Contemporary Life 
 
A?B2.),& begins by asserting that praise is an essential part of human life. Not 
only is praise a “universal human experience,” but also “people do the most 
extraordinary things and make all sorts of sacrifices in honour of what they praise.”
19
 
Perhaps the clearest definition of praise is offered in A?B2.),&’s first appendix: “…praise 
is a comprehensive activity which ‘composes the spirit to love (Coleridge), and does so 
by integrating man’s capacities and his being by bringing them into a right relation with 
its object.”
20
 That said, Hardy and Ford are quick to acknowledge that while this 
universality of praise crosses all human contexts, their explicit focus is to articulate 
praise in the Christian mode. In turn, they aim to provoke interest from, and not 
argument with, those outside of Christian faith. “For those who do not praise God, but 
are curious, we hope that they may have a glimpse of what happens beyond the border 
battles.”
21
 This style of theology, one which is not defensive or critical of non-Christian 
positions is characteristic of both Hardy and Ford’s work over the course of their 
respective careers.  
Their starting place locates praise as part of a contemporary “twin explosion” 
alongside knowledge of God. While the past century’s “critical and constructive 
intellectual activity in relation to Christianity and other religions” has exploded 
knowledge, praise has exploded through such things as the renewal of liturgy and 
prayer, Pentecostalism, embracing of diverse cultures, and the creativity stemming from 
new media.
22
 In the authors’ own creative process this twin explosion has been 
central.
23
 As a result, they aim “to make a constructive statement of one way of 
                                                 
19 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 1 (1). 
20 Ibid., Appendix A, 155. 
21 Ibid., 2 (2). 
22 Ibid., 3-4 (3). 
23 J2@25*$25$-6)2(&, “Preface to the Second Edition”, vii, “A core question that came up repeatedly was 
about the relation between on the one hand, prayer, worship, meditation, contemplation and a life that 
tries to respond to a loving God with love, and, on the other hand, the stretching of the mind in 
understanding, discernment, knowing and wise judgement.” 
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understanding and affirming Christianity by concentrating on the themes of praise and 
knowledge.”
24
 
The study of praise and its relation to knowledge begins in earnest with the 
second chapter. Praise has a “strange logic” according to Hardy and Ford. “To 
recognize worth and to respond to it with praise is to create a new relationship. This 
new mutual delight is itself something of worth, and enhancement of what was already 
valued.”
25
 Furthermore, such logic stretches toward the infinite and towards a concept 
of overflow, which Hardy and Ford find analogous to the nature of freedom and 
creativity. “This new order and overflow of order (what we later call non-order) is a 
realm of freedom yet definiteness, creativity yet precision (the agony of finding the right 
word or note), and it aims to celebrate the best by both discerning what it is and letting 
it overflow in surprising new ways.”
26
 Thanks is the companion of praise in this 
overflow,
27
 which the authors place within their understanding of healthy human 
identity. “The operation of the logic of thanks and praise can be noticed in most good 
personal relationships. It is explicit perhaps rarely, but it is the essential structure of 
respect, personal worth and identity.”
28
 
For Christianity, as for Judaism, the overflowing logic of praise finds its center 
and origin in a self-affirming God. Thus the act of praising identifies God to us, but only 
by first identifying us in God.  
Through it all runs the strange experience of faith: what seems like oneself finding God 
is seen in retrospect to be recognition that one has already been found by him; and one’s 
knowledge of God is wrapped up inside being known by him. Praise brings this to its 
extreme. All that one has and is, all one’s energy, freedom, imagination and thought are 
tested and stretched in adoration of God; yet this supreme effort only rings true as it 
acknowledges that God is its initiator and inspirer
29
 
God as the basis of human participation in faithful worship in turn brings knowledge, 
making praise and knowledge of God inextricable.
30
 For this reason, praise should play 
a powerful role in recovering the vitality of God in current culture. Hardy and Ford 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 1 (1). 
25 Ibid., 8 (6). 
26 IbidU, 9 (7). 
27 Ibid., 10 (7). “Just as praise perfects perfection, so thanks completes what is completed.” 
28 Ibid., 10 (7-8). 
29 Ibid.,$12 (9-10). 
30 Ibid., 13 (10). “This is another basic feature of praising God: there is no simple sequence of recognition 
of God followed by expression, but expression can lead the way, and often recognition happens in the 
very act of expression. There is a knowledge of God that can only come in praising him. …Faith in God 
is an experience that lives and grows by praise. There is continual spiral reinforcement: praising God 
helps us to appreciate what one is praising him for.”  
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emphasize the centrality of God in “…an attempt to evoke a life which can take many 
forms but whose essence is that it lets God be God for us, in thought, feeling and 
practice.”
31
 
 Four modes of praise are proposed as functioning in two pairs: word and 
sacrament, and spontaneity and silence. The first pair “represent two basic ways in 
which we relate to reality and are shaped by it: by language, and by our ability to 
appreciate and use things.”
32
 In sentiments similar to Brueggemann, Hardy and Ford 
find that language “is not only a means of communication with others. We are 
intimately formed by it… A large part of our reality (memory, values, intentions, 
knowledge, laws, government, culture, religion) is constituted by meaning and most of 
that is embodied in language.”
33
 Thus “[i]n the Christian church word-centred 
praise…focuses on the contents of the Bible, on preaching to stir response to the ‘word 
of God’, on prayer, and on psalms or hymns gathering all of this into praise.”
34
 Word is 
paired with sacrament which means most broadly “the taking up of any aspect of the 
material universe into being a sign or symbol of its Creator.”
35
 It is hard to 
underestimate the importance of this idea for Hardy and Ford. “A great deal of this book 
is about the sacramental in this wide sense. …The sacramental concern is to enter into 
God’s way of using and enjoying his world.”
36
 However, the authors also prioritize the 
narrower, traditional sense of sacrament. The eucharist, even above baptism, is “the 
most distinctive Christian act of praise. …This is the explosive nuclear centre whose 
Spirit powers all praise, and at the centre of this nucleus is the death and resurrection of 
Jesus.”
37
 The connection of word and sacrament, particularly in light of Christ’s life and 
death, occupies the center of Hardy and Ford’s proposal. Christians “remember a history 
with the vital difference that the main character of this story is believed to be alive, 
present and communicating his life and words.”
38
 This remembrance demonstrates “the 
praise of word and sacrament inextricably interwoven.”
39
 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 18 (14). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 18-19 (14). 
35 Ibid., 21 (17). 
36 Ibid., 22 (17). 
37 Ibid., 23 (18). 
38 Ibid., 23 (18). 
39 Ibid. 
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 The pairing of spontaneity and silence makes a “disturbing contribution” which 
those who might otherwise overemphasize word and sacrament ignore at their own 
peril.
40
 Spontaneity is associated with “the stirring of the Holy Spirit” characteristic 
both of the early church and contemporary charismatic movements.  
What is offered is not an alternative to word and sacrament but a new life and power to 
both of these, with an atmosphere that actualizes the ‘logic of overflow’ in various 
ways: in the expectation that God will act and speak, in the freedom to express 
adoration in a wide range of bodily as well as verbal behaviour, in the physical contact 
between the worshippers (kiss of peace, handshakes, holding hands, laying-on of 
hands), and in the exercise of various gifts.
41
 
Hardy and Ford are particularly warm to Pentecostalism which they see as “recovery of 
the authentic Christian impetus of praise” which “[a]t its best…is distinctive by being 
able both to use pattern and dispense with pattern.”
42
 They label this dynamic “the jazz 
factor”
 43
 which analogously references the improvisatory style of that music and 
anticipates a concept Hardy and Ford later develop called “non-order.” Unlike the 
familiar opposition of order to disorder, non-order is generative yet threatening because 
of its apparent openness. “This is a threat to much of the tradition, perhaps most of all 
because it demands trust both in God and in the worshippers as a group: anything might 
happen when freedom is granted; but if it is not, some of the most liberating and 
relevant activity of God is excluded.”
44
 
 Silence is the fourth and final mode of praise, and its pairing with spontaneity is 
not accidental.  
Often the two go together, and in world Christianity there are signs that just as the old 
divisiveness over word and sacrament is being healed in many Churches, so the 
difficulties over the relation of the charismatic to the contemplative are being solved in 
groups and individuals that value both.
45
 
Silence has its most significant manifestation in early Quakerism, but it also has roots in 
Eastern and Western monasticism. Such traditions benefit the contemporary church. 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 24 (18). 
41 Ibid., 25 (19). 
42 Ibid., 25,26 (20). 
43 “The jazz factor” is of particular interest to Brueggemann’s understanding of praise in %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$
:.;$%&(,)/&5,, 478, nt. 56, “Hardy and Ford…speak of praise as the ‘jazz factor’ of the Christian life. 
The image is a suggestive one, for it bespeaks the fact that life rooted in biblical faith, Jewish or 
Christian, in generous surrender (a) has a regular cadence to it, (b) pushes forward into newness, and (c) 
allows for newness and radical variation amid the reliable cadences.”  
44 Ibid., 26 (20).  
45 Ibid., 26-27 (21). 
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“This has worked like an underground stream down the centuries, penetrating and 
nourishing the Church far more deeply and widely than its usual hiddenness might 
suggest.”
46
 In the more recent charismatic movements Hardy and Ford find a substantial 
“convergence on the value of the interplay between silence and spontaneity.”
47
 
 In conclusion, A?B2.),&’s multifaceted introduction to praise suggests a rather 
straightforward theological result:  
The theological point in this is simple: God is free and one cannot make rules for how 
God may speak and act. Yet the complementary point is that God is faithful and 
consistent, the sort of God who takes part in liturgies as well. The further perspective 
that embraces both these is that God is above all to be praised, and is well able to guide 
individuals and communities as regards how to do so.
48
 
Freedom and faithfulness of God are clearly theologically central to Hardy and Ford’s 
proposal about praise. Moreover, both are clearly understood by the authors as being 
subsumed in a “further perspective” that God is “above all to be praised.” The 
theological nature of this further perspective is not yet exactly clear (i.e. how is such a 
perspective acquired?), but functionally it seems to suggest a certain human receptivity 
towards God being God on humanity’s behalf. Indeed, the authors add that praise’s 
“keynote always is to let God be God and to celebrate this, and it draws on the basic 
human capacities of speech, use of things, spontaneity and silence.”
49
 
 Hardy and Ford aim to come to terms with how human experience can be 
understood in relation to this articulation of praising God. 
What idea of ‘experience’ can contain all this? A dynamic notion of experience is 
needed which can cope with constant development and openness while at the same time 
continually grasping afresh its basis and principles. Finding God and letting God be 
God changes a person’s experience in cumulative ways. There is a constant but non-
coercive making and re-making of the self in community, a new proportioning and 
energizing that at each stage opens up to further transformations.
50
 
The freedom and faithfulness of God are here joined by the human experience of 
“development and openness” and “basis and principles.” Correspondingly, there is a 
constant experience of “further transformations” which encompasses all of human 
experience via the praise of God. In other words, praise remains primary. “This 
developing experience, which we view from the perspective of the praise of God, 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 27 (21). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 29 (23). 
50 Ibid. 
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embraces intellect, will, feelings and imagination, as well as the social and corporate 
dimensions of life.”
51
  
A “further” theological perspective on the praise of God in human experience is 
thus the goal of A?B2.),&. The abundant use of words such as “overflow”, “developing”, 
“constant”, and “continual” strongly imply that “further” indicates a generative 
experience of praise which Hardy and Ford aim to describe. As they set out to explicate 
the theological nature of this generativity, they commence with two respective studies 
of how praise in the past affects the present through biblical text and tradition.  
 
 ii. Praise in Text and Tradition 
 
Scripture, for Hardy and Ford, is a product of praise. “Our own key to 
interpreting it…is as a book primarily related to God and written by people who were 
engaged in praising him.”
52
 Praise underwrites the original production of Scripture 
through “the supreme attempt to acknowledge to God what was most fundamental for 
the community: God and God’s activity.”
53
 This God-centeredness yields the “perfect” 
perspective from which textual-transmission transpires:  
Praise is therefore the perfect vantage point on the whole, and contains in essence the 
characteristic patterns and structures informing the community. These are likely to have 
been the ‘deep structures’ through which the identity of the community was shaped 
over many years. …Add to all this the process of writing, collecting, testing, sifting and 
editing that went into the formation of the canon of Scripture as it slowly 
accumulated… In each generation the tradition was learnt and modified in the context 
of praise of God, and knowing God was inseparable from praising him.
54
 
The net theological results are once again clear: praise and knowledge of God 
inextricably bound together in the community of faith. 
 Having thus grounded interpretation in praise the authors inquire about “the 
heart of all this praise.” In terms of human experience they propose “two key acts: 
recognition and respect.” These acts are then considered in three biblical contexts: the 
letter to the Philippians, the Gospel of Mark, and the Psalms.  
Philippians exemplifies the praise of God in Christian existence. “…[A] mature 
expression of (Paul’s) faith in concentrated form…it shows the transformation of an 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 29 (23). 
52 Ibid., 31 (24). 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 31, 32 (24, 25). 
 109
existence taken up into the praise of God.”
55
 Of particular note is the biblical 
contextualization of Christian existence as joy which confronts suffering. “The whole 
Letter reinforces this message that praise and joy are not optional extras in faith, but its 
very life, and that it is possible to grow in them through suffering (1:29f) as well as 
blessings.”
56
 Nothing elucidates this better than the early christology of Philippians 2:1-
11 which “locks together the new content of Christian praise with the conduct of 
ordinary relationships.”
57
 In the desire for completion of his joy, Paul calls for “an ethic 
of active recognition and respect which is the interpersonal counterpart of the praise of 
Christ.”
58
 This requires “a new sort of mind” which is given to believers as the 
“privilege of taking part in God’s own way of life.”
59
 To underscore this, Hardy and 
Ford quote Philippians 2: 5-8: 
Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in Christ Jesus, who, though he was 
in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied 
himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being 
found in human form he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even death 
on a cross.
60
 
The reality which Paul lives and promotes every day is the reality of joy in the crucified 
and risen Christ. This other-directed, God-centered reality is the context of praise. 
Commenting on Philippians 4, Hardy and Ford write, “The otherness of God is here 
stated absolutely, but not as a threat or discouragement in the use of the mind. Rather, 
rejoicing in the Lord and appreciating his glory is the only safe context for full and free 
intellectual and emotional life.”
61
 Faith is also characterized by joy regardless of 
circumstances. “Praise, joy in the Lord, is the mediation through which (Paul) faces 
ordinary life and suffering.”
62
  
The christological reality described in Philippians is, according Hardy and Ford, 
“the same transformation that Mark makes the pivot point of his Gospel, the new 
astonishing form of God’s glory in the world. It becomes the content of a praise, 
initiated by God, that is to be the supreme activity of all people.”
63
 Unsurprisingly, 
                                                 
55 Ibid, 33 (25). 
56 Ibid., 33-34 (26). 
57 Ibid., 34 (26).  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 34 (27). 
61 Ibid. 38-39 (30). 
62 Ibid, 39 (30). 
63 Ibid., 34-35 (27). 
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Hardy and Ford’s examination of Mark focuses on the generativity culminating from the 
suffering and subsequent glory of Christ: 
In the way he has told his story, especially in the transfiguration sequence and in the 
events from the Last Supper through Gethsemane to Easter, Mark has portrayed a 
network of relations which he wants to imprint on all Christian praise, preaching and 
discipleship. Crucial to that network is appreciation of the glory of Jesus as suffering 
and resurrected Messiah.
64
 
Hardy and Ford stress the reality of Jesus at the center of Mark’s narrative. “Above all, 
(Mark’s) grasp of the dazzling event with which (his narrative) ends is meant to 
encourage his readers to live from this new reality and never to accept its domestication 
or to dissociate it from &L(,)(2(.”
65
  
Hardy and Ford conclude their biblical exploration with a return to the Old 
Testament and the Psalms. Their work here focuses mainly on situating praise in the 
developmental theory of Israel’s cult. Less explicitly theological ground is covered as 
the section makes a general survey of how Old Testament liturgy evolved into post-
exilic Judaism and eventually early Christianity. Nevertheless, in sentiments akin to 
Brueggemann’s more substantial work on Psalms they write, “…the Psalms are classic 
expressions of the lively intensity of praise of God. They offer above all a vehicle for 
realistic but jubilant joy in God, taking  up the good and the bad into a faith that always 
(even if it takes a struggle) results in praise of God.”
66
 This concludes their brief 
examination of both testaments which demonstrates that “…the Bible shows praise of 
God to be the heart of Old and New Testament communities.”
67
 
Tradition, according to Hardy and Ford, is dynamically united through time with 
the work of the biblical writers. “This unity flows essentially from the continual relating 
of everything to God.”
68
 Their chapter on Christian tradition continues the theme of 
praise rooted in God, this time emphasizing the aspects of the church which emerge 
from a distinctly Trinitarian understanding. The authors suggest, “the most important 
question is: who is this God? The answer of the Christian tradition is a surprising one: 
God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. The focus and inspiration of all 
praising and living is God the Trinity.”
69
 An extended analogy immediately follows 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 46 (36). 
65 Ibid., 47, (36). 
66 Ibid., 48 (37). 
67 Ibid., 59 (46). 
68 Ibid., 60 (47). 
69 Ibid. 
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whereby trinitarian thought is seen to permeate the work of Dante in a way similar to 
the development of trinitarian doctrine in the history of the Church itself. “…the 
Trinitarian pattern for thinking of God pervades the =2@25&$ 4"/&;7. It is the ‘deep 
structure’ of his understanding of reality, but one which (as in most good psalms) is 
presented in a variety of mediated ways. The same is true of the whole Christian 
tradition.”
70
 Hardy and Ford note the benefits of this “deep structure,” including the 
crucial contribution of the Trinity in negating idolatry, but their pronounced emphasis is 
reserved for the “positive” aspects of the Trinity. 
What was the positive contribution of the doctrine of the Trinity? Praise is, among other 
things, a form of thinking, and aims to ‘think God’ as adequately as possible. The 
Trinity gives the logic of Christian praise, the way one thought or concept follows from 
another and coheres with all the others. It is not just a string of implications, it is a 
whole ‘ecology.’
71
 
This ecology calls for radical theological reconsideration which goes beyond “Judaism 
or Greek philosophy or a combination of these” in rethinking the person of God, who is 
now reassessed in light of Christ. “What was thought to characterize God alone—new 
creation, universal lordship, ultimate salvation, and the receiving of worship—was now 
identified also with the person and activity of Jesus Christ.”
72
 Such rethinking also 
includes the Spirit. “Further, the Holy Spirit was experienced not just as the energy of 
worship but as the generative thrust of every act that honoured God. It was not an 
impersonal impulse but the presence of God.”
73
  
The remainder of the chapter explores and expands upon the implications of 
trinitarian doctrinal development through varied contexts including the early church, the 
implications of the cross in Luther’s theology, and the 20
th
 century influence of 
Pentecostalism. Of particular note is Luther, for it is in his theology of the cross that 
Hardy and Ford claim a “corrective” grounding which gives Christian praise an ethical 
edge. “(Luther’s concept of grace) is defined through the crucified Christ. The ethics 
and Christian living that flow from this are described again and again as a matter of 
gratitude before God…”
74
 While the wide-ranging exploration here foreshadows ideas 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 67-68 (53). 
71 Ibid., 71, (56). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 72 (57). 
74 Ibid., 81, (64). 
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better developed in later chapters, the work at hand repeatedly stresses all aspects of 
praise tied together through “the master theme: God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”
75
  
 
 iii. Praise in Christian Existence and the Existence of Evil 
 
Having surveyed the influence of text and tradition, Hardy and Ford return to 
their present theological concern of linking praise of God to the human experience of 
that praise. Again, like Brueggemann, both authors are ever concerned for how their 
theology impacts the life of the Church; consequently, the chapter “Basic Christian 
Existence as Praise” is, according to the authors, “the central chapter and in many ways 
the book pivots around it.”
76
 They begin by provocatively comparing Christian 
existence to “a laugh,” a metaphor suggested by the poetry of Patrick Kavanagh who 
“calls the resurrection of Jesus ‘…a laugh freed for ever and ever.’”
77
 Once again, the 
implication here is a generative one. “Part of the logic of laughter, poetry and praise is 
that of intensification and overflow. …The resurrection of the crucified Jesus Christ is 
this logic at the heart of Christianity.”
78
 The generativity of this logic is what creates the 
further theological perspective Hardy and Ford find through praising God. “The basis of 
Christian existence is not just a basis. It is also an environment of abundance created 
through this overflow of life, and giving reason for praise in all situations. If this is basic 
reality then all of existence can be thought through in the light of it.”
79
 
Practically speaking, the authors aim “to trace a pervasive pattern and possibility 
for ordinary life that the perspective of praise illuminates.”
80
 The “master key” of praise 
is considered in light of two concepts briefly introduced in the earlier chapter on 
scripture—recognition and respect. “The plea for recognition and affirmation is heard 
from cradle to the tombstone,” is “intrinsic to our identity,” and elucidates the nature of 
human dignity which “embraces ‘human rights’ but is far wider.”
81
 The “heart of 
human dignity is the free respect given by one person to another, recognizing their 
otherness, their distinctive life, the irreducible pluralism of being persons in relation.”
82
 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 89 (70). 
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77 Ibid., 92 (73). 
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80 Ibid., 93 (74). 
81 Ibid., 94, 95 (74, 75). 
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For Christian identity this connotes “dying to self,” taking up the cross of Christ, and 
becoming a servant. “The nerve-centre of our identity is aimed at by the call to follow 
Jesus on his way to the cross.”
83
 
 Here, Hardy and Ford’s alignment of praise with cross and resurrection moves in 
a direction which Ford will build upon in his subsequent work. The understanding of the 
cross in A?B2.),& has an emphasis on exteriority, which Ford later develops in interaction 
with the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and others, as ethical responsibility rooted in 
the suffering death of Christ. In this context, the otherness of Christ’s death is a 
testament to the respect for otherness offered humanity even in its sinful condition. 
The crucifixion of Jesus is the summary of God’s respect for creation. This is God’s 
speech expressed in suffering. He lets people be themselves, lets them have their 
freedom even to be wrong, to ignore him and to show disrespect to the point of killing. 
This is met not with counter-force but with a willingness to go through the final 
destructive experience and so respect the power that has been given to the world. The 
resurrection is not a simple reversal of this or a way of giving in, a few days late, to the 
taunt: ‘Come down from the cross.’ It is the overcoming of evil and death in a way that 
utterly respects but also judges and shows the limits of the world.
84
 
Hardy and Ford’s juxtaposition of God’s respect for humanity with God’s judgment of 
humanity is illustrative of their desire to situate human freedom in the purview of God’s 
costly redemption. Unlike Brueggemann’s mature work, there is no division of divine 
fidelity from sovereignty here: “(God) is prepared to follow through to their limits the 
negative consequences of his genuine, respectful participation in history.”
85
  
The chapter closes with reference to the life and martyrdom of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer as an example of a particular Christian “self” engaged in the realities of 
Christ’s redemption.  “Bonhoeffer’s way is of constantly renewed recognition of God in 
all complexities and agonies of living, and an accompanying liberation from concern for 
oneself.”
86
 His example puts into practice what Hardy and Ford mean in theory. “The 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the ultimate standpoint for Christian praise, and 
there we find an event and person that relativises all differences in maturity, 
achievement and capacity.”
87
 
The scope of redemptive transformation is expanded upon in the following 
chapter, “Evil, Suffering and Death.” Shame, not sin, is introduced as the key 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 96 (76). 
84 Ibid., 101 (79-80). 
85 Ibid., 102 (81). 
86 Ibid., 111, (87). 
87 Ibid. 
 114
experiential reality, not in ignorance of the latter but because shame “is not just a moral 
experience, and it is more comprehensive than guilt.”
88
 Right shame calls us back to the 
true state of things before God, while wrong shame corrupts right shame and destroys 
the joy of self praising God. Christ is the decisive response to both. “The crucifixion 
itself was the climax of shame, in which its many dimensions focused…The New 
Testament pivots round the sequel to this. In the perspective of shame, the resurrection 
does what is most needed: it vindicates.”
89
 The cross and its vindicating resurrection 
then transform the identity of those who worship Christ.  
So shame is opposed from the inside by suffering it, embodying it, and going to the 
roots of it as perversion of respect. The result is a new object of respect and boasting, 
Jesus Christ. This transforms the meaning of shame and liberates it for the two basic 
Christian activities of worship and witness. Not to be ashamed of Jesus Christ becomes 
the central mark of identity of the Christian Church.90 
Boasting in Christ is contrasted with a false solution to shame—stoicism. “Stoics avoid 
the ravages and abyss of shame at the cost of the possibility of joy. Their world is 
marked by order and imperturbability in face of disorder, but they miss what we have 
called the reality of overflow.”
91
  
In presenting Christ as an alternative to stoicism, Hardy and Ford call “for a new 
concept in the description of both good and evil,” which relates back to laughter as “not 
order, nor is it disorder: our term for its ‘non-order’.”
92
 Shame’s perversion of this 
combination can only be overcome, once again, by the saving work of Christ.  
Affliction itself is, in our terms, the worst perversion of good order and of non-order 
together. Jesus meets it with a further dimension of non-order, of overflow: he suffers it 
for others, identifies completely and gets sucked in. ‘My God, my God, why hast thou 
forsaken me?’ is the result.
93
 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 112 (89). 
89 Ibid., 117 (93). 
90 Ibid., 119 (94). 
91 Ibid., 120 (95). 
92 Ibid., 121 (96). Hardy and Ford observe a reality beyond common sense order, which they align with 
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What ultimately creates the overflow here is the resurrection. “In the vindication of the 
resurrection this becomes the essence of the new free order.”
94
 
 Vindication of God in light of evil brings the themes of this chapter together. 
After considering evil from the side of both suffers and perpetrators, Hardy and Ford lay 
the problem before God via a discussion of theodicy. Calling the issue “necessarily 
inconclusive,” they reflect on common propensities and problems of any theodicy 
before concluding the following:  
If it is granted that evil is a possibility in a world where freedom is valued, the answer 
to evil must be in the possibility of a free response to it that genuinely meets and 
overcomes it. …In other words, God needs to be vindicated by God, and theodicy will 
depend on recognising this justification.
95
 
Hardy and Ford believe the above to be the best understanding of theodicy in light of 
Scripture, as seen particularly through the Psalms
96
 and the New Testament.
97
 
Moreover, they stress the centrality of God in confronting evil: 
The vehemence of this rejection of God and the energy put into creating alternatives to 
faith in him overflow and spread in ways that cannot be stemmed, &S3&>,$ B7$ )$
L5"#.&;*&$"+$G";$,!),$2($&/B";2&;$25$)$#)7$"+$.2+&$#!23!$3"/>6&!&5(2@&.7$)++26/($!2/ 
in the face of evil and hatred and is taken up into the free overflow of praise.
98
 
Unlike Brueggemann’s proposal, recognizing the problem of evil in light of the explicit 
vindication of God in Christ does not, for Hardy and Ford, ignore the problem. “Rather, 
it places the cross and continuing discipleship at the centre of faith which lives in a 
world of evil but fights it with confidence in a crucified and risen Lord.”
99
 
 
 iv. Praise and the Triune God 
 
“The final three chapters,” write Hardy and Ford, “take complementary 
perspectives on God, roughly corresponding to God as Trinity.”
100
$
                                                 
94 Ibid., 124 (98).  
95 Ibid., 130-131 (104). Rodd, review of Hardy and Ford, 98, notes, “The authors are not entirely happy 
about producing a theodicy, but the form that they develop is an extension of the freewill defence.”  
96 Ibid., 131 (104). “Vindication of God by God is the source of the Psalmists’ hope and praise, appearing 
in nearly every Psalm, and especially in the depths of suffering.” 
97 Ibid., 133 (105). “In the New Testament the theme of vindication is concentrated in Jesus’ crucifixion 
and resurrection. …Praise of God celebrates God’s self-identification through the crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus.” 
98 Ibid., 133-134 (106). 
99 Ibid., 134 (106). 
100 Ibid., 5 (4). 
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 The first of these is entitled “Knowing God.” Here the focus lies on God as 
Creator who “both creates and respects what is created,” and as Christ who, through 
cross and resurrection, enables our response in knowledge and praise.
101
 Such 
knowledge of God, contra allegations of projectionism, is about stretching the 
imagination, a transformation at the root of trinitarian understanding.  
If (Christ’s) crucifixion and resurrection are taken as the event ‘than which none greater 
can be conceived’ this is another way of expressing what was central to first Christians: 
the ultimate eschatological nature of what happened. It is an event embracing 
affirmative and negative, but not in equilibrium—the cross is taken up into the new life 
in overflow, while persisting in its critique of all escapism, idolatry and projection. The 
new event is recognized and responded to ‘in the Spirit’.102 
For Hardy and Ford, the cross and resurrection and the subsequent ongoing presence of 
the Holy Spirit become “the criteria of knowledge of God, the points of greatest clarity” 
shaping the fullness of Christian witness and granting primacy to the story of Christ as 
revealed in the New Testament.
103
 This is the basis for all knowledge of God which is 
then related to the world and “spread by telling its story.”
104
  
The particular story of Christ is central to the penultimate chapter “Jesus is Our 
Praise.” Here the cross and resurrection are seen to “explode” into the generative 
realities of Christian praise through the Spirit.  
The crucifixion, seen as the will of God in the face of evil, shows the double-bind that 
God himself is in when dealing with evil. There is the classic Zen dilemma in which the 
master tells the pupil that he will beat him with his stick if he does a certain action and 
will also beat him if he does not. People put God in a similar position. …%!&$36?32+2S2"5$
3)5$B&$ (&&5$)($G";9($#)7$"+$ ,)L25*$ ,!&$ (,23L$ "+$ ,!&$>6"B.&/$"+$ &@2.<$ )5;$).("$ ,)L25*$
6&(>"5(2B2.2,7$+"6$)..$,!),$2,$25@".@&(U But unlike the Zen solution, which merely reverses 
the master-pupil relationship and keeps the relationship of authority (though Zen too 
can go beyond this), ,!2($&S3!)5*&$25$,!&$36?32+2S2"5$,6)5(+"6/($,!&$6&.),2"5(!2>$2,(&.+U$
%!&$ 6&(?66&3,2"5$ (!"#($ #!),$ 2,$ 2(U There is something beyond the double-binds and 
paralyzing vicious circles of evil. 8,$ B625*($ )$ 5&#$ (!)6&;$ 6&(>"5(2B2.2,7$ B&,#&&5$G";$
)5;$/)5, offering all and demanding all within an ecology of freedom, blessing and 
praise…%!&$5&#$(!)625*$B&,#&&5$G";$)5;$/)5$&S>.";&($+6"/$,!&$6&(?66&3,2"5, with its 
double focus on the glorified Jesus and his sending out others round the world. The 
energy and life of this sharing is the Holy Spirit, and the message it carries is ‘Jesus is 
our praise’. The risen Jesus is beyond the dilemmas of disunity and the paradoxes of 
evil, and moves freely in the Spirit, liberating from the double-binds.
105
 
                                                 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 144 (114). 
103 Ibid., 152-153 (121). 
104 Ibid., 154 (122). 
105 Ibid., 161, 162 (128, 129), italics mine. 
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That sharing which “explodes from the resurrection” results in continual outward 
manifestations of praise corresponding to a new Christian responsibility toward the 
world. 
Resurrection is God’s way of referring back Jesus to the world…It is not a neutral, 
amoral fact about what happened to a corpse. It climaxes the pattern of responsibility 
between man and God. God takes responsibility for everything, the resurrection is an 
initiative of God alone, but he gives back a new responsibility. For the disciples the 
resurrection was an experience of joy and vocation together. There is the joyful freedom 
of complete forgiveness and acceptance in the welcome of Jesus, and the .2/2,.&(($
6&(>"5(2B2.2,7 of mission to the whole world.
106
 
Hardy and Ford bring to fruition here their transformative theology of praise. Joy 
becomes inextricable from outward action, a “vocation” of “limitless responsibility” 
established in the praise of Christ, crucified and resurrected. And nowhere is the 
transformative power of this praise more evident than in how it presently witnesses to 
the past in open anticipation of the future. 
  Thus “Praise and Prophecy” is the subject of A?B2.),&9( final chapter concerning 
the overflowing nature of faith sustained in ongoing Christian life. Prophecy is a 
dynamic, human discernment of God which becomes manifest as the Holy Spirit makes 
possible human life in hope.
107
 The Spirit also integrates the overflow which, in contrast 
to the tension of Brueggemann’s theology, defines Hardy and Ford’s conclusions about 
human response to suffering in the light of God in Christ. “The gospel is that all sin, evil 
and suffering, all need and want, can now be seen in the perspective of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ in which God acts in such a way that the realistic response is joy.”
108
 
 
 B. Putting the Theological Pieces Together 
 
  i. Viewing the Big Picture 
 
Throughout A?B2.),& numerous themes present themselves and then reemerge in 
new contexts. If we continue to follow Brueggemann’s suggestion of treating the work 
                                                 
106 Ibid.,  158, 159 (126), italics mine. 
107 Ibid., 185 (147), “The Holy Spirit in the Church produces that mature, tested hope which Paul 
decribes, oriented towards the ultimate hope of sharing God’s glory. It is a lively movement with three 
basic dynamics which have also emerged in the previous chapters: the overflow of praise to God, offering 
him everything; the overflow of love in a community that shares in the Holy Spirit; and the overflow in 
mission to the world. …The prophetic signs of our times are that Christian praise, community and 
mission are being integrated in new ways.” 
108 Ibid., 190 (150). 
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as like a mosaic, then on the “surface” the text is inconsistent and irregular in terms of 
consistent word use and meaning and the multiple semantic layers tacked on to many 
thoughts and ideas.
109
 However, viewing a mosaic also requires stepping back from the 
details of the surface to see the whole, an activity intended to bring integration to 
seemingly disparate parts. By the end of A?B2.),&, certain theological themes can be 
consistently found to connect the authors’ wide-spread examination and application of 
praise. 
First is the “economy of praise” proposed through an ever-widening circle of 
relation to God. Praise, worship and, by extension, joy which results from Christian 
faith are the guiding influences throughout the course of this work from the initial 
paradoxical statement that “Praise perfects perfection.” Methodologically, praise is 
oriented by the infinite expansion of God towards creation, something which becomes 
more evident through A?B2.),&9($first appendix.  
As we concluded earlier, God is self-same in his expansion, and is so (a) by positing a 
direction for his expanding perfection and (b) by originating that from perfection which 
has already come to be; this is what establishes the activity of God in an economy of 
praise. Now the nature of such praise is not to be distant, alienated from that which it 
has originated. Therefore, even as God expands, as an ‘expanding circumference’, he 
remains close to all that he has previously originated in the history of creation, retaining 
its direction and movement by continuing to establish ‘space’ for it to be itself and 
‘moving’ it to its true being.
 110
 
The “movement” articulated here suggests praise is an activity whereby God becomes 
more manifest as humanity becomes more human. However, Hardy and Ford adamantly 
assert the initiating of this activity has its exclusive origin in an already perfect God. 
“Thus, the economy which is in God is that of an inner distinction in God which posits a 
direction for his expanding perfection, and it can be characterized as an economy of 
praise, one which establishes the character of God as praise.”
111
 This “inner distinction 
in God” is not so much the distinct focus of A?B2.),&; more central is the proposal that 
such a distinction moves toward and through humanity. Thus, Hardy and Ford add that 
                                                 
109 Wood, review of Hardy and Ford, 367, “While the criticisms generally have merit…the constructive 
alternatives on the whole are only very sketchily suggested. …This is true as well of some of the book’s 
more central themes, where the rationale for some of the choices made could stand to be more explicit.” 
110 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, “Appendix A”, 164. The language here is not without certain difficulties, 
e.g. the phrase “originating that from his perfection which has already 3"/&$,"$B&” (italics mine). Such 
wording could appear to assume God as a finite being, something which Hardy and Ford do not seem to 
otherwise suggest, but something perhaps inadvertently suggested by their language here.  
111 Ibid., 162. 
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“…for this to regenerate humanity, God’s economy of praise would actually have to 
become operative in man, displacing that which undermines it.”
112
  
This constitutes the second pervasive theme in A?B2.),&’s theology. Hardy and 
Ford unceasingly relate God’s economy of praise to humanity through the cross and 
resurrection of Christ.
113
 Atonement in Christ is clearly proposed as God’s response to 
human suffering. Christ’s person and work reverses the offense of humanity through a 
closeness which is in fact an “inside” job, atonement of incarnational proportion. Hardy 
and Ford assert that evil is “opposed from the inside by suffering it, embodying it, and 
going to the roots of it as the perversion of respect…This transforms the meaning of 
shame and liberates it for the two basic Christian activities of worship and witness.”
114
  
Nevertheless, most central to A?B2.),&$ is how these two above themes come 
together in the ongoing experience of human life, or more specifically, “the inner 
movement of God’s relationship with man through the life of praise.”
115
 This third 
theme is described as nothing less than life-affirming, life-sustaining overflow. “The 
basis of Christian existence is not just a basis. It is also an environment of abundance 
created through this overflow of life, and giving reason for praise in all situations. If this 
is basic reality then all of existence can be thought through in the light of it.”
116
 Again, 
such an overflow is made possible through and characterized by the cross and 
resurrection. 
If (Christ’s) crucifixion and resurrection are taken as the event ‘than which none greater 
can be conceived’ this is another way of expressing what was central to first Christians: 
the ultimate eschatological nature of what happened. It is an event embracing 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 165. 
113 Ibid., 166-67, “What is it then which reverses the offence, and completes the reconsituitive act in 
Jesus? It is the persistent presence of the expanding perfection of God, now shown to expand even 
through its own defeat and to remain closer than ever to man, even in his materiality, in doing so. As the 
life and death of Jesus were the expanding closeness to man of the economy of God’s praise, despite the 
restrictions placed on this by man, so the resurrection was the supervening of the economy of praise over 
its contradictions. If the death of Jesus had been offensive to God, not withstanding the fact that Jesus had 
reversed the blaming by which he was crucified, this offensiveness was itself taken away by God’s own 
praise given material form in the resurrection of Jesus, and those who crucified him were returned to 
praise in place of the blame which was due them.” 
114 A?B2.),&, 119 (94). 
115 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, “Appendix A”, 170. This purpose is declared as Hardy and Ford evaluate 
A?B2.),& in comparison to Geoffrey Wainwright, ="S"."*70$%!&$-6)2(&$"+$G";$25$P"6(!2><$="3,625&$)5;$
J2+& (London: Epworth, 1980). Wainwright’s work, in Hardy and Ford’s view essentially fails “to 
establish the inner movement or ‘grammar’ of God’s relationship with man.” (169). On the next page they 
continue, “So, by comparison with Wainwright’s book, we have attempted to explore the inner movement 
of God’s relationship with man through the life of praise, and allow that to show how worship operates, 
and knowing and behaving (including their doctrinal and ethical form) arise. We also make that 
movement the criterion for the examination of Christian materials, and for a systematic theology.”  
116 Ibid., 92-93 (73).  
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affirmative and negative, but not in equilibrium—the cross is taken up into the new life 
in overflow, while persisting in its critique of all escapism, idolatry and projection. The 
new event is recognized and responded to ‘in the Spirit’.
117 
The theological inner workings of “overflow” are briefly sketched out here: the cross is 
“taken up” into the new life of the resurrection, overcoming the destructive overflow of 
evil, suffering and death.  The Holy Spirit provides the modes of recognition and 
response, modes which are “essentially practical” for the human condition.
118
  
Practically speaking such recognition and response are necessary conditions to 
confronting evil. 
The vehemence of this rejection of God and the energy put into creating alternatives to 
faith in him overflow and spread in ways that cannot be stemmed, &S3&>,$ B7$ )$
L5"#.&;*&$"+$G";$,!),$2($&/B";2&;$25$)$#)7$"+$.2+&$#!23!$3"/>6&!&5(2@&.7$)++26/($!2/ 
in the face of evil and hatred and is taken up into the free overflow of praise.
119
 
The free overflow of praise is a God-given, God-generated reality of faith which, in the 
power of the Spirit, “lives in a world of evil but fights it with confidence in a crucified 
and risen Lord.
120
 
 
  ii. Deflecting the Reality of Lament or Reflecting the Reality of God’s 
Faithfulness in Christ? 
 
At first glance, connections between Brueggemann’s work and A?B2.),&$may not 
appear obvious. The former always works with the issues of contemporary biblical 
studies in mind, whereas Hardy and Ford write from an overtly theological perspective. 
Brueggemann’s scholarship often examines the relationship between praise and lament, 
while lament is hardly an explicit issue in A?B2.),&. The only such discussion involving 
a lament text occurs fittingly though briefly, in Chapter 6, “Evil, Suffering and Death,” 
where Hardy and Ford discuss suffering and the Psalms.  
The Psalmist continually cries out against the ‘enemies’ who thrive on slander, fear, 
violence, deceit and the perversion of goodness and trust. He often recognizes his own 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 144 (114). 
118 Ibid., 133 (106), “Evil’s historical particularity is met on the cross, and evil’s dynamic, spreading 
overflow through history is met by the Spirit of the resurrected Lord. It is an answer to evil that is 
essentially practical, taking the form of a call to live in this Spirit and follow the way of the cross, trusting 
in the vindication of God by God.” 
119 Ibid., 133-134 (106), italics mine. 
120 Ibid., 134 (106). 
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sin and need for repentance, but beyond that is in no doubt about the evil that shapes the 
state of the world.
121
  
The chapter later proposes the specific implications of laments such as Psalm 69.  
Vindication of God by God is the source of the Psalmists’ hope and praise, appearing in 
nearly every Psalm, and especially in the depths of suffering….The theodicy of the 
Psalms is one of complaint, questioning and passionate protest, but all this is embraced 
by a faith in God as vindicator in spite of all appearances, resulting in a theodicy of 
praise.
122
 
Despite the brevity of such a discussion on complaint and lament, Hardy and Ford’s 
theology surfaces a valuable perspective for interacting with Brueggemann’s concerns 
over praise, particularly in the light of theological issues which arise in his emphasis on 
lament. A?B2.),&$ affords us a context in which to push Brueggemann’s pressing 
theological question. Is Hardy and Ford’s position so subsumed “under the aegis of 
Easter joy” that they fail to properly engage “Saturday issues even on Monday?” Does 
their understanding of the overflow of praise simply deflect the suffering and sorrow of 
lament or could it actually reflect how such sorrow is taken up into the reality of God’s 
faithfulness in Christ? 
To be sure, A?B2.),& unceasingly emphasizes that reality itself is praise in and 
through God. Brueggemann comments upon this in his review: 
Their orientation is in a classical philosophical direction that is aimed at the objective 
reality of God in God’s own self. Thus they speak about “perfection” in God. My own 
biblical orientation would be to speak about God’s fidelity as the center of our life with 
God, but it is precisely perfection rather than fidelity that belongs to the heart of the 
argument, for they want to make a statement about the sheer reality of God, apart from 
those who are invited to praise.
123
 
At the time of this writing, Brueggemann’s own work has yet to come to maturity. As 
we have seen, he later strongly critiques this understanding of reality
124
 while also 
complicating his own view of divine fidelity by separating it from divine sovereignty.
125
  
                                                 
121 Ibid., 115 (91). 
122 Ibid., 131 (104). 
123 Brueggemann, review of Hardy and Ford, 99. 
124 Brueggemann, %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, 64, 65, “Our intellectual inheritance has 
characteristically preferred “being” to rhetoric, and therefore has assumed that metaphysics is a much 
more serious matter than is speech. That outcome is that issues of God are foreclosed before disputatious 
utterance rather than in and through disputatious utterance....The issues are exceedingly difficult, but we 
must at least recognize that what has passed for an essentialist or realist position has in fact been the 
attempt of hegemonic speech that sought to silence all alternative utterance.” 
125 See Ch. 3 above. 
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Beyond his dedication as an Old Testament scholar, Brueggemann is keenly 
concerned that theologically prioritizing praise can and will become ideologically 
destructive by producing faith which cannot or will not account for voices which lament 
suffering. “It is my judgment that while the Old Testament can make assumptions about 
and claims for what is real, it is unable and unwilling to do so by way of silencing 
countervoices.”
126
 He is most concerned for this tendency in the history and practice of 
Christian theology. For him, the only alternative is a view of biblical faith where God 
arises in the endlessly disputatious rhetorical tension of texts such as praise and lament. 
A view of faith which can never ultimately affirm God’s faithfulness, apparently even in 
Christ’s cross and resurrection. 
 However, for all of their theological prioritization of the praise of God as true 
reality, Hardy and Ford hardly seem to be “silencing countervoices” but rather 
reconceiving “Christian communication”: 
Yet the very conception of much Christian communication has been questionable. It has 
often presented the good news in functional terms: it is useful for meeting needs, crises, 
limitations or other problems. It has been a gospel that fills gaps in one’s life, or repairs 
things that have gone wrong, or is essentially practical in a host of ways. The 
seductiveness of this is that there is indeed good news for every problematic situation 
and person. The flaw lies in its missing the free praise of God, the generosity, the 
foolish abundance far beyond all need and practicality. The gospel is that all sin, evil 
and suffering, all need and want, can now be seen in the perspective of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ in which God acts in such a way that the realistic response is joy. Even 
beyond this, it is the joy of love between us and God, the ultimate mutuality and 
intimacy.
127
 
Hardy and Ford pull no punches in asserting that “).. sin, evil and suffering…can now 
be seen in the perspective of the resurrection” (italics mine). Through God’s self-
expression in the person and work of Christ, human reality is truly made anew. Yet the 
very way in which God’s faithfulness overflows into human experience also shapes the 
nature of Christian expectation.  
Recognizing and responding to this God inevitably leads to evangelism and mission as 
acts of love and celebration, longing for others to share in something whose delight 
increases by being shared. Yet expressions of praise easily become overbearing and 
triumphalist, and so does evangelism. When this happens, there is a contradiction of the 
message. The history of evangelism is extremely painful, full of examples of the 
message being falsified by the way it is spread. The crucifixion of Jesus is the only 
essential guard against this. It contradicts all glib praise and preaching. It continually 
demands the repentance, reconversion, suffering and even death of the evangelist. 
…The temptations of Jesus show the classic traps of evangelism—use of worldly 
                                                 
126 Brueggemann, %:%, 65. 
127 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 189-90, (150). 
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incentives, spectacular events and manipulative power. The alternative is the way of the 
cross, from which the true ethic of evangelism springs: an ethic of radical respect which 
refuses any coercive communication, preferring to suffer and die; but which also 
refuses to compromise on what is communicated.
128
 
The praise of God refuses coercive or manipulative action through faith in the cross as 
“the true ethic of evangelism.” The overflowing power of God in Christ does not lead to 
praise which refuses suffering but desires instead to identify to the furthest extent with 
the suffering of the cross. Thus the cross “guards” against triumphalism not by failing to 
express God’s victory in Christ, but by reshaping human expectation of salvation 
through the sufferings of Christ for the sake of communicating and manifesting the 
praise of God. As quoted previously, Hardy and Ford understand the cross as “an event 
embracing affirmative and negative, but not in equilibrium—the cross is taken up into 
the new life in overflow, while persisting in its critique of all escapism, idolatry and 
projection.”
129
 
Furthermore, praise manifests the abundance of God as not simply flowing 
within the church but overflowing from God out into the world via the Holy Spirit. This 
produces important consequences for how faith responds to the world: 
God is already ahead of all evangelism, carrying on his mission in the world, and this 
adds further dimensions to the ethic of respect. It means that the abundance of God is 
poured out way beyond the boundaries of the Church, and a vital task is in discerning 
this abundance and accepting it with joy. There is no Christian triumphalism in a 
theology of the all-sufficiency and abundance of God. More often than not, respectful 
discernment will demand drastic changes of heart and mind, as for Peter with his own 
traditions. Christians are only beginning to glimpse the comprehensive repercussions of 
this in relation to the various sciences, other religions, philosophies and ways of 
living…. But without the right content and mode of affirmation of God the horizon is 
lacking within which all that can take place
 
.
130
 
Faith functions as a doxological “horizon” of understanding which, for Hardy and Ford, 
is ultimately established christologically. “The crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ is 
therefore at the heart of the method as well as the content of Christian mission.”
131
 
 A?B2.),& refuses to articulate praise outside of Christ. Thus praise, understood as 
the fullness of divine and human reality, cannot merely function as the theological 
counterbalance to lament. Though, on an explicit level, they hardly deal with lament in 
relation to praise, Hardy and Ford nonetheless account for the reality of suffering so 
                                                 
128 Ibid., 190 (150-1). 
129 Ibid., 144 (114). See op. cit. 
130 Ibid., 191 (151). 
131 Ibid., (151-2). 
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acutely expressed through lamentation addressed to God.  By understanding praise 
particularly in relation to the cross and resurrection of Christ, Hardy and Ford discern 
the shape and movement of faith through God’s own human self-expression, the 
dynamic which they so often label as the overflow of praise. They then demonstrate that 
this overflow in human experience, made possible by the power of the Holy Spirit, 
neither finds itself overrunning suffering in a destructive triumphalist sense nor, contra 
Brueggemann, purely remaining in tension with suffering. Neither of these options 
adequately account for the vindicating sacrifice and eschatological hope made manifest 
in Christ. Only in the horizon of the cross )5; resurrection can praise in relation to 
suffering finally be understood.
132
 And it is only in this christological sense that Hardy 
and Ford propose that praise can be expected to overflow the darkest of human realities 
even now in the present. Again as A?B2.),& concludes, “The gospel is that all sin, evil 
and suffering, all need and want, 3)5$5"#$B&$(&&5 in the perspective of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ in which God acts in such a way that the realistic response is joy.” 
133
 
 
II. Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians: Ford’s Collaboration with Frances Young 
 
A. Reflecting God’s Glory: Conceptualizing the Overflow of Faith in 2 
Corinthians 
 
'&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$ 25$C$4"625,!2)5(, a theological commentary coauthored by 
Ford and Frances Young a few years after A?B2.),&’s first publication, further develops 
Ford’s conceptualization of the overflowing nature of faith through Christian praise. 
While one Pauline epistle serves here as the central theological guide, conclusions 
similar to those presented in$ Ford’s work with Hardy$ quickly emerge from this 
scriptural context.
134
 Moreover, 2 Corinthians also allows Ford to introduce the “face of 
                                                 
132 Ibid., (105-6). “In the New Testament the theme of vindication is concentrated in Jesus’ crucifixion 
and resurrection. …God involved with evil, suffering and death in such a way that their terrible reality is 
recognized and more than adequately met. The resurrection is not a containment or a reversal or a denial 
of this reality; it is the revelation of the one person who goes through them in God’s way and creates an 
alternative.” 
133 Ibid., 190 (150), italics mine. 
134 Ford also later underscores the importance of joy in 2 Corinthians (particularly in relation to Paul’s 
authority) in his 1998 presidential address to the Society for the Study of Theology published in D3",,2(!$
A"?65).$"+$%!&"."*7 53, no. 1 (2000): 58-9. 
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Christ” as a new and innovative concept for properly understanding the overflow of 
faith first discerned in A?B2.),&.  
 
i. God’s Glory and Paul’s Overflowing Faith 
 
Ford and Young begin with Paul’s commitment to God’s glory,
135
 which is the 
apostle’s focus through either joy or suffering, even when the latter is his own. 
So Paul is afflicted, oppressed, persecuted, bearing everywhere in his body the killing 
of Jesus. But this is the means of communicating life. His very sufferings prove that the 
life he has is not his own but that of Jesus. His vocation is to play out over and over 
again the death and resurrection pattern. And the purpose is to absorb affliction, 
destruction and death, to fill up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ, so as to 
communicate power, life, the Spirit. It is for the sake of the Corinthians; its purpose is 
the overflow of grace into more and more people, causing an overflow of thanksgiving 
to God’s glory (4:15). Once more Paul is picking up the language and themes of his 
previous discussions, and the principal drive of his mission is encapsulated in phrases 
pointing not to worldly success but to the glory of God in worship.
136
 
While the above words are attributed to Young,
137
 several themes are characteristic of 
how Ford comes to theologically tie together Christian identity in joy and worship, 
suffering and responsibility. First, Paul’s identity, his very “life,” is found in identifying 
with Christ. Second, Paul’s responsibility, his “vocation,” is found in repeatedly living 
out the pattern of Christ’s death and resurrection. Third, the purpose of this living into 
“affliction” is to manifest the “overflow of grace” which generates “an overflow of 
thanksgiving to God’s glory.” Fourth, Paul’s entire motivation is summarized as the 
“glory of God in worship.” Young and Ford’s interlinking of each of these aspects of 
Pauline theology is consistent with how Ford’s other work talks of Christian identity in 
terms of a generative circularity. Worship overflows into manifestations of sacrificial 
suffering along the lines of Christ death and resurrection so that grace and thanksgiving 
may again overflow to the glory of God. 
 Young further finds a parallel between the overflowing faith of Paul’s example 
and the Psalms. “So with the confidence of the Psalmist…and reinforced by the power 
                                                 
135 The introduction states that 2 Corinthians, “…is about two closely related things. One of these, is the 
glory of God, the other is the reputation of Paul. Crucial to the whole is the relationship betwen [(23] these 
two themes, and perhaps it is no accident that the Greek word ;"S) means both reputation and glory.” See 
'&)525*$)5;$%6?,!, 12. 
136 Ibid., 129. 
137 Ibid., 7, “What follows has emerged from work in which both of us have been involved at every stage. 
...However, Chapters 1-4 are attributable to the pen of Frances Young, and Chapters 5-9 to that of David 
Ford.” 
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of the resurrection of Jesus, Paul refuses to be daunted, in spite of everything that 
happens to him.”
138
 Though this confidence is being fulfilled in and through Christ, it 
also aligns present Christian existence with the shape of faith seen throughout Israel’s 
psalter. “Paul is struggling to outline the paradoxical double existence of the believer. 
He has seen the desperate prayers and joyful confidence of the Psalmist through the 
spectacles of his apocalyptic perspective, and identified with them.”
139
 As with the faith 
of the psalmist who earnestly and vigorously petitions God with “desperate prayers,” 
Paul’s faith is directed in all circumstances toward God who does and will deliver.  
His mission is not an obvious triumph. Yet in another sense the weakness and suffering 
through which Paul communicates life, are themselves a testimony to the fact that his 
mission is entirely grounded not in his own strength or qualifications, but in God’s 
commissioning and the all-sufficiency of God’s power. It is the eschatological promise 
already partially experienced through the Spirit, anticipated in the resurrection of 
Christ, which puts the whole thing in proper perspective.
 140
  
Thus Young is able to conclude, “Faith in God is fundamental, as it was for the 
Psalmist.”
141
 
  
ii. Powering the Overflow in Cross and Resurrection 
 
In the later chapters of '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!, Ford builds upon Young’s work by 
further linking it with a notion of overflow tied to faith in Christ’s cross and 
resurrection. The chapter titled “The Economy of God: Exploring a Metaphor” states, 
“Most economies are characterized by their ways of coping with scarcity, but Paul’s 
                                                 
138 Ibid., 130. Young develops her understanding of Paul and the Psalms in Chapter 3, “The Biblical 
Roots of Paul’s Perceptions” and specifically the subsection “The Importance of the Psalms” (pp. 63-9). 
Space does not allow for a full and careful treatment of how Young works through the textual issues. 
However, the following extended quote demonstrates her own perspective on the importance of the 
Psalms for Paul: “We have already noted that in 2. Cor. 1 the language of the B&6)L)!$is reminiscent of 
the language of the lament Psalms. Now, however, it becomes possible to see how profoundly this self-
understanding underlies everything Paul has said and is going to say. It would be impossible to prove 
close literary dependence. But the impact of reading the Septuagint (Greek) versions of the Psalms with 
the Greek text of 2 Corinthians in mind is quite extraordinary. Paul would no doubt have been raised on 
the Psalms in the synagogue, though he may have used the Hebrew in that context. Be that as it may, the 
language of the Psalms seems to have got into his bloodstream, and putting the Greek texts side by side 
makes this evident.” (64). 
139 Ibid., 132. 
140 Ibid., 133. 
141 Ibid. 
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vision is of more than enough of the central resource.”
142
 The central resource here is 
the God revealed and made known through Christ, a resource which Ford, following 
Paul, labels as overflowing.  
The theme of abundance and overflow runs all through the letter. Paul describes the 
intensification of both suffering and blessing initiated by Jesus Christ’s death and resurrection. 
For just as the sufferings of Christ overflow onto us, so through Christ even the encouragement we receive is 
overflowing (1.5; cf. 7.4; 11.23). 
There is no steady equilibrium here, no careful regulation of limited goods. The basic fact is ‘the 
extraordinary (surpassing) grace of God’ (9.14).
143
 
Described in terms of “surpassing” grace, it is nonetheless an ongoing “exchange” 
economy. “This is an economy of abundance at the heart of which is an exchange that 
requires to be re-enacted in appropriate ways in new circumstances if the abundance is 
to be shared properly.”
144
 
Ford expands on how the “sharing” in this economy happens in his final chapter 
“God and 2 Corinthians.”
145
 This develops in a pair of subsections, one dealing with 
power and God and the other discussing the face of Christ.  
First, God’s power, understood along Pauline lines,
146
 is the heart Ford’s 
economical concept of overflow.
147
 Ford critiques theological approaches which have 
“the tendency to ascribe to God power and freedom which contradicted all weakness 
and contingency, and an absoluteness and immutability that seemed to rule out 
mutuality and real involvement in history.”
148
 Instead, he argues that the cross “wages 
                                                 
142 Ibid., 172. In David F. Ford, %!&$D!)>&$"+$J2@25*0$D>262,?).$=26&3,2"5($+"6$E@&67;)7$J2+& (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997), 144, Ford credits Hardy with the initial suggestion to develop this “economic” 
metaphor in 2 Corinthians.  
143 Ibid., 172. 
144 Ibid., 174. 
145 N. T. Wright’s review calls this “the crowning chapter…The chapter argues, among other things, that 
‘the face of Christ’ is for Paul the key to a whole new way of seeing the world, a new ontology and 
epistemology.” See Wright, review of Frances M. Young and David F. Ford, '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$
4"625,!2)5(< D3",,2(!$A"?65).$"+$%!&"."*7 43 No. 2 1990, 273-5.$
146 Ibid., 240, “Paul’s gospel relates power and weakness differently. It is not that he simply replaces 
power with weakness. Rather, both are reinterpreted through the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ.” 
147 Ibid., 241, “Paul’s straining with ordinary language underlines his basic conviction that the new 
creation must primarily be communicated as testimony to events, both in the gospel and in his own life. 
But the events themselves identify afresh who God is and in particular they embody the relationship of 
God to Jesus Christ. So it is concepts not only of power or knowledge that are being transformed but of 
God, too.” 
148 Ibid., 242. 
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war on ways of seeing God that have not passed through the inconceivable, this death. 
To insulate God from weakness, suffering, sin, poverty and death is no longer 
possible.”
149
  
Moreover, God’s power in Christ’s resurrection, while revealing the vindicating 
glory of God, does not contradict Ford’s understanding of God’s contingency: 
Christianity has always been tempted to interpret the resurrection in the sense of a 
happy, victorious ending through which God sets everything right from the outside. 
This can lead to the sort of triumphalism that Paul met in Corinth and dealt with in 1 
Corinthians by such downright statements as: ‘For I decided to know nothing among 
you except Jesus Christ and him crucified’ (1 Cor. 2.2). Likewise in 2 Corinthians it is 
easy to see how the nature of God’s power is at stake in Paul’s authority, and how the 
main threat is to conceive power and success in terms that divorce the resurrection from 
the content of crucifixion. Resurrection is not simply a reversal of death, leaving death 
behind it. The resurrection does differentiate God from death—his life, sovereign 
creativity and power are vindicated decisively and his transcendence and provenience 
demonstrated. But the differentiation happens through an event which identifies God, 
including all those attributes afresh. The directness of the attribution of resurrection is 
inseparable from the indirectness of the cross.
150
 
Ford’s aims to deal simultaneously with what he sees as the connected problems of 
Christian triumphalism
151
 and concerns over God’s contingency.
152
 His approach 
answers both issues by redefining God in an irreversible narrative order which yet 
resists linear reduction. “The Christian solution is to characterize God through a story 
whose climactic events defy any simplistic linear description (as if one could have the 
‘result’ of the resurrection without the continuing content of the cross), but resists any 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 245. Here, Ford also lists contemporary theological influences on this view. “In this century one 
recalls Bonhoeffer’s final explosive prison writings after a lifetime of intensive thought and action. In 
Britain there has been the awkward challenge of the theology and life of P. T. Forsyth, and, in a more 
philosophical mode, the agonizing of Donald MacKinnon over the need for a Christian realism that does 
justice to the crucifixion. In contemporary Roman Catholic theology the massive corpus of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar pivots around the day Jesus was dead, Holy Saturday; while the liberation theologians work 
through with more political relevance the implications of freedom and a God characterized through a 
crucified liberator. Asian theology has been particularly attentive to ‘the pain of God’ and its meaning for 
a continent that includes the prosperity of Japan and the poverty of many other countries. And back in 
European protestantism, in Tübingen, one of the most influential faculties of theology, two of the 
professors, Eberhard Jüngel and Jürgen Moltmann, have made ‘the crucified God’ central to their work.” 
(245-6). 
150 Ibid., 246-47. 
151 Ibid., 247, Ford follows Kierkegaard’s %6)2525*$25$4!62(,2)52,7 to propose “the fundamental problem 
with Christendom in terms of a wrong relation of crucifixion and resurrection. Christendom, Christianity 
triumphant, wants to start with the resurrection, and does not see that the resurrection is only reached 
through the cross. It conceives God in an idolatrously direct way, and believes that he can be 
acknowledged apart from going the way of the cross: the happy ending is the good news.” 
152 Ibid., Ford explains such concerns as follows, “The order of the gospel story is irreversible and its 
contents are cumulative. In a God who ‘will be who he will be’ is it not possible to conceive of order? If 
he identifies himself through contingent history is he not allowing the sequential nature of time to be part 
of his being? Yet such a linear identification is also unsatisfactory, as it seems to submerge God in 
contingency.” 
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elimination of the order.”
153
 Ford is thereby able to conclude, “The abundance and 
overflow of God’s economy are represented through a historical transcendence that 
never ignores or bypasses the negativities.”
154
 
 Second, Ford’s reflection on the power of God leads to the introduction of his 
concept of Christ’s face in the light of 2 Corinthians 4:6.
155
  Several extended 
quotations are necessary to elucidate Ford’s meaning. He starts by introducing this as 
the only concept which can bring together the events of God in Christ.  
                                                
The face of Christ represents the subject of the events of crucifixion and resurrection. It 
transcends paradox but yet inconceivably holds together suffering, sin, death and God. 
These have to be thought together, according to this gospel, but there is no concept or 
image that can do it except this name and face.
156
  
Christ’s face allows theology to go “beyond a functional understanding of the gospel 
events,”
157
 thus identifying these events as the reality of human faith.  
In the light of this face the Christian meaning of contingency and freedom becomes 
clearer. It is a face that has been shaped through the contingencies of history and bears 
their marks. Its way of transcending them has been to undergo them. Now too it does 
not have a life separate from contingencies: a living face represents continuing 
sensitivity and responsiveness to events and people. …Faith is living before the face of 
Christ in free thanks, prayer and praise, and ministry in this >)66!!(2)$overflowing in 
speech and life.
158
 
God’s glory as “shared” through Christ is thus the overflowing nature of Christian 
identity in faith. 
All of this questions our use of the concept of ‘identity’ referring to God, Christ and 
ourselves. If identity implies something self-same, with a permanent centre and 
discernible boundaries, then that is adequate. If God’s glory in the face of Christ shows 
who God is, and if this glory is shared with us in a way that ‘transforms us into that 
self-same image, from glory to glory’ (3.18), usual notions of identity need to be 
transformed too. This ‘self-same image’ denies any individualism or autonomy in being 
a person, but constitutes identity in a new way, through being part of God’s sharing of 
 
153 Ibid., 247. 
154 Ibid., 248. 
155 Ibid., 248, “…the central verse 4.6 condenses the theology of God in the letter, while also offering the 
letter’s most distinctive idea for identifying God.” 
156 Ibid., 249. 
157 Ibid., 250. It leads us beyond a functional understanding of the gospel events. We cannot be content 
with speaking of God doing something through these events. We have to speak also of the person of Jesus 
Christ and then to follow through the implications of this face which could be both dead and the 
revelation of God’s glory. 
158 Ibid., 250, 251. 
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his own glory. This changes the very idea of the boundaries of self in favour of 
concepts such as coinherence, exchange, mutual indwelling and living for others.
159
 
Ford goes further to suggest that as “the face of Christ shows who God is,” our own 
faces become freely “responsible” in how we are to “face” others: 
Above all, the new identity is summed up in the face, which is at once the mark of 
unique personality and the embodiment of receptivity to others. The welcome of the 
face is not a threat to other selves but is the supreme sign of the possibility that we can 
live in free, non-competitive mutuality. Yet this is a freedom that is in its very essence 
responsible, because it only exists face to face with the other who continually puts the 
self in question and calls us to live responsively.
160
 
Furthermore, Ford links this theological idea of “facing” to the philosophy of 
Levinas,
161
 a connection which we examine further below.   
Ford’s “final move must take us through this philosophy into the heart of 
theology again.”
162
 The direction is a trinitarian one, not only discussing the “negative” 
theological rule derived from doctrine of the Trinity (“never refer to God in one way 
without intending also each of the others”) but offering a “positive” one as well:  
“Positively, the being and transcendence of God are expressed in three ways. The 
negative rule is turned around to become: always identify God through Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, and intend this even when only one is mentioned”
163
 He lastly reflects on 
how his chapter on God’s economy and his chapter on God’s power and the face of 
Christ “converge from different angles in questioning the boundary between the 
economic and the doxological Trinity.”
164
 This allows him to conclude that God’s glory 
is “the dynamic of transformation in Christian life and it is intrinsically social to be 
participated in through a community of those who reflect it together….Above all, it is a 
                                                 
159 Ibid., 251-52. 
160 Ibid., 252. 
161 Ford, at this point in his career, offers the following theological application of Levinas. “Levinas traces 
language, responsibility, ethics and reason to the plural reality of the face to face. …God therefore 
represents, negatively, a critique of any understanding of reality (ontology) that unifies it by ignoring the 
ultimate pluralism of the face to face, and, positively, the priority of ethics over ontology. This links up 
with our concern above to bring general concepts of God into line with the gospel. God has supremely 
been used as a totality, an idol of necessity and omnipotence, and the absolutist ideas of deity continue to 
have seductive power, both among believers and others. Paul’s focus on the face of Christ gives a good 
lever for shifting this deadweight, and Levinas’ thought is an example of the way a whole understanding 
of reality, including thorough treatment of philosophical problems, might be supportive in this.” See ibid., 
254-55. 
162 Ibid., 255. 
163 Ibid., 257. 
164 Ibid., 259. 
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glory imprinted so utterly with the face of Christ that it is wrong to conceive of any 
other sort of God ‘in himself’ behind or apart from it.”
165
 
 
 B. Beginning to Face the Source of the Overflow 
 
'&)525*$)5;$%6?,! displays many of the developing aspects of Ford’s theology. 
Aligning themselves with Paul’s epistle, Young and Ford find God’s glory as both the 
purpose and power of worship in faith; ;"S) fittingly correlates with doxology.
166
  
Glory is divinely self-imparted yet also participated in by humanity through the self-
revelation of God in Christ. Chapters authored by Ford explore !"# such participation is 
made possible, and, as in A?B2.),&,$he proposes such participation to be the overflow of a 
new economy of abundance which unites God’s faithfulness in Christ to human 
response. “The initiative of God is clear throughout…but the whole letter is a plea for 
an active response to Paul and to God. The letter embodies the union of the two.”
167
 
Human faithfulness is thus made possible through #!"$G";$2($25$+)2,!+?.5&(( and, more 
specifically, who God is in faithfulness )/2;(,$ (?++&625*. Ford finds this epistle to 
demonstrate emphatically that Christ has transformed all expressions of power and 
weakness by transforming all expectations of God. 
Drawing a contrast with Brueggemann is again helpful here. Young particularly 
notes the influence of the Psalms on Paul and, like Brueggemann, finds the honest faith 
of the psalmists compatible and anticipatory of Christian faith. Unlike Brueggemann, 
however, Young and Ford do not propose God’s power, in sovereignty, to be at odds 
with God’s faithfulness to respond to the suffering of the world. Rather, these authors 
follow Paul in concluding that divine power has been redefined in God’s atoning for all 
sin and suffering in Christ, a redefinition which does not override the expression of faith 
found in the psalms of lament but includes it. 
Still, what continues to concern Ford is !"#$Christ’s atoning person and work 
)3,?)..7$transforms human life in faith. This focus lies behind Ford’s introduction of the 
face of Christ as the key image for faith.
168
 Because the face can be “both dead and the 
                                                 
165 Ibid., 259. 
166 See Ibid., 13-14, for Young and Ford’s defense of the centrality of ;"S) for the entire epistle. 
167 Ibid., 238. 
168 Ibid., 13. 
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revelation of God’s glory,”
169
 Ford believes this is the "5.7 concept which can hold the 
crucifixion and resurrection together.
170
 This provides the logic for his conclusion, “If 
God’s glory in the face of Christ shows who God is, and if this glory is shared with us in 
a way that ‘transforms us into that self-same image, from glory to glory’ (3.18), usual 
notions of identity need to be transformed too.”
171
 Ford finds God’s glory is shared not 
in spite of suffering but exactly because of the suffering which God undergoes.  
Ford goes on to explicitly question theology which does not allow for exploring 
“contingency” in God. Yet ascribing divine contingency in the light of the cross is still 
not, in and of itself, sufficient enough to answer exactly !"# contingency empowers 
such sharing through faith. What does it mean “to face” ,!2( face and how is such 
“facing” enabled? Even if God is free to be contingent in the way Ford espouses, Ford 
must still further explain !"# such divine freedom 2($(!)6&; in and through Christ.  
At this point, we should note how the face of Christ appears to transform reality 
in Ford’s work here. At one point he unabashedly prioritizes the essential and 
encompassing claim of the gospel. 
But the substructure of all of these events [in 2 Corinthians] is the narrative of the 
gospel, pivoting around the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This alone is specific 
enough, and its resists incorporation in any wider framework or being subsumed within 
any general scheme of reality. It is making an open bid to B&$ the framework, to 
challenge all available schemes of reality in the name of the new creation, and orient all 
thinking by that. The universality of the claim comes from the fact that God is seen as 
intrinsic to the events of the gospel and to its continuing eventfulness. The gospel is in 
turn crucial to the identification of God.
172
 
Yet, when explicating Christ’s face as transformation of reality, he states: 
…the history of theology, philosophy and other disciplines shows how the gospel can 
energize the attempt to follow through as broadly and rigorously as possible its 
implications in many directions. Our immediate question is what understanding can 
begin to do justice to the face of Christ. …We now draw the most embracing 
conclusion: what is at stake is the /"(,$+?5;)/&5,). conception of reality, often called 
metaphysics or ontology. 
So what ontology is consonant with a theology of the face of Christ? Of 
contemporary philosophers Emmanuel Levinas has contributed the most to the above 
discussion.
173
 
                                                 
169 Ibid., 250, op. cit. 
170 Ibid., 249, op. cit. 
171 Ibid., 251, op. cit. 
172 Ibid., 240, italics original. 
173 Ibid., 253-4, italics mine.  
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While Ford is eager to embrace a vigorous theological understanding of how the cross 
and the resurrection overflow into all human existence, the surpassing reality of God’s 
faithfulness in Christ seems significantly and, at this point, uncritically, embedded in the 
philosophy of Levinas.
174
 The face, which for Levinas represents the immanence which 
theology and philosophy have so often wrongly deemphasized in favor of ontological 
transcendence,
175
 becomes Ford’s face of Christ, which “revolutionizes…all reality.”
176
 
Moreover, it is this concept of face which appears to undergird Ford’s trinitarian 
conclusions.
177
 When Ford, citing Barth and Rahner, collapses all understanding of the 
immanent (Ford uses the term “doxological”) trinity into the economic, his justification 
for doing so is not evidenced in engagement with those theologians but insisted upon 
because “the glory of God is none other than that in the face of Christ.”
178
  
 Such unsettled issues in the conclusions of '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5($
reveal that Ford’s theology is still a work in progress, albeit progress moving in a 
specific direction. Ford argues for joyful praise while striving to account for concerns 
we have examined with regard to Brueggemann and lament. Alongside both Hardy and 
Young, he proposes that the praise of Christian faith only happens by being ?52,&;$ 25$
God’s own faithful human response amidst suffering; this is why A?B2.),&$asserts, “Jesus 
2($our praise.”
179
 By the power of the Holy Spirit, this union produces an overflow of 
human participation not only within the divine life but also out into human experience 
“in such a way that the realistic response is joy.”
180
 But the joyful reality of Christ’s 
person and work is not grounds for responding to suffering by ignoring or perpetuating 
                                                 
174 Ibid., 255, “God has supremely been used as a totality, an idol of necessity and omnipotence, and the 
absolutist ideas of deity continue to have seductive power, both among believers and others. Paul’s focus 
on the face of Christ gives a good lever for shifting this deadweight, and Levinas’s thought is an example 
of the way )$#!".&$?5;&6(,)5;25*$"+$6&).2,7…might be supportive in this.” (italics mine). 
175 Ibid., 254-5, Ford summarizes as follows, “Levinas traces language, responsibility, ethics and reason 
to the plural reality of the face to face. …God therefore represents, negatively, a critique of any 
understanding of reality (ontology) that unifies it by ignoring the ultimate pluralism of the face to face, 
and, positively, the priority of ethics over ontology. This links up with our concern above to bring general 
concepts of God into line with the gospel.” 
176 Ibid., 250 
177 Ibid., 255, “For 2 Corinthians this raises the vital question of how ‘the knowledge of God’s glory in 
the face of Christ’ is related to the later development of the doctrine of the Trinity. …We have started 
from this face and now come to consider the conception of God as Trinity.” 
178 Ibid., 260. 
179 A?B2.),&, (136), italics mine, “‘Jesus is our praise’ expresses the union and its two sides. He is our 
praise because he himself is to be praised and is identified with God in what he does and is; because he 
embodies the ultimate sacrifice of praise to God; and because he is ours, in solidarity and mutuality with 
us. And being for us, he constantly generates fresh initiatives and action, and his life is shared in 
particular ways…” See also, “Appendix B”, 176, “In other words, it is through the movement of praise 
from God through Jesus, that God is God for man, and man is himself.” 
180 Ibid., 190 (150). 
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lamentable realities. Indeed, Ford and Young argue “[t]he abundance and overflow of 
God’s economy are represented through a historical transcendence that never ignores or 
bypasses the negativities.”
181
 
 The coming chapter will explore how Ford continues to work out this 
overflowing reality of faith amidst the “negativity” of human suffering. The particular 
interrelationship of joy with ethical responsibility, as well as the philosophy of Levinas, 
will become pivotal for Ford as he continues to develop his face of Christ concept. Yet 
this development would not be possible apart from his central emphasis on praise. As 
the recent epilogue featured in J2@25*$25$-6)2(& states,  
In this context, praise is ‘perfecting perfection’, following the one—Jesus—by who 
God serves others in their need and 6&.&)(25* through the Spirit the infinitely intensive 
identity of God in the dynamics of the world. This is the importance of praise in today’s 
world.
182
 
Such is the priority on praise of God as it remains throughout the theological 
development of David Ford. 
 
 
 
181 '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!, 248. 
182 Hardy and Ford, J2@25*$25$-6)2(&, “Epilogue: After Twenty Years,” 202. 
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~5~  
 
Facing the Overflow of Faith: Joy and Suffering in Ford’s Mature 
Theology 
 
 
I. From Praise to the Joy of Facing Christ 
 
David Ford’s collaborations with Daniel Hardy and Frances Young continue to 
generate a theological trajectory guiding much of his subsequent work. As Ford’s focus 
on praise overflowing from faith matures, however, Christian joy emerges as the pivotal 
concern. A?B2.),& already lays the groundwork for this development by asserting the 
inextricable relationship of praise to joy: “Above all, the joy of God needs to be 
celebrated as the central and embracing reality of the universe, and everything else seen 
in light of this.”
1
 Joy, for Ford, is the integral nature of all praise of God, and by the 
same token, praise is how joy is faithfully made manifest. His later work D&.+$ )5;$
D).@),2"5 (examined in detail below) cites Ricoeur’s view that “in praising one rejoices 
over the view of one’s object set above all the other objects of one’s concern.”
2
 In 
turning his attention to Christian joy, Ford is not turning away from praise but rather 
more deeply examining how praise arises through faith, and distinctly through faith in 
Jesus Christ. 
Hardy has offered his own summary of Christian joy which, while not written in 
explicit collaboration with Ford, nonetheless serves as a succinct introduction to the 
direction which Ford’s later work follows. In an article appearing in %!&$ :S+"6;$
4"/>)52"5$,"$4!62(,2)5$%!"?*!,, Hardy proposes joy as an emotion but also adds that 
in Christian and Jewish understanding, “joy denotes a deeper affirmation of God no 
matter what the circumstances. Scripture testifies that joy in this way is not just an 
expression or event of a Christian but is to be characteristic.”
3
 Yet this characteristic 
nature does not simply ignore suffering. “In favourable situations, (joy) appears as 
exultation and healing. Where there is vulnerability and sorrow it still appears, but 
                                                 
1 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 17 (13). 
2 Paul Ricoeur, N2*?625*$,!&$D)36&;, Mark I. Wallace, ed. (trans. D. Pellauer; Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1995), 317, as quoted by David F. Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&; (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1999), 98. 
3 Daniel W. Hardy, “Joy,” %!&$:S+"6;$4"/>)52"5$,"$4!62(,2)5$%!"?*!,, A. Hastings, ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 354.  
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adversity alters its character to self-giving, trust, perseverance.”
4
 For Hardy, Christian 
joy is always to be understood within the activity of worship which necessitates action 
on behalf of others from within itself.
5
 As his article concludes, “Thus the joy of 
(Christian believers’) common life in the world is the social counterpart of their praise 
of God, both attracting and guiding others to the true meaning of joy.”
6
  
Ford’s ongoing work continues to explore exactly how the joy of praising God 
overflows in and through Christian faith and out into the world. This focus, as we 
argued in the previous chapter, allows Ford to consider the joyful nature of faith while 
also taking seriously the type of theological concerns with lament and suffering raised 
by Brueggemann. From the beginning, Ford pursues praise in the light of knowing 
Christ in both the suffering of the cross and the joy of the resurrection; A?B2.),&$
concludes, “The crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ is therefore at the heart of the 
method as well as the content of Christian mission.”
7
 Through '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$
4"625,!2)5( this christological method and content begin to be brought together in 
Ford’s concept of the face of Christ. To reflect the realities of both cross and 
resurrection in faith, Ford asserts “there is no concept or image that can do it except this 
name and face.”
8
 Levinas, the preeminent Jewish philosopher of ethics and “the face,” 
also emerges as an important conversation partner in Ford’s thought.  
Nevertheless, as the face of Christ comes to define the joyful and ethical locus of 
Ford’s theology, the decisive nature of Christ’s atonement in response to human 
suffering will become much more difficult to discern. This chapter attends to Ford’s 
mature work with this concern in mind and ultimately presses the question of how his 
proposal for Christian praise and joy can be understood to overflow from God’s "#5 
human faithfulness though Christ.  
 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Hardy incorporates ethics and worship together in Chapter 2, “The Foundation of Cognition and Ethics 
in Worship” of his work G";9($P)7($#2,!$,!&$P"6.;0$%!25L25*$)5;$-6)3,2(25*$4!62(,2)5$N)2,!$
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 7-8. “Instead of seeing worship either as the most intensive expression of 
a faith arrived-at, in which the issue of truth is suspended, or as a free approach to mystery, we shall see 
worship as that special and primary activity which incorporates truth in its activity, and thereby defines 
and effects a reality which exemplifies this truth. Cognition, as we will see, finds its proper placing and 
methods within worship as it participates in the movement of truth and exemplifies it in the understanding 
of reality. Ethics likewise participates in the movement of truth, but does so through bringing about the 
proper form of reality as such, particularly in the realms of nature and society. Thus, worship is the 
central means whereby human beings are called to their proper fullness in society and the world. 
6 Hardy, “Joy,” 354. 
7 A?B2.),&, 191, (151-2). 
8 '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!, 249. 
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A. Joy and Tragedy: Dialogue with MacKinnon and Levinas 
 
i. “Tragedy and Atonement” 
 
Issues of atonement are close at hand as Ford begins to develop his face of 
Christ concept more fully through interaction with the scholarship of his doctoral 
supervisor, Donald MacKinnon. The latter’s theology consistently emphasizes the need 
to understand resurrection joy in light of the tragic elements of human existence seen 
acutely in the cross. MacKinnon summarizes this approach in an influential essay titled 
“Atonement and Tragedy”:  
…I wish to ask the question whether in fact the theme of the work of Christ may not 
receive effective theological treatment when it is represented as tragedy. This I say 
remembering the supreme significance of the resurrection, but also continually recalling 
the extent to which in popular apologetic understanding of the resurrection has been 
deformed through its representation as in effect a descent from the Cross, given greater 
dramatic effect by a thirty-six hour postponement.
9
 
In Ford’s contribution to MacKinnon’s 1989 festschrift, he titles his own paper 
“Tragedy and Atonement” calling the combination “one of MacKinnon’s main 
themes.”
10
 Here, Ford brings his concern for Christian joy into dialogue with 
MacKinnon while also using 2 Corinthians, a set of Helen Gardner lectures, and the 
philosophy of Levinas to clarify and contribute to the conversation. 
Ford first recaps his conclusions about 2 Corinthians, as “full of references to the 
joyful and the painful contingencies of Paul’s ministry…this reaches its climax in Paul’s 
account of what he learnt about God’s own involvement in contingencies: ‘my power is 
made perfect in weakness’ (12:9).”
11
 Though aware of the many metaphors often used 
to describe the atonement, Ford believes 2 Corinthians emphasizes economic exchange 
centered in the person and work of Christ.
12
 He then frames his work within the context 
                                                 
9 MacKinnon, “Atonement and Tragedy” in O"6;&6.)5;($"+$%!&"."*7$)5;$",!&6$E(()7(, London: 
Lutterworth, 1968, 100. 
10 Ford, “Tragedy and Atonement” in 4!62(,<$E,!23($)5;$%6)*&;70$E(()7($25$M"5"?6$"+$="5).;$
')3X255"5, Kenneth Surin, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 118. Ford’s essay 
originated as a spoken presentation given at a conference in MacKinnon’s honor held on 22-25 July 1986 
at St. John’s College, Cambridge and has also been recently reprinted in Ford, D!)>25*$%!&"."*70$
E5*)*&/&5,($25$)$I&.2*2"?($)5;$D&3?.)6$P"6.; (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 211-24. 
11 “Tragedy and Atonement,” 119. 
12 Ibid., 120, “The generative event in this economy is the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ 
characterized as an exchange which enables a new economy of exchanges.” Also ibid., 122, “Through 
economic metaphors and also in many other ways this letter attempts to do justice to the crucified and 
risen Christ.” 
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of a MacKinnon comment on the epistle
13
 which leads to the following line of inquiry: 
“Yet one question that the letter prompts one to ask MacKinnon is whether he has done 
justice to the joyful note of abundance. Paul describes himself and others as ‘sorrowful, 
yet always rejoicing’ (6:10); can MacKinnon’s emphasis on tragedy fully affirm the 
second half of the paradox?”
14
  
Moving on to reflect on Helen Gardner’s concept of tragedy,
15
 Ford asserts that 
the “pivotal issue is the relation of Crucifixion to Resurrection” which is by no means 
“untragic.” 
Indeed, I want to argue that 2 Corinthians show the tragic being taken into a 
transformation which sharpens rather than negates it, while yet rendering the category 
of tragic inadequate by itself. …The case is as follows. Paul is acutely aware as 
MacKinnon of the dangers of a triumphalist understanding of the Resurrection. …The 
Resurrection is not simply the reversal of death, leaving death behind it. Paul “carries in 
the body the death of Jesus” (4:10): the Resurrection message has sent him even more 
deeply into contingency, weakness and suffering. It is atonement whose power is to 
allow him to stay close to, even immersed in, the tragic depths of life.
16
 
Because of Christ’s atonement, Ford finds a new purpose in tragedy: “to communicate 
the Gospel.”
17
 While Ford asserts that Paul’s Gospel still “fits” Gardner’s definition of 
tragedy, he acknowledges its seeming incoherence in light of Paul’s joy. “Paul draws 
continual comfort from his joint membership in Christ with others who share both his 
joy and his suffering. Is it not the case that suffering taken up into this mutual comfort 
and even rejoicing can hardly be called tragic?”
18
 However, the possible abuse of this 
mutuality is exactly why Ford believes the tragic remains relevant.
19
 He concludes, 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 122, Ford cites MacKinnon, “Atonement and Tragedy,” 80. “(2 Corinthians’) background is 
ontological; what Paul speaks of is not something that he records as ‘the contents of his consciousness’, 
but a sense of his mission and its significance that he has won through daring to see it in the light of the 
Cross. …And yet, because all is under the sign of the kenosis, the final note is of a radical self-
abandonment.” 
14 Ibid., 122. 
15 Ford draws here from Gardner’s T.S. Eliot Memorial Lectures of 1968 on ‘Religion and Tragedy’ 
published in Gardner, I&.2*2"5$)5;$J2,&6),?6& (London: Faber 1971). See pp. 113-18. 
16 Ibid., 123. 
17 Ibid., 123, “Here is the clue to the new possibility of tragedy. The Gospel is the new contingency. It 
relativises all the old contingencies of suffering and death. But it does not end the contingency; rather it 
intensifies it terrifyingly.” 
18 Ibid., 124-5. 
19 Ibid., 125, “The focusing of what one might call Paul’s concept of the tragic around the Gospel means 
that the community called into being through the Gospel is also subject to the threat of tragedy. Indeed, it 
is almost as if in Paul’s dramatic conception of history the spectacle of the people of God, whether Israel 
or the Church, is what chiefly evokes his pity and fear. ‘The corruption of the best is the worst’, and he is 
acutely aware of how the greatest glory is also the place of greatest responsibility and temptation. 
MacKinnon, coming after nearly 2000 years of Church history, has even more appalling evidence that the 
Gospel, far from making the category of tragedy less important, both illuminates new ways in which it is 
relevant and makes possible new forms of communal evil.” 
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“There is again a heightening or deepening of the tragic even as its ultimate content is 
transformed by the Gospel.”
20
 
 The nature of the Gospel’s transformation therefore is a central issue. “But now 
we have to ask about that transformation. As MacKinnon says…tragedy has to be used 
but not allowed to dominate or obscure the uniqueness of what is here. What is this 
uniqueness?”
21
 Ford answers this question via his concept of the face of Christ, which 
he again bases in 2 Corinthians 4:6
22
 and then applies to MacKinnon’s concerns:  
Could this be one way of beginning to develop the ‘radicalized and transformed’ notion 
of the contingent that MacKinnon suggests is required by christology? This face has 
been through historical contingencies, it is not separable from them yet also not 
reducible to them. It has also been dead. Yet it is seen as the manifestation of the glory 
of God, so that in future the glory of God and this death cannot be thought of without 
each other. It has also been raised from death, and represents the unity beyond paradox 
of the Crucifixion and Resurrection. The face of Christ calls for christology as well as 
soteriology.
23
 
Ford further believes that the face of Christ can help reconceptualize eschatology. “If 
the ultimate is recognized in a face, we glimpse a way out of the dilemma of 
eschatology which so often seems unable to conceive of history without also seeing it as 
predetermined. The face of Christ is definitive, but it does not predetermine.”
24
 
Nevertheless, Ford anticipates a MacKinnon question, “but what sort of face is this 
face?” He consequently specifies that “This face is heard of and anticipated, but not yet 
seen face to face; it is unsubstitutably identified…by the events of the Crucifixion and 
Resurrection; it fits no category short of the glory of God…that of the complete 
prevenience of the God who said ‘Let light shine in darkness’…”
25
 This face, which is 
historically unsubstitutable yet seemingly does not predetermine history, is that which 
does justice to the tragic through providing “a resolution which does not fall into 
triumphalism or cheap joy when it enables the overflow of thanks and Paul’s ‘always 
rejoicing’.”
26
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 125-6. 
22 Ibid., “That verse could inspire a whole systematics, but the phrase I want to explore is ‘the glory of 
God in the face of Christ’.” $
23 Ibid., 126-7, Ford’s note here references MacKinnon’s chapter  “Philosophy and Christology” in 
O"6;&6.)5;(. 
24 Ibid., 127. 
25 Ibid., 128. 
26 Ibid., 127. 
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Mirroring his move in '&)525*$ )5;$ %6?,!$ 25$ C$ 4"625,!2)5(, Ford then asks, 
“What sort of metaphysics can do justice to the ultimacy of a face?”
27
 The answer is 
once again Levinas who “has the same Jewish roots as Paul’s writings” and “criticizes 
ontology for often attempting to conceive the unity of being as some sort of totality of 
which it is possible to have, at least in principle, an overview.”
28
 This is exactly the type 
of overview which MacKinnon wishes to avoid.
29
 So Levinas operates as chief architect 
for Ford’s metaphysics of face; “…Levinas traces the discontinuity, the pluralism, not 
only to the sharpness of the tragic but to the face, which can express joy as well as 
agony. And in the face of Christ I see a manifestation of Christian eschatological hope: 
for a non-tragic outcome of history which yet does full justice to the tragic.”
30
 
 
ii. Atonement Facing Tragedy 
 
Against the backdrop of his mentor’s tragic emphasis, Ford’s understanding of 
joyful faith amidst suffering becomes more distinct. By situating his previous work on 2 
Corinthians within MacKinnon’s concern for “the interrogation that the tragic must be 
allowed to conduct in theology,”
31
 Ford reveals the terms upon which he will seek to 
advance the state of a question which is continually a priority in his developing work. 
As previously, Ford’s inquiry concerns the unique transformation offered in the person 
and work of Christ and accomplished through both the suffering of the cross and the joy 
of the resurrection. But out of the shadow of MacKinnon, we can see Ford striving to 
cast this uniqueness in a different, yet unceasingly sympathetic, light.   
The question symbolized by Paul’s phrase ‘sorrowful, yet always rejoicing’ has been 
raised about MacKinnon’s way of relating tragedy to the Gospel. I have defended him 
against any simplistic accusation in these terms, such as Paul’s opponents in Corinth 
might have made, but a question remains. How do we identify the 25adequacy of 
tragedy as a genre through which to understand the Gospel whose climax is the 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 128. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 129, “I suggest that there is here [in Levinas] a metaphysics which meets the demand MacKinnon 
makes, at the end of his chapter on ‘The Transcendence of the Tragic’ in his Gifford Lectures, for an 
ontological pluralism which is not atheist and which, by holding to the significance of the tragic, is 
protected against, ‘that sort of synthesis which seeks to obliterate by the vision of an all-embracing order 
the sharper discontinuity of human existence’.” Ford cites from MacKinnon, %!&$-6"B.&/$"+$'&,)>!7(23( 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 135. 
30 Ibid., 129. 
31 Ibid. 
 141
Resurrection joy, but without falling into the traps which MacKinnon has so insistently 
pointed out?
32
 
It is not simply that Ford wants to be able to explain Christian hope as “a non-tragic 
outcome of history which yet does full justice to the tragic.”
33
 He also wants to explain 
how such an outcome transforms the faithful here and now.  
 Besides MacKinnon, a comparison with Brueggemann’s work is helpful here. 
Ford is proposing that the joyful testimony of Christian faith cannot be understood 
simply in tension with the tragic realities which Brueggemann discerns through the 
rhetorical disorientation and countertestimony expressed in lament. Ford is rather trying 
to explain the 5&#$"62&5,),2"5 which is true of Christian faith: a 6&(".?,2"5$to the sin and 
suffering of the world which has happened in Christ, and a resolution which now 
"@&6+."#($out and into the world through the Holy Spirit. However, Ford refuses to let 
go of the problem which either Brueggemann or MacKinnon express, in their own 
respective ways, concerning all that is still not yet and leads to abusive manifestations 
of Christianity which ignore or perpetuate the lamentable and tragic realities of the 
present. Precisely for the purpose of confronting this concern Ford’s face of Christ 
concept begins to occupy the central locus of faith in his theology. As with '&)525*$
)5;$%6?,!, he continues to allude to this concept as properly taking into account both 
divine freedom and contingency; thus Christ’s face is conceived as “a definitive 
consummation of history without also seeing it as predetermined.”
34
  
Nevertheless, if Christ provides human history with “a non-tragic outcome” and 
“a definitive consummation,” then !"#$;"&($,!&$),"525*$>&6("5$)5;$#"6L$4!62(,$5",<$),$
                                                 
32 Ibid., 126, italics original. Brian Hebblethwaite further explains how Ford’s approach differs from 
MacKinnon’s: “But the question before us at the moment is whether these failures, tragedies and horrors 
are ultimate, irredeemable facts, and the people involved in them for ever unforgivable, unchangeable and 
unresurrectable. Only if this is so can tragedy be said to be an absolute and final fact of human 
experience. I submit that Christianity is a faith which necessarily contradicts that view—not by 
attempting to diminish the horror of the tragic, nor by trying to reduce it to appearance or subsume it into 
a monistic whole, but by preaching a Gospel of redemption whereby the world’s sorrow will be turned 
into joy and the inevitable sufferings and travail of the present phase of God’s creative purpose will give 
birth to a glory beyond compare. That must mean a glory in which both victims and perpetrators (the 
former made new and whole and the latter transformed and forgiven) participate. Such a consummation 
may or may not occur. But Christianity is committed to faith that it will occur. It is in that sense that I 
cannot concede to MacKinnon the ineradicability of the tragic. Another way of making the same point 
would be to suggest that David Ford’s insistence on the ‘sorrowful yet always rejoicing’ quality of 2 
Corinthians 6.8 has to be, and can only be, spelled out eschatologically, and that the eschatological 
fulfillment of redemption will be such as to deprive all tragedy of finality.” See Hebblethwaite, 
“MacKinnon and the problem of evil” in 4!62(,<$E,!23($)5;$%6)*&;70$E(()7($25$M"5"?6$"+$="5).;$
')3X255"5, Kenneth Surin, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), pg. 143. 
33 Ibid., 129, op. cit. 
34 Ibid., 127, op. cit. 
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.&)(,$ 25$ ("/&$ 2/>"6,)5,$ (&5(&<$>6&;&,&6/25&? Even if history is not viewed as simply 
static or closed in atonement, does not Christ, in consummating history thereby 
determine its cast and shape &(3!),"."*23)..7? While Ford asserts that the face of Christ 
is “the counterpart of a new history of freedom and responsibility,” the implications of 
this connection come to rest not on any particular view of atonement or eschatology. 
Instead, the philosophy of Levinas once again appears as the best metaphysical 
approach to the christology and “trinitarian structure” of a verse such as 2 Corinthians 
4:6.
35
 Through Levinas, Ford now begins to sharpen his focus on how faith confronted 
by the face of Christ provides “a resolution which does not fall into triumphalism or 
cheap joy when it enables the overflow of thanks and Paul’s ‘always rejoicing’.”
36
  
 
B. Joy and Responsibility: Dialogue with Jüngel and Levinas 
 
 Ford’s engagement with Levinas expands in the middle part of the 1990’s 
through two key essays bringing the philosophy of Levinas in contact with the theology 
of Eberhard Jüngel. Like MacKinnon, Jüngel is an influence on Ford from his student 
days, and G";$ )($ '7(,&67$ "+$ ,!&$ P"6.; figures significantly in Ford’s thought.
37
 
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in how Ford consistently strives to bring the 
positions of Jüngel and Levinas together. Through mutual examination of these two 
very different scholars Ford explores the interrelationship of joy and human 
responsibility in faith. At the center of this relationship remains Ford’s developing 
concept of Christ’s face.  
 
i. “Hosting a Dialogue” 
 
 Ford publishes the first of these essays concerning Levinas and Jüngel in a work 
dedicated to the latter, and though well aware of the differences between their respective 
positions, he believes, “the number of shared concerns suggests they are ideal 
conversation partners.”
38
  
                                                 
35 Ibid., 128. 
36 Ibid., 127, op. cit. 
37 See Ford, “Hosting a Dialogue” in %!&$-"((2B2.2,2&($"+$%!&"."*70$D,?;2&($25$,!&$%!&"."*7$"+$EB&6!)6;$
AW5*&.$25$!2($D2S,2&,!$]&)6, John Webster, ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 23. 
38 Ibid., 24. 
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 The differences lead off through examination of Levinas’s concern over 
theology and his preference for an a-theological description of divinity focused through 
the concept of the face. “The face is for Levinas that which confronts us with what is 
uncontainable and infinite, a summons to responsibility that is the trace of a God 
beyond being.”
39
 By “doing philosophy” in relation to the face, Levinas avoids theology 
which: 
…thematises or objectifies what it should not; it is mythological, or suggests that there 
is a divine drama in progress in which people are participants, often unwittingly; it 
suggests that it is possible to participate directly in or have cognitive or emotional 
access to the life of God; it finds intrinsic links between human nature and the divine; it 
tends to confuse creation with causality or to conceptualise creation in ontological 
terms; it makes ontology absolute, with God as supreme being and therefore inevitably 
totalitarian; it argues analogically from the world to God; it signifies God in terms of 
presence, action, efficacity in the world; above all, its alliance with ontology conspires 
against doing justice to an ethics which resists the assimilation of the other person to 
oneself and one’s overview, and which finds in the face to face an unsurpassable 
imperative directness and immediacy.
40
 
Ethics thus becomes Levinas’s “first philosophy”
41
 which “is developed into one of 
preserving the ambivalence of all talk of God in the interests of its ethical 
significance.”
42
 
 Ford then argues that Levinas’s stereotypes of theology cannot apply, at least 
fully, to Jüngel. “Levinas’s basic contention, that theology embraces God in a 
thematisation, a ‘said’, that objectifies God within ‘being’ in the mode of presence, is 
not applicable to Jüngel for several reasons.”
43
 Ford proposes five—Jungel’s “concern 
for the unobjectifiable mode of address”; his “refusal of any overarching concept of 
being”; his “radical notion of absence in…concepts of God”; the particular way “the 
word of the cross” functions in his theology; and his “concept of analogical talk of 
God”—that should not allow for an immediate Levinassian dismissal of Jüngel.
44
 Yet, 
Ford finds that Jüngel stereotypes as well, along the lines of revelation. “He sees a 
decisive difference between himself and Levinas lying in Levinas’s contention that the 
proximity of the other person is the condition of possibility of God’s word and 
proximity.”
45
 Levinas’s imperative ethics can only indicate anthropologically, but 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Ibid., 27-28. 
41 Ibid., 25. 
42 Ibid., 28. 
43 Ibid., 30. 
44 Ibid., 30-33. 
45 Ibid., 33. 
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“Jüngel’s indicative is a coming of God to the world in the living, dying and raising up 
of a human being which interrupts the world so that the world becomes a parable of 
God.”
46
 
 Ford distills the differences between Levinas and Jüngel down to the 
particularity of revelation. “Jüngel’s pivots around a person and event, a ‘something’ of 
history; Levinas’s consistently refuses that sort of particularity”
47
 Yet, Ford also 
suggests that “Jüngel seems to have misread the structure of Levinas’s notion of 
revelation.”
48
 Noting the influence of Barth on Jüngel, Ford cites Graham Ward’s 
proposal about the similarities in Barth and Levinas’s concept of revelation.
49
 This leads 
to the following observation: 
Jüngel seems to have missed the way in which saying (or the face) as a trace of the 
Infinite in Levinas refuses any claim to primary subjectivity; there is a concern, which 
takes many forms of expression, to refer it to what is “otherwise than being”, and his 
extremes of “abusive” language could be seen, not as a movement from the world to 
God but as an attempt to avoid the ever-renewed danger of idolizing any particular 
event or person in history. 
50
  
Calling Jüngel’s assertions about the structure of revelation “a relatively crude 
criterion,” Ford instead points to “the main difference between the two: Levinas’s 
rejection of the primary focus of Jüngel’s testimony in the singular incarnation of 
God.”
51
 
 Ford believes the positions of both thinkers should be reconsidered in light of 
the other without simply producing “a crudely confrontational result.”
52
 Levinas, for 
instance, “does suggest a form of particularity in answer to the question: Where is 
God?”
53
 However,  
The contrast, of course is in the nature of the location. Each is “most concrete” and each 
finds God in what is human. Each also offers a positive answer which is “beyond the 
alternative of presence or absence”, but for Jüngel this is in the crucified and risen 
Jesus, while for Levinas it is the trace of the Infinite in the face, or saying, of the other 
person.
54
 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 34. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ward, “The Revelation of the Holy Other as Wholly Other: Between Barth’s Theology of the Word and 
Levinas’s Philosophy of Saying,” '";&65$%!&"."*7 9/2 (1993): 159-80. 
50 Ibid., 34. 
51 Ibid., 35. 
52 Ibid., 37. 
53 Ibid. 34. 
54 Ibid., 36. 
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Levinas is questioned because “Above all, is Levinas’s imperative of infinite 
responsibility for others actually sustainable by anyone at all? Levinas seems to say that 
it does not have to be; Jüngel is speaking from faith that it has been.”
55
 Jüngel’s, on the 
other hand, is probed by Levinas’s “attractive alternative” to christology. 
It is a vision comparable to some of the approaches currently being canvassed in order 
to live with pluralisms of various sorts, stressing both ethical convergences and respect 
for otherness. In this complex of responsibilities, what worries Levinas most about the 
cross-centered position identified with Jüngel is that, somehow, Christianity involves a 
shifting of responsibility on to that man on the cross, and an infinite pardon which 
encourages irresponsibility.
56
 
While Ford acknowledges that “agreement is not the only aim of conversation, 
especially between two such extreme statements,” he proceeds to focus the conversation 
on the two areas which “promise the deepest engagement”: the self and language.
57
 
 
1. Selfhood 
 
 Similar to his own earlier reflections on praise in A?B2.),&, Ford finds in Levinas 
that “enjoyment is given quite a basic role in the constitution of the self.”  
Enjoyment is more fundamental than intending, representing, reasoning, freedom, 
theory and practice, or any psychological state: “enjoyment is the ultimate 
consciousness of all the contents that fill my life—it embraces them.” We do not know 
“being” first in some neutral state, or as needed for living, but rather through enjoyment 
or pain, as object of enjoyment or not.
58
 
Yet, otherness for Levinas “cuts across enjoyment, questions the self, and is 
unassimilable. The approach of the other in the face is an ‘epiphany’, a ‘revelation’, 
summoning to responsibility in an asymmetrical relation, not dependent on reciprocity 
or equality but on ‘looking up’ to the other.”
59
 Ford points to how Levinas’s later work 
supports this claim along the lines of prophecy and witness. “Levinas’s claim is an 
address by him which testifies to ‘the other in the same’, and vulnerably exposes his 
own psyche in this extravagant attestation. And the self that witnesses is described in 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 38. 
56 Ibid., 38-9. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 40, Ford’s quotes from Levinas, %",).2,7$)5;$85+252,70$15$E(()7$"5$ES,&62"62,7 (trans. A. Lingis; 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1969), 111. 
59 Ibid. 
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terms of ‘substitution’, being a hostage for the other, responsible even for the other’s 
responsibility.”
60
 
 Jüngel’s concept of selfhood, of course, centers in faith not ethics because “[t]he 
thinking of faith ‘sets reason in movement’, but without any certainty that is self-
grounding.”
61
 But Ford endeavors to show the “essential passivity” of Jüngel’s faith “is 
linked to responsibility for others in a way reminiscent of Levinas on desire, passivity 
and responsibility.”
62
 This would support Ford’s contention that “it is possible to see 
each being enriched by mutual engagement.”
63
  
How can such “extreme” thinkers be mutually enriched? Ford proposes “One 
might speculate what Jüngel’s theology would look like if the face of Christ were as 
integral to it as the death of Christ.”
64
  For Ford this means examining weaknesses in 
Jüngel’s understanding of the body, birth, and death. Were Jüngel to be critiqued by 
Levinas on the last,
65
 Ford believes Jüngel would answer based on his theology of love. 
If Jüngel were to reply that love has in his thought the pivotal role that the good does in 
Levinas’s, the discussion would need to shift to Jüngel’s definition of love. “Formally 
judged, love appeared to us as the event of a still greater selflessness within a great, and 
justifiably very great, self-relatedness. Judged materially, love was understood as the 
unity of life and death for the sake of life…We shall proceed on that basis of the full 
form of love…in which a loving I is loved back by the beloved Thou.”
66
 
Yet, Ford still argues that Jüngel has “not yet taken account of a contemporary ‘master 
of suspicion’” who “would suspect that there is here an integrating through the notions 
of event, unity and dialectic which amounts to a ‘totality’ that sacrifices radical 
separation and ethical otherness.”
67
 
Therefore, “Substitution raises perhaps the sharpest issue of all” between Jüngel 
and Levinas, with the latter offering “at least two possible lessons.”
68
 First, Ford 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 42, Ford’s quotes from Levinas, :,!&6#2(&$,!)5$O&25*$"6$O&7"5;$E((&53& (trans. M. Nijhoff; 
Boston: The Hague, 1981), 149. 
61 Ibid., 42, Ford’s quotes from Jüngel, G";$)($'7(,&67$"+$,!&$P"6.;0$:5$,!&$N"?5;),2"5$"+$,!&$%!&"."*7$
"+$,!&$46?32+2&;$:5&$25$,!&$=2(>?,&$B&,#&&5$%!&2(/$)5;$1,!&2(/$(trans. D. L. Guder; Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1983), 167. 
62 Ibid., 43. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 45, “Put bluntly, it seems that Jüngel’s ontological notion of death would draw the reply from 
Levinas: you have not given goodness its proper priority; you are repeating a fundamental error of the 
Western philosophical and theological traditions; and the consequences of giving a pivotal position to 
death rather than goodness means that you have compromised the ethical content of your thinking.” 
66 Ibid., 45, Ford quotes from G";$)($'7(,&67$"+$,!&$P"6.;, 314ff., 317. 
67 Ibid., 46, 45. 
68 Ibid., 47. 
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proposes that Jüngel see Levinas as “a fellow extremist who urges him to follow his 
Christological extremism through into his anthropology.”
69
 Jüngel’s definition of love 
“does not measure up to the extremism of his Christological and trinitarian thought,” 
and Ford suggests following the example of Paul Ricoeur. Though noting the 
appreciation Ricoeur has for Jüngel, Ford observes, “it is striking how much Ricoeur 
has learnt from Levinas about the self. One might predict a similar fruitfulness for 
Jüngel if one of his ‘people’ were Levinas…”
70
  
 Ford now returns to question Levinas on selfhood in light of Jüngel. The 
“principal issue” is joy. “Might it be that that rich conception of enjoyment could, in 
being opened up to responsibility by the appeal of the other, be transformed into joy in 
the other?”
71
 Jüngel is helpful here because his “appreciation of joy goes deep. It is, of 
course, linked with faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, but his basic theological 
analysis of it rings true with Jewish traditions of rejoicing in God.”
72
 Showing how 
Jüngel links joy with his fundamental concept of God as “more than necessary,” Ford 
suggests that Levinas might reconsider the severity of his proposal. “It sometimes seems 
that Levinas is still so bound negatively by his reaction against ‘onto-theology’ and its 
totalizing ontology that the only alternative he can confidently pursue is one which is 
severely practical.”
73
 
 
  2. Language 
 
 Considerations of selfhood give way as Ford then points out the “great deal of 
energy thinking about language” in both Jüngel and Levinas. Ford’s questions follow 
the same issue of particularity as before but this time the inquiry is mainly directed 
towards Jüngel. 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 48. Ford anticipates the direction of his later work in D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5$as he cites Ricoeur, 
:5&(&.+$)($15",!&6 (trans. K. Blamey; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), 25, and writes, “There are 
several indications of convergence between Ricoeur and Jüngel on the self, perhaps the most important of 
which with regard to Levinas is their concern with differentiations in one’s self-relatedness, summed up 
in the title of Ricoeur’s work.” See also p. 57, nt. 127, “For a recent treatment of the theme of testimony 
which is aware of both Jüngel and Levinas, see the discussions of ‘attestation’ in Ricoeur, :5&(&.+$)($
15",!&6…”  
71 Ibid., 49.  
72 Ibid., 49-50. 
73 Ibid., 51. Ford also points out here Levinas’s insistent consideration for “horror of the Shoah” seen 
most explicitly in his dedication to this memory in :,!&6#2(&$%!)5$O&25*. 
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So the dynamics of language in relation to God are linked to love and both are 
understood in christological and trinitarian terms. Here, too, Jüngel has maintained his 
primary difference from Levinas, whose talk of God likewise pivots around a central 
focus, ethics between people. There is the possibility for a long debate between them 
here, but I want to ask just one big question of Jüngel, in line with what has already 
been said of love: does this do justice to otherness?
74
 
After specifying how both thinkers raise concerns over classical conceptions of analogy, 
Ford wagers his own proposal for bringing the two together:  
Might there yet be another alternative? My concern is to offer a Christian development 
of Jüngel which learns from Levinas. Might an analogy of joyful obligation be 
conceivable? This would develop Jüngel’s ‘advent’ in terms of facing, substitutionary 
responsibility and joy. In all the great difference between God and humanity there 
would be even greater joy in and responsibility towards the other. This would be God’s 
joy and responsibility capacitating that of humanity. It might even lead to a more 
sympathetic assessment of traditional theological language’s principle that ‘God is 
always greater’. That would be placed in its primary context of the language of 
worship.
75
 
Through worship itself Ford finds the need to expand upon language of God because 
“[t]he resulting version of the analogy of advent might affirm that, for all the great 
definiteness of joy and responsibility in testimony before the God who comes, there is 
even greater potential for improvisation in truthful praise and goodness.”
76
  
 Ford concludes this essay by calling for an improvisation on Jüngel’s language 
of love. “Jüngel’s material definition quoted above was that love is ‘the unity of life and 
death for the sake of life.’ On this one might improvise: love is the unity of joy and 
substitutionary responsibility for the sake of joy.”
77
 This definition potentially brings 
Christian worship into alignment with Levinas’s concerns. “…this is a love which 
allows for the feasting of friends and may even find its exemplary embodiment in 
eucharistic worship. That is, of course, very far from anything Levinas concludes but 
nevertheless he makes a critical contribution to it.”
78
  
 
ii. “On Substitution” 
 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 53. 
75 Ibid., 54. 
76 Ibid., 55. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 56. 
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This 1996 essay appears as a chapter in an edited work dedicated to the ethics of 
Levinas and is described as a “companion piece” to “Hosting a Dialogue.”
79
 After 
recapping Levinas’ continual dismissals of theology, Ford wonders again whether or not 
Jüngel’s theology warrants such a verdict.  The specific focus here is Chapter 4, 
“Substitution,” in Levinas’ :,!&6#2(&$,!)5$O&25* compared with Jüngel’s understanding 
of justification by faith. As with the previous article, Ford’s method proceeds by 
questioning both of his dialogue partners in the light of the other’s work.  
Levinas’s concept of face is at the heart of questions for Jüngel. Ford finds a 
“most fascinating” development when examining Jüngel’s theology in light of Levinas’s 
“particularizing of death.” Ford proposes that the “absolute singularity” which Jüngel 
reserves for Christ’s death should be modified, at least in how it is understood as 
universally applicable. “The totality of a generalized death is by Levinas given the sense 
of each face (Levinas’s notion of ‘approach’ is linked to that of ‘the face’) which 
appeals to me to be responsible, and that is at the very least is a valuable supplement to 
Jüngel’s ‘death’...”
80
 
Levinas’s concept of face therefore suggests reconsideration of Jüngel’s “great 
emphasis on God alone being the one who can fully substitute for others.”
81
 Jüngel 
affirms Vogel’s critique of Bonhoeffer’s “position with many similarities to that of 
Levinas, linking a radical notion of human responsibility with substitution.”
82
 Ford 
consequently critiques this critique: 
It is this contrast that helps focus on critical questions to Jüngel. If he has a non-
competitive concept of divine and human freedom, why not a similar concept of 
substitution? Is Vogel’s alternative between general anthropological framework and 
christological uniqueness appropriate? Even if it is, is substitution the right concept 
through which to identify that sort of uniqueness?
83
 
Ford believes theology must necessarily come to terms with Levinas’s critique of any 
language which obscures “the appeal in the face of the other person.”
84
 
                                                 
79 Ford, “On Substitution” in N)325*$,!&$:,!&60$%!&$E,!23($"+$E//)5?&.$J&@25)(, Sean Hand, ed. (Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1996), see nt. 3. 
80 “On Substitution,” 36. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. Ford cites Jüngel, %!&"."*23).$E(()7($88, John Webster, ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 153ff.  
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 37, “Levinas’s linguistic practice stands as a rigorous ascesis which is especially adept at alerting 
his readers to our near irresistible temptation to settle for thought and expression which gives us more 
clarity, control and security than are just…and which reduces our exposure to (and obsession by) the 
appeal in the face of the other person.” 
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 Questions for Levinas gravitate towards his marginalization of worship and the 
problematic implications of his thought even within his own religious tradition.  
Jüngel, however, can conceive a joy as extreme as Levinas’s responsibility… Can one 
responsibly have both? For Levinas this is by no means just an issue with the Christian 
Jüngel but also within Judaism. The question it puts to him is perhaps the largest of all, 
if one grants his main concern for substitutionary responsibility. Levinas’s thought can 
be seen as one of the most perceptive exposures of idolatries in late modernity, 
including those in the thematizings of theology. But its constriction is suggested by its 
limited willingness to do justice to the positive counterpart which, perhaps, is required 
all the more by such a devastating ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’: the praise, thanks, 
confession and intercession that are, for example, complexly represented by the Psalms. 
Can idolatries be safely rejected if one does not run the risks of true worship?
85
  
Ford’s allusion to the Psalms is all the more appropriate as he further questions 
Levinas’s refusal to “even call God ‘You’: only ‘He’ (‘Il’) is permitted, and only then 
on the most severe conditions.”
86
 This contrasts with Jüngel, who following Barth, finds 
the petition of God “is the ground of Christian ethics.”
87
 Because Jüngel’s ethic is 
“basically one of commanded prayer” he challenges Levinas’s “veto on God as ‘an 
alleged interlocutor’.”
88
 
 Levinas is also questioned on the uniqueness of his “other.” Ford cites Gibbs’ 
comment that “Levinas’s ‘other’ is ‘strangely undetermined, is almost formal, in its 
concreteness. This face is anyone we meet, is any other, but is archetypically a poor 
person, one who is hungry’.”
89
 Ford concludes that Levinas’s concept still seems to 
push toward particularity as does Jüngel “whose differences…are glaring but who is 
obsessed with a uniqueness traced in one particular face.”
90
 
 
iii. Joy, Responsibility, and the Face of Christ 
 
Having now examined Ford’s arguments in both essays, a momentary return to 
Ford’s concluding remarks in “Hosting a Dialogue” becomes beneficial. Here, Ford 
offers several celebratory “toasts” which include the following: 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 40. Ford cites Levinas, “Prayer without Demand” in %!&$J&@25)($I&);&6, Sean Hand, ed., 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 227-34. 
87 Ibid. Ford explains that “Karl Barth was startled by his own conclusion that invocation of God, 
especially in petition, is the ground of Christian ethics. …For Jüngel, as for Barth, God’s embracing 
command is to call on God. Jüngel’s ethic is therefore basically one of commanded prayer.”  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. Ford citing Robert Gibbs, 4"66&.),2"5($25$I"(&5Q#&2*$)5;$J&@25)( (Princeton: Princeton 
University, 1992), 183. 
90 Ibid., 41. 
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To a Christian theology which can bring together conceptualities focussing both on 
“event” and “face”. This has similarities to talk about the “work” and “person” of Christ 
but a theology learning from Jüngel and Levinas would need not only to explore these 
concepts in relation to Jesus Christ…but also to the trinity… 
To a conception of substitution in Christian theology which has passed through the 
rigours of Levinas’s conception of it without failing to think through death in relation to 
God. 
To a conception of the human self and of love in terms of facing, substitutionary 
responsibility and joy.
91
 
The above not only finalizes Ford’s “culminating intention” to “propose this toast to 
Jüngel while remaining responsible before the face of Levinas—and of God.”
92
 These 
conclusions also essentially summarize Ford’s refinement of his theology through the 
two Jüngel/Levinas essays.  
For our purposes, working backwards through these “toasts” proves an effective 
manner of analysis. As in the earlier essay in dialogue with MacKinnon’s work, Ford 
proposes faithful human identity as joy which does not ignore suffering. The respective 
concerns of Levinas for ethics and Jüngel for faith, while significantly divergent, are 
focused by Ford towards this common goal. Specifically, he unites the “indicative” 
human agency expressed in Jüngel’s joy arising out of substitutionary atonement with 
the “imperative” otherness expressed in Levinas’s concern to relegate joy, powerful 
though it may be, to substitutionary responsibility.
93
 Ford argues that the ethical 
implications of Christian atonement can then be reassessed in a way “which has passed 
through the rigours of Levinas’s conception.”
94
 Moreover, this renders an 
“improvisation” on Jüngel’s understanding of love: “the unity of joy and substitutionary 
responsibility for the sake of joy.”
95
 Jüngel’s original locutionary structure (“unity…for 
the sake of”) is not the only signification here; Ford now finds helpful resources to 
express what he is trying to capture in his earlier critique of the “25adequacy of tragedy” 
                                                 
91 “Hosting a Dialogue,” 58. 
92 Ibid., 25. 
93 “On Substitution,” 35, “But at the very least Levinas’s rethinking of the imperative might stimulate 
Jüngel to question how shot through with the imperative is the Christian indicative, above all in the ‘do 
this’ of the Last Supper and the obedience of Gethsemane. To rethink the Christian story with such 
Levinassian concepts as election, vocation, kenosis, responsibility for others, expiation and persecution 
might not only refocus Jüngel’s concept of the imperative but also the notion of what is to ‘correspond’ to 
all faith.” 
94 “Hosting a Dialogue,” 58. 
95 Ibid., 55. 
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to allow for “the overflow of thanks and Paul’s ‘always rejoicing’.”
96
 Overflow happens 
when ).. is “for the sake of joy.” 
But what of thinking through death in relation to God? MacKinnon’s concerns 
are hardly left behind.
97
 After subjecting Jüngel’s focus on death to Levinassian 
critique, a new priority on the face of Christ emerges.
98
 Preposterous though such a 
theological Levinassian derivative as “Christ’s face” might be to the philosopher 
himself, Ford moves beyond this obvious objection largely on the basis that Levinas 
“thematizes” in a way which his philosophy cannot uphold. Overall, Ford is not 
concerned with philosophical victory;
99
 he is merely trying to sustain a Christian 
theology which yet still captures the benefits found in Levinas’s “attractive alternative” 
to Jüngel’s christology.
100
 
And what Ford believes the face of Christ to sustain is significant. Conceptually, 
the joining of “face” and “event” present Ford with the means to use the language of 
both Levinas and Jüngel to express the person and work of Christ. Ford wants to ensure 
that any substitution associated with the event of Christ as God’s atonement cannot be 
grounds for irresponsibility when facing suffering. At issue here is the way in which 
Christ’s work should be understood objectively to transform human existence. Ford 
asserts, “Levinas’s striving for a language that can signify what is ‘otherwise than 
being’ might in relation to theories of atonement in Christian theology, go behind the 
unsatisfactory alternatives of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’.”
101
 Thus, Ford moves toward 
aligning Jüngel’s historically Lutheran concern with sin and more objective 
understanding of the person of Christ with the ethical concerns Ford believes are 
subjectively valorized in Levinas’s concept of face. This does not mean Ford wants to 
do away with the uniqueness of Christ’s atonement, but he does want to rethink how 
                                                 
96 “Tragedy and Atonement,” 127, op. cit. 
97 “Hosting a Dialogue,” 57, nt. 126, “I find an example of a Christian discourse which comes nearer to an 
incorporation of ‘unsaying’ and, partly due to that, also expresses the interrogative and even tragic 
significance of the incarnation, in the works of Donald MacKinnon. Ford cites “Tragedy and Atonement” 
in the following note. 
98 “Hosting a Dialogue,” 43, “One might speculate what Jüngel’s theology would look like if the face of 
Christ were as integral as the death of Christ.” 
99 The following quote from Jüngel ends “Hosting a Dialogue,” 59, “There are disputes in which the 
desire to win is prohibited from the outset, but out of which the freedom of understood closeness to each 
other can emerge as something new.” Cited from G";$)($'7(,&67$"+$,!&$P"6.;, 193. 
100 Ford sees these benefits as follows: Levinas “must count as an attractive alternative to Jüngel’s 
Christian ‘scandal of particularity’ centered on the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. It is a vision comparable to 
some of the approaches currently being canvassed in order to live with pluralisms of various sorts, 
stressing both ethical convergences and respect for otherness.” See “Hosting a Dialogue,” 38. 
101 Ibid., 34. 
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atonement should be understood in relation to the human response of faith. Ford says 
much when he critiques Jüngel on Vogel, asking, “…is substitution the right concept 
through which to identity (christological) uniqueness?”
102
  
Questions left open about “a non-competitive concept of divine and human 
freedom”
103
 beg to be worked out, as Ford rightly indicates in his toast, on not only a 
christological level but a trinitarian one as well. In '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5( 
Ford affirmed the necessity of refusing to identify any one of the trinity apart from the 
other two. God’s contingency was also asserted in reference to the suffering of Christ. 
But these essays offer no substantial development of how such concepts describe the 
Trinity 25$ (&.
104
 For example, Ford does not clarify how the Son, amidst suffering, 
“faces” the Father and how the Father “faces” (and/or does 5", face) the Son on the 
cross. Who is the Holy Spirit as God in this person and event?
105
 Even more notable 
considering Ford’s concerns, is the relative absence of discussion concerning Trinity as 
God >6"$5"B2(. This is especially apparent in contrast with Hardy and Ford’s work in 
A?B2.),&. Appendix B of A?B2.),& asserts, “…it is through the movement of praise for 
God through Jesus, that God is God for man, and man for himself.”
106
 Concerning sin, 
Appendix A is even more explicit that for the person and work of Christ “to regenerate 
humanity, God’s economy of praise would actually have to become operative in man, 
displacing that which undermines it.”
107
 Both the reality of sin and God’s act "5$B&!).+$
of humanity seem to move to the background as Ford’s concerns over substitution and 
atonement surface and any clear role of the Holy Spirit seemingly recedes. Again, in 
A?B2.),&, Ford and Hardy write, “The new sharing between man and God explodes from 
the resurrection…. The energy and life of this sharing is the Holy Spirit…”
108
 While it 
                                                 
102 “On Substitution,” 36, op. cit. 
103 Ibid. 
104 An arguably small exception is the future direction suggested parenthetically in “Hosting a Dialogue,” 
58, “(might those three-faced Russian icons of the trinity, and the whole Eastern orthodox tradition of 
trinitarian thought, have a new contribution to make to the perennial debate about threeness and oneness 
if mediated through the unlikely combination of Levinas and Jüngel?).” 
105 Such trinitarian issues are critical to how Jüngel sustains “a positive answer which is ‘beyond the 
alternative of presence or absence’.” See Ford, “Hosting a Dialogue,” 36. Jungel, G";$)($'7(,&67, 379, 
states, “The Trinity of God implies, within the horizons of the world, the self-differentiating of the 
25@2(2B.&$Father in heaven from the Son on earth, @2(2B.& as man, and from the Spirit who reigns as the 
bond of unity and love between the invisible Father in heaven and the visible Son on earth and who 
produces in an 25@2(2B.&$way @2(2B.& results in us. The Holy Spirit is thus both the relationship between 
Father and Son which consititutes the life of God and their powerful turning to man who is drawn in this 
way into the relationship of the Son to the Father. As Holy Spirit, God is mystery of the world.” 
106 “Appendix B,” 176. 
107 “Appendix A,” 165. 
108 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 162 (129). 
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is clear in these later essays that Ford proposes his “face of Christ” concept to account 
for “God’s joy and responsibility capacitating that of humanity,”
109
 it remains unclear 
exactly #!7$God necessarily does this capacitating and !"# it happens not only through 
the Son but also through the Father and Holy Spirit.  
Finally, though Ford’s dialogue with Levinas has significantly developed 
through these essays, and though some important issues still remain unclarified, the 
emphasis appears much the same as his earlier work in 2 Corinthians and the essay for 
MacKinnon. Ford is quite willing to allow Levinas’s “absolutising of the ethical” to 
interrogate theology, but he also continues to strive for a theology centered upon the 
overflowing nature of faith which he has always found characteristic of praise and joy. 
As we noted previously, developing such an approach has the benefit of accounting for 
Christian joy, while also taking MacKinnon’s concerns for the tragic aspects of life into 
account, )5; further engaging the type of theological issues which this thesis has 
examined in relation to Brueggemann and lament. The key, for Ford, to proposing how 
Christian joy properly sustains amidst suffering appears to lie in working out how 
humanity becomes identified in the person and work of Jesus Christ—an issue which 
receives its most substantial examination and development in Ford’s D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5.  
 
II. Facing Christ as the Human Response to Suffering 
  
A. D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5: Ford’s Mature Soteriology 
 
Ford publishes two smaller monographs in the later 1990’s both of which draw 
substantially from his previous scholarship. One is a popular book about Christian 
spirituality; the other, an introductory work on theology.
110
 However, it is D&.+$ )5;$
D).@),2"50$ O&25*$ %6)5(+"6/&; which provides the most significant context for 
development in Ford’s theology since A?B2.),&.
111
 As Regius Professor of Divinity in 
the University of Cambridge, Ford is fittingly chosen to author the first publication in 
                                                 
109 “Hosting a Dialogue,” 54. 
110  David F. Ford, %!&$D!)>&$"+$J2@25*0$D>262,?).$=26&3,2"5($+"6$E@&67;)7$J2+& (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1997); and Ford, %!&"."*70$$1$H&67$D!"6,$85,6";?3,2"5 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999).  
111 Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&; (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999). Significantly, 
Hardy is described in the first page of the acknowledgements as the “theological midwife of the book.” 
(xi). 
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the new Cambridge Studies of Christian Doctrine which seeks to “practise theology in 
the fullest sense of the word.”
112
 
                                                
 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5$begins with an introduction which discusses both the scope 
of the book and its style. The former is wide, indeed. “Salvation is not really one 
doctrine at all in most works of Christian theology. It is distributed…in fact, through all 
topics. This all-pervasiveness gives it a potentially integrating role, but also risks 
overwhelming vastness.”
113
 Integration of varying ideas and influences well describes 
the encompassing theological style of Ford who, like MacKinnon, highlights the 
interrogative.
114
 This leads to a series of six defining questions (The heart of Christian 
identity? An accessible salvation? A key image? Conceptual richness? Practical 
fruitfulness? A defensible theology?) that form the “interrogative field” into which Ford 
develops his two-part proposal. Part I consists of dialogues developing his previous 
work with Levinas and Jüngel as well as introducing the mediating voice of Paul 
Ricoeur. “The result is my work’s central idea: the worshipping self, before the face of 
Christ and other people, in an ‘economy of superabundance’.”
115
 Part II explicitly 
develops the concept of “worshipping self” in various contexts, none more central than 
in the cross and resurrection of Christ. 
 
 i. “Dialogues”: Overview of Part I 
 
 Indicating a culmination of the central image in much of his previous work, D&.+$
)5;$D).@),2"5’s$first chapter is titled “Facing” and begins, “We live before the faces of 
others.”
116
 While Ford’s introduction indicates that the face is “not a usual focus for 
salvation,” he intends to demonstrate that the face deserves “at least a minor role 
alongside others in the tradition.”
117
 After meditating on the human face in various 
aspects of existence, including our relation to our own face and how we “face” others, 
 
112 Cited from back cover of D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5. 
113 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 1. 
114 Ibid., 2, Ford asserts from the outset, “Theology, like other intellectual disciplines, is pervaded by the 
interrogative mood.” Cf. Ford, “Tragedy and Atonement”, 129, which cites Kenneth Surin’s description 
of MacKinnon’s preference “for an interrogative, as opposed to an affirmative, mode of theological 
discourse.” See Surin, “Christology, Tragedy and Ideology”, %!&"."*7 89 (July 1986), 285. Curiously, 
D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5$makes no explicit mention of MacKinnon, but as the above demonstrates, his influence 
can be seen throughout. 
115 Ibid., 9. 
116 Ibid., 17. 
117 Ibid., 4. Ford also states here, “Undoubtedly the image that has gone deepest and is most pervasive in 
this book is the subject of the meditation in chapter 1, facing.” 
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Ford underscores the “dynamics of ‘facing’” to be described. “ ‘Facing’ helps to avoid 
the wrong sort of fixations on the face as an ‘object’. It embraces the face in activity and 
passivity, purpose and temporality, loneliness and reciprocity.”
118
 Mirroring previous 
reflections on the face, Ford clearly intends to expand on how this dynamic emerges at 
the core of Christian faith. Towards the end of the chapter he offers what amounts to a 
programmatic statement: 
Christianity is characterized by the simplicity and complexity of facing; being faced by 
God, embodied in the face of Christ; turning to face Jesus Christ in faith; being 
members of a community of the face; seeing the face of God reflected in creation and 
especially in each human face, with all the faces in our heart related to the presence of 
the face of Christ; having an ethic of gentleness (>6)?,&() towards each face; 
disclaiming any overview of others and being content with massive agnosticism about 
how God is dealing with them; and having a vision of transformation before the face of 
Christ ‘from glory to glory’ that is cosmic in scope, with endless surprises for both 
Christians and others.
119
 
Through words which tie together previous interests from A?B2.),&$ to 2 Corinthians to 
his engagements with MacKinnon, Levinas and Jüngel, Ford sets out his agenda to 
demonstrate facing as the central locus for how salvation transforms human existence 
through God in Christ. Principally, he will do this by bringing together that which has 
always been a chief concern: the joy of Christian faith united with human ethical 
responsibility amidst suffering. Therefore, before ending the chapter with Dante, Ford 
asserts D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5’s guiding imperative: “But for the joy of that celebration to be 
holy it needs to have come by way of sharing food with the hungry and being liberated 
from the idols that distort the dynamics of our praising, knowing and desiring.”
120
 
 Levinas, whose work “pervades these pages more than any other thinker,”
121
 is 
the first of Ford’s three dialogue partners. Ford begins by building his previous 
examinations of joy in Levinas for whom “the personality of the person, the ipseity of 
the I…is the particularity of the happiness of enjoyment.”
122
 Within enjoyment, Levinas 
finds the emergence of the self as radically separate,
123
 a separation which integrally 
accompanies the even more radical Levinassian notions of relationality and 
responsibility. Because of this, Ford even goes as far as to assert that “Levinas’s 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 23. 
119 Ibid., 25. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., xii. 
122 Emmanuel Levinas, %",).2,7$)5;$85+252,7$(trans. A. Lingis; Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1998), 115, as quoted by Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 34. 
123 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 35, “For Levinas enjoyment is uniquely my own, individuating; it produces the 
radical separation of an ego at home with itself, with interiority and solitude.” 
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philosophy of enjoyment is )($ 6);23).$ )5;$ 25,&5(& as his philosophy of 
responsibility.”
124
  
But Ford, of course, also sees the particular way in which responsibility 
materializes as the defining pole of Levinassian thought, something which occurs as 
Levinas accords materiality to responsibility itself via his lauded conceptualization of 
+)3&. As with enjoyment, the face indicates a crucial separation within the thought of 
Levinas. Unlike with joy, however, this separation acts as ground to a fundamental 
relationality. “The separation of the face to face is never subsumed in a totality. There is 
no overview or adequate idea of ‘the face to face, the irreducible and ultimate 
relation’.”
125
 Such relation in turn elicits responsibility. “The face opens the primordial 
discourse whose first word is obligation which no ‘interiority’ permits avoiding.”
126
  
Crucially, Ford notes a dissonance between the extremity of enjoyment in 
Levinas and the primacy of responsibility. “There is a tension between, on the one hand, 
a Kantian tendency to detach ethical imperatives from pleasure, interest and 
desire…and, on the other hand, what I take to be the logic of his conceptions of 
enjoyment and desire.”
127
 With this in mind Ford makes a critical turn via the question, 
“Why should enjoyment in some form not be intrinsic to the derivation of 
responsibility?”
128
  
To this end the next chapter introduces Jüngel as a theologian of both joy and 
resistance to idolatry. Ford finds Jüngel’s G";$)($,!&$'7(,&67$"+$,!&$P"6.;, particularly 
interesting because Jüngel does not propose God as necessary but rather as “ ‘more than 
necessary’ (/&!6$ ).($ 5",#&5;2*).”
129
 This allows for the excess of joy and desire 
described by Levinas while also approaching the Levinassian emphasis on relationality 
and responsibility.
130
 Ford employs the ideas of Jüngel and Levinas to mutually 
challenge each other in a way which “the extremism of Levinas seeing ‘me’ substituting 
for all confronts Jüngel’s extremism of seeing ‘Jesus Christ’ substituting for all.” This 
                                                 
124 Ibid., italics mine. 
125 Ibid., 37, Ford’s quotes from Levinas, %",).2,7$)5;$85+252,7, 295. 
126 Ibid., 37-8. Ford’s quotes from Levinas, %",).2,7$)5;$85+252,7, 201. 
127 Ibid., 42. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 55. Ford quotes from Jüngel, G";$)($'7(,&67$"+$,!&$P"6.;,  24. 
130 Ibid., 58, “Each (Levinas and Jüngel) is ‘most concrete’ and each finds God in what is human. Each 
also offers a positive answer which is ‘beyond the alternative of presence or absence’; but for Jüngel this 
is in the crucified and risen Jesus, for Levinas it is in the trace of the infinite in the face, or saying, of the 
other person.” See also op. cit.,  “Hosting a Dialogue,” 36. 
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leads to a proposal of “a substitutionary self, defined by radical responsibility, and also 
Jesus Christ dying for all.”
131
  
However, in his concern “to offer a Christian development of Jüngel which 
learns from Levinas,” Ford has yet to truly address responsibility as derivative of joy. 
To do so, Ford must address worship and its negative perception within much 
philosophy.  
Levinas sympathises with Kant’s ethical belittling of worship and is deeply sensitive to 
the multifarious critiques that can be applied to such practices as the praise, 
lamentation, thanks, confession, intercession and petition addressed to God in the 
Psalms. He relentlessly rules out ways in which the ethical purity of responsibility 
might be compromised or its rigour ameliorated.
132
 
While the disregard for worship arises from a different focus within Kant’s thinking 
than from Levinas,
133
 Ford correctly notes that the span of Western thought connecting 
the two thinkers shares a common tendency—the distrust of worship as truly 
definitional upon human identity and relationality. As Levinas explicates a relationality 
emerging simultaneously as responsibility, his conceptualization of identity struggles at 
best to find its center in joy. Ford responds with an acute interrogative which pervades 
the heart of his work. “The logic of excess in relation to the infinite is for Levinas 
embodied only in responsibility. But might there be another way of maintaining the 
purity and overflow of responsibility through an excess whose primary dynamic is that 
of worship.”
134
 Though this position risks vigorous Levinassian critique, Ford asserts 
“that responsibility before the other needs to do justice to joy, and may not rule out full 
worship in faith.”
135
 
At this point, Ford has come as far as his earlier work on Levinas and Jüngel, at 
times directly quoting from these essays, albeit with more development. Nevertheless, 
he aims to go further in D&.+$ )5;$ D).@),2"5$ towards a fully developed concept of 
Christian identity. In this endeavor he welcomes Paul Ricoeur as his third dialogue 
partner in whom “we find the sort of concept of self required by a definition of love as 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 68. 
132 Ibid., 81. 
133 For Kant, human reason ultimately functions, in terms of Levinassian language, as the totality in which 
worship may be disregarded—an approach which Levinas would hardly consciously condone in his own 
originating emphasis on alterity. David Bentley Hart, %!&$O&)?,7$"+$,!&$85+252,& (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 75, describes Levinas under the category of the “ethical sublime” which is “Kantian, 
that is, only insofar as it concerns a kind of categorical imperative, though certainly not one that emanates 
from the ‘moral law within’ or the power of reason to legislate for itself.”  
134 Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 81. 
135 Ibid., 81. 
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‘the unity of joy and substitutionary responsibility for the sake of joy’.”
136
  Not only is 
Ricoeur’s work “in line with the discussion of Jüngel and Levinas,” but Ford sees him 
“salvaging the ethical priority of the other while affirming a self-esteem that 
incorporates benevolent spontaneity, receptivity and recognition.”
137
  
 Ford notes the emphasis on testimony in all three thinkers before concentrating 
on Ricoeur’s work in :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6.
138
 Here the thought of Levinas is modified “in 
the direction of a more differentiated concept of self embracing both self-effacement 
and self-esteem…”
139
 The key notion is as “an exchange between esteem for myself and 
solicitude for others” which is developed in the book’s seventh study.
140
  This exchange 
“authorizes us to say that I cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as 
myself. Becoming in this way fundamentally equivalent are the esteem of the ",!&6$)($)$
"5&(&.+ and the esteem of "5&(&.+$)( an other.”
141
 Through the eighth and ninth studies 
Ricoeur then “affirms the universality of Kant’s ethic of obligation” yet eventually 
suggests a modification in Kant which Ford terms “a face-oriented ethic.”
142
 Ricoeur’s 
position can consequently be described as “a Levinassian appropriation of Kant—with 
one major difference. …and the difference from Levinas is in the account offered of 
recognition at the heart of the self.”
143
 Ford quotes the following from Ricoeur: 
Recognition is a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self-esteem 
toward solicitude and solicitude toward justice. Recognition introduces the dyad and 
plurality in the very constitution of the self. Reciprocity in friendship and proportional 
equality in justice, when they are reflected in self-consciousness, make self-esteem a 
figure of recognition.
144
 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 92. 
137 Ibid., 91. 
138 Ibid., 83, “Jüngel, Levinas and Ricoeur all, in various ways, make testimony a constitutive dimension 
of selfhood, and it also pervades Christian worship.” Ford goes on to discuss Ricoeur’s interaction with 
Levinas and Nabert, quoting the following from Ricoeur, “is it forbidden to a reader, who is a friend of 
both Nabert and Levinas, to puzzle over a philosophy where the attestation of self and the glory of the 
absolute would be co-originary? Does not the testimony rendered by other actions, other lives, reciprocal 
to the divestment of the ego, speak 25$)5",!&6$#)7 about what testimony, according to Levinas, unsays?” 
See Ricoeur, :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6 (trans. K. Blamey; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 126, as 
quoted by Ford,$D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 84. 
139 Ibid., 89. 
140 Ricoeur, :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6, 193f., as quoted by Ford,$D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 91. 
141 Ibid., italics original in Ricoeur.. 
142 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 92-93. “Like Levinas, Ricoeur takes with radical seriousness the threat of evil, and 
especially of violence, and the need for imperatives and prohibitions of Kantian radicality in order to 
reply to it. But also like Levinas, Ricoeur wants to pluralise Kant’s general notion of humanity. He finds 
an inadequate notion of otherness in Kant, and the particularizing idea of the face responds to this lack” 
(93). 
143 Ibid., 93. 
144 Ricoeur, :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6, 296, as quoted by Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 93-4. 
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This reflection is contextualized by the tenth and final study, titled “What Ontology in 
View” where Ricoeur describes self and otherness in terms of three “passivities” of 
flesh, other people, and conscience which are “,!&$ attestation of otherness.”
145
 Here, 
Ricoeur is works out an interiority which critiques Levinas yet appropriates his 
concerns
146
 resulting in the culminating idea of “B&25*$ &5T"25&;$ )($ ,!&$ (,6?3,?6&$ "+$
(&.+!"";.”
147
 The “final reservation for Levinas” consists in a concluding aporia that 
“[p]erhaps the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and 
cannot say whether this Other, the source of injunction, is another person…or my 
ancestors…or God—living God, absent God—or an empty place.”
148
 
 Ford now introduces his concept of worshipping self by pointing to how Ricoeur 
tentatively moves “beyond the aporia” in his more religious and biblical writings. 
Language emerges here which is very similar to that of Hardy and Ford in A?B2.),&. 
Selfhood in worship “operates according to a ‘logic of superabundance’, which is the 
logic of love. The primary discourse of love (Ricoeur) sees as praise, ‘where in praising 
one rejoices over the view of one object set above all the other object’s of one’s 
concern’.”
149
 Such language of course also links with Jüngel’s theology, but by utilizing 
Ricoeur’s “enjoined” structure of identity, Ford posits a human identity where praise 
and joy also manifest awareness of Levinassian concerns. 
Read like this, a worship of God which is alert to its own unceasing need for 
accompanying critique and suspicion might be understood as the most encompassing 
and formative “practice of self” in line with Ricoeur’s philosophy. …The self is posited 
by God in community without that necessarily being a dominating heteronomy. 
Likewise there is no “shattered cogito” in fragmentation, but there can be a complex 
gathering of self in diverse relationships…before God who is trusted as the gatherer of 
selves in blessing.
150
 
                                                 
145 :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6, 318 as quoted by Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 94. 
146 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 95, “The main problem he finds with Levinas is the radical concept of the 
exteriority of the other person, the ‘hyperbolic’ separation of the other from the self. Levinas 
unnecessarily binds the identity of the same (2;&/) to a concept of ontology as totality, he fails to 
distinguish the ‘self’ from the ‘I’, and he therefore ends up with a dissymmetry between self and other 
which amounts to a lack of relation and to the sterility of interiority. As a corrective Ricoeur sees the 
other as analogous to ‘me’ and even intrinsic to my identity through self-esteem which does not equate 
‘self’ with ‘I’. In Levinas there is no return from the other to self-affirmation in the mode of self-esteem 
and conviction. This converges with my development of Levinas’s concept of responsibility so as to 
embrace joy.” 
147 :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6, 354, italics original, quoted by Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 96. 
148 :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6, 356, as quoted by Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 97. 
149 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 98, quotes respectively here from Ricoeur, “Ethical and Theological Considerations 
of the Golden Rule”, 300, and “Love and Justice”, 317, both in N2*?625*$,!&$D)36&;, Mark I. Wallace, ed. 
(trans. D. Pellauer; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995). 
150 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 99. 
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Therefore, Ford sees Ricoeur pressing towards a “concept of self appropriate 
to…worship,” but one that Ricoeur himself “does not work out.”
151
 Ford concludes the 
first half of D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5 by pointing to exactly how he will work out his concept 
of the worshipping self—in light of the face of Christ.
152
  
 
  ii. “Flourishings”: Overview of Part II 
 
From these dialogues Ford transitions “to explore human flourishing in some of 
its richest forms” as the context in which to connect identity and salvation before the 
face of Christ. He begins with “Communicating God’s abundance,” a chapter structured 
around an interrelated examination of Ephesians and Psalms. Observing “transformative 
communication” in the epistle, Ford asks, “To what does this communication 
testify?”
153
 His answer is the abundance of God which he finds communicated through 
the use of >.&6"/) throughout Ephesians. The context and application of >.&6"/)$
indicates nothing less than that a “radical culmination for members of the church in a 
new location and content of selfhood.”
154
 The abundance of this identity is first and 
foremost communicated in Christ. “The testimony to Jesus Christ in Ephesians pivots, 
as in the rest of the Pauline tradition, around the death and resurrection of Christ, which 
will be recurring themes in later chapters of this book.”
155
 This christological focus 
generates two subsequent developments. First, “a new humanity which is already a 
reality in Christ,” and second, “a distinctive interrelation” of this already to all that is 
not yet in Christ.
156
 Ford establishes the link between now and not yet through 
understanding >.&6"/) as “an abundance already there but also endlessly generative. 
…It is better conceived through the notion of overflow linked with >.&6"/). In 
linguistic terms it is found in such notions as blessing, praise and thanks.”
157
 
Such endlessly generative abundance is then related to the psalter through Ford’s 
concepts of a “singing self” and the “ ‘I’ of the Psalms.” “The ‘I’ has God intrinsic to its 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid., 104. “The glory of God in the face of Christ is Paul’s testimony in response to Ricoeur’s final 
aporia…” Ford here cites the development of verse 4:6 in '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5(. On p. 102 
of D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, Ford cites Ricoeur’s discussion of 2 Cor. 3:18 in “The Summoned Subject in the 
School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation” in N2*?625*$,!&$D)36&;, 267f. 
153 Ibid., 113. 
154 Ibid., 114. 
155 Ibid., 114 
156 Ibid., 115.  
157 Ibid., 115.  
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identity through worship: the one before who it worships is the main clue to its 
selfhood.”
158
 Therefore the “I” of the Psalms “is most comprehensively constituted 
through the activity of God. It acknowledges God’s past activity (or laments God’s 
inactivity) and it awaits God’s future activity.”
159
 As more generally related to Christian 
identity this means “[o]ne’s own self is constituted in relationship to all others who sing 
the Psalms, but there is a special relationship to Jesus Christ” which is interpreted 
through the death and resurrection.
160
 This “special relationship” has trifold 
implications which again recall the concerns of Brueggemann’s work on the Psalms. 
First, believers should acknowledge the “key interpretive factor” of christological 
interpretation of the Psalms throughout Christian history. Second, Ford substantiates his 
concerns for responsibility in the “radical implications for a community which faces 
Jesus on the cross crying out through the Psalms.”
161
 Third, theology must address the 
“realism” indicated by Christ upon the cross. 
                                                
Finally, Jesus is said to have ‘sung a hymn’ at the Last Supper before going to 
Gethsemane (Mark 14:26). But he did not sing on the cross. His ‘loud cry’ from the 
cross is the extremity of speech, beyond talk and song. It resonates with the anguished 
laments of the Psalms and with the cries of sufferers down the centuries. It is one way 
of relativising the ‘singing self’, guarding it against any sense of sentimentality or lack 
of realism about the sort of world we inhabit. Ephesians shows this realism by 
concluding with an inventory of armour for ‘the evil day’ (6.10ff.).
162
 
A “realism” which faces “the ‘high’ christology and ecclesiology of Ephesians”
163
 is 
Ford’s ultimate goal. 
The high ecclesiology is a double-edged weapon for any Christian triumphalism 
because it means the church is the first to be judged by this ethic of love and abundance. 
If this were to happen according to the criteria of Ephesians the result would be 
devastating for a great deal of what the church has done and continues to do in its 
exercise of power and its forms of communication. The meanings of triumph, 
domination, power and strength are being redefined through this ‘new human being 
[L)25"($)5,!6">"(]’ (2.15).
164
 
For Ford, the redefinition and reconciliation of the Church “turns on the character of the 
one this community is testifying to and being conformed to.”
165
 
 
158 Ibid., 128. 
159 Ibid., 128. 
160 Ibid., 129. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 132. 
164 Ibid., 133. 
165 Ibid., 132. 
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The title of the next chapter, “Do this”, moves from scripture to tradition and 
Ford’s understanding of eucharist. The Lord’s Supper is not mere tradition but a 
practice “that from the beginning of the church…has been intrinsic to its identity.”
166
 
The tie to worship in this identity is essential to eucharist. “It is hard to overestimate the 
importance for Christianity of the fact that the eucharist, a pivotal locus of its identity, is 
a corporate practice rather than, say, an ethical code, a worldview, a set of doctrines, an 
institutional constitution, a book or some other distinctive feature.”
167
 By developing a 
notion of “eucharistic habitus,” Ford is able to center identity-forming considerations in 
the Last Supper and its correlation to the cross. “The Last Supper is where this knot is 
decisively tied. It looks to the culmination of Jesus’s obedience in death and commands 
a sharing in his body and blood.”
168
 Throughout this chapter Ford explores themes such 
as apprenticeship, repetition, and the differing text of the Johannine “improvisation,” 
but all is restated and refocused in Christ. “…the utterly essential matter for thought is 
indicated by the distinctive nature of the eucharistic habitus. Because it is oriented to 
Jesus Christ and to others the main energies of thought must be directed towards Jesus 
Christ and others.”
169
 
 D&.+$ )5;$ D).@),2"5’s central way of explaining faith’s orientation is through 
facing the face of Christ which receives its most thorough development in the two 
subsequent chapters. First, “Facing Jesus Christ” begins by outlining the issues inherent 
to such an innovative concept. Because many modern systematics have “offered 
doctrinal frameworks which are ‘good enough’” to support his constructive position, 
Ford briefly highlights just one—the christological grammar of Ingolf Dalferth who 
explicitly identifies Christ as “the resurrected crucified one.”
170
  Ford affirms Dalferth’s 
                                                 
166 Ibid., 137. 
167 Ibid., 140. 
168 Ibid., 146. 
169 Ibid., 165. 
170 Ingolf Dalferth, =&6$)?+&6#&3L,&$G&L6&?Q2*,&U$V?6$G6)//),2L$;&6$4!62(,"."*2& (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1994). Ford translates (D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, p. 171, nt. 7) =&6$)?+&6#&3L,&$
G&L6&?Q2*,& as “The Resurrected Crucified One.” Ford, 169, states, “Dalferth traces the interconnections 
between the ‘resurrected crucified one’ and questions of creation, anthropology, history, salvation, 
ecclesiology and eschatology, and he analyses the ‘grammar’ of these relations as irreducibly trinitarian. I 
see his achievement as a sensitive summary of the most important thrust of twentieth-century Christian 
systematic theology.” 
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“personal-trinitarian thinking”
171
 but aims to proceed beyond it by “also attempting to 
contribute to a reconception of the personal.”
172
  
Ford then identifies two possible theological problems for this facing concept: 
vagueness and domination. The first is seen not as problem but as essential: 
What is the overall significance of this pervasive theme of the facing of the risen Jesus 
Christ for the problem of vagueness? …this facing is identified with the facing of God. 
This in turn means that it is a face which relates to every face. Any vagueness is not so 
much because of abstraction or generality but because of the utter particularity of this 
face’s relating to each face. …In this way vagueness is by no means something to 
defend it against: to be vague…is intrinsic to its reality. The overwhelming diversity 
and intensity of these relationships is part of the meaning of transformation ‘from one 
degree of glory to another’ (2 Cor. 3.18).
173
 
In his affirmation of vagueness, Ford does not ignore Christ’s historical reality,
174
 but 
he does stress that Gospel testimony aims “not just to give interesting historical 
information but to enable living before this face as the face of the risen Jesus Christ.”
175
 
The problem of domination is more acutely proposed. “The question is whether 
universal relating must mean imperialism: might there be a non-coercive form of 
universality.”
176
 Ford immediately turns to Levinas but now has resources to relate his 
philosophy back to theology. “When such an ethic is critically related to the thought of 
Jüngel and Ricoeur as they bear on Jesus Christ the result is a universality which can be 
related to this one face. It is possible to imagine this face relating limitlessly in a non-
coercive way.”
177
 Ford gives substantial weight to the social and political issues Jesus 
confronted in his life. However, he concludes this chapter by pointing “to the only place 
from which suspicion about his being a dominating face can be decisively answered: the 
crucifixion.”
178
 
 The second of the two key chapters on christology is thus titled “The face on the 
cross and the worship of God.” Ford believes the “dead face of Christ” has been “an 
                                                 
171 =&6$)?+&6#&3L,&$G&L6&?Q2*,&, 303, as quoted and translated in D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 170. 
172 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 170, Ford sees himself moving beyond Dalferth because, “…as most of his energy 
in soteriology is spent on the discussion of sacrifice he does not develop the model in fresh ways.” Ford, 
209, furthermore finds that the “weakness in (Dalferth’s account) is its failure to do justice to the 
physicality that sacrifice makes unavoidable. In his concern for the word of the cross, for the activity of 
God through Christ and for Christ as a corporate person Dalferth does not reckon with the bodily 
particularity of the dead Jesus and the continuing importance of this, represented in his face.”  
173 Ibid., 175-6. Ford later (p. 180) adds, “as the glorious face of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ, it is 
not so much vague as superabundant in its reality as relating to God and to all people.” 
174 See Ibid., 177, nt. 10, for a list of New Testament historical scholarship from which Ford draws. 
175 Ibid., 181. 
176 Ibid., 183. 
177 Ibid., 184-5. 
178 Ibid., 190. 
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obvious neglected focus” in theology. To recover this focus he first surveys the use of 
>)52/ in the Old Testament, concentrating on the Pentateuch, the Psalms and prophecy. 
He then provides the book’s most explicit account of cross, resurrection and the 
relationship of both to worship. All is done in context of the face of Christ. Because of 
the centrality of this chapter to the theological proposals of D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, we shall 
forego detailed examination until evaluation below of Ford’s overall position.  
D&.+$ )5;$ D).@),2"5 concludes with three chapters designed to give specific 
examples of how this theology is actualized. Two exemplars of the worshipping self are 
presented: Thérèse of Lisieux and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Music, along the lines of 
polyphony, is a particular issue in his discussion of Bonhoeffer, and Ford widens his 
scope to consider the arts more generally in his flourishing conclusion based on the 
concept of feasting. This is the culmination of “the joy of the saints” as that which “is 
the simplest summary of the reality of selves being saved. Their joy is in God and in 
what delights God.”
179
  
 
B. A Responsible Overflow: The Culmination of Praise in Ford’s Theology 
 
 D&.+$ )5;$ D).@),2"5$ brings to fruition Ford’s consistent effort to propose the 
overflowing nature of Christian faith amidst suffering. By bringing the work of earlier 
essays on Levinas and Jüngel together in dialogue with Ricoeur, Ford strives to fully 
ground human identity in worship through facing the face of Christ. The resulting “self” 
worships through an excessive joy arising from God’s faithfulness in Christ which 
cannot be understood apart from the sufferings of the cross. MacKinnon’s influence, 
while never made explicit, remains implicitly ever near. As the chapter on the eucharist 
states, “The Last Supper was a meal in the face of death. …The remembering is false if 
it is not connected with entering more fully into the contingencies and tragic 
potentialities of life in the face of evil and death. There can be no quick leap across 
Gethsemane and Calvary.”
180
 Ford in no way strays from an awareness of “joy 
destroying evil” )5; the fact that Christians “wrestle with reality at its darkest points 
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and still testify to the joy of God.”
181
 In sentiments similar to Brueggemann, Ford finds 
the psalms of lament to be potent expressions of this struggle. 
These are cries from the heart, open questions which cannot be made impotent by 
remarking that they often coexist with or develop into praise and trust. Lament and 
radical interrogation of God regarding salvation maintain a persistent and untamed 
element of protest, doubt, bewilderment and even despair in the heart of the prayer of 
the tradition. This becomes a keynote of the stories of Jesus’s crucifixion.
182
 
Ford, like Brueggemann, remains anxious to acknowledge the disorienting aspects of 
human life which continue to persist. 
 Unlike Brueggemann, however, Ford does not simply correlate the self-
abandonment he associates with the joy of praise in a dialectic with the self-assertion of 
lament. In his response to Jüngel’s concept of love Ford writes: 
Nor is the dialectic of selflessness and self-relatedness adequate. It is linked to the 
conception of the ‘full form of love’ as a loving I being loved back by the beloved thou. 
This must not be contradicted, but is it adequately ‘full’? Jüngel’s own concept of joy 
might urge him towards some concept of community as the full (and certainly the 
biblical) form. Joy is perhaps not best seen in terms of selflessness and self-relatedness 
(though they would be part of the definition), nor in the quantitative language of 
comparative ‘greatness’. Something further is needed which might do justice to the 
Psalms, to the eucharist, to the arts, to feasting and dancing, and to Dante’s -)6);2("; 
but perhaps one should refrain from a formal definition.
183
 
Since A?B2.),&$we have traced Ford’s articulation of the need for “something further” to 
describe that which overflows through Christian faith.
184
 Now we see that overflowing 
nature of praise in A?B2.),& culminates in the excessive joy which Ford proposes in D&.+$
)5;$ D).@),2"5. Furthermore, such joy finally cannot be seen to override ethical 
responsibility amidst suffering because ,!2( excessive joy overflows ethically ,!6"?*!$
+)2,!.  
This is the implication of my reformulation of Jüngel’s definition of love as the unity of 
joy and substitutionary responsibility for the sake of joy. The celebratory excess of non-
necessary joy in God is part of the ‘ecology’ of responsibility before God. …I am 
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182 Ibid., 199. 
183 Ibid., 80. 
184 Hardy and Ford, A?B2.),&, 27 (21), “The theological point in this is simple: God is free and one cannot 
make rules for how God may speak and act. Yet the complimentary point is that God is faithful and 
consistent, the sort of God who takes part in liturgies as well. The further perspective that embraces both 
these is that God is above all to be praised, and is well able to guide individuals and communities as 
regards how to do so.” 
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arguing that responsibility before the other needs to do justice to joy, and may not rule 
out full worship in faith.
185
 
Through this “full worship in faith” Ford connects human identity and salvation 
together in Christ.  
By proposing the “face of Christ” as the leading image around which to explain 
how Christian faith transforms life, Ford does not intend his innovation as a break with 
theological tradition. Rather, this is exactly the style in which Ford attends to scripture 
and tradition: he redescribes long-held beliefs through new concepts and reaffirms 
cherished confessions through inventive and imaginative language.
186
 Yet, his 
theological reconceptualization of Christ as God’s faithfulness to humanity, ,!& one for 
“testifying to and being conformed to,” remains not unintentionally, vague. Vernon 
White writes: 
The theological method by which Ford proceeds is not always transparent…the most 
explicit statement of it is on p. 166: ‘It has been my intention neither to develop a 
concept of self independently of Jesus Christ and then relate this to him, nor to attempt 
to read a concept of self out of some description of Jesus Christ…’ Ford would not be 
perturbed if this leads to the charge of ‘vagueness’: he positively embraces an 
appropriate ‘vagueness’ of the face of Jesus Christ in its relating to God and all 
humanity’ (p. 167, n. 1).
187
 
As White notes, Ford appears to welcome this hazy approach, and D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5$
asserts, “This worshipping self…is deprived of )57 overview of itself…”
188
 One could 
easily ask how such a “self” could then be capable of identifying itself, even in the 
careful interplay of 2;&/$ and 2>(& which Ford notes in Ricoeur. But then again the 
exercise of exhaustively pursuing theoretical connections between the conceptual and 
contextual does not produce the defining criterion at the heart of Ford’s work. Instead, 
as Vanhoozer writes, “Ford does seem to assume a minimalist metanarrative that 
enables him to navigate his way through the discussion. The criterion for such 
discrimination, at least for Christians, is the person and work of Jesus Christ, through 
                                                 
185 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5<$ 81. 
186 David F. Ford, “Salvation and the Nature of Theology: A Response to John Webster’s Review of D&.+$
)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&;”, D3",,2(!$A"?65).$"+$%!&"."*7 54/4 (2001), 561, “Aquinas and Barth, 
for example, did not only comment on scripture and tradition: they daringly took on extraordinarily broad 
theological responsibilities in their situations. Our task is not only to comment on what they and the rest 
of tradition have said but also to something analogous to what they did.” 
187 Vernon White, review of David F. Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&;, E>#"6,!$I&@2&#, 26 
no. 4 (1999): 94. 
188 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 128, italics mine. 
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whom Ford discerns a radically hospitable God.”
189
 Hospitality is an important clue 
here. Ford’s concern about overview is not about having a broad and guiding view of 
God, it is about the belief that one has the broadest view, ,!&$guiding view.  
However, because of this concern, precisely discerning Ford’s own view of 
salvation through Christ now becomes all the more important. Ford never really offers a 
clear definition of what he means by salvation, despite all of his soteriological 
innovation.
190
 His view of sin as a human problem necessitating salvation also receives 
little development.
191
 Instead he emphasizes that the person and work united through 
the image of “face of Christ” is both encompassing and inclusive; in other words, the 
person of Christ encompasses in such a way as to include. Vanhoozer aptly describes 
Ford’s “prime methodological imperative” as “thou shalt not commit extremism.”
192
 
This means the atoning work of Christ’s person transforms the means by which 
Christian community includes others.
193
 In this sense, the response which results from 
faith in Christ is extreme by not being extreme. Such overflow happens not by 
overriding but by encompassing; therefore, all are invited to the feast. Ford’s final goal 
is nothing short of a “metaphysics of feasting” which overcomes any &S3.?(2"5$ of 
worship by Levinas through 253.?;25* his ethical concerns in all that the worship of 
Christ &53"/>)((&(. 
For this metaphysics the danger to which Levinas alerts us is that of a new totality. 
Feasting, however, allows for his ethical pluralism of being. There can be no overview 
of all those encounters and conversations, but the feast can enact the union of 
substitutionary joy in the joy of others with substitutionary responsibility.
194
 
                                                 
189 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, review of David F. Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&;, 85,&65),2"5).$
A"?65).$"+$D7(,&/),23$%!&"."*7 2 no. 3 (2000): 355-61; (359).  
190 This point was first made clear to me in conversation with Trevor Hart. 
191 Ford acknowledges on page 7 of D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5’s introduction that “[m]any of the questions that 
can be raised about my position come more directly within the scope of other volumes in the series. I 
have been particularly helped by A. I. McFadyen who has been writing a volume on sin…” See 
McFadyen, O"?5;$,"$D250$1B?(&<$M"."3)?(,$)5;$,!&$4!62(,2)5$="3,625&$"+$D25$(Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). Still, of the ten occurrences in which Ford mentions sin in the remainder of the 
book, none significantly deal with his constructive position, with the possible exception of the following 
affirmation of Bonhoeffer: “In [Bonhoeffer’s] thought about…the unacceptability of using human sins, 
weakness and existential limitations to show the necessity of Christian faith, Bonhoeffer affirms a God 
who allows full human freedom and responsibility—and therefore maturity.” See Self and Salvation, 256. 
192 Vanhoozer, review, 358. 
193 For example D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 133, “The church envisaged in Ephesians sustains human dignity 
without excluding anyone; its ethic of reconciliation faces religious, racial, cultural and household 
issues.” 
194 Ibid., 271. 
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Though Ford is never ambiguous that that this union is enacted by Christ, what remains 
murky is how this “enacting” is )3,?)..7$6&).2Q&; in Ford’s christology. William Placher 
puts it well, “I’m clear what kind of life Ford wants Christians to live—a life of 
hospitality, especially to the poor; a life of worship—to sum it up, a life of love. I’m 
also clear…that Ford believes Jesus offers more than just an example. But I’m unclear 
about the manner of that ‘more’.”
195
 $$
$ %!),$/"6&, ultimately, can be no small issue for Ford’s theology or the concerns 
of this thesis. In contrast to Brueggemann’s theological proposal of faith as tension 
derived from the expression of lament, we have examined how Ford, through praise and 
joy, consistently strives to articulate the overflowing nature of Christian faith (praise as 
the perfecting of perfection, “sorrowful, yet always rejoicing,” excessiveness arising 
“for the sake of joy”, the generativity of “full worship in faith”, the abundant 
“metaphysics of feasting”). From A?B2.),& onward, Ford has also unceasingly drawn 
theological connections between any proposed overflow of faith and the cross and 
resurrection of Christ. The importance of clarifying the soteriological approach 
presented by D&.+$ )5;$ D).@),2"5 should now be apparent, for indeed Ford’s own 
concerns have come to depend upon it.
196
 If we are not transformed by how God faces 
suffering and sin through Christ "5$"?6$B&!).+, then what reason do we have to believe 
otherwise about Christ than Levinas? 
 
C. Identifying Christ’s Atonement as God’s Human Response to Suffering 
 
                                                 
195 William Placher, review of David F. Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"50$O&25*$%6)5(+"6/&;, 4!62(,2)5$4&5,?67 
116 no. 23 (1999): 823.  
196 The concluding section of a relatively recent reader on Jesus edited by Ford and Mike Higton states, 
“At the beginning of the twenty-first century the question arises again: who will Jesus be? …Of one 
thing, and perhaps one thing only, we can be certain: in this century as in the centuries before it, many 
millions will encounter the face of Christ, and will find themselves compelled to come to terms with it.”  
See Ford and Higton, eds., A&(?( (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 523. A similar priority on the 
face of Christ (and similar dependence on the work in D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5) is on hand in Ford, “Apophasis 
and the Shoah: Where was Jesus Christ at Auschuwitz?” in D2.&53&$)5;$,!&$P"6;0$1>">!)(2($)5;$
853)65),2"5, O. Davies and D. Turner, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 185-200. 
Reprinted in Ford, D!)>25*$%!&"."*70$E5*)*&/&5,($25$)$I&.2*2"?($)5;$D&3?.)6$P"6.; (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007), 225-41.  
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A significant burden for Ford’s mature work is to demonstrate why the “the face 
of Christ” provides a necessary alternative to Levinas’s own philosophical concept of 
“face.”
197
 The >)6,23?.)62,7 of Christ, in suffering and death, appears crucial.
198
  
This face as dead matter is like a “black hole” for all familiar and comforting images of 
this event. It sucks into it other reality, represented in the inexhaustible stream of 
metaphors, drawing on every area of creation, and their conceptual elaborations. …If 
this dead face of Jesus is intrinsic to salvation, then there is needed a radical critique of 
concepts of salvation which major on ideas of mutuality, reciprocity, interpersonal 
consciousness or communication, including ‘facing’.
199
 
All human concepts of salvation (even Ford’s own) are unable to escape such critique 
because ).. human possibilities appear to vanish into the vacuum of Christ’s demise. 
Any overflow “for the sake of joy,” at least here, seems to come about "5.7$ through 
divine action to save.
200
 As such, this very particular human face “holds open” the 
possibility of atonement, a “true universal.”
201
 
Nevertheless, through reflection upon Christ’s dead face, the influence of 
Levinas upon Ford also becomes acutely focused.  
I developed Levinas’s concept of substitutionary responsibility in dialogue with Jüngel, 
Bonhoeffer and Ricoeur. That can now be brought to bear here. The dead face resists 
any notion of substitution which is about replacement of the one substituted for and 
which sponsors irresponsibility. Instead, it represents the full person of Jesus Christ, but 
in an absence which demands a comparable responsibility. It signifies silmultaneously 
the ultimate carrying out of responsibility and the complete handing over of it. Before 
this dead face one can recognize both someone who gave himself utterly for God and 
for us, and also the fact that being dead is not a matter of doing anything for us: it is 
being dead for us, being absent for us, being one who creates by his death a .2/2,.&(( 
sphere of responsibility for us.
202
 
Here we can also detect the influence of MacKinnon’s concerns for tragedy and 
atonement. Over and against “any notion of substitution…which sponsors 
                                                 
197 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 8, “Neither Levinas nor Jungel offers a satisfactory account of the worshipping 
self…” See also ibid., 71, “In other words, while of course recognising major unresolved issues, is it 
possible to envisage a Levinnasian Christian theology?” 
198 Ibid., 205, “…the face of the dead Christ, in the context of testimony to his life, death and resurrection, 
is the Christian touchstone for love and power.” 
199 Ibid., 205. 
200 Ibid., “But this is full death for Jesus, and there can be no immanent continuity across it. The only 
continuity is the corpse with this dead face, awaiting a resurrection which…2($?,,&6.7$;?&$,"$G"; giving 
life in body, mind, spirit.” (italics mine). 
201 Ibid., 206, “The dead face therefore holds open the answer to this question: might the particularity of 
this face, dead before God, be the true universal? …Or, more precisely, might death itself be transformed 
by this person undergoing it?” 
202 Ibid., 206, italics mine. 
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irresponsibility,” Christ dies not as “not a matter of doing anything for us.” Instead, the 
result which matters for Ford is “limitless” human responsibility. 
Ford’s mature theology, as it turns out, produces a concept of “facing” Christ 
which is very hard to distinguish from Levinas’s own expressions of messianism. For 
both, human ethical responsibility is the result of God’s “being absent for us” or in 
Levinassian terms “transcendence to the point of absence.”
203
 For both, such 
responsibility becomes preeminent before a face.
204
 For both, such responsibility is the 
reason for critique of Christian substitutionary atonement.
205
 Of course, these 
similarities could be understood as the accomplishment of Ford’s goal to unite the best 
of Levinas and Jüngel; “I want to argue for a substitutionary self, defined by radical 
responsibility, and also for Jesus Christ dying for all.”
206
 Ford’s note on this point 
further makes clear he is not trying to argue against Levinas’s Jewish witness.  
]&,$,!&$>6"B.&/$(2/>.7$3"/&($;"#5$,"$,!2(: Levinas is arguing )*)25(,$Christian 
witness. Levinas can tell us why his messianic expectation 2($5", Christian.
207
 Can Ford 
tell us why his view 2(? P!7$2($2,$2/>"6,)5,$,!),$A&(?($4!62(,$2($,!&$"5&$#!"$;2&($+"6$)..? 
To be sure, Ford consistently holds to the “superabundance” of God’s 
faithfulness in Christ; following discussions of the dead face, he is quick to 
acknowledge “the resurrection as an event than which none better or greater could be 
conceived.”
208
 But for all of his considerable stress on this “God-sized” vindication, we 
struggle to see how Ford understands human responsibility to overflow from more than 
simply exemplifying Christ’s sacrifice. Again Placher writes: 
                                                 
203 See Levinas, “A God ‘Transcendent to the Point of Absence’: Friday, May 21, 1976,” in G";<$=&),!<$
)5;$%2/& (ed. Jacques Rolland; trans. B. Bergo; Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), 224. “…God is not 
simply the first other but other than the other [)?,6&$K?9)?,6?(], other otherwise, other with an alterity 
prior to the alterity of the other person, prior to the ethical compulsion to the neighbor. And transcendent 
to the point of absence, to the point of his possible confusion with the agitation of the ,!&6&$2(” (italics 
orginal). 
204 See Levinas, 1.,&62,7$)5;$%6)5(3&5;&53& (trans. Michael B. Smith; New York: Columbia University, 
1999), 104. “There is, in the face, the supreme authority that commands, and I always say it is the word of 
God. The face is the locus of the word of God. There is the word of God in the other, a nonthematized 
word.” 
205 Levinas clearly leaves no room for any Christian understanding of substitutionary atonement. See 
Levinas, “Messianic Texts,” in =2++23?.,$N6&&;"/0$E(()7($"5$A?;)2(/$B7$E//)5?&.$J&@25)( (trans. S. 
Hand; London: Althone, 1990), 89. “The fact of not evading the burden imposed by the suffering of 
others defines ipseity itself. All persons are the Messiah.”  
206 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 68. 
207 Levinas, “Messianic Texts,” 90. “Messianism is therefore not the certainty of the coming of a man 
who stops History. It is my power to bear the suffering of all. It is the moment when I recognize this 
power and my universal responsibility.” 
208 Ibid., 210. 
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I believe that we can take on such responsibility joyfully only because we know that we 
will be forgiven our mistakes—in what Calvin called Christian freedom—and that it is 
Jesus’ life, death and resurrection that makes that confidence possible. I think Ford 
believes that too. But, while he is suspicious of a good many traditional concepts of 
substitutionary atonement, I’m not sure what he has put in their place.
209
 
On this issue, Ford’s mature theology lacks clarity which appears in his earlier work: 
Resurrection is God’s way of referring back Jesus to the world…It is not a neutral, 
amoral fact about what happened to a corpse. It climaxes the pattern of responsibility 
between man and God. God takes responsibility for everything, the resurrection is an 
initiative of God alone, but he gives back a new responsibility. For the disciples the 
resurrection was an experience of joy and vocation together. There is the joyful freedom 
of complete forgiveness and acceptance in the welcome of Jesus, and the .2/2,.&(($
6&(>"5(2B2.2,7 of mission to the whole world.
210
 
A?B2.),&’s proclamation of Christ$ is not difficult to differentiate from that of 
Levinas. Exactly because “God takes responsibility for everything” humanity is 
therefore enabled to become newly responsible for “mission to the whole world.” 
A?B2.),&$also appears more clear on the necessity of God’s confrontation in Christ with 
human sin which is “opposed from the inside by suffering it, embodying it, and going to 
the roots of it as the perversion of respect…”
211
 Thus, who God is in Christ produces 
the overflow of responsibility “for the sake of joy.” 
                                                
D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5 instead draws heavily upon Ricoeur to develop further how 
such overflow happens. But on the above issues Ricoeur is really not of much help, 
even if agreement is found with the critique of Levinas offered in :5&(&.+$)($15",!&6. 
Such critique still cannot overcome that which ultimately underlies it: Ricoeur’s own 
inclination toward Hegelian reliance on a trinitarian economy made +?..7$present and 
manifest B7 humanity’s power to actualize its own identity as faith’s rationale.
212
 To 
 
209 Placher, review, 823. 
210 A?B2.),&, 158, 159 (126), italics mine. 
211 A?B2.),&, 119 (94). 
212 Paul Ricoeur, 462,2K?&$)5;$4"5@23,2"5 (New York, Columbia University, 1998), 152, “The 
proclamation: ‘It is true; the Lord has risen’ (Luke 24: 34) seems to me in its affirmative vigor to go 
beyond its investment in the imaginary of faith. Is it not in the quality of this death that the beginning of 
the sense of the resurrection resides? …It is here that, perhaps once again pressured by the philosopher in 
me, 8$)/$,&/>,&;<$+".."#25*$M&*&.<$,"$?5;&6(,)5;$,!&$6&(?66&3,2"5$)($6&(?66&3,2"5$25$,!&$4!62(,2)5$
3"//?52,7<$#!23!$B&3"/&($,!&$B";7$"+$,!&$.2@25*$4!62(,U The resurrection would consist in having a body 
other than the physical body, that is to say, acquiring a historical body. Am I entirely unorthodox in 
thinking this?” (italics mine). John Milbank provides a nuanced response to such Hegelian “temptation” 
regarding the result of Christ’s death in %!&$P"6;$');&$D,6)5*&0$%!&"."*7<$J)5*?)*&<$4?.,?6& (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), 184, “Here one should certainly reject [Hegel’s] idea that a fully rational presence can 
finally grasp all aesthetic content, but at the same time one should not ignore what can be salvaged from 
Hegel’s attempt to conceive of a work of the Holy Spirit that is more than mere application of the work of 
Christ. What is vital is his pneumatological reformulation of the problematic of atonement.” See also 
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whatever degree we find the identity of one human self as and in another, Christian faith 
has no resources to conceive of something like this interpenetration of identity apart 
from sharing in the overflow which is the divine atonement in the incarnate Christ, 
made possible not by the spirit of humanity itself, but by the power of the Holy Spirit 
sustaining the Godhead &@&5 as the Father allows the suffering of the Son. Furthermore, 
Christian faith traditionally believes a lot more about what happened between the cross 
and Pentecost than Ricoeur himself can acknowledge.
213
 
Properly proposing ,!2( overflow—herein meaning how humanity shares in 
resurrection and the defeat of evil, sin and suffering as the most improbable result of the 
cross—has always taxed the Christian imagination. This is exactly what has led Ford to 
the synecdoche of Christ’s dead face. 
Death is where the category of historical action fails…. And in meditating on the 
transition from death to resurrection imagination fails too. So the dead face is an 
imaginative sign of the unimaginable. I found thinking about the dead face the most 
demanding part of the book.
214
 
In imagining the unimaginable, Ford is looking to find Ricoeur’s “icon that is not an 
idol,” the image of Christ’s person which transforms us into that same image.
215
 But if 
Christ’s death is truly “not a matter of doing anything for us” then this image only 
becomes at best the supreme pattern of human sacrifice. Such a rendering of Christ’s 
face hardly takes us beyond Levinas.
216
 Nor does it adequately address the reality of 
human unfaithfulness and irresponsibility in sin. Instead, it leaves Ford struggling to 
provide a clear account of how faith )3,?)..7$"@&6+."#( human experience in any kind of 
discernible excess or superabundance.$ Why? Because the manner in which Ford 
consistently criticizes substitutionary atonement, developed with MacKinnon in the 
background and Levinas to the fore, undermines any expectation of God’s own self-
expression of human faithfulness through Christ. We can hardly imagine why human 
                                                                                                                                               
Colin Gunton, %!&$:5&<$,!&$%!6&&$)5;$,!&$')570$G";<$46&),2"5<$)5;$,!&$4?.,?6&$"+$'";&652,7 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), 147-48. 
213 462,2K?&$)5;$4"5@23,2"5, 154, “This brings me to say that I do not finally know what happened 
between the Cross and Pentecost. …I know nothing of the resurrection as an event, as peripeteia, as 
turning point.” 
214 “Response to Webster,” 570. 
215 Ricoeur cited by Ford, op. cit. 
216 Michael Purcell, J&@25)($)5;$%!&"."*7, 162, “This is perhaps as far as we can go with Levinas. The 
person of Jesus serves as an example of what the human is and is called to be; the proximity and presence 
of God in the world can only be articulated in terms of the neighbour and the responsibility and justice 
which this provokes.” 
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responsibility is for “the sake of joy” if Christ’s death has simply rendered such 
responsibility the “limitless” condition of human existence. 
For atonement to have any meaning as the response of a faithful God to the 
suffering of humanity, Christian theology must always argue that there is more to the 
cross than !"# it meets the eye.
 217
 John Milbank writes, 
Under the dispensation of death, we only see gift via sacrifice, but the genuine sacrifice, 
supremely that of the cross, is only recognized as such in so far as it is the (?(,)2525* of 
joyful, non-reactive giving, by a hastening of death as the only way of continuing to 
give despite the cancellation of gift by death.
218
 
This appears to be the kind of “recognition” Ford’s work strives for—a presentation of 
christology as overflowing the death and destruction of sacrifice without perpetuating 
the very problems which make this sacrifice a necessity. Ford’s facing concept, in this 
sense, rightly depends on recognizing !"# God acts for humanity in Christ. 
However, Ford never adequately addresses how this recognition itself is 
necessarily realized through #!" God is for humanity in Christ. This finally requires an 
expression of both human and divine identity in atonement which is less vague and 
elusive than that to which Ford clings. D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5 asserts that, “the Father also 
faces the Son, the transformative overflow of which is the Holy Spirit,” but never goes 
on to explains why ,!2( facing and ,!2( overflow really matter.
219
 Without a more 
developed and integrated account of God as trinity than what Ford gives there is little 
way to expect that “facing the face of Christ” is anything more than our own response to 
suffering.
220
 For we are ultimately left to confess the cross and resurrection as little “for 
                                                 
217 George Lindbeck, “Atonement & the Hermeneutics of Intratextual Social Embodiment” in %!&$F),?6&$
"+$4"5+&((2"5, Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1996), 
221-240 (238), “…we need to remember that the atonement message, though necessary, is not a sufficient 
condition for "@&6+."#25* fruits of faith and works of love. There are ways of preaching that message 
which foster a narrow love of a little Jesus. The history of the church is full of such distortions, and while 
these are by no means only in the West, it is there that most of us are chiefly aware of them. Cross-
centered medieval piety and later Prostestant conversionism affirmed that there is no forgiveness of sins 
apart from Christ’s death on the cross, and yet also often fell into the Pelagian trap of speaking as if the 
reception of that forgiveness were made possible only through one’s own &,!23)., religious or emotional 
good works.” (italics mine). 
218 John Milbank, %!&$P"6;$');&$D,6)5*&0$%!&"."*7<$J)5*?)*&<$4?.,?6& (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
228. 
219 D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 214. 
220 Webster, “Review of Ford,” 553, labels Ford’s approach “a description which concentrates largely on 
Christianity as a form of human life or religion, and only secondarily or derivatively is it concerned with 
God 25$(&.” In “Response to Webster”, 572-3, Ford asserts that D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5’s first chapter reference 
of Dante’s -)6);2(" “sensitively transcends the split between God >6"$5"B2( and God 25$(&$about which 
Webster is worried.” Even if this addresses Webster’s concern (surely doubtful!), I find it unlikely to 
serve as an effective way for Ford to differentiate the Christian God from the transcendence of the divine 
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us” besides an example which simply validates the ethical priority Levinas maintains 
over worship in general and Christian faith in particular.
221
  
 
 
 
 
 
in Levinas (cf. “A God ‘Transcendent to the Point of Absence’,” op. cit.), which is exactly, I argue, 
Ford’s task in accounting for Christian faith through the face of Christ.   
221 Ford, “Response to Webster,” 573. “…if the glory and freedom of God 25$(& are in fact clearly 
indicated in the opening meditation and elsewhere, then it is appropriate for a theology of salvation to get 
on with its proper task. That task is seen in the book as not a doctrine of the Trinity but dealing with God 
for us, and salvation in human reality—including morality and experience.” Again, in line with Webster, 
this is my concern: exactly how 3.&)6.7 has Ford indicated the glory and freedom of God 25$(&? Without 
this clear indicative, how well can Ford move on with the “proper task” of “dealing with God for us”? 
 176
~6~  
 
Lament, Praise and the Reality of Christ’s Atonement: Faith as 
Human Participation in the Trinitarian Response to Suffering 
 
 
Our final chapter pursues a two-fold goal. We will further clarify problems 
identified in the respective theological approaches of Walter Brueggemann and David 
Ford, and we will also keep in mind their insistent concern over human suffering as we 
begin to articulate a way forward beyond their proposals for faith as lament and praise.  
Up to this point, we have largely focused on the issues with respect to the theologians 
individually, identifying the unique role which lament and praise plays in the 
developing thought of both. We have seen Brueggemann approach the problem of 
suffering through biblical scholarship on the lament psalms and argue that human pain 
is the main question of Old Testament theology. Lament as it characterizes scriptural 
testimony of suffering subsequently influences his theological account of Israel’s God 
and the New Testament proclamation of God in Christ. Alternatively, Ford begins with 
the theological centrality of praise in response to God’s faithfulness to redeem creation 
through Christ. His expectation that faith “overflows…for the sake of joy” is 
subsequently proposed in relationship to the suffering which faith cannot ignore but, 
indeed, “faces”$in the New Testament accounts of Christ crucified, dead and buried.  
These two proposals shape our examination of faith amidst suffering through the 
interrelationship of two particular concerns: first, the theological nature of the biblical 
relationship B&,#&&5 lament and praise, and second, !"#$,!2($6&.),2"5(!2>$6&.),&($to the 
suffering person and work of Christ. While we have seen Brueggemann’s proposal 
primarily as a development of the first concern, and Ford’s primarily as a development 
of the second, both issues clearly come into play by bringing the work of these two 
theologians together. Examining Brueggemann’s aim to recover lament as a Christian 
&S>6&((2"5 alongside Ford’s aim to articulate praise and joy as a central &S>&3,),2"5 of 
Christian faith parallels the textual relationship proposed by Brueggemann’s earliest 
scholarship on the typical dual form of Israel’s lament psalms.
1
 Likewise, though we 
have drawn a theological contrast between the ,&5(2"5 of faith which Brueggemann 
eventually derives from this biblical form and Ford’s own emphasis on Christian faith 
                                                 
1 See Brueggemann, “From Hurt to Joy,” 71, 77, and 83. 
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"@&6+."#25* in praise and joy, we also consistently observe that both understand the 
passion and resurrection of Christ to manifest their respective approaches to faith.  
Our previous critique of Brueggemann and Ford has thus focused on how both 
propose that human response to suffering is transformed by God’s response to humanity 
through Christ. This chapter further clarifies this concern by briefly revisiting the work 
of Brueggemann’s predecessor, Claus Westermann, to illustrate how lament and praise 
relate to the way in which theology construes Christ’s person and work. We then 
develop the implications of Brueggemann and Ford’s mutual failure to treat suffering in 
conjunction with the universality of sin and consequent human involvement in the 
persistence of evil in creation. We argue that a trinitarian understanding of Christ’s 
atonement is necessary to propose how God confronts B",! suffering )5; sin thereby 
producing faithful human response. We consider this alternative in conversation with 
Colin Gunton’s account of atonement as pneumatological participation in Christ’s own 
human response to suffering. Though we affirm Gunton’s ultimate conclusion that the 
triune God’s faithfulness in Christ, mediated by the Holy Spirit, transforms humanity in 
joyful expectation of praise, we also assert that his identification of Christ’s cry from 
the cross (".&.7 with human sin problematically obscures the identification of Christ’s 
humanity with the suffering expressed in lament. We conclude by arguing that a 
trinitarian theology of praise cannot be understood apart from either who God is in 
Christ’s atonement or how the atoning Christ is humanly faithful in lament. 
 
I. Atonement for Sin or Suffering? Revisiting Westermann’s Concern and the 
Work of Christ as Proposed by Brueggemann and Ford 
 
 As noted in our first chapter, Brueggemann’s initial article on lament appears 
alongside Westermann’s programmatic “The Role of Lament in the Old Testament” in 
the same 1974 issue of 85,&6>6&,),2"5. Westermann there argues that the New Testament 
does not exclude lament from Christian faith, and he critiques theology which 
emphasizes Christ’s atonement for sin all the while ignoring ongoing human suffering.   
…in Christian dogmatics and in Christian worship suffering as opposed to sin has 
receded far into the background: Jesus Christ’s work of salvation has to do with the 
forgiveness of sins and with eternal life; it does not deal however with ending human 
suffering. Here we see the real reason why the lament has been dropped from Christian 
prayer. The believing Christian should bear his suffering patiently; he should not 
complain about it to God. The “sufferings of this world” are unimportant and 
 178
insignificant. What is important is the guilt of sin. …We must now ask whether Paul 
and Pauline oriented theology has not understood the work of Christ in a onesided 
manner. 
…On the basis of these observations we would have to decide anew whether the 
onesidedness of relating the work of Christ to sin alone, to the exclusion of any relation 
to man’s suffering, actually represents the New Testament as a whole and, if so, 
whether that understanding would not have to be corrected by the Old Testament. A 
correction of this sort would have far-reaching consequences. One of these would be 
that the lament, as the language of suffering, would receive a legitimate place in 
Christian worship, as it had in the worship of the Old Testament.
2
 
We have observed that Brueggemann’s consistent engagement with Israel’s lament 
throughout the development of his biblical theology pursues the very type of correction 
called for by Westermann. Yet suffering in Christian theology also remains an evident 
concern throughout the development of David Ford’s work, particularly in reference to 
his engagement with the New Testament. While Westermann above criticizes Pauline 
theology for one-sidedly emphasizing the problem of sin over suffering, Ford’s 2 
Corinthians commentary with Young presents Paul’s image of the face of Christ as a 
central christological proposal for confronting suffering.
3
 Westermann’s above concern 
about faith which must bear “suffering patiently” and “not complain to God about it” is 
also at hand as Ford’s article for MacKinnon’s festschrift reflects on the life of Paul as 
“sorrowful, yet always rejoicing.” 
Indeed, I want to argue that 2 Corinthians show the tragic being taken into a 
transformation which sharpens rather than negates it, while yet rendering the category 
of tragic inadequate by itself. …The case is as follows. Paul is acutely aware as 
MacKinnon of the dangers of a triumphalist understanding of the Resurrection. …The 
Resurrection is not simply the reversal of death, leaving death behind it. Paul “carries in 
the body the death of Jesus” (4:10): the Resurrection message has sent him even more 
deeply into contingency, weakness and suffering. It is atonement whose power is to 
allow him to stay close to, even immersed in, the tragic depths of life.
4
 
The atonement theology offered here is not a refusal to face ongoing human suffering, 
but, as Ford goes on to develop in D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, exactly the opposite; “…the face 
                                                 
2 Westermann, “The Role of Lament,” 33, 34.  
3 Young and Ford, '&)525*$)5;$%6?,!$25$C$4"625,!2)5(,  249, “The face of Christ represents the subject 
of the events of crucifixion and resurrection. It transcends paradox but yet inconceivably holds together 
suffering, sin, death and God. These have to be thought together, according to this gospel, but there is no 
concept or image that can do it except this name and face.” See also Ford’s comments on p. 245, the cross 
“wages war on ways of seeing God that have not passed through the inconceivable, this death. To insulate 
God from weakness, suffering, sin, poverty and death is no longer possible.” 
4 Ford, “Tragedy and Atonement,” 123. 
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of the dead Christ, in the context of testimony to his life, death and resurrection, is the 
Christian touchstone for love and power.”
5
 
 Clearly, neither Brueggemann in his emphasis on lament, nor Ford in his priority 
on praise and joy, downplay or evade human suffering in either their account of 
scripture or their understanding of Christ. Yet our focus has also remained on how both 
propose suffering to be transformed by God’s faithfulness through Christ’s person and 
work. Westermann, despite his critique, does not entirely lose traditional concepts of 
atonement as sacrifice or divine judgment of sin from view; his article on lament 
concludes that renewed biblical understanding of suffering in Christian theology is 
necessary to articulate “a history which ultimately reaches the point where God, as the 
God of judgment, suffers +"6 his people.”
6
 Our scrutiny of Brueggemann and Ford has 
ultimately focused in on precisely this issue: how do both understand ,!&$5&3&((2,7$"+$
4!62(,$)($G";9($"#5$+)2,!+?.$6&(>"5(&$,"$(?++&625*$"5$"?6$B&!).+? 
 On the one hand, the nature of divine faithfulness has emerged as our concern 
with Brueggemann’s proposal. His early lament scholarship builds on Westermann’s 
observation that biblical faith takes shape in human expressions of suffering 
characteristically followed by human praise and/or thanksgiving for divine response. As 
his theology matures he argues that the rhetorical tension between these dual aspects 
does not simply function to shape human experience in faith. Instead, Brueggemann 
concludes that the form reveals an irresolute nature within God and the possibility that 
the sovereign God of scripture may be unresolved in fidelity towards creation. We have 
argued that this complicates how the Old Testament can be meaningfully understood to 
express the expectation that God +)2,!+?..7$6&(>"5;($,"$.)/&5,.  
 This interpretive approach makes Brueggemann’s theological understanding of 
the New Testament even more problematic. He asserts that “the unresolve [(23] is as 
profound in the New Testament as in the Old,”
7
 and the basis behind such a claim lies 
in his biblical interpretation of Christ’s passion. “There is a sense that Sunday resolves 
Friday, that the core testimony resolves the countertestimony…But in our honest 
reading of the New Testament, and in our honest liturgic reckoning, the Friday of 
negativity persists to make its claim.”
8
 Brueggemann here goes beyond merely 
                                                 
5 Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 205. 
6 Westermann, “The Role of Lament,” 38, italics mine. 
7 Brueggemann, %!&"."*7$"+$,!&$:.;$%&(,)/&5,, 403. 
8 Ibid. 
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accounting for the gravity of Christ’s dereliction and crucifixion; he actually describes 
the gospel narratives concerning the cross as “countertestimony,” the same concept with 
which he classifies aspects of scripture as human rhetoric )*)25(,$ G";. Such an 
understanding, we have argued, obscures any understanding of Christ’s atonement )($
),"5&/&5, and makes it difficult to understand the New Testament on its own terms, as 
surprising, even shocking, testimony expressing what God is doing #2,!25$the suffering 
work of Christ ,"$6&;&&/$!?/)52,7.  
 On the other hand, Ford’s theology proposes divine faithfulness through Christ, 
especially amidst suffering and death, as that which explicitly generates Christian joy 
and praise of God. While Ford never acutely focuses on lament, his treatment of praise 
in relation to suffering can be readily joined with Westermann’s biblical observation 
that the New Testament does not exclude lament from Christian faith and with 
Brueggemann’s own biblical scholarship on lament. Nevertheless, our concern with 
Ford lies in how he understands faith to arise through God’s own expression of human 
faithfulness in Christ. By Ford’s account, the innovative presentation of Christ’s person 
through his face leaves vague the nature of his work. We have thus argued that Ford 
struggles to explain why Christ faith “overflows” in praise and joy amidst suffering 
because he does not articulate clearly what Christian faith should expect as a result of 
the person of Christ facing suffering and death +"6$?(.  
 While neither Brueggemann nor Ford fail to describe christology in terms of 
suffering, we have found the former’s theology of lament to present an inadequate 
account of how God in Christ suffers #2,!$?(. The latter’s theology of praise and joy has 
been proposed to overcome this problem, but we have still found that Ford presents an 
inadequate account of how God in Christ suffers +"6$?(. We will now further develop 
both of these problems in their mutual misunderstanding of Christ’s person and work in 
atonement. Notably missing from Brueggemann and Ford’s respective accounts of faith 
is any significant notion of God’s own confrontation in Christ with evil which humanity 
is finally unable to face within, and not just without, itself. Even as both may be seen to 
address Westermann’s concern about suffering, their proposals appear to invert the 
problem in relation to sin: theological priority on the suffering of Christ for 
Brueggemann and Ford now threatens to overshadow and obscure any notion of Christ’s 
work on behalf of sinful humanity. For both, atonement for sin more or less takes the 
place which Westermann finds suffering to occupy often in earlier Christian 
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formulations of atonement, that which is “unimportant and insignificant.” How then 
does this affect how both understand faith to transform human response in lament and 
praise? 
  
 
II. Confronting Suffering and Sin: Faith and the Necessity of God’s Own Human 
Response in Christ 
 
 We have observed in previous chapters that Brueggemann and Ford tend to 
account for the transforming person and work of Christ subjectively, in relation to 
human experience and as a moral example. Christian faith is thus portrayed as more or 
less the result of !"# humanity responds to the >&6("5$of Christ, whether by following 
him to “maintain the tension” found expressed in the lament psalms or “facing the face 
of Christ” for the sake of joy.  The suffering, death and resurrection of Christ is 
construed as example or pattern, and in Brueggemann’s case, the person of Christ as 
God #2,!$?( in faithfulness becomes obscured while for Ford, the work of God$in Christ 
+"6$!?/)52,7 remains significantly unclear.   
 Colin Gunton, whose trinitarian theology we examine in more detail below, 
presents an alternative view in his work %!&$ 13,?).2,7$ "+$ 1,"5&/&5,. He argues that 
these kinds of accounts obscure a proper understanding of God and humanity in 
relationship to evil and suffering. He reflects on the issue alongside the theology of 
Anselm and MacKinnon. 
In his ‘Subjective and Objective Conceptions of Atonement’…Donald MacKinnon 
argues that the crucial weakness of subjective theologies of the atonement is that they 
trivialize evil. Anselm has a similar point with his ‘Have you not considered how great 
is the weight of sin?’ (4?6$=&?($M"/"$ I, xxi). Although Anselm’s may, as has been 
remarked already, appear to be a rather quantitative way of putting the matter, it draws 
attention to the fact that the human condition is too enmeshed in evil to be able to be 
restored by its own agency. Forgiveness is not, therefore, simply a matter of 
omnipotence: something God can do simply because he wants to. A mere declaration 
changes nothing. …The point could be reinforced by a discussion of the concept of sin 
which is implied in any of the three metaphors of atonement, although it is done most 
easily by a reference to the discussion of the demonic. On such an account, sin is 
slavery, and slavery is not abolished by appeals to follow a good example.
9
  
                                                 
9 Colin E. Gunton,  %!&$13,?).2,7$"+$1,"5&/&5,0$1$D,?;7$"+$'&,)>!"6<$I),2"5).2,7$)5;$,!&$4!62(,2)5$
%6);2,2"5 (London: T&T Clark, 1988), 159. Gunton cites MacKinnon, “Subjective and Objective 
Conceptions of Atonement,” in -6"(>&3,$+"6$%!&"."*70$E(()7($25$M"5"?6$"+$MUMU$N)6/&6, ed. F.G. 
Healey (Welwyn: Nisbet, 1966), 167-182. 
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Gunton demonstrates that the problem of evil which Christ’s atonement addresses is one 
in which the seriousness of suffering in the world cannot be separated from human 
perpetuation of suffering in sin. In this sense, atonement is first and foremost 
understood to reconcile the disruption of relationship between creation and Creator 
thereby becoming the means for a new, redeemed creationU “By virtue of both truths, 
that the problem is one that we cannot solve and that our being clean and free and 
upright is the gift of the creator, there needs to be a recreative, redemptive divine 
initiative in which the root of the problem, the disrupted personal relationship, is set to 
rights.”
10
  
 Gunton also asserts that both of these truths—the gift of God’s faithful response 
in Christ and its incarnational necessity on behalf of our own human unfaithfulness—
become obscured when the issue of suffering overtakes the focus of atonement. 
On the one hand, it tends to reduce atonement to theodicy: as if the problem is not 
human offence and sin, but the evil for which God is in some sense responsible…. On 
the other hand, it calls attention away from the fact that atonement is also a human act, 
an act, that is, of the incarnate Son whose life, death and resurrection realise, in the 
Spirit, a human conquest of evil which those who come to God through him may 
subsequently share. To place the weight on a suffering God deprives the incarnate Son 
of his proper work…
11
 
Over and against that which he calls the “perils of the current fashion” regarding 
suffering and christology, any theology of atonement, for Gunton, must approach the 
problem of evil primarily by proclaiming who the triune God is for humanity in Christ, 
who we are in sin, and how redemption of the latter is a result of the former.
12
 
 The above two-fold critique parallels our previous concerns about the respective 
christologies of Brueggemann and Ford in relation to suffering. For Brueggemann, 
human pain and God’s response to it are central issues of biblical theology,
13
 and we 
have traced how his method for interpreting scriptural rhetoric produces an eventual 
conclusion that “amibivalence” is the theological reality which “drives the very life of 
the divine.”
14
 In this context any meaningful expectation that God responds faithfully to 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 160. 
11 Gunton, “Atonement and the Project of Creation” in %!&$-6"/2(&$"+$%6252,)62)5$%!&"."*7 (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 2004), 192. 
12 Gunton, “Epilogue” in O&3"/25*$)5;$O&25*0$%!&$="3,625&$"+$G";$25$4!)6.&($M)6(!"65&$)5;$X)6.$
O)6,! (London: SCM, 2001), 225. 
13 See Ch. 2 above, Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I,” 19, “The issue that Israel 
and Israel’s God (and those who continue this line of reflection) must always face concerns pain…” 
14 Linafelt and Beal, “Introduction,” G";$25$,!&$N6)7, 4-5, “In short, disorientation encompasses both 
threat and promise, and it is impossible to have one without the other….The refusal to choose constitutes 
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lament seems to collapse, as does New Testament affirmation of the work of Christ on 
the cross as faithful divine response for all suffering. Both instead function as 
3"?5,&6testimony against God, with the complaint of lament becoming obscured as +)2,!$
25$ G";, and the cross becoming obscured as G";9($ ?52@&6().$ ),"525*$ 6&(>"5(&. 
However, a very problematic kind of theodicy could be said to emerge in atonement’s 
place: if the cross can be interpreted as something other than divine faithfulness through 
the humanity of Christ, then there is little reason why it might not be a countertestimony 
of God’s responsibility for human suffering.   
 On the other hand, Ford’s concept of “facing” Christ in suffering and death 
emerges as a critique of substitutionary atonement in the light of his concern that 
Christian worship not be divided from ethical response to the world. Atonement as a 
human act thus results not distinctly from who the triune God is in the incarnate Christ 
but rather from accounts of this perspective (i.e. Ford’s dialogues with Jüngel and, to a 
much less developed degree, Dalferth) and accounts of philosophical ethics (i.e. Ford’s 
dialogues with Levinas and Ricoeur) presented in dialogue on &K?).$"5,"."*23).$*6"?5;. 
Therefore, Ford’s own theological footing, by his own intent, and especially in regard to 
Christ’s person, is unavoidably unstable, a deliberate choice to be vague about the 
nature of God’s work in Christ rather than risking any overview which might be 
perceived to be dogmatic and thereby, on Ford’s account, undercut human responsibility 
to follow Christ’s example.  
Nevertheless, we could anticipate Brueggemann and Ford’s respective responses 
to such critique. Brueggemann’s objection would likely arise from the interrelationship 
of scripture and theology. Can a more theological account of scripture allow the text to 
truly “testify” and “speak,” or does it merely silence and cover over the unsettling 
reality of God which Brueggemann believes to be a “certain… and inescapable” result 
of his approach to biblical interpretation? 
15
 Kevin Vanhoozer’s recent proposal on 
Christian doctrine shows why such a question presents a false choice: 
Brueggemann is partly right: we cannot get “behind” the biblical discourse, to history or 
ontology for instance, to “check and see” if what the text says corresponds to the way 
God is outside the text. Where he…goes wrong is in treating the biblical text as human 
                                                                                                                                               
the fundamental ambivalence of God, an ambivalence that is never resolved in some middle-ground 
synthesis but instead reels back and forth between the two. Walter Brueggemann has understood more 
than anyone that this tension, this fiercely imagined disjunction, is what drives the life of the divine…” 
15 Brueggemann, %:%, 750, “Testimony leads reality and makes a decision for a 3&6,)25 kind of reality 
both possible and 25&(3)>)B.&.” (italics mine). See also ibid., 125, nt. 18. 
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testimony only. Happily, we need not choose between God as an abstract idea and God 
as a pattern of cultural practice. An alternative conception, drawn from [Vanhoozer’s] 
previous theo-dramatic analysis of the gospel, sees God as a communicative agent. It is 
God’s triune speech and action that generate Israel’s (and the church’s) practices, and 
not the reverse. N?6,!&6/"6&<$G";$!2/(&.+$2($)$/&/B&6$"+$,!&$.25*?2(,23$3"//?52,7$,!),$
253.?;&($8(6)&.$)5;$,!&$3!?63!. This is not at all to say that God is an “object” in our 
world; God is not a being that can be encompassed by space and time. But this does not 
mean that God cannot exercise speech agency. When God speaks, he is present as the 
one who transcends (is ontologically distinct from) the world order.
16
  
Notably, the divine ontological distinction made by Vanhoozer here is similar to a point 
Fretheim makes about Israel’s God in his own critique of Brueggemann.
17
 Without 
theological or doctrinal “criteria” for distinguishing between the various biblical 
portrayals of God, “)..$talk about Israel’s unsettling testimony regarding God is called 
into question.”
18
 
For his part, Ford might argue that his “facing” concept already encompasses a 
proper theological priority on the work of Christ’s suffering for humanity: “Any 
vagueness is not so much because of abstraction or generality but because of the utter 
particularity of this face’s relating to each face.”
19
 However, what appears to govern the 
particularity at work here is not so much the triune God’s incarnation as the human 
Christ but rather the relationship of Christ to every human particularity. Discussion of 
atonement thus shifts from divine initiative to human response without much accounting 
for how the latter is made possible by the former in faith; again, “to be vague (in the 
sense of eluding definitions which try to avoid the richness of its infinitely particular 
relationships) is intrinsic to its reality.”
20
 So, when Ford explains the confrontation of 
suffering and death, sin and evil in terms of humanity related to Christ, we do not know, 
B&7"5;$ ,!&$ >6&(&5,),2"5$ "+$ 4!62(,9($ >)6,23?.)6$ !?/)5$ &S)/>.&, why this atoning 
relationship is really necessary or what it means. As Ford writes, “God is free to take an 
initiative in order to lead us into worship from our side. Jesus is God 25$)$#)7$#!23!$
                                                 
16 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, =6)/)$"+$="3,625&0$1$4)5"523).RJ25*?2(,23$1>>6")3!$,"$4!62(,2)5$%!&"."*7 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 99, italics original. 
17 See op. cit., Ch. 3 above, Fretheim, “Some Reflections,” 27, “The biblical God is transcendent #2,!25$
relationship (never ‘above’ it); the God active ‘in the fray’ and ‘embracing  pain’ is so engaged as the  
immanent )5;$transcendent one. The goodness of God is revealed precisely in ,!),$God wills—once and 
for all…to enter into the fray and B7$,!&$#)7$25$#!23!$God embraces the pain: steadfast in love, faithful to 
promises, and unwaveringly willing the salvation of Israel and world.” (italics original). 
18 Ibid., 34-5. 
19 Ford, D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, 175-6. 
20 Ibid., 176. 
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,&..($ ?($ !"# to worship God. He embodies the facing of God and the facing of 
humanity.”
21
 We finally can’t know why &/B";2/&5, is more than &S&/>.2+23),2"5 here. 
 Again, what is missing in both Brueggemann and Ford is any real notion of 
human sin as a problem or complication for human faith response as lament or praise. 
Gunton stresses that atonement cannot be proposed “at the cost of denying subjective 
and exemplary implications,”
22
 but he more precisely argues that “without prefacing, 
for example, the exhortations to follow Jesus with a theological account, expounding his 
saving significance on the basis of which imitation is 6&)("5)B.& (Rom 12.1 again), the 
imitation hangs in the air.”
23
 This issue surfaces in the work of Patrick Miller, 
Brueggemann’s frequent editor and himself a noted expert on lament, though he clearly 
aims to account for Christ’s own lament in relationship to suffering )5; sin. 
When the New Testament hears the laments in Jesus’ voice, this is not simply a 
prophetic and messianic move. Something even more fundamental is going on. For 
what it means is that all the cries for help that have come forth and still come forth from 
human lips, all the laments that we have uttered and will utter, are taken up in the 
laments of Christ. …the lament opens to us not only the meaning of the >&6("5 of 
Christ. The lament is also critical for understanding ,!&$#"6L$"+$G"; in Jesus Christ, for 
it is our chief clue that Christ died not simply as one "+$us but also as one +"6$us, both 
#2,!$us and 25$ "?6$ B&!).+. As we hear our human voice of lament on the lips of the 
dying Jesus, it now becomes crystal clear: Jesus dies for our (?++&625*$as much as for 
our (25(.
24
 
Miller, unlike Brueggemann, does not tend to shy away from explicitly affirming divine 
faithfulness through Christ’s humanity as it has traditionally shaped Christian theology. 
He also appears more explicit than Ford on the nature of Christ’s atonement for sin all 
the while still emphasizing Christ’s confrontation with suffering. Even so, the problem 
arises when Miller employs a concept very familiar to Ford to explain how Christian 
prayer takes suffering seriously through lament. 
As the lament becomes the voice of Christ, therefore, three things happen that now shape our 
own prayer: 
1. In his own praying, Jesus exemplifies the depths of despair and forsakenness and 
also the profoundest and simplest trust that hands over one’s life and story, one’s 
suffering and hopelessness, into the hands of God… 
2. But to hear these prayers now in the voice of Christ radically transforms our 
suffering and changes its face. The face of suffering for us is now the face of 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 214, italics mine. 
22 Gunton, %!&$13,?).2,7$"+$1,"5&/&5,, 157. 
23 Ibid., 158. 
24 Miller, “Heaven’s Prisoners: The Lament as Christian Prayer,” in J)/&5,0$I&3.)2/25*$-6)3,23&($25$
-?.>2,<$-&#<$)5;$-?B.23$DK?)6&, Sally A. Brown and Patrick D. Miller, eds. (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2005), 15-26, here 20, 21, italics original. 
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Christ. It is no less real for us than it was for him. But he has walked that way 
before us and walked that way for us. So we do not ever walk that way alone… 
3. And if I see now the face of suffering not simply in a mirror but in the face of 
Christ, it is now not my own suffering that I see. It is the suffering of the other. So 
finally Christ teaches us a new mode of crying out, a crying out in behalf of 
others.
25
 
In discussing the face of Christ, Miller argues that Christ goes “before us” and “for us,” 
in a way which “transforms” how we face suffering. Yet, exactly like Ford, Miller 
leaves unclear how Christ actually faces suffering +"6$ ?(, except to argue that 
transformation comes through our experience of his mutuality and moral example 
(“Jesus &S&/>.2+2&(…”; “Christ ,&)3!&(…”). If sin truly complicates how we offer 
lament and praise to God, then Miller’s theology does not adequately explain how God, 
in being #2,!$?( in Christ’s sufferings<$now makes it possible$+"6$?( to follow Christ’s 
example$on behalf of a suffering world. So while Miller moves beyond Brueggemann 
and Ford by hinting at a necessary conception of Christ’s atoning action in terms of both 
suffering )5;$sin, nevertheless, Miller does not adequately work out how atonement for 
both impacts ongoing human response in faith. 
 
III. Examining a Trinitarian Alternative 
  
 A. Gunton’s Proposal: Praise as Result of Participation in Atonement 
 
 In addressing the types of theological problems we see in the proposals of 
Brueggemann and Ford (and also Miller above), much contemporary theology has taken 
up the task of reaffirming Christian faith, in both doxological and ethical response, as 
the result of the triune nature of God.
26
 Gunton’s theology of atonement provides a 
particularly relevant example because his emphasis on atonement for sin proposes 
Christ’s suffering and death not simply to be a forensic or legal transaction, but the 
means of participation in a trinitarian transformation of humanity so that all creation 
may praise the Creator.  This approach allows him to consider human response to 
suffering in relation to the problem of sin, and so we will briefly outline his position in 
order to contrast it with our concerns over Brueggemann and Ford.   
                                                 
25 Ibid., 22-3. 
26 See Christoph Schwöbel, “Introduction: The Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems, 
Tasks,” in %6252,)62)5$%!&"."*7$%";)70$E(()7($"+$=2@25&$O&25*$)5;$13,, C. Schwöbel, ed. (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1995), 1-30.!
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 Much of Gunton’s work on atonement develops his observation that any one 
biblical metaphor for the work of God—conceived as victory, judgment, or sacrifice—
in and through the person of Christ—conceived as human substitute, representative, or 
example—can be overstressed unless each of the metaphors are properly understood to 
“operate with a double focus, on both God and the world.”
27
 To speak of faith 25$Christ 
then is not simply to speak of a possible human response to God; it is a theological 
reality necessarily made possible by who the triune God is in faithfulness.  
In what sense, then, does it follow that God in such a way causes us to be what and who 
we are? The question arises because to say that Jesus is our substitute (albeit as also our 
representative) is to say that through him God re-establishes our life in its orientation to 
its promised perfection. The directedness of our life is now determined not by slavery, 
lawlessness and pollution, but by grace: by the pull of the Spirit to completion rather 
than the pull of sin to dissolution. … So it is in general: the Spirit is God enabling the 
world to be itself, to realise its eschatological perfection.
28
 
God’s atonement for all evil, wrought upon the Cross in Christ the Son, is a reality in 
which sinful humanity >)6,232>),&( through the power of the Holy Spirit. This 
participation is the means by which atonement can be both particular and universal,
29
 
and lived out concretely in the eschatological existence of the church.
30
 
 Gunton argues that this trinitarian priority on human participation in Christ’s 
atonement for sin does not ignore the ongoing reality of evil in the world. He 
acknowledges that participation in Christ is not only pneumatological but also 
eschatological in nature, and so we do 5",$7&, experience all suffering, sin and evil to 
cease. 
There is, to be sure, a sense in which Jesus is the climax of a definitive and final 
victory. Our place really is taken, so that we stand in a new relation to God. O?,$2,$;"&($
5",$+".."#<$)($#&$!)@&$(&&5<$,!),$,!&6&$2($)$/)*23).$,6)5(+"6/),2"5. The past is not so 
much wiped out as made into the basis on which a transformed style of living may take 
shape. The church is the place given by God to be the living space of this new 
formation, but there can be no suggestion that the inherited weight of evil simply 
disappears. Because it remains to bedevil the present, 2,$!)($,"$6&>&),&;.7$B&$.)2;$)(2;&. 
                                                 
27 Gunton, %!&$13,?).2,7$"+$1,"5&/&5,, 160. 
28 Ibid., 167. 
29 Ibid., 170, “It is the function of God the Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, to >)6,23?.)62(& the universal 
redemption in anticipation of the eschatological redemption.$All the metaphors we have considered are in 
some way or other concerned with the creation of space in which the creation has room to breathe and 
expand, to move in freedom to its appointed end. They are specifications of the way in which the 
universal atoning work becomes real.” 
30 Ibid., “The church is called to be that midpoint, the realization in time of the universal redemption and 
the place where the reconciliation of all things is from time to time anticipated.” 
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The church is therefore, it can be argued, no more inherently immune from failure than 
any other human institution or society.
31
 
However, the problem of persistent evil now, apparent even in the church and its 
history, is precisely why the human response of faith must be understood 
pneumatologically, as participation ).6&);7 in God’s redemption in Christ which is not 
yet fully manifest. 
One response to the situation would be that things are so bad that nothing can be done 
about them. In one sense, that is right: the body can be healed only by the Spirit’s 
blowing upon dead bones and clothing them with new flesh. But to appeal to the Spirit 
is also an invitation to hopeful thought and activity.
32
 
Gunton asserts that atonement must be construed as a pneumatological and 
eschatological interplay of each of the metaphors for Christ’s person and work in order 
“to show how the reconciliation between God and the world achieved on the cross may 
take shape in a God-given community ordered to that purpose.”
33
 
How does this reconciliation )3,?)..7$take shape in and through the Church? The 
Holy Spirit makes possible renewed living, amidst all ongoing evil, through mediating 
the victory, judgement and sacrifice accomplished in Christ’s own humanity.  
The victory of Jesus stands behind; its final revelation lies ahead. It is the gift of the 
Spirit to enable anticipations of the final victory to take place in our time. The Spirit 
works not by some automatic or “magical” process, but uses /&)5(—earthly, this-
worldly means like the humanity of Jesus—to make God’s kingdom real among us.
34
 
Christ’s humanity, the means for God’s justice on our behalf, is the basis for God’s 
victory; “[b]ecause [Christ] has undergone judgement for us and in our place, we may 
undergo it as a gift of life rather than a sentence of death.”
35
 The sacrifice by which 
God’s justice is satisfied in the humanity of Christ then becomes the means by which 
the Spirit transforms human response to suffering in faith. “To enter the church is 
therefore to enter a form of community in which the vicarious suffering of Jesus 
becomes the basis for a corresponding form of life, one in which the offence of others is 
borne rather than avenged.”
36
  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 175, italics mine. 
32 Ibid., 177.  
33 Ibid., 177.  
34 Ibid., 179. 
35 Ibid., 185. 
36 Ibid., 190.  
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 The result of this trinitarian approach to atonement is nothing short of the 
Christian life of praise. “In one sense, the church has nothing to do but praise, when that 
word is used to characterise not just the particular acts we call worship, but a whole way 
of being in the world.”
37
 Along these lines, Gunton affirms Hardy and Ford’s work in 
A?B2.),&
38
 and turns to the Psalms to illustrate the primacy of praise.
39
 Yet a trinitarian 
understanding is ultimately necessary. Why? Because, if praise 
is not to appear to evade the reality of evil, it must be construed christologically. God 
hears the world as praise in Christ, by virtue of his sacrifice. The church’s praise is true 
worship when the Spirit empowers it to offer the first fruits of the redeemed creation to 
the Father, in water, bread and wine, and, more generally, in word and music.
40
 
Such is what it means to articulate “the eschatological unity of nature and grace, 
realised in the atoning sacrifice and celebrated in the church’s worship.”
41
 
  
 B. Gunton’s Problem: Suffering and the Question of Participation in Lament  
 
Even in such brief overview, Gunton’s theology demonstrates why a trinitarian 
approach to atonement provides several advantages in proposing how Christian faith 
results from God’s faithfulness in Christ. First, he avoids undue stress on the theological 
aspects of any one traditional view of atonement (as with the exemplarism emphasized 
by Brueggemann, Ford and others) by taking into account each of the metaphors 
expressed through biblical testimony to the person and work of Christ. Second, he aims 
not to “evade the reality of evil” in either sin or suffering by articulating the interplay of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 200. 
38 Ibid., 201, “The centrality of praise both for theology and for the life of the church has been spelled out 
recently in Daniel Hardy and David Ford’s A?B2.),&U$%!&"."*7$25$-6)2(& (1984). Some of their opening 
remarks indicate that praise is the very word for the human response to the atonement. “Praise is...an 
attempt to cope with the abundance of God’s love.” (p. 1). “Praise perfects perfection” (p. 6). It has 
already been remarked that when we explore the death of Jesus with the assistance of the language of 
sacrifice we come to the heart of the being of God, to his perfection… . From one point of view—
christologically—the sacrifice is perfect, complete, once for all. All that is needed for salvation has been 
done. But from another—pnuematologically—in the praise of word and life that perfection awaits 
perfection.” 
39 Ibid., 202, “The scriptures and particularly the Psalms, are witness to the way in which the whole of 
creation shares in the praise of God. It would be a grave mistake, a sign of a captivity to outmoded 
mechanistic views of the universe, to dismiss such expressions as fanciful and primitive. …It is the 
church’s calling, as the community of praise, to share in the creation’s liberation from the bondage to 
decay so that it may obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God. Our worship is incomplete unless it 
offers to the creator, from the midst of our demonised world, the firstfruits of the creation liberated to 
praise its Lord.” 
40 Ibid., 203. 
41 Ibid. 
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the metaphors through theological reflection on God’s faithfulness as Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. Third, by properly relating the testimony of scripture and the theological 
reality of the Trinity, Gunton brings into focus the necessity of understanding all human 
response of faith as pneumatological participation in Christ’s own humanity. This final 
point, while inextricable from the previous two, bears the most relevance for our 
critique of Brueggemann and Ford while still allowing for a theological framework 
which beneficially incorporates their important concerns in relation to suffering. The 
significant advantage of a trinitarian perspective is to proclaim not only how God 
confronts evil +"6$ ?( in Christ, but to explain how that past work for us, through the 
power of the Holy Spirit, becomes precisely the human faithfulness which remains #2,!$
?( amidst our present sinfulness and suffering. Beyond the problematic tension defining 
Brueggemann’s biblical interpretation and the vague face of Ford’s theology, 
participation explains how faith clearly may be understood to “overflow…for the sake 
of joy.” The Spirit’s mediation of Christ’s vicarious humanity truly gives rise to the 
resulting Christian life as praise: “true worship when the Spirit &/>"#&6( it to offer the 
first fruits of the redeemed creation.”
42
 
Nevertheless, Gunton also points out that our participation in Christ is not 
merely pneumatological but eschatological as well. The +?.. redemption of creation now$
clearly remains 5",$7&,, and in apparent contradiction to any understanding of faith as 
life lived in the proclamation of praise, the church not only continues to suffer in and 
through its proclamation but also often seems bound to the perpetuation of suffering 
through the very reality of this practice. We have seen this issue drive much of 
Brueggemann and Ford’s concern over Christian response to suffering. Therefore, if 
“God hears the world as praise in Christ, by virtue of his sacrifice,” then must not we 
also ask about how God hears the laments of the world, especially in view of Gospel 
accounts of Christ’s own lament from the cross? Is our participation in Christ through 
the Spirit only about responding to God in praise, or does it also renew our 
understanding of faith as lament?  
                                                 
42 Op. cit., italics mine. Worship as the human response which results from atonement is insightfully 
explored by Trevor Hart, “Atonement and Worship,” 15@2. 11 no. 3 (1994): 203-14, here 212.  “In 
Christian worship there is )5)/5&(2(, an act of recollection in which the boundaries between past and 
present are somehow transcended, and the same Christ who was crucified and raised once for our 
redemption, and the same Spirit in whose power he was crucified and raised, make themselves present in 
the Church’s midst in transforming power.”  
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Gunton’s approach to this issue is problematic, but not because his theology 
simply ignores suffering. He writes the following about Christ’s utterance of Psalm 22:1 
appearing in the passion narratives of Matthew 27 and Mark 15: 
...Indeed, simply to leave the matter with a statement that God shares our suffering runs 
the risk of affirming suffering, making it in some way the will of God. The point of the 
exercise, rather, is to remove suffering from the creation, not to affirm it or establish it 
as in some way a necessity for God or man. This priority of redemption is undermined, 
if not actively subverted, by any breach of perichoresis; any suggestion that there is a 
rift in God. It seems therefore that the so-called cry of dereliction should not be seen in 
such terms, but as the final episode in the incarnate Son’s total identification of himself, 
through the Spirit, with the lost human condition. Most simply, it is the cry of an 
Israelite expressing the self-distancing of that people from God as the result of their sin, 
the completion of Jesus’ identification with Israel in his baptism.
43
 
Gunton obviously disavows christology focused through a lens of divine pathos, and he 
directs the focus of this interpretation of scripture towards sin. Yet Gunton cannot 
simply be accused of reaffirming the concern that Westermann proposes about Christian 
theology. Again, the latter argues that lament is lost from faith practice when 
Christianity promotes the following position: “Jesus Christ’s work of salvation has to do 
with the forgiveness of sins and with eternal life; it does not deal however with ending 
human suffering.”
44
 By contrast, Gunton’s read of Christ’s lament explicitly argues 
atonement for sin )($ ,!&$/&)5($ B7$#!23!$ ,"$ ,)L&$ ,!&$&5;$ "+$ (?++&625*$/"(,$ (&62"?(.7. 
Removal of suffering is “the point” of God’s redemption of creation through Christ.  
 Complications in Gunton’s interpretation instead arise more implicitly, amidst 
what he makes explicit about the work of Christ’s person as both divine and human. In 
Gunton’s eagerness to avoid the “so called” dereliction of the cross<$ 4!62(,9($
2;&5,2+23),2"5$#2,!$!?/)5$(?++&625*$).("$)>>&)6($,"$*"$/2((25*U As he interprets Christ’s 
lament, Gunton explicitly affirms Christ’s identification through the Spirit "5.7 with 
human$(25, and here, specifically, Israel’s sin. Again, the theological significance of this 
move could be overplayed and hasty charges of docetism can be denied just as quickly 
by referencing Gunton’s discussion (only pages before) of “the particular calling of the 
Son to suffer, in obedience to the Father’s will.”
45
 Neither should we understand 
Gunton to find Israel uniquely sinful in a way in which the Church or any other part of 
creation is not. Still, the conclusion that Christ merely identifies with sinful human 
                                                 
43 Gunton, 13,$)5;$O&25*0$%"#)6;($)$%!&"."*7$"+$,!&$=2@25&$1,,62B?,&( (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 
132. 
44 Op. cit. 
45 Gunton, 13,$)5;$O&25*, 127.  
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“self-distancing” through expression of this Israelite lament creates problems along both 
of these lines, in terms of lament’s biblical form and its relationship to the particularity 
of Christ’s human suffering. 
                                                
 First, Gunton’s interpretation of the question of Christ’s lament obscures its 
meaning as an expression of faith. This point is easily made with reference to 
Brueggemann’s biblical scholarship on the Psalms. He observes that the typical lament 
form, of which Psalm 22 is representative in this case, manifests an explicit concern 
with sin far less regularly than with suffering.
46
 This is not to deny the reality of sin, 
even as confessed in some of the Psalms, but rather to say that the complaint of Israel’s 
lament should not be interpreted primarily as an expression of “self-distancing” but as a 
faithful plea amidst the experience of calamity or distress over which the speaker of 
lament may have little or no control. In turn, God’s faithful response to rectify this 
suffering is most often the express reason for the praise and thanksgiving which 
typically ends Israel’s lament. Against this biblical backdrop, Gunton’s view of lament 
from the cross, and his apparent repudiation of it as an expression of dereliction, is 
hardly adequate as an explanation of “the completion of Jesus’ identification #2,!$
8(6)&..”
47
  
 The second complication follows from the first, for now we can trace how 
deemphasis on Christ’s identification with human suffering results from Gunton’s 
misconstrual of the lament itself as simply a result of sin rather than an expression of 
faith. Of course, the real concern leading to this misconstrual is theological; as we have 
seen, Gunton critiques views of atonement which do not to relate a proper sense of 
divine resolve against suffering to Christ’s own “particular calling” to suffer on behalf 
of humanity. By emphasizing the work of Christ in identification with human sin, 
Gunton thus strives to avoid what he sees as more problematic issues at hand when 
Christ’s cry is understood as the result of God’s abandonment of Christ’s person. While 
 
46 Psalm 22, specifically in relation to aspects of  suffering, is cited several times amidst categories for 
types of lament in Brueggemann’s initial article “From Hurt to Joy,” 70-1. '&(()*&$"+$,!&$-()./(, 20, 
also explicitly states that “>()./($"+$,!&$255"3&5, (?++&6&6 more directly apply to Jesus than >()./($"+$
>&52,&53&” (italics original). Brueggemann’s later work tends to follow Lindström to argue “that many of 
the psalms which voice trouble and suffering do not acknowledge—indeed do not even hint at—sin or 
guilt. Thus, while taken seriously, sin does not and cannot function as the great moral explanation for all 
troubles. See “Sin” in Walter Brueggemann, I&@&6B&6),2"5($"+$N)2,!0$1$%!&"."*23).$M)5;B""L$"+$:.;$
%&(,)/&5,$%!&/&( (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 196-7.  
47 In a note, Gunton recounts a story from Philip Yancey of a Rabbi describing Jewish perception of 
Christ’s cry from the cross as “the death cry of yet another Jewish victim.” Yet Gunton’s note still does 
nothing to explain Christ’s cry in terms of Israel’s lament and as not simply the result of sin but also an 
act of faith amidst suffering. See 13,$)5;$O&25*, 131, nt. 31. 
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Moltmann appears as the target of critique here (cf. “any suggestion that there is a rift in 
God”),
48
 this is also a problem we have noted in Brueggemann’s mature theology and 
his assertion that “Friday is the day of countertestimony in the Christian tradition, 
centered in Jesus’ recital of Psalm 22.”
49
 Yet a recent essay of William Stacy Johnson
50
 
proposes, much more along the lines of Brueggemann’s earliest work, that exactly 
because Christ cries a psalm of lament, his experience of suffering is transposed into a 
biblical context where its raw expression is bound to an expectation that God will 
respond in deliverance.
51
 Divine abandonment consequently should not serve as 
theological explanation of the cry.  
In this one cry, by which divinity is revealed in humanity and humanity redeemed in 
divinity, all other cries take on a new and urgent significance. Precisely because God 
did 5",$abandon Jesus in his time of trial, we come to see that God draws near in grace 
to all who are poor, weak, defeated, or lost.
52
 
By bringing together biblical understanding of Israel’s lament with theological 
affirmation of Christ’s person and work, Johnson’s proposal both retains the heart of 
Gunton’s concern over divine abandonment while overcoming his misrepresentation of 
lament primarily in terms of sin. Johnson demonstrates that Christ’s cry should also be 
interpreted as both faithful identification #2,!$!?/)5$(?++&625*$and unmitigated divine 
resolve ,"$()@&$+6"/ (?++&625*.  
 From these two previous points we may finally conclude that Gunton’s view, as 
it loses sight of Christ’s cry in identification with suffering, also loses sight of this 
particular lament as a human response of faith in which we continue to participate 
                                                 
48 See critique of Moltmann’s interpretation of Christ’s cry as divine abandonment in Gunton, 13,$)5;$
O&25*, 126-7. See also idem., 4!62(,$)5;$46&),2"50$%!&$=2;(B?67$J&3,?6&(<$abbc (Grand Rapids, 
Eerdmans, 1992), 86-88, and idem., “The Being and Attributes of God: Eberhard Jüngel’s Dispute with 
the Classical Philosophical Tradition,” in %!&$-"((2B2.2,2&($"+$%!&"."*70$D,?;2&($25$,!&$%!&"."*7$"+$
EB&6!)6;$AW5*&.$25$!2($D2S,2&,!$]&)6, John Webster, ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994),  15. 
49 Brueggemann, %:%, 401. 
50 William Stacy Johnson, “Jesus’ Cry, God’s Cry, and Ours,” in J)/&5,0$I&3.)2/25*$-6)3,23&($25$-?.>2,<$
-&#<$)5;$-?B.23$DK?)6&, Sally A. Brown and Patrick D. Miller, eds. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2005), 80-94. 
51 Like Gunton, Johnson’s critique focuses on Moltmann but gives much more direct attention to the 
specificities of lament. See Johnson, 81, “That Jesus is invoking a psalm here seems to make little 
difference to Moltmann, who thinks he hears in this cry an assertion that God is absent. For Moltmann, 
Jesus’ statement is construed not so much through the genre of biblical lament, in which God is still 
presumed to be present and able to save, as through the lens of modern atheistic protest. …but the prayer 
in Psalm 22 is one that receives a definite answer. For both the psalmist and the evangelist, God is a God 
who saves the righteous. This theology of deliverance is written into the very structure of the psalm.” Cf. 
Brueggemann’s earliest essay on lament, “From Hurt to Joy,” 71, “But characteristically the entire 
sequence complaint-petition-motivation is to be understood as an act of faithfulness. That act is premised 
on the reliability and accessibility of God, on a vision of the way the world is supposed to be and is not.” 
52 Johnson, “Jesus’ Cry, God’s Cry, and Ours,” 90. 
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amidst our own suffering and that of others. Johnson, on the other hand, concludes that 
“Just as God hears our cries in Jesus Christ, so too by the Spirit’s power are we called to 
hear the cries of one another,” but he does not (and perhaps, to be fair, because in a brief 
essay he simply cannot) expand on why the Spirit’s role to mediate Christ’s human 
lament in faith is so necessary. When this is left out, the risk for Johnson, like Ford and 
his concept of “facing the dead face of Christ,” becomes a description of Christ’s 
sufferings merely as example which humanity is responsible to follow. Gunton’s 
trinitarian perspective on atonement, as we have seen, could provide the theological 
resources to address this in terms of participation in Christ’s humanity, but again he 
does not identify Christ’s lament as God #2,!$?($amidst suffering through a decisive act 
of human faith. When this goes missing, Gunton’s risk is of another kind: he expects 
praise to result from our participation in the triune God’s ).6&);7 accomplished work 
+"6$ ?( without explaining how that participation also makes possible faithful human 
expression to our experience of all which is 5",$7&,.  
 
IV. Participation in Suffering on Joy’s Behalf: Towards a Trinitarian Theology of 
Faith as Praise and Lament 
  
 The eschatological nature of the Christian life ultimately provides the most 
important impetus for a proper understanding of the two interrelated concerns which 
have framed our examination of faith as human response to suffering. On the one hand, 
both Christian scripture and tradition joyfully affirm that God has already acted to 
redeem us in Christ and that indeed this redemption will be made fully manifest in the 
future. On the other hand, all human life continues to suffer the tensions of existence 
amidst evil, and faith bereft of any language for this experience will not provide hope 
now for what is not yet. Yet as we indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the 
question for 4!62(,2)5 faith is not simply how the human expression of these realities 
takes shape in biblical lament or praise, but also how the relationship of both is made 
possible by God’s +)2,!+?.5&(( +"6$and$#2,! humanity in Christ. Precisely for this reason, 
we have examined Colin Gunton’s approach to atonement as an example of a trinitarian 
alternative to the christological difficulties we find in Brueggemann and Ford. We have 
seen that proposing atonement through the faithful act of the triune God can explain 
Christ’s work +"6$ ?($ as the human faithfulness which, in the power of Holy Spirit, 
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remains #2,!$?( amidst both present suffering )5; sinfulness. Gunton rightly points out 
that this is why praise now results from Christian faith, but, as we have also argued, his 
construal of Christ’s cry on the cross solely in terms of the “self-distancing” of sin fails 
to follow through upon the implications of Christ’s human identification with the 
suffering of Israel in lament.  
 Therefore, in drawing together the issues presented and examined by this thesis, 
we are finally arguing that ,!&$ >6)2(&$ )5;$ T"7$ ("$ ;&+2525*$ "+$ 4!62(,2)5$ +)2,!$ 25$ B",!$
(362>,?6&$ )5;$ ,6);2,2"5$ /?(,$ B&$ ?5;&6(,"";$ ,"$ 6&(?.,$ 5",$ "5.7$ +6"/$ #!"$ G";$ 2($ 25$
4!62(,9($ ),"5&/&5,$ B?,$ ).("$ +6"/$!"#$ ,!&$ ),"525*$4!62(,$ 2($ +)2,!+?.$ 25$ .)/&5,U To be 
sure, the New Testament proclaims the cross 5", as a 3"?5,&6,&(,2/"57, but to use 
instead Brueggemann’s psalmic categories, as a decisive 5&#$"62&5,),2"5 of all creation 
in the faithfulness of the triune God which the psalmists themselves only anticipate. 
Still, this proclamation is inextricably "62&5,&; to our participation through the Spirit in 
the suffering and death of Christ.
53
 Christian faith thus lives not from ignorance or 
perpetuation of present ;2("62&5,),2"5, but, as Miller observes in terms so similar to 
Ford, from the reality “…that suffering has a different face because the one whom we 
call Lord has gone through it for us and with us.”
54
 Like Ford, but with greater 
trinitarian clarity than in his conclusions in D&.+$)5;$D).@),2"5, we are contending that 
Christian faith emerges as “sorrowful, yet always rejoicing” through an “atonement 
whose power is to allow [us] to stay close to, even immersed in, the tragic depths of 
life.”
55
 Yet we are also arguing that in order for trinitarian theology to overcome 
Gunton’s own concern not to “evade the reality of evil” through Christian praise, we 
must take lament seriously as a form of faith truly made possible and necessary by 
Christ’s person and work. 
 We offer three conclusions which we believe Christian theology should consider 
in addressing faith amidst all which fractures life. First,$ +)2,!$ 25$4!62(,$ (!"?.;$5",$ B&$
?5;&6(,"";$ )($ )$ 3!"23&$ B&,#&&5$ B2B.23).$ .)/&5,$ )5;$ >6)2(&U Brueggemann’s early 
                                                 
53 See Richard Hays, “Reading Scripture in Light of the Resurrection,” in %!&$16,$"+$I&);25*$D362>,?6&, 
E. F. Davis and R. B. Hays, eds. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 216-38, here 234-35, “In the time 
between Jesus’ resurrection and parousia, therefore, the church lives under the sign of the cross while 
awaiting the consummation of God’s promises. Thus the New Testament and the Old Testament are 
closely analogous in their eschatological orientation and in their posture of awaiting God’s deliverance in 
the midst of suffering.”  
54 Patrick D. Miller, %!&7$462&;$,"$,!&$J"6;0$%!&$N"6/$)5;$%!&"."*7$"+$O2B.23).$-6)7&6 (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1994), 324.  
55 Ford, “Tragedy and Atonement,” 123. 
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biblical scholarship on the Psalms, despite the problematic theological turn it takes as 
his career develops, effectively presents lament not as an affirmation of suffering itself 
but rather as an affirmation of God’s relationship to those who suffer. The Old 
Testament regularly portrays Israel as those who boldly express even their darkest 
experiences to Yahweh )5; as those who also expect faithful divine response. 
Christians, in turn, find that this very type of faith is taken up by Christ as he acts to 
confront all human suffering upon the cross. Far from an outmoded or irrelevant 
Israelite liturgical practice, or a collapse of Christ’s human faith,
56
 lament manifests a 
true confession amidst suffering of relationship with the God revealed in scripture. 
 In this light, the function of lament in Christian faith may indeed be recovered as 
called for by Westermann, but on the basis of different biblical conclusions about God 
than those eventually arrived at by Brueggemann. In contrast to the latter’s mature 
theology, establishing lament as faith is not to deny the priority of joyful proclamation 
which characterizes the New Testament’s affirmation of God in Christ and subsequent 
eschatological hope. Nor is it to deny the centrality of praise found in the theology of 
Ford and articulated with trinitarian precision in the theology of Gunton. Lament is 
hardly incompatible with these aspects of Christian faith. Gunton, for example, writes:  
The test of the church’s form of life, accordingly, is not whether it merely preaches 
against contemporary idolatry and lies, but whether, first, its manner of proclamation 
truly reveals things for what they are, idolatrous perversions of God’s good creation; 
and, second, it develops a way of being in the world in which they are seen to be in the 
process of defeat. 
57
  
While Gunton here again emphasizes acknowledgment and confrontation of sin, we 
may also observe that the terms of this “test” of faith closely parallel Brueggemann’s 
initial articulation of Israel’s lament psalm form and its function. Lament allows the real 
experience of suffering in pain, confusion, doubt, and alienation to surface in the 
context of faith; in other words, “a proclamation truly revealing things for what they 
are.” John Swinton recently writes, “the task of the practice of lament is to produce a 
form of character that can live with unanswered questions, not through repression or 
denial, but by expression and active acceptance of the reality of evil and suffering and 
                                                 
56 As Bultmann suggests in “The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus,” in %!&$M2(,"623).$
A&(?($)5;$,!&$X&67*/),23$4!62(,, C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrisville, eds. (New York and Nashville, 
1964), 15-42, here 24. 
57 Gunton, %!&$13,?).2,7$"+$1,"5&/&5,, 183. 
 197
the love of God in the midst of it.”
58
 Exactly by shaping expression of all human 
experience towards expectation that God faithfully responds to suffering, lament does 
not contradict praise but rather allows time and space for the anticipation of God’s 
faithfulness to emerge precisely when it seems least likely. Nowhere does God’s 
faithfulness seem less likely, as Christian tradition has routinely noted, than at the 
scandalous cross of Christ. Yet here is where the tradition stakes all of its expectations, 
in that which N. T. Wright trenchantly calls God’s “strange victory” and that which 
Luther before him labels 6&@&.),2"$(?B$3"5,6)62"$(>&32&.
59
 As Alan Lewis writes in his 
theology of Holy Saturday, “Faith in the wisdom of such folly, hope despite the worldly 
grounds for seeing only hopelessness in Christ’s cross and grave, are perfectly 
compatible with feelings of physical or psychological distress…and as in Christ’s own 
case, with the experience of spiritual exhaustion and godforsakeness.”
60
 Biblical lament 
is consequently inextricable from Christian praise amidst suffering because that praise is 
offered to a God whose own atoning response to evil includes biblical lament.  
 Nevertheless, Christ’s participation #2,!$ ?($ amidst human suffering is not the 
only reality at hand in his person and work at the cross nor the reason which finally 
brings creation to praise. Thus our second conclusion: +)2,!$)($&2,!&6$.)/&5,$"6$>6)2(&$
;&>&5;($"5$!"#$G";$2($?5;&6(,"";$,"$)3,$25$4!62(,$,"$"@&63"/&$)..$&@2.<$B",!$25$!?/)5$
(?++&625*$)5;$!?/)5$(25. The theological import of gospel testimony to Christ’s cry of 
Psalm 22 should not be ignored and, as we have seen, has often been used to underwrite 
calls for the Christian church to follow ,!2( example of Israel’s lament. This chapter, 
however, has particularly developed the problem of Brueggemann and Ford’s respective 
concerns over faith’s response to suffering to the neglect of an account for the triune 
God’s atonement in response to sin. Both the Old and New Testaments, despite 
noteworthy differences, clearly proclaim the evil at work in suffering not as something 
which simply happens in creation but as a reality in which all of creation is destructively 
involved. In contrast to Brueggemann’s concept of faith as “maintaining the tension” 
and Ford’s emphasis on human responsibility before “the face of Christ,” Gunton 
                                                 
58 John Swinton, I)*25*$#2,!$4"/>)((2"50$-)(,"6).$I&(>"5(&($,"$,!&$-6"B.&/$"+$E@2. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2007), 113.$
59 Miller, “Heaven’s Prisoners,” 20, notes that “one Luther scholar has aptly translated (Luther’s) words, 
‘finding God in the last place we would reasonably look.” Miller cites Timothy Wengert, “ ‘Peace, Peace 
Cross, Cross’: Reflections on How Martin Luther Relates the Theology of the Cross to Suffering,” 
%!&"."*7$%";)7 (2002): 205. 
60 Alan E. Lewis, O&,#&&5$46"(($)5;$I&(?66&3,2"50$1$%!&"."*7$"+$M".7$D),?6;)7 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001), 430. 
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stresses the reality of human tension which results from the intrinsic human inability to 
respond faithfully. We have argued that this reality cannot be ignored in relation to 
either praise or lament, and if we are honest about sin both as described in scripture and 
as experienced in the world, it becomes difficult to avoid the fact that the petition and 
praise which characterizes Israel’s typical lament psalm is a simultaneity which 
humanity regularly fails ," /)25,)25 before God. We too often live one reality without 
the other, either expressing suffering in myriad ways apart from any hope in God or 
joyfully proclaiming divine faithfulness while refusing any honest expression of human 
pain. Acknowledging the reality of sin does not absolve the church from following the 
liturgical pattern found in Israel’s psalms or from truly “facing” Christ’s example 
proclaimed in the New Testament; rather, we are contending that theology of the church 
or its scripture cannot ignore why all humanity, even when seemingly innocent in the 
face of suffering, fails to exemplify this faith in the first place.
61
  
 A Christian theology of atonement becomes truly >6)2(&#"6,!7 only if all evil is 
understood to be confronted by God’s faithfulness in Christ and truly /&)525*+?. only if 
that once-and-for-all act becomes the consequent means for faithful human response 
even amidst present suffering. In emphasizing a trinitarian approach, we have argued 
that Christ’s faithful humanity +"6$?( is crucial to how we respond to Christ in humanity 
#2,!$?(. Atonement, as Gunton’s theology proposes, redeems and transforms not just by 
offering Christ as a human example to follow but by enabling us to do so through 
pneumatological participation in Christ’s own human faithfulness. Still, beyond Gunton, 
we are arguing that this participation necessarily makes possible not only praise in faith 
but also lament as faith amidst suffering. In a real sense, we praise Christ who in 
suffering !">&( the human hope which we refuse when we pervert what is now$ by 
denying all that is not yet, when we rage to the point of exhaustion against a God whom 
we cannot really believe raises the dead. Moreover, Christ 362&( the cries we refuse to 
express when we pervert what is not yet by pretending all is well now, when our own 
effort to fulfill eschatological reality exhausts us to the point of rage over our consistent 
failure to prevent God from having to suffer and die on our behalf. The Spirit in this 
                                                 
61 Here we find much agreement with Miroslav Volf’s analysis of sin and the status of victims in Volf, 
ES3.?(2"5$)5;$E/B6)3&0$1$%!&"."*23).$ES>."6),2"5$"+$8;&5,2,7<$:,!&65&((<$)5;$I&3"532.2),2"5 (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1996), Chapter 2 “Exclusion,” 57-98.  
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way works to shape in us through the work of Christ the precise function Brueggemann 
proposes for the form of Israel’s psalms of lament.
62
  
 Therefore, third and finally, ,!&$ 6&).2,7$ "+$ G";9($ +)2,!+?.$ (?++&625*$ #2,!$ ?($ 25$
4!62(,,$ )($ G";9($ "#5$ (&.+R&S>6&((2"5$ +"6$ ?($ 25$ 6&;&/>,2"5, 5&3&(()62.7$ (!)>&($ "?6$
&S>&3,),2"5$ +"6$4!62(,2)5$ >6)2(&$ )/2;(,$ "5*"25*$ &@2.$ 25$ 36&),2"5. We can and should 
agree with Ford that faith in Christ, exactly “for the sake of joy,” inextricably unites 
praise of God and human response to suffering. Yet we should also disagree with Ford 
that theological articulation of this unity benefits from trading a clear understanding of 
atonement for emphasis on our own unlimited human responsibility to “face” Christ. 
Triumphalism, and all destructive forms of false joy which properly concern Ford, 
cannot be avoided by risking a vague identification of God’s own humanity in relation 
to our sinful identity. This is because all triumphalism is not the mere exchange of 
ethical responsibility for enthusiasm but rather a destructive delight in anything that 
appears to respond to the terrors of the world$)>)6,$+6"/$6&>&5,)53&$"+$"?6$"#5$6&+?().$
,"$ +)3&$ (?++&625*$ +)2,!+?..7$ )($4!62(,$ ;"&(—in identification with the cries of all who 
suffer and in expectation that God does and will bring suffering to an end. Affirming the 
triune God’s victory in atonement thus means rejoicing in a triumph of an entirely 
different kind, )5; not one which merely consigns Christian faith to a response of 
retreat into otherworldly mysticism or impotent passivity amidst the activity of evil.
63
 In 
conclusion, by speaking of repentance, we are arguing that the Holy Spirit’s conviction 
upon our hearts to turn away from sin and to turn to God in praise never comes apart 
from the conviction to turn to God in faithful sorrow over our own sin and suffering and 
that of all creation.
64
 More directly, we are arguing that Christian faith means the Spirit 
places upon us the active power and calling not only to heed the words of the epistle to 
                                                 
62 Lewis, O&,#&&5$46"(($)5;$I&(?66&3,2"5, 398, states, “In their literal prayers, private and public, in their 
sacraments and ordinances, in every liturgical moment of their cyclical calendar, and in all their deeds 
outside the sanctuary consequent upon and corresponding to what they do within it, Christians participate 
in Christ, himself the Great High Priest. Eternally he shares humanity’s infirmities as fellow sufferer, and 
as victim he endures re-crucifixion at their hands. He intercedes for their healing with the Father and 
pleads their case as advocate, and sends to comfort them the Spirit whose own beseeching, groaning, 
wordless prayer lifts their pain into the heart of the divine community when their own lips fall dumb in 
despair and numb bewilderment.” 
63 See Richard Bauckham and Trevor Hart, M">&$1*)25(,$M">& (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1999), 201, “The fact that we cannot bring something about or render it possible in and of ourselves does 
not mean that its possibility will be established while we stand by and watch. This may sometimes be 
true, of course; but more often than not we may confidently expect that, while the Holy Spirit will do for 
us that which we cannot do for ourselves, he will nonetheless do it in and through us in ways which 
involve our full and free participation.” 
64 Cf. 2 Corinthians 7:10. 
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the Romans (12:15, “Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep”) but 
also to proclaim hope both for those who weep but cannot rejoice and those who rejoice 
but cannot weep. 
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